

Prajñā and *dṛṣṭi* in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma

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The stress laid in Prajñāpāramitā texts upon the eradication of ignorance (*avidyā*) or attainment of perfect insight (*prajñā*) is of course well-known, often being cited as a distinguishing mark of that body of literature. Little has been said, however, about the concept of *prajñā* as it occurs among the so-called Hīnayāna doctrines, perhaps due to the generally held view that its role therein was a relatively unimportant one. Such a view is not, however, borne out by the textual evidence. Theravādin works, for example, refer to the Abhidharma teachings as *adhi-paññāsikkhā*, “instruction in the highest insight;” similarly, Vasubandhu’s opening remarks in his *Abhidharmakośa* define the very term *abhidharma* as *amalā* (“completely pure”) *prajñā*. It must be admitted, furthermore, that in spite of the great attention paid to the subject by the authors of the Prajñāpāramitā materials, the precise meaning of *prajñā* itself remains obscure; one sometimes feels that nothing definite can be said beyond the statement that *prajñā* is something which was attained by the Buddha and is attainable by the bodhisattvas. Strangely enough, certain Hīnayāna materials are perhaps more useful in this regard than are their Mahāyāna counterparts. We will not claim here that these earlier sources provide complete clarification of the *prajñā* issue. It does seem to be true, however, that some investigation among Hīnayāna texts, supplemented by a reasonable degree of inference, may well add greatly to our understanding of what the Buddhist *prajñā* is and is not. Light may be cast, moreover, upon heretofore unsuspected similarities between doctrines of the Hīnayānist Vaibhāṣika school and those of the Mahāyāna tradition.

Any discussion of *prajñā* and *avidyā* must begin by making clear precisely what is the object upon which these radically opposed modes of awareness are focused. Probably all Buddhist schools would designate this object as “the four noble truths,” this expression here being a technical term for “things as they really are.” Given that knowing “things as they really are” or failing to do so spells the difference between salvation and eons of suffering, we can see that the spiritual stakes here are of

the highest order. Thus it is no surprise that the terms under discussion should have been subject to the closest scrutiny and generated a great deal of controversy among Buddhist thinkers. Consider for example, the following summary of certain points made in Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:¹

What is *avidyā*? Is it simply that which is not *vidyā*? Obviously not, for if so then even the eye and other sense-organs, for instance, would have to be called *avidyā*. Is it then the absence of *vidyā*? No, because in that case it would be nothing but an absence, i.e. not a positive existent (*dharmā*). And such a theory cannot be accepted, for *avidyā* has time and again been referred to in the Sūtras as being a *dharmā*, an adversary of *vidyā* which stands on its own. The (negative) prefix *a-* in *avidyā* is to be understood in the same way as that in *amitra*, which means “an enemy,” not just “the absence of a friend.” This must be so, for the term *avidyā* appears in various lists of *akuśala* (“unwholesome”) *dharmas*. It cannot be considered merely a negative term showing the absence of something else; it must be understood as a positive *dharmā*. (Someone else maintains, however, that) while the term *avidyā* does appear in the Sūtras, it is used there in a metaphorical sense, indicating not an absence of *vidyā* but rather a kind of defiled or wrong awareness (*kuvidyā*). Such expressions are common; a bad son (*kuputra*), for example, is often referred to as *aputra*, or an unfaithful wife (*kubhāryā*) as *abhāryā*. Thus, *avidyā* is nothing but *kuprajñā* (“wrong insight,” here equivalent to *kuvidyā*). (The Vaibhāṣika position is now given:) This cannot be, for *kuprajñā* is not *avidyā*; in fact it (i.e. *kuprajñā*) is nothing but a *dr̥ṣṭi* (“wrong view”).

This exchange is not only interesting as an example of the content of the *Kośabhāṣya* and its style of argumentation; the final Vaibhāṣika remark, although delivered in a rather offhand manner, is in fact of great importance to our present investigation. First, in order to understand the Vaibhāṣika’s point, we must recall the following tenets of the Abhidharma system: *Dr̥ṣṭi*², which refers most particularly to belief in the false notion of a permanent self, is destroyed by attainment of the *darśanamārga*, a moment of great insight which irrevocably establishes the aspirant upon the Buddhist path; *avidyā*, on the other hand, persists beyond the *darśanamārga*, eventually being overcome only at the level

of arhatship through the extended meditational practices of the *bhāvanāmārga*.³ It is clear that in this system *dṛṣṭi* and *avidyā* cannot be identical; thus, by equating *kuprajñā* with the former, the Vaibhāṣika denies his opponent's view.

Bearing this equation in mind for a moment, let us think a bit more about the term *dṛṣṭi* itself. One of the hallmarks of the Vaibhāṣika system is its enumeration of seventy-five *dharmas*,⁴ a collection which supposedly comprises the totality of "reals" (i.e. existent-categories) in the universe. It is a characteristic of this list that many of the *dharmas* included thereon would be classified as "process" or "description" rather than "existent" by thinkers of other schools; in other words, the Vaibhāṣikas do not suffer from any tendency to "leave things out" simply because their identity as *dharmas* might be questionable. Thus it comes as no small surprise to the student of Vaibhāṣika thought to discover that *dṛṣṭi*, which plays such an important role in Buddhist soteriology, *does not appear* among the seventy-five *dharmas*. This is especially strange in light of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine that *dṛṣṭi*, following its destruction by the *darśanamārga*, is replaced by an *asaṃskṛta dharma* known as *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*⁵ ("cessation resulting from the application of knowledge"). Now there are said to be several such *nirodhas*, special unconditioned "blanks" which correspond one-to-one with the six *anuśaya*-factors that they forever replace, viz. *vicikitsā*, *rāga*, *pratiḥṣā*, *māna*, *avidyā*, and *dṛṣṭi* itself. For some reason all of these six appear on the Vaibhāṣika *dharma* list except *dṛṣṭi*. Hence the Vaibhāṣikas might seem to have inadvertently committed an omission which calls the consistency of their whole schema into question. (This omission, strangely enough, elicits no comment from either Vasubandhu or Yaśomitra; such Abhidharma scholars as Stcherbatsky, moreover, have apparently failed to notice it.) Even the Theravādins, who are free of the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* doctrine and thus have no pressing need to make *dṛṣṭi* a *dharma*, have seen fit to do so. It will not suffice, however, to simply suggest a Vaibhāṣika oversight here. Rather, we should assume a definite purpose in their manner of presentation, and thus seek to discover precisely what *dṛṣṭi* is understood to be and how this is connected to other aspects of Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Returning to the passage cited above, a partial solution appears immediately: *dṛṣṭi* is for the Vaibhāṣikas a *type of prajñā* (viz. *kuprajñā*), and since *prajñā* already has a place among the *dharmas*, no new cate-

gory need be created for *dr̥ṣṭi*.⁶ But this of course means that the term *prajñā* itself cannot refer to a single kind of entity; it must have (at least) two varieties.

The situation is complicated still further when we examine the Vaibhāṣika classification of certain *dharma*s as *mahābhūmika*, “found in all moments of consciousness.” The *dharma*s which fall into this category are given as follows: *vedanā* (“feelings”), *cetanā* (“will”), *saṃjñā* (“concepts”), *chanda* (“desire”), *sparśa* (“contact” “sensation”), *smṛti* (“memory”), *manaskāra* (“attention”), *adhimokṣa* (“inclination”), *samādhi* (“concentration”), and *prajñā*.⁷ The inclusion of *prajñā* here seems very odd, for it means that even those mind-moments characterized by the presence of *avidyā* must contain the supposedly antithetical *prajñā* element. Even more significant, it suggests that *prajñā* is not something which must be *attained*; it is always present regardless of one’s state of purity or defilement. The Theravādins avoid such difficulties by placing *prajñā* among twenty-five wholesome *caitasikas* found only in a few particular *cittas* (“mind-moments”) and never in conjunction with *avidyā* (= *moha*)⁸. Similarly, Vasubandhu himself apparently did not agree with the Vaibhāṣika classification; one of his independent works, called *Pañcaskandha prakaraṇa*,⁹ groups *prajñā* with the *pratiniyata viśayas*, *dharma*s associated only with certain *cittas* and then only when these are focused upon one of a given set of objects.

The Vaibhāṣikas themselves must have been aware of the problems accruing to their categorization of *prajñā* as a *mahābhūmikadharmā*. These problems can be circumvented, however, if *prajñā* is taken in a generic rather than specific sense, i.e. as a label designating two or more related but distinguishable entities. We have already seen this interpretation implied by the identification of *kuprajñā* with *dr̥ṣṭi*, above. The Vaibhāṣikas’ further inclusion of *prajñā* among their “universal” *dharma*s leaves little room for doubt that such was indeed their understanding of the term.

How, then, shall we understand the relationship between *kuprajñā* and *prajñā*? In a similar context (viz. the discussion of *mithyāsamādhi* vs. *samādhi*), Yaśomitra uses the analogy of a rotten seed and a good seed; both are “seeds,” and yet there is a definite difference between them.¹⁰ At another point in the text, where *dr̥ṣṭi* is defined by Vasubandhu as *prajñāviśeṣa*, (“a special kind of *prajñā*”), Yaśomitra adds the following:

santīrikā yā prajñā, sā dṛṣṭih (“*dṛṣṭi* is that kind of *prajñā* which involves judgement”).¹¹

Our translation of the word *santīrika* (“involving judgement”) requires some expansion here. This seems to have been a Buddhist technical term which, along with the related *santīraṇa*,¹² denoted that stage of the cognitive process which followed perception and which comprised the making of discriminative decisions, i.e. “this is (an) x as opposed to (a) y.” Now, it will be immediately apparent that the decision or judgement arrived at may be either incorrect or correct. In the former case we would have an example of *mithyādṛṣṭi*, “inaccurate view;” such views may be of various types, but as we have suggested earlier the term most often implies *satkāyadrṣṭi*, belief in a permanent soul. (This is the most pernicious, hence most important, of *mithyādṛṣṭis*.) If, on the other hand, one’s judgement is correct, i.e. made in accord with the Buddha’s teachings (“that thing is nothing but the five *skandhas*; it is characterized by suffering; it is impermanent;” etc.), we have a *samyakdṛṣṭi*, “accurate view.”

Lest some confusion arise here, we should point out the rather different use of these terms by Theravādin writers. They understand *dṛṣṭi*, first of all, only in the restricted sense of what has been called *mithyādṛṣṭi* above. *Samyakdṛṣṭi*, on the other hand, seems to be understood as the absence of *inaccurate* views, but not of *all* views. It is considered, moreover, the highest form of insight possible, the functional equivalent of *prajñā*.¹³ This is very interesting, for it means that in this system there is no difference between the insight of the stream-winner (*srotāpanna*) and that of the *arhat*; both have experienced the *darśanamārga* and thus eliminated all but accurate views. The distinction between these two levels of the path, therefore, is here one of defilements overcome rather than of understanding attained.

Returning to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is obvious that they have gone beyond the simple Theravādin breakdown of cognition into “inaccurate” and “accurate” modes; as we have seen, Yaśomitra classifies *all* views based on decision making, regardless of their accuracy, as *dṛṣṭi* or *ku-prajñā*. His notion of *santīrikaprajñā*, moreover, leaves open the possibility of another type of *prajñā* which is *asantīrikā*, totally free from any judgement whatsoever. This possibility is made explicit by Vasubandhu in the beginning of the seventh Kośasthāna; there he says that all *dṛṣṭis* are forms of knowledge (*jñāna*), but not all forms of knowledge are *dṛ-*

ṣṭis, and that those which are not can be described as “devoid of judgement” (*asantīraṇa*) and “devoid of investigation” (*aparimārgaṇa*). The *asantīranaraparimārgaṇa* category, of course, refers to (pure) *prajñā* as opposed to *kuprajñā*¹⁴.

With these distinctions in mind, it is possible to understand the otherwise perplexing role of *avidyā* in the Vaibhāṣika system. First, we can see that any instance of *avidyā* and *prajñā* coexisting in the same mind-moment must involve only *kuprajñā*, i.e. *drṣṭi*, for this factor is *not antithetical* to *avidyā*. Second, the idea that *avidyā* persists even after *drṣṭis* are destroyed by the *darśanamārga* makes sense when it is recalled that not all *drṣṭis*, but only those of the *mithyā* variety, are so destroyed. Thus, during the practice of the *bhāvanāmārga* the aspirant’s consciousness is characterized both by *avidyā* and by the presence of *samyakdrṣṭi*; the latter, though immeasurably *better* than *mithyādrṣṭi*, is still a form of *kuprajñā*.

This brief discussion, growing out of the Vaibhāṣika’s “omission” of *drṣṭi* from their *dharma* list, has now led us back to our original field of inquiry: the Vaibhāṣika concept of pure *prajñā* itself. We have noted above Vasubandhu’s reference to certain types of knowledge (*jñāna*) which are not *drṣṭis*. Such knowledges are two in number: *kṣayajñāna* (“knowledge of cessation”) and *anutpādajñāna* (“knowledge of non-arising”).¹⁵ These are attained when, through the meditational disciplines of the *bhāvanāmārga*, the mind becomes totally free of discriminatory judgements, or, as later Mahāyāna texts would have it, of “concept formation” (*vikalpa*). *Samyakdrṣṭi* and *avidyā*, in other words, are overcome simultaneously. (Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the investigative and judgemental functions of the former comprise nothing less than the sufficient conditions for existence of the latter.) Once this has taken place, there arises knowledge of the fact that all the *anuśayas* which remained after the *darśanamārga*, (viz. *rāga*, *pratigha*, and *māna*, in addition to *avidyā*) have now ceased to exist, and also that they will never arise again. Arhatship is thus achieved; the mind retains only a sort of “pure awareness” (*pratyavekṣaṇamātram*).¹⁶

Theravādins, as noted above, seem never to have considered this higher, non-discriminative level of *prajñā*; they simply equated the term with their version of *samyakdrṣṭi*. But this means, as we have also seen, that the highest form of insight arises *prior* to the *bhāvanāmārga*. Even Theravādins themselves seem to have felt somewhat uncomfortable with this interpretation, for it raises serious questions about the very

raison d'être of the *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* (which is, after all, supposedly a functional *dharmā*). The point is debated in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* in such terms as these:¹⁷

If all sixty-two *dr̥ṣṭis* are left behind by the first path (i.e. the *darśanamārga*), there are none to be overcome by the three higher paths (i.e. the *bhāvanāmārga*). So how would you explain the purpose of *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* there? (The Theravādin says:) We would still call it *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*, in the same way that a medicine is still called by that name even when there is no poison against which it may be used. (The opponent suggests:) In that case it is nothing but a name, a totally non-functional thing. And if that is so, the limbs of the path (*mārgāṅga*) are not complete (i.e. if a *dharmā* is mentioned in *sūtra* as an essential element of the path, as *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* is, it must be functional).

Pressed in this manner, the Theravādins offered a rather unconvincing explanation, namely that *māna* (“egocentrism”), one of the *anuśayas* not destroyed by the *darśanamārga* takes the place of *dr̥ṣṭi* after the latter’s removal; *māna*, in other words, takes over the role of *dr̥ṣṭi* as a “defiling element to be overcome by *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*, thereby giving *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* “something to do” on the path from stream-winner to *arhat*.¹⁸ This suggestion is probably based upon the Pali Abhidharma doctrine that *māna* and *dr̥ṣṭi* never occur in the same *citta*,¹⁹ perhaps because their respective functions (being both centered on ego) are similar enough so that the presence of one makes that of the other superfluous. Whether or not *māna* is indeed a proper “replacement” for *dr̥ṣṭi* as the object of *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*’s “medicinal” effects, its use as such does restore some measure of consistency to the Theravādin system.


The Vaibhāṣikas, for their part, envisioned a much broader function for *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*. That function seems to have been removal of *all* the remaining *anuśayas*. By investigating the nature of his experiences over and over again from the correct standpoint (“this is only the five *skandhas*,” etc., as mentioned above,) the aspirant reaffirms the insight of the *darśanamārga* and weakens the unwholesome habits and tendencies produced when he was subject to *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. For the Vaibhāṣikas, therefore, *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* is nothing less than the key element of the *bhāvanāmārga* itself; its application, together with that of the other “limbs” of the eight-fold path, entails the eventual eradication of all emotional attachments to the five *skandhas*. Once these attachments have been re-

moved, even *samyakdṛṣṭi* itself can be allowed to pass out of existence; then, at last, pure *prajñā* is able to emerge.

A further point must be considered here. It was previously asserted that at the time when arhatship is attained, there is first an awareness of the destruction of the *anuśayas* (*kṣayajñāna*), then of the fact that they will never again arise (*anutpādayñāna*). Indeed this description conforms to the conventionally accepted, i.e. Theravādin, view of that event. Such a description cannot, however, be considered adequate for the Vaibhāṣikas, since it clearly involves the very sort of discriminative judgement (*santīraṇa*) which they have insisted must be absent from *prajñā*. Vaibhāṣika doctrine necessitates, therefore, that *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayñāna* be understood not as “knowledges” in the ordinary (discriminative) sense, but rather as those mind-moments wherein there occurs, respectively, *aprāpti* (“non-possession”) of the *anuśayas* and *prāpti* (“obtainment”) of *pratisamkhyānirodha*²⁰ (the “blank” *dharmas* referred to earlier.) Thus the traditional criteria of arhatship are met, but without the “taint” of *santīraṇa*; this is *anāsravā prajñā*, *prajñā* devoid of all defiling *dharmas*.

It may well be asked here just how an *arhat*, ostensibly free from any tendency to discriminate or conceptualize, can function in daily life. The answer proceeds from understanding that the state of pure awareness, of *prajñā*, *does not continue*; it is a conditioned thing (*saṃskṛta*) and must therefore disappear after its moment of existence. Following that moment, the *arhat* once again makes identifications, judgements, etc. (of course in accord with the four noble truths), and to all appearances lives like any stream-winner (*srotāpanna*, i.e. one freed from *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) until his death. The *effect* of his moment of pure *prajñā*, however, *does not* disappear; *pratisamkhyānirodha* is an unconditioned *dharma* which effectively precludes forever the arising of any defiling influences. In other words, the *arhat* seems to be operating in the context of *samyakdṛṣṭi*, but it is of a special sort, viz. unencumbered by *avidyā* or the other *anuśayas* and generating no attachment to anything, not even the five *skandhas*. Thus we have here still another form of awareness, another subcategory of “*prajñā*,” indeed, the significations given this term by the Vaibhāṣikas are so numerous that we should perhaps construct a small diagram to illustrate them (see p. 409)

If we have been correct in holding that the Vaibhāṣikas view pure *prajñā* as a condition of non-discriminative awareness accompanying the *kṣaya* and *anutpāda jñānas* (in their *aprāpti* and *prāpti* senses, as a-



bove), it would appear that their conceptualization of this supreme insight is not altogether different from that set forth in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Most significantly, the *prajñā* of both traditions is said to be free from all conceptualizations, devoid of all *dr̥ṣṭis* (*śūnyatā sarvadr̥ṣṭīnām*). Even so, a major distinction remains between the systems, for while the Vaibhāṣikas did relegate even *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* to the level of *kuprajñā*, they never developed the implications of this move as the Mahāyānist did. Vaibhāṣika doctrine sees only *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* as *avastuka*,²¹ “focused upon unreal or non-existent objects (e.g. a permanent soul);” *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*, while not considered pure *prajñā*, was nevertheless classed as *savastuka*, “focused upon actually existing objects (i.e. the five *skandhas*)”. To apply Mahāyāna terminology, we may say that the Vaibhāṣikas believed in *pudgalaśūnyatā* (“non-existence of anything called ‘the self,’”) but not in *dharmāśūnyatā* (“non-existence of *dharmas*”). The Prajñāpāramitā tradition, on the other hand, embraced both doctrines equally.

In the Buddha’s famous sermon concerning the raft, it is stated that in addition to the obvious need for abandonment of non-*dharmas* (*adhammā*, i.e. the objects of *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*), eventually even *dharmas* (*dhammā*, i.e. the objects of *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*) must be left behind as well.²² The full ramifications of this *sutta*, viz. that *dharmas* too are *avastu*, seem to have been lost on the Vaibhāṣikas. Although they understood that *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* was an inferior sort of *prajñā*, they were unable to translate that insight into a doctrinal rejection of the reality of the five *skandhas*.

NOTES

1. *athāvidyeti ko 'rthaḥ? yā na vidyā. cakṣurādīṣv api prasangaḥ? vidyāyā abhāvas tarhi. evaṃ sati na kiñcit syāt; na caītaḍ yuktam. tasmāt*

vidyāvīpakṣo dharmo 'nyo 'vidyā 'mītrānṛtādivat||28||

yathā mītravīpariyayena tadvipakṣataḥ kaścīd amitro bhavati, na tu yaḥ kaścīd anyo mītrāt, nāpi mītrābhāvāḥ . . . evam avidyāpi vidyāyāḥ pratīdvandvabhūtadharmaṅt-aram iti draṣṭavyam. . . .

samyojanādivacanāt,

saṃyojanam bandhanam anuśaya ogho yogaś cāvidyocyate Sūtreṣu. na cābhāva-mātram tathā bhavitum arhati. . . .

yathā tarhi kubhāryā abhāryety ucyate, kuputraś cāputraḥ, evam avidyā 'py astu? kuprajñā cen na darśanāt| 29 ab|

kutsitā hi prajñā kliṣṭā. sā ca dṛṣṭīsvabhāvā itī nāvidyā yujyate.

yā tarhi na dṛṣṭīḥ sā bhaviṣyati? sāpi bhavitum nārhati. kiṃ kāraṇam

dṛṣṭes tat samprayuktatvāt| 29 c|

avidyā cet prajñā 'bhaviṣyan na dṛṣṭīs tayā yujyate . . . dvayoḥ prajñādravyayor asampayogāt. AKB. III, 28-29.

Commenting on the last part Yaśomitra says:

"dṛṣṭes tat samprayuktatvāt" itī. avidyāsamprayuktatvād ity arthaḥ. kathaṅ ca dṛṣṭīr avidyayā samprayuktā yasmād avidyālakṣaṇo mohaḥ kleśamahābhūmau paṭhyate, kleśamahābhūmikāś ca sarve 'pi mahābhūmikaiḥ saha samprayujyanta itī dṛṣṭīyā satkāyadrṣṭīyādikayā prajñāsvabhāvayā avidyā samprayujyata itī gamyate. tasmān nāvidyā prajñā, dvayoḥ prajñādravyayor asampayogāt. SAKV. III, 29.

2. *dṛṣṭayah pañca satkāyamithyāntargrahadrṣṭayah|*

dṛṣṭīśīlavrataparāmarśāv itī punar daśa|

. . . ity ete . . . darśanaprahātavyāḥ, satyānām darśanamātreṇa prahāṅāt. AKB. V, 3-4. [It should be noted that the nirodha of vicikitsā occurs together with that of dṛṣṭī.]

3. *catvāro bhāvanāheyāḥ: tad yathā—rāgaḥ, pratighaḥ, mānaḥ, avidyā ca. dṛṣṭa-satyasya paścāt mārgābhyāseṇa prahāṅāt. AKB. V, 5a.*

4. See CCB, Appendix II (Tables of the Elements according to the Sarvāstī-vādīns).

5. *yaḥ sāsravair dharmair viśamyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ. duḥkhādinām āryasatyānām . . . prajñāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ . . . kiṃ punar eka eva sarveṣāṃ sāsravāṅām dharmāṅām pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ? nety āha. kim tarhi? pṛthak pṛthak| yāvanti hi saṃyogadravyāṅi tāvanti viśamyogadravyāṅi. anyathā hi duḥkha-darśanaheyakleśanirodhasākṣātkaraṅāt sarvakleśanirodhasākṣātkriyā prasajyeta. sati caivaṃ śeṣapratīpakṣabhāvanāvaiyarthyaṃ syāt. AKB. I, 5cd.*

6. *nanu ca dṛṣṭīyadhikatyād ekaviṃśatīr bhavanti? na bhavanti. yasmān mahābhūmika eva kaścīd prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭīr ity ucyate. AKB. II, 29ab. Cf. nanu ca dṛṣṭīr adhikā? nādhikā, prajñāviśeṣa eva hi kaścīd dṛṣṭīr ity ucyate. ADV. [123]*

7. *vedanā cetanā saṃjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ|*

manaskāro 'dhimokṣaś ca samādhiḥ sarvacetasi|

*ime kīla daśa dharmāḥ sarvatra cittakṣaṇe samagrābhavanti. AKB. II, 24. It should be noted that the kārikā actually employs the term *mati* rather than *prajñā* here.*

However, Vasubandhu glosses *mati* as *prajñā* (*matiḥ prajñā dharmapraṇicayaḥ*) in his *Bhāṣya*, and Yaśomitra is at pains to prevent any other interpretation when he says: *pratītatvāt prajñeti vaktavye śloka-bandhānugūnyena matir iti kārīkāyāṃ uktam. SAKV. II, 24.*

8. . . . *paññīndriyena saddhim pañcavīsati 'me cetasi kā sobhanā veditabbā. AbhS. II, 7. paññā, dvādasasu kāmāvacarasahetukacittesu, pannarasasu rūpāvacaracittesu, aṭṭhasu arūpāvacaracittesu, aṭṭhasu lokuttaracittesu cā ti sattacattāsilacittesu sampayujjati. AbhS. II. 16.*

9. That Vasubandhu is indeed the author of this work is confirmed by Yaśomitra: *ime kileti. kilāśabdaḥ paramatadyotane. svamataṃ tu chandūdayaḥ sarvacetaṣi na bhavanti. tathā hy anenaivācāryeṇa Pañcaskandhake likhitam . . . SAKV. II, 24.* For the complete *dharma* list of the *Pañcaskandhaka*, see *IAKB*. Part I, pp. XVI-XIX.

10. . . . *mahābhūmikavāc ca samādheḥ sarvacittānām ekāgratāprasangaḥ? na; durbalatvāt samādheḥ . . . kliṣṭasya kathaṃ dhyānatvam? mithyopaniḍhyānāt. atiprasangaḥ? na; tatpratirūpa eva tatsaṃjñāviniveśāt pūtibījavat. AKB. VIII, 1d.*

"pūtibījavat". *yathā kiñcid abījaṃ pāṣāṇādi atyantatajjātivilakṣaṇaṃ na pūtibījam ity ucyate, kiṃ tarhi? bījajātīyam evopahataṃ yad bhavati tasminn eva saṃjñāsanniveśaḥ 'pūtibījam' iti. SAKV. VIII, 1d.*

11. *yasmān mahābhūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir ity ucyate. AKB. II, 29 ab. "mahābhūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir" iti. santīrikā ya prajñā, sā dṛṣṭiḥ. SAKV. II, 29 ab.*

12. *santīrikā hi dṛṣṭiḥ, upadhyānapravṛttatvāt. AKB. I, 4cd.*

santīraṇaṃ punar viṣayopaniḍhyānapūrvakaṃ niścayākarṣaṇam. SAKV. I, 41 cd. See BHSD. p. 556.

13. The *Dhammasaṅgāṇi*, for example, uses *sammādiṭṭhi* as a synonym for *paññīndriya*: *katame dhammā kusalā (yasmīṃ samaye kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ . . . tasmīṃ samaye . . . paññīndriyaṃ hoti . . . sammādiṭṭhi hoti . . . katamaṃ tasmīṃ samaye paññīndriyaṃ hoti? yā tasmīṃ samaye paññā . . . amoho dhammavicayo sammādiṭṭhi-idaṃ tasmīṃ samaye paññīndriyaṃ hoti. katamā tasmīṃ samaye sammādiṭṭhi hoti? yā tasmīṃ samaye paññā . . . paññīndriyaṃ . . . ayaṃ . . . sammādiṭṭhi hoti. Dhs. pp. 9-12.*

14. *kṣayānutpādadhīr na drk|*

kṣayajñānam anutpādajñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭiḥ, asantīraṇāparimārgaṇāśayatvāt.

tadanyobhayathāryā dhīḥ,

kṣāntikṣayānutpādajñānebhyo 'nyānāsravā prajñā, dṛṣṭiḥ jñānaṃ ca.

anyā jñānaṃ,

laukikī prajñā sarvajva jñānam.

dṛśās va śat||1||

pañva dṛṣṭayaḥ, laukikī ca samyagdṛṣṭiḥ. eṣā ṣaḍvidhā laukikī prajñā dṛṣṭiḥ, anyā na dṛṣṭiḥ. jñānaṃ tv eṣā vānyā ca. AKB. VII, 1.

15. . . . *kṣayajñānam anutpādajñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭiḥ ity arthaḥ. yāvadvadayaṃ akṛtakṛtyaḥ, tāvad duḥkḥādīni satyāny upaniḍhyāyatj, parimārgayati vāśayato yathoktair anityādibhir ākārāiḥ. . . . tasmān na te darṣṭiṣvabhāve. . . "anye" ti. laukikī. sā sarvajva jñānaṃ ity avadhāraṇam. na sā prajñāsti yan na jñānaṃ ity arthaḥ. kā punar asau*

prajñā? pañcaviññānakāyikā kuśalākuśalāvvyākṛtā mānasi yā dṛṣṭisvabhāvakleśasamprayuktā, anivṛtāvvyākṛtā ca. . . . ‘jñānaṃ tv eṣā cānyā ce’ ti. eṣā ca ṣadvidhā dṛṣṭisvabhāvā prajñā, tato ‘nyā ca pūrvoktā jñānam ity ucyate. . . . yasmād etiāḥ ṣaḍ jñānāni cocyante dṛṣṭayaś ceti. SAKV. VII, 1. See also AKB. . . I, 41.

16. . . . kṛtakṛtyasya punar yathā dṛṣṭeṣv eva duḥkhādiṣv āryasatyēṣu pratyavekṣaṇamātraṃ tābhyaṃ bhavati ‘duḥkaṃ mayā parijñātaṃ na punaḥ parijñeyam’ ity ādi. tasmān na te dṛṣṭisvabhāve. SAKV. VII, 1.

17. . . . tattha paṭhamamagge samādiṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhiṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. . . . evaṃ sante paṭhamamaggen’ eva dvāsaṭṭhiyā diṭṭhigatānaṃ pahīnattā uparimaggattayena pahātābbā diṭṭhi nāma natthi. tattha sammādiṭṭhi ti nāmaṃ kaṭṭhaṃ hotī ti? yathā viṣaṃ atthi vā, hotu mā vā, agado agado tv eva vuccati, evaṃ micchādiṭṭhi atthi vā, hotu mā vā, ayaṃ sammādiṭṭhi yeva nāma. yadi evaṃ nāmammattam ev’ etaṃ hoti, uparimaggattaye pana sammādiṭṭhiyā kiccābhāvo ā pajjati, maggangāni na paripūrenti, tasmā sammādiṭṭhi sakiccakā kātābbā maggangāni pūretābbāni ti. DhsA. 3.529.

18. sakiccakā c’ ettha sammādiṭṭhi yathā lābhaniyamena dīpetābbā. uparimaggattayavajjho hi eko māno atthi, so diṭṭhiṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. sā taṃ mānaṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. sotāpattimaggasmiṃ hi sammādiṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhiṃ pajahati. sotāpanassa pana sakadāgāmimaggavajjho māno atthi, taṃ mānaṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. . . . anāgāmiṃ arahattamaggavajjho māno atthi. so diṭṭhiṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. . . . DhsA. 3.530.

19. diṭṭhi catūsu diṭṭhigatasampayuttesu [labbhati]. māno catūsu diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu [labbhati]. AbhS. 2.13.

20. Cf. ‘ajitajayajitādhyavasānāt’. yathā tadajitāni grāmāntgamādīni jayati, jitāni cādhyavasati, evaṃ ānantaryamārgeṇājitān satkāyadṛṣṭyādīn kleśān jayati; tat prāpticedāt. jitāṃś cādhyavasati vimuktimārgeṇa; kleśaviṣṇiyogaprāptisahotpādāt. SAKV. VI, 54d. On prāpti and aprāpti, see my article, ‘Origin and development of the theory of viprayuktasaṃskāras’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. XXII, Part 3, 1959, pp. 531–547.

21. . . . ity ete . . . anuśayā darśanaprahātavyāḥ; satyānāṃ darśanamātreṇa prahāṇāt. AKB. V, 4.

yo hi kleśo yasya satyasyāpavādāya pravṛttāḥ, sa tasmin dṛṣṭe prahīyate; sarpabhrāntir iva rajjudarśanāt. ‘satyānāṃ darśanamātreṇa prahāṇāt’ iti. nābhyaṣena prahāṇād ity abhiprāyah. SAKV. V, 4. bhāvanāheyā hi kleśā dṛḍhāḥ, savastukatvāt. ato lokoterāṇāpi teṣāṃ na sakṛt prahāṇaṃ. SAKV. VI, 1.

22. kullūpamaṃ vo, bhikkhave, dhammāṃ desissāmi nītharaṇatthāya, no gahaṇattāya. . . . kullūpamaṃ vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṃ desitaṃ ā jānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātābbā pageva adhammā. M. I, 135.

‘dhammā pi vo pahātābbā’ ti ettha dhammā ti samathavipassanā. bhaguvā hi samathe pi chandarāgaṃ pajahāpeti, vipassanāya pi. . . . idha pana ubhayattha pajahāpento. . . . āha. tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo: bhikkhave, aham evarūpesu pi santapaṇītesu dhammesu chandarāgappahānaṃ vadāmi, kiṃ pana imsamiṃ asaddhamme gāmadhamme MA. Part II, p. 109. Cf. tasmād iyaṃ tathāgatena vāg bhāṣitā ‘kolopamaṃ dharmaparyāyam ājānabhīr dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmaḥ’ iti. Vajra, 6. Vasubandhu applies this sūtra to the mārga: . . . mārgasya kolopamatayā ‘vaśyatyajaniyatvāt AKB. VIII, 24d.

PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

AND RELATED SYSTEMS:

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