The stress laid in Prajñāpāramitā texts upon the eradication of ignorance (avidyā) or attainment of perfect insight (prajñā) is of course well-known, often being cited as a distinguishing mark of that body of literature. Little has been said, however, about the concept of prajñā as it occurs among the so-called Hīnayāna doctrines, perhaps due to the generally held view that its role therein was a relatively unimportant one. Such a view is not, however, borne out by the textual evidence. Theravādin works, for example, refer to the Abhidharma teachings as adhipaññasikkhā, “instruction in the highest insight;” similarly, Vasubandhu’s opening remarks in his Abhidharmakosa define the very term abhidharma as amalā (“completely pure”) prajñā. It must be admitted, furthermore, that in spite of the great attention paid to the subject by the authors of the Prajñāpāramitā materials, the precise meaning of prajñā itself remains obscure; one sometimes feels that nothing definite can be said beyond the statement that prajñā is something which was attained by the Buddha and is attainable by the bodhisattvas. Strangely enough, certain Hīnayāna materials are perhaps more useful in this regard than are their Mahāyāna counterparts. We will not claim here that these earlier sources provide complete clarification of the prajñā issue. It does seem to be true, however, that some investigation among Hīnayāna texts, supplemented by a reasonable degree of inference, may well add greatly to our understanding of what the Buddhist prajñā is and is not. Light may be cast, moreover, upon heretofore unsuspected similarities between doctrines of the Hīnayānist Vaibhāṣika school and those of the Mahāyāna tradition.

Any discussion of prajñā and avidyā must begin by making clear precisely what is the object upon which these radically opposed modes of awareness are focused. Probably all Buddhist schools would designate this object as “the four noble truths,” this expression here being a technical term for “things as they really are.” Given that knowing “things as they really are” or failing to do so spells the difference between salvation and eons of suffering, we can see that the spiritual stakes here are of
the highest order. Thus it is no surprise that the terms under discussion should have been subject to the closest scrutiny and generated a great deal of controversy among Buddhist thinkers. Consider for example, the following summary of certain points made in Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:\(^1\)

What is avidyā? Is it simply that which is not vidyā? Obviously not, for if so then even the eye and other sense-organs, for instance, would have to be called avidyā. Is it then the absence of vidyā? No, because in that case it would be nothing but an absence, i.e. not a positive existent (*dharma*). And such a theory cannot be accepted, for avidyā has time and again been referred to in the Sūtras as being a *dharma*, an adversary of vidyā which stands on its own. The (negative) prefix *a*- in avidyā is to be understood in the same way as that in *amitra*, which means “an enemy,” not just “the absence of a friend.” This must be so, for the term avidyā appears in various lists of *akusala* (“unwholesome”) *dharmas*. It cannot be considered merely a negative term showing the absence of something else; it must be understood as a positive *dharma*. (Someone else maintains, however, that) while the term avidyā does appear in the Sūtras, it is used there in a metaphorical sense, indicating not an absence of vidyā but rather a kind of defiled or wrong awareness (*kuvidyā*). Such expressions are common; a bad son (*kuputra*), for example, is often referred to as *aputra*, or an unfaithful wife (*kubhāryā*) as *abhāryā*. Thus, avidyā is nothing but *kuprajñā* (“wrong insight,” here equivalent to *kuvidyā*). (The Vaibhāṣika position is now given:) This cannot be, for *kuprajñā* is not avidyā; in fact it (i.e. *kuprajñā*) is nothing but a *dṛṣṭi* (“wrong view”).

This exchange is not only interesting as an example of the content of the *Kośabhāṣya* and its style of argumentation; the final Vaibhāṣika remark, although delivered in a rather offhand manner, is in fact of great importance to our present investigation. First, in order to understand the Vaibhāṣika’s point, we must recall the following tenets of the Abhidharma system: *Dṛṣṭi*, which refers most particularly to belief in the false notion of a permanent self, is destroyed by attainment of the *darśana-mārga*, a moment of great insight which irrevocably establishes the aspirant upon the Buddhist path; avidyā, on the other hand, persists beyond the *darśanamārga*, eventually being overcome only at the level
of arhatship through the extended meditational practices of the bhavvanāmārga. It is clear that in this system drṣṭi and avidyā cannot be identical; thus, by equating kuprajñā with the former, the Vaibhāṣīka denies his opponent's view.

Bearing this equation in mind for a moment, let us think a bit more about the term drṣṭi itself. One of the hallmarks of the Vaibhāṣīka system is its enumeration of seventy-five dharmas, a collection which supposedly comprises the totality of "reals" (i.e. existent-categories) in the universe. It is a characteristic of this list that many of the dharmas included thereon would be classified as "process" or "description" rather than "existent" by thinkers of other schools; in other words, the Vaibhāṣīkas do not suffer from any tendency to "leave things out" simply because their identity as dharmas might be questionable. Thus it comes as no small surprise to the student of Vaibhāṣīka thought to discover that drṣṭi, which plays such an important role in Buddhist soteriology, does not appear among the seventy-five dharmas. This is especially strange in light of the Vaibhāṣīka doctrine that drṣṭi, following its destruction by the darśanamārga, is replaced by an asamskrta dharma known as pratisamkhyaṇirodha ("cessation resulting from the application of knowledge"). Now there are said to be several such nirodhas, special unconditioned "blanks" which correspond one-to-one with the six anusaya-factors that they forever replace, viz. vicikitsā, rāga, pratigha, māna, avidyā, and drṣṭi itself. For some reason all of these six appear on the Vaibhāṣīka dharma list except drṣṭi. Hence the Vaibhāṣīkas might seem to have inadvertantly committed an omission which calls the consistency of their whole schema into question. (This omission, strangely enough, elicits no comment from either Vasubandhu or Yaśomitra; such Abhidharma scholars as Stcherbatsky, moreover, have apparently failed to notice it.) Even the Theravādins, who are free of the pratisamkhyaṇirodha doctrine and thus have no pressing need to make drṣṭi a dharma, have seen fit to do so. It will not suffice, however, to simply suggest a Vaibhāṣīka oversight here. Rather, we should assume a definite purpose in their manner of presentation, and thus seek to discover precisely what drṣṭi is understood to be and how this is connected to other aspects of Vaibhāṣīka doctrine.

Returning to the passage cited above, a partial solution appears immediately: drṣṭi is for the Vaibhāṣīkas a type of prajñā (viz. kuprajñā), and since prajñā already has a place among the dharmas, no new cate-
gory need be created for *drṣṭi.* But this of course means that the term *prajñā* itself cannot refer to a single kind of entity; it must have (at least) two varieties.

The situation is complicated still further when we examine the Vaibhāṣīka classification of certain dharmas as mahābhūmika, “found in all moments of consciousness.” The dharmas which fall into this category are given as follows: *vedanā* ("feelings"), *cetanā* ("will"), *saṃjñā* ("concepts"), *chanda* ("desire"), *sparśa* ("contact" "sensation"), *smṛti* ("memory"), *manaskāra* ("attention"), *adhimokṣa* ("inclination"), *samādhi* ("concentration"), and *prajñā.* The inclusion of *prajñā* here seems very odd, for it means that even those mind-moments characterized by the presence of *avidyā* must contain the supposedly antithetical *prajñā* element. Even more significant, it suggests that *prajñā* is not something which must be *attained*; it is always present regardless of one’s state of purity or defilement. The Theravādins avoid such difficulties by placing *prajñā* among twenty-five wholesome caītasikas found only in a few particular *cittas* ("mind-moments") and never in conjunction with *avidyā* (=moha). Similarly, Vasubandhu himself apparently did not agree with the Vaibhāṣīka classification; one of his independent works, called *Pañcaskandhaprakarana,* groups *prajñā* with the *pratiniyataviśayas,* dharmas associated only with certain *cittas* and then only when these are focused upon one of a given set of objects.

The Vaibhāṣīkas themselves must have been aware of the problems accruing to their categorization of *prajñā* as a *mahābhūmikadharma.* These problems can be circumvented, however, if *prajñā* is taken in a generic rather than specific sense, i.e. as a label designating two or more related but distinguishable entities. We have already seen this interpretation implied by the identification of *kuprajñā* with *drṣṭi,* above. The Vaibhāṣīkas’ further inclusion of *prajñā* among their “universal” dharmas leaves little room for doubt that such was indeed their understanding of the term.

How, then, shall we understand the relationship between *kuprajñā* and *prajñā*? In a similar context (viz. the discussion of *mithyāsamādhi* vs. *samādhi*), Yaśomitra uses the analogy of a rotten seed and a good seed; both are “seeds,” and yet there is a definite difference between them. At another point in the text, where *drṣṭi* is defined by Vasubandhu as *prajñāviśeṣa,* ("a special kind of prajñā"), Yaśomitra adds the following:
santīrikā yā prajñā, sā dṛṣṭih ("dṛṣṭi is that kind of prajñā which involves judgement").

Our translation of the word santīrika ("involving judgement") requires some expansion here. This seems to have been a Buddhist technical term which, along with the related santīraṇa, denoted that stage of the cognitive process which followed perception and which comprised the making of discriminative decisions, i.e. "this is (an) x as opposed to (a) y." Now, it will be immediately apparent that the decision or judgement arrived at may be either incorrect or correct. In the former case we would have an example of mithyādṛṣṭi, "inaccurate view;" such views may be of various types, but as we have suggested earlier the term most often implies satkāyadṛṣṭi, belief in a permanent soul. (This is the most pernicious, hence most important, of mithyādṛṣṭis.) If, on the other hand, one’s judgement is correct, i.e. made in accord with the Buddha’s teachings ("that thing is nothing but the five skandhas; it is characterized by suffering; it is impermanent;" etc.), we have a samyakdṛṣṭi, "accurate view."

Lest some confusion arise here, we should point out the rather different use of these terms by Theravādin writers. They understand dṛṣṭi, first of all, only in the restricted sense of what has been called mithyādṛṣṭi above. Samyakdṛṣṭi, on the other hand, seems to be understood as the absence of inaccurate views, but not of all views. It is considered, moreover, the highest form of insight possible, the functional equivalent of prajñā. This is very interesting, for it means that in this system there is no difference between the insight of the stream-winner (srotāpanna) and that of the arhat; both have experienced the darśanamārga and thus eliminated all but accurate views. The distinction between these two levels of the path, therefore, is here one of defilements overcome rather than of understanding attained.

Returning to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is obvious that they have gone beyond the simple Theravādin breakdown of cognition into "inaccurate" and "accurate" modes; as we have seen, Yaśomitra classifies all views based on decision making, regardless of their accuracy, as dṛṣṭi or ku-prajñā. His notion of santīrikaprajñā, moreover, leaves open the possibility of another type of prajñā which is asantīrikā, totally free from any judgement whatsoever. This possibility is made explicit by Vasubandhu in the beginning of the seventh Kośasthāna; there he says that all dṛṣṭis are forms of knowledge (jñāna), but not all forms of knowledge are dṛ-
śtis, and that those which are not can be described as “devoid of judgement” (asantīraṇa) and “devoid of investigation” (aparimārgaṇa). The asantīraṇa-parimārgaṇa category, of course, refers to (pure) prajñā as opposed to kuprajñā.

With these distinctions in mind, it is possible to understand the otherwise perplexing role of avidyā in the Vaibhāṣika system. First, we can see that any instance of avidyā and prajñā coexisting in the same mind-moment must involve only kuprajñā, i.e. drṣṭi, for this factor is not antithetical to avidyā. Second, the idea that avidyā persists even after drṣṭis are destroyed by the darśananāmārga makes sense when it is recalled that not all drṣṭis, but only those of the mithyā variety, are so destroyed. Thus, during the practice of the bhāvanāmārga the aspirant’s consciousness is characterized both by avidyā and by the presence of samyakdrṣṭi; the latter, though immeasurably better than mithyādrṣṭi, is still a form of kuprajñā.

This brief discussion, growing out of the Vaibhāṣika’s “omission” of drṣṭi from their dharma list, has now led us back to our original field of inquiry: the Vaibhāṣika concept of pure prajñā itself. We have noted above Vasubandhu’s reference to certain types of knowledge (jnāna) which are not drṣṭis. Such knowledges are two in number: kṣayajñāna (“knowledge of cessation”) and anutpādajñāna (“knowledge of non-arising”). These are attained when, through the meditational disciplines of the bhāvanāmārga, the mind becomes totally free of discriminatory judgements, or, as later Mahāyāna texts would have it, of “concept formation” (vikalpa). Samyakdrṣṭi and avidyā, in other words, are overcome simultaneously. (Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the investigative and judgemental functions of the former comprise nothing less than the sufficient conditions for existence of the latter.) Once this has taken place, there arises knowledge of the fact that all the anusayas which remained after the darśananāmārga, (viz. rāga, pratigha, and māna, in addition to avidyā) have now ceased to exist, and also that they will never arise again. Arhatship is thus achieved; the mind retains only a sort of “pure awareness” (pratyavekṣanāmātram).

Theravādins, as noted above, seem never to have considered this higher, non-discriminative level of prajñā; they simply equated the term with their version of samyakdrṣṭi. But this means, as we have also seen, that the highest form of insight arises prior to the bhāvanāmārga. Even Theravādins themselves seem to have felt somewhat uncomfortable with this interpretation, for it raises serious questions about the very
raison d'être of the samyakdrṣṭi (which is, after all, supposedly a functional dharma). The point is debated in the Atthasālīni in such terms as these:

If all sixty-two drṣṭis are left behind by the first path (i.e. the darśanamārga), there are none to be overcome by the three higher paths (i.e. the bhāvanāmārga). So how would you explain the purpose of samyakdrṣṭi there? (The Theravādin says:) We would still call it samyakdrṣṭi, in the same way that a medicine is still called by that name even when there is no poison against which it may be used. (The opponent suggests:) In that case it is nothing but a name, a totally non-functional thing. And if that is so, the limbs of the path (mārga) are not complete (i.e. if a dharma is mentioned in sūtra as an essential element of the path, as samyakdrṣṭi is, it must be functional).

Pressed in this manner, the Theravādins offered a rather unconvincing explanation, namely that māna ("egocentrism"), one of the anusayas not destroyed by the darśanamārga takes the place of drṣṭi after the latter's removal; māna, in other words, takes over the role of drṣṭi as a "defiling element to be overcome by samyakdrṣṭi, thereby giving samyakdrṣṭi "something to do" on the path from stream-winner to arhat. This suggestion is probably based upon the Pali Abhidharma doctrine that māna and drṣṭi never occur in the same citta, perhaps because their respective functions (being both centered on ego) are similar enough so that the presence of one makes that of the other superfluous. Whether or not māna is indeed a proper "replacement" for drṣṭi as the object of samyakdrṣṭi’s “medicinal” effects, its use as such does restore some measure of consistency to the Theravādin system.

The Vaibhāṣikas, for their part, envisioned a much broader function for samyakdrṣṭi. That function seems to have been removal of all the remaining anusayas. By investigating the nature of his experiences over and over again from the correct standpoint ("this is only the five skandhas," etc., as mentioned above,) the aspirant reaffirms the insight of the darśanamārga and weakens the unwholesome habits and tendencies produced when he was subject to mithyādrṣṭi. For the Vaibhāṣikas, therefore, samyakdrṣṭi is nothing less than the key element of the bhāvanāmārga itself; its application, together with that of the other "limbs" of the eight-fold path, entails the eventual eradication of all emotional attachments to the five skandhas. Once these attachments have been re-
moved, even *samyakdrṣṭi* itself can be allowed to pass out of existence; then, at last, pure *prajñā* is able to emerge.

A further point must be considered here. It was previously asserted that at the time when arhatship is attained, there is first an awareness of the destruction of the *anusayas* (*kṣayajñāna*), then of the fact that they will never again arise (*anutpāda-jñāna*). Indeed this description conforms to the conventionally accepted, i.e. Theravādin, view of that event. Such a description cannot, however, be considered adequate for the Vaibhāṣikas, since it clearly involves the very sort of discriminative judgement (*santīraṇa*) which they have insisted must be absent from *prajñā*. Vaibhāṣika doctrine necessitates, therefore, that *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpāda-jñāna* be understood not as “knowledges” in the ordinary (discriminative) sense, but rather as those mind-moments wherein there occurs, respectively, *aprāpti* (“non-possession”) of the *anusayas* and *prāpti* (“obtainment”) of *pratisamkhyānirodha* (the “blank” dharmas referred to earlier.) Thus the traditional criteria of arhatship are met, but without the “taint” of *santīraṇa*; this is *anāsravā prajñā*, *prajñā* devoid of all defiling dharmas.

It may well be asked here just how an *arhat*, ostensibly free from any tendency to discriminate or conceptualize, can function in daily life. The answer proceeds from understanding that the state of pure awareness, of *prajñā*, does not continue; it is a conditioned thing (*samskrta*) and must therefore disappear after its moment of existence. Following that moment, the *arhat* once again makes identifications, judgements, etc. (of course in accord with the four noble truths), and to all appearances lives like any stream-winner (*srotāpanna*, i.e. one freed from *mithyādrṣṭi*) until his death. The effect of his moment of pure *prajñā*, however, does not disappear; *pratisamkhyānirodha* is an unconditioned dharma which effectively precludes forever the arising of any defiling influences. In other words, the *arhat* seems to be operating in the context of *samyakdrṣṭi*, but it is of a special sort, viz. unencumbered by *avidyā* or the other *anusayas* and generating no attachment to anything, not even the five *skandhas*. Thus we have here still another form of awareness, another subcategory of “*prajñā*”; indeed, the significations given this term by the Vaibhāṣikas are so numerous that we should perhaps construct a small diagram to illustrate them (see p. 409)

If we have been correct in holding that the Vaibhāṣikas view pure *prajñā* as a condition of non-discriminative awareness accompanying the *kṣaya* and *anutpāda-jñānas* (in their *aprāpti* and *prāpti* senses, as a-
Prajñā

(a) dṛṣṭi (kuprajñā)
   (Views characterized by investigation and judgement)
     (a-1) mithyādṛṣṭi
        (inaccurate views)
     (a-2) samyakdṛṣṭi
        (accurate views)
       (a-2-a) laukikīsamyakdṛṣṭi
         (pre-darśanamārga;
          dṛṣṭianuśaya is
          still present.)
      (a-2-b) saikśisāsravāsamyakdṛṣṭi
         (after the
darśanamārga,
but prior to
arhatship.)
      (a-2-c) asaikśianāsravāsamyakdṛṣṭi
         (mode of
awareness of the
arhat living in
the world.)

(b) non-dṛṣṭi
   (b-1) pañcavijñānakāyikā
      prajñā
      (pure worldly perception,
i.e. the first moment
of any act of cognition,
prior to investigation
and judgement.)
   (b-2) asaikśianāsravāprajñā
      (pure non-worldly prajñā
i.e. kṣuyajñāna and
anutpāda-jñāna).
bove), it would appear that their conceptualization of this supreme insight is not altogether different from that set forth in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Most significantly, the *prajñā* of both traditions is said to be free from all conceptualizations, devoid of all *drṣṭis* (*śūnyatā sarvadrṣṭīnām*). Even so, a major distinction remains between the systems, for while the Vaibhāṣikas did relegate even *samyakdrṣṭi* to the level of *kuprajñā*, they never developed the implications of this move as the Mahāyānists did. Vaibhāṣika doctrine sees only *mithyādrṣṭi* as *avastūka*,

21 "focused upon unreal or non-existent objects (e.g. a permanent soul);" *samyakdrṣṭi*, while not considered pure *prajñā*, was nevertheless classed as *savastūka*, "focused upon actually existing objects (i.e. the five *skandhas*)". To apply Mahāyāna terminology, we may say that the Vaibhāṣikas believed in *pudgalasūnyatā* ("non-existence of anything called 'the self,'") but not in *dharmaśūnyatā* ("non-existence of dharmas"). The Prajñāpāramitā tradition, on the other hand, embraced both doctrines equally.

In the Buddha’s famous sermon concerning the raft, it is stated that in addition to the obvious need for abandonment of non-dharmas (*a-dhammā*, i.e. the objects of *mithyādrṣṭi*), eventually even dharmas (*dhammā*, i.e. the objects of *samyakdrṣṭi*) must be left behind as well.

22 The full ramifications of this *sutta*, viz. that dharmas too are *avastu*, seem to have been lost on the Vaibhāṣikas. Although they understood that *samyakdrṣṭi* was an inferior sort of *prajñā*, they were unable to translate that insight into a doctrinal rejection of the reality of the five *skandhas*. 
NOTES

1. athāvidyeti ko 'rthaḥ? yā na vidyā, caksurādiṣṭ yaprassangaḥ? vidyāyā abhāvas
tarhi. evaṃ sati na kincit syāt; na caitad yuktam. tasmāt
vidyāvipakṣo dharmo 'nyo 'vidyā 'mitrāṇṛtādivat'[[28]]
yathā mitraviparyayena tadvipakṣaṭaḥ kaścid amitro bhavati, na tu yaḥ kaścid anyo
mitrāt, nāpi mitrābhāvaḥ . . . evam avidyāpī vidyāyāḥ pratidvandvabkhātadharmānt-
arām iti drāṣṭavyam . . .
samyojanādivacanāt,
saṃyojanam bandhanam anusaya ogho yogaś cāvidyocaye Sūtreṣu. na cābhāva-
maṭram tathā bhavitum arhati . . .
yathā tarhi kubhāryā abhāryety ucyate, kuputraś cāputraḥ, evam avidyā 'py astu?
kuprajnā cen na darśanāt| 29 ab/ kutsitā hi prajnā klīṣā, sā ca drṣṭisvabhāvā iti nāvidyā yujyate.
yā tarhi na drṣṭiḥ sā bhaviṣyati? sāpi bhavitum nārhathi. kiṃ kāraṇam
drṣṭe sat sampravyuktavāt 29 c/ avidyā cet prajnā 'bhaviṣyān na drṣṭis tāyah yujyate . . . dvayok prajnādravyayor
asampyayogāt. AKB. III, 28–29.

Commenting on the last part Yasomitra says:
“dṛṣṭe sat sampravyuktavāt” iti. avidyāsampravyuktavād ity arthaḥ. kathā ca
dṛṣṭir avidyāyā sampravyuktā yasmād avidyālakṣaṇo mohāḥ kleśamahābhūmā
patyate, kleśamahābhūmikāḥ ca sarve 'pi mahābhūmikāḥ saha sampravyujyanta iti
dṛṣṭyā satkāyadṛṣṭyādikāya prajnāsvabhāvāvāyā avidyā sampravyujyata iti gamyate.
tasmān nāvidyā prajnā, dvayok prajnādravyayor asampravyogāt. SAKV. III, 29.

2. dṛṣṭayaḥ paṇca satkāyyāmyāntyāntargrāhadrṣṭayaḥ]
dṛṣṭiśilavratapāramārśāv iti punar daśa||
. . . ity ete . . . darśanaprahātavyāḥ, satyānām darśanāmātreṇa prahānāt. AKB. V, 3–4. [It should be noted that the
niruddha of vicikitsā occurs together with that of
drṣṭi.]

3. cātvāro bhāvanāheyāḥ: tad yathā—rāgaḥ, pratighaḥ, māṇaḥ, avidyā ca. dṛṣṭa-
satyasya pascāt mārgābhāyāsena prahānāt. AKB. V, 5a.

4. See CCB, Appendix II (Tables of the Elements according to the Sarvāstī-
vādins).

5. yaḥ sāsravair dharmaie visāmyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyānīrodhaḥ. duḥkhādhīnām
āryasatyānām . . . prajnāvisēṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ . . . kim punar eka eva sar-
veṣāṁ sāsravāṇāṁ dharmanāṁ pratisaṃkhyānīrodhāḥ? nety āha. kim tarhi? prthak
prthak/ prthak/ yāvantī hi saṃyogadravyāni tāvantī visāmyogadravyāni. anyathā hi duḥkhā-
darśanahyaklesanirodhasākskārānaṇāt sarvaklesanirodhasākskāriṇī prasajyeta, sati
cāvaṃ śesapratipakṣabhāvanāvaiyartham syāt. AKB. I, 5cd.

6. nanu ca dṛṣṭyadhikatvād ekāvimsatir bhavanti? na bhavanti. yasmān maḥāb-
hūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo drṣṭir ity ucyate. AKB. II, 29ab. Cf. nanu ca dṛṣṭih
adhikā? nādhikā, prajñāviśeṣa eva hi kaścit drṣṭir ity ucyate. ADV. [123]

7. vedānā cetanā saṃjñā cchandaḥ sparśo maṭiḥ smṛtīḥ]
manaskāro 'dhimoksāś ca samādhiḥ sarvacetasī]
ime kila daśa dharmaḥ sarvatra cittaśaṅge samagrābhavanti. AKB. II, 24. It should be noted that the kārikā actually employs the term maṭi rather than prajñā here.
However, Vasubandhu glosses *mati* as *prajñā* (*matiḥ prajñā dharmapracicayāḥ*) in his *Bhāṣya*, and Yaśomitra is at pains to prevent any other interpretation when he says: *pratītavāt prajñeti vaktavye ślokabandhānugunyena matir iti kārikāyāṁ uktam.* SAKV. II, 24.


9. That Vasubandhu is indeed the author of this work is confirmed by Yaśomitra: *ime kileti. kilasabdah paramatadyotane. svamatam tu chandādayaḥ sarvacetas na bhavanti. tathā hy anenaivyācāryena Paṇcaskandhake likhitam . . . SAKV. II, 24.* For the complete dharma list of the *Paṇcaskandha*, see IAKB. Part I, pp. XVI-XIX.


11. *yasmān mahābhūmika eva koṣcit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir ity ucyate. AKB. II, 29 ab. “mahābhūmika eva koṣcit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir” iti. santirikā ya prajñā, sā dṛṣṭīḥ. SAKV. II, 29 ab.*


14. *ksāyānupādaḍāhi na dṛk*| *ksāyajñānaṃ anupādaḍājñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭīḥ, asantirāṇāparimārgaṅāṣayatvāt.* tadanyobhāvathāryā dhiḥ, *ksāntikksāyānupādaḍājñānebhyo 'nyānāsravā prajñā, dṛṣṭīḥ jñānaṃ ca.* anyā jñānaṃ, *laukikā prajñā sarvajva jñānaṃ.* dṛṣās va sat/t1/| *paṇva dṛṣṭayaḥ, laukiki ca samyaṅgṛṣṭīḥ. eşā śādvidhā laukikā prajñā dṛṣṭīḥ, anyā na dṛṣṭīḥ. jñānaṃ tv eṣā vānyā ca. AKB. VII, 1.*

15. . . . *ksāyajñānaṃ anupādaḍājñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭīḥ ity arthaḥ. yāvad ayam akṛtaktāt-ṛtyaḥ, tāvad duḥkhādd iṇ satyāṇy upanidhyāyayat, parimārgayati vāsaya yathoktair anityādibhibh ākāraḥī. . . . tasmān na te dāṛṣṭivasabhāve . . . “anye” ti. laukiki, sā sarvajva jñānaṃ ity avadhāraṇam. na sā prajñāsti yan na jñānaṃ ity arthaḥ. kā punar asau
prajñā? pañcavijñānakāyikā kuśalakūśalāvyākṛtā mānasī yā dṛṣṭisvabhāvaklesasam-prayuktā, anirvāyākṛtā ca. . . “jñānāṁ tv esa cânāy ca” ti. esa ca ṣadvidhā dṛṣṭisvabhāvā prajñā, tato ‘nya ca pūrvakā jñānam ity ucyate. . . yasmin etāḥ sad jñānāṁ cocyante dṛṣṭayaś ceti. SAKV. VII, 1. See also AKB. . . 1, 41.

16. . . kṛtakṛtyasya punar yathā dṛṣṭeṣv eva duḥkhādiṣv āryasateṣu pratyavek-ṣaṇamānāṃ tābhyaṃ bhavatītī “duḥkhaṃ māyā parjñāṇatāṃ na punaḥ parjñeyam” ity ādi. tasmān na te dṛṣṭisvabhāvā. SAKV. VII, 1.


18. sakiccakā c’ ettha samādītiḥīḥ yathālābhanīyanema dipeṭabbā. uparimaggattayavajjho hi eko māno aththi, so dīṭṭhiḥ thāne tiṭṭhati. sa tāṁ mānaṁ pajahati ti samādītiḥīḥ. sotā patti maggaṁsmin’ so samādītiḥīḥ micchādītiḥīṁ pajahati. sotā pannasam sakadāgāmimaggavajjho māno aththi, tāṁ mānaṁ pajahati ti samādītiḥīḥ. . . anāgāmissa arahattamaggavajjho māno aththi. so dīṭṭhiḥ thāne tiṭṭhati. . . DhsA. 3.530.


21. . . ity ete . . . anuṣaya ā darṣanaprahātavyāḥ; satyānāṁ ā darṣanamātreṇa prahānāt. AKB. V, 4.

yo hi keśo yasya satyasyāpavādāya pravṛttah, sa tasmin dṛṣṭe prahīyate; sarpabhāṁti iti raja judeśanāt. “satyānāṁ ā darṣanamātreṇa prahānād” iti. nābhāyaṇena prahānād ity abhiprāyaḥ. SAKV. V, 4. bhāvanāheyyā hi keśā dṛḍhāḥ, savastutavāt. ato lokotterāṇāpi teṣāṁ na sakṛi prahānām. SAKV. VI, 1.


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