down in Ayodhyā and accept life-long royal support. Vasubandhu accepted the offer...The master was creative even at his advanced age, and more than a match for Vasuśrā, the Young King's grammarian brother-in-law, in his favorite sport of debate...But...debate was to him mainly upāya: if it could lead to no one's interest in Mahāyāna, he would not engage in it. Thus, when Saṅghabhadra, who had written his two great treatises, one of which is a furious denunciation of the Kośa Bhāṣya, challenged Vasubandhu to defend the Kośa's statements, and was invited to come to court and debate by the jealous Vasuśrā, Vasubandhu told his pupils that he could see no good reason for such a debate, but diplomatically sent the official answer the Saṅghabhadra would indeed be hard to defeat....The debate never took place...Saṅghabhadra in fact died shortly after."

"Vasubandhu did not long survive Saṅghabhadra. In the eightieth year of his life, c. 396, he died...

Over thirty works are attributed to Vasubandhu by tradition for which we have no special reason to doubt his authorship. A good many of these are commentaries on Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, most of them available now only in Chinese or Tibetan translations if at all. In keeping with the putative chronology provided by Anacker's account just provided, we shall place the Abhidharma works previous to those Mahāyāna sūtras, and the remaining, Yogācāra works at the end, with the Trisvabhāvanirdesa last in keeping with Anacker's estimate.

173. VASUBANDHU, Abhidharma kośa

The Kośa was first known to modern readers in two Chinese translations, one by Paramārtha in the sixth century, the other by Hsüan-tsang in the seventh. There are also two Tibetan translations, one by Jinamitra and the other by Śrīkūṭaraksita, dating from the ninth century. Rahula Sankrtyayanad discovered the Sanskrit text at Ngor in Tibet in 1935 and made photocopies; these are the basis for more recent editions. Louis de la Vallee Poussin translated Hsüan-tsang's Chinese into French518 and there are various partial translations.519 In this summary "E" references are to the edition by Swami Dvarikadas Shastri,520 whereas "T" references are to Leo M. Pruden's four-volume English translation of Poussin's French, op. cit., numbered consecutively.

Summary by Stefan Anacker

CHAPTER ONE: Realms

1. (E4; T56) Homage to the Buddha, who destroys all blindness.
2. (E11-13; T56) Abhidharma is defined as pure wisdom with accompaniments. It may also be used for impure wisdom or even for treatises which result in pure wisdom.
3. (E14; T57) The only way to lay to rest the defilements that cause worldly wandering is to investigate the factors, and it is for this investigation the Buddha taught Abhidharma.
4. (E16; T58) All conditioned factors except those of the path are contaminating because defilements adhere to them.
5. (E18-19; T59) The three unconditioned factors—space, calculated and uncalculated cessation—are noncontaminating.
6. (E20-22; T59-60) Calculated cessations are separate disjunctions.
7. (E25-26; T61) Conditioned factors can all be subsumed under the five aggregates. They are temporal, the objects of discourse, exist, and involve actual objects.
8. (E28-29; T62-63) Contaminating factors are grasping aggregates. They are harmful, being frustrating, originating, worldly, the topic of opinions, existent.
9. (E30; T63) Material form comprises the five sense-organs, five objects, and unmanifest form. The loci of the awarenesses of these are subtle matter, visual, etc.
10. (E32-35; T64-66) There are two (or twenty) material bases. Sounds are eightfold, tastes sixfold, smell fourfold, and tangible are of eleven sorts.
11. (E38; T67) Unmanifest material form occurs in a series dependent on the great elements which is distracted or unaware.1

1. Unmanifest form is used to explain the karmic retribution of one who has instigated an action. Someone who prompts someone else to murder engenders an unmanifest form of karma as soon as he prompts; the unmanifest form "comes to maturity" when the other person actually commits the murder.
12. ((E43; T68-69) The great material elements are earth, water, fire and wind. They function respectively as supporting, humidifying, heating and motion.

13. (E43; T69) As commonly used "earth", "water", "fire", and "wind" refer to colors and shapes.

14. (E47-48; T72) Feelings are experiencings. Conceptual identifications are the grasping of signs.

15. (E48-50; T73) The aggregates of feelings, identifications, and conditioning factors, together with unmanifest form and the unconditioned factors, belong to the sense-basis of factors (dharma-yatana), the realm of factors.

16. (E50; T74) Consciousness is the awareness of something manifesting (prativijñapti). It is the mental organ; it is seven elements, six consciousnesses plus mind.

17. (E51; T75) The term "mind" (manas) is used for any occurrence of the six types of consciousnesses which immediately afterwards gives rise to a mental-consciousness-moment. Eighteen sensory domains are enumerated to support there being just six types of consciousness.

18. (E54; T76) All conditioned factors are included in an aggregate, a sense-basis, or an element.

19. (E55; T75) Vaibhāśika: Though the organs of sight, hearing, and smelling are double, they each count as only one sensory domain.

20. (E56-62; T77-80) On the etymology of "skandha", "āyatana" and "dhātu".

21. (E64; T81) Feelings and identifications are designated as separate aggregates because they are the causes of dispute, of samsāra, and because of order.

22. (E65-66; T81-83) The unconditioned can't be classified under "aggregates", since they aren't that sort of thing. The order in which the aggregates are listed reflects their relative grossness or subtlety, their defiling capacities, and their relative range in the four realms.

23. (E67-68; T84) The five sensory consciousnesses have objects which are simultaneously present. The arrangement of the sense-fields has to do with the range and rapidity of their functioning, the eye having a longer range and greater rapidity than the ear, the ear than the nose, etc.

24. (E69; T85) Only one sense-field is called a material basis because of its excellence and predominance. Only one sense-field is called a "basis of factors" because of what it includes.

25-26. (E70-72; T86-87) The rest of the large number of factors that the Buddha refers to fall among either the material or conditioning aggregate.

27. (E72-765; T87-88) Examples of how other factors can be classified as aggregates, senses and elements.

28. (E77-78; T88-89) The element of space is, according to some, light or dark. The consciousness element is contaminating, being the locus of birth.

29a-b.(E79-81; T89-92) Only one material element is visible. Ten material elements are resistant. Eight elements are neutral (those excluding matter and sound).

29cd-30. (E81-87; T92-93) The rest of the elements can be of three sorts, good, bad or neutral. All of the elements exist in the realm of desire; fourteen exist in the material realm (excluding smell, taste, the smell- and taste-awarenesses).

31. (E87; T95-96) In the material realm all the material sensory domains are absent. In that realm occur three elements--the mind element, the mental consciousness element, and the factor element. They can be contaminating or not.

32. (E88; T96-97) Five awareness elements involve initial and sustained thought. The mind, mental consciousness, and the factor elements involve three different combinations of initial and sustained thought. The rest of the elements involve no thought.

33. (E89-90; T97) The five awarenesses are construction-free, not involving defining and memory. Those two kinds of construction affect any distracted mentality, be it wise or mnemonic.

34. (E90-91; T98) Seven elements of awareness plus one part of the factor-element have supporting objects. The seven plus the factor-element and sounds are never appropriated by a body. The remaining nine sensory domains are sometimes appropriated, sometimes not.

35. (E92-95; T99-101) Among the ten material elements, the tangible element consists, in part, of the great elements and in part of material form derived from these great elements. The remaining nine material elements are only derivative.

36. (E95-96; T102) Four elements can cut or be cut, burn or be burned, weigh or be weighed. There is disagreement about details.

37. (E97-99; T103-104) The five internal sense-bases are the result of karmic maturation and grow through nourishment. Sound is never the result of karmic maturation.
Only one sensory domain grasps reality: the unconditioned (which is part of the sensory domain of mental cognizables), because only it is permanent.

Twelve of the sensory elements are personal--the twelve excluding those six that are objects of consciousness.

The sensory element called "factor(-element)" is homogeneous. The remaining ones are partially homogeneous.

Fifteen elements are abandoned in meditational concentration; the last thirteen are of three kinds. Undefiled and material factors are not abandoned by the path of vision.

The term "view" (drṣṭi) is used for the visual organ as well as for eight views which form parts of the factor element. The five sensory consciousnesses are not views, as there is no judgment in them made after deliberation.

Vaibhāṣika: It is the eye which sees visibles, not the visual consciousness. For when the visible is obstructed, or the eye, there is nothing seen.

Vaibhāṣika: The eye, ear, and mind perceive their objects without coming directly in touch with them. This is not the case with the other three organs of sense.

The three organs starting with the olfactory grasp an object of equal size. The objects of the five sensory consciousnesses occur simultaneously with their consciousness, but the mental consciousness may have a past, present, or future object of consciousness.

Since a consciousness depends both on the object and the organ, why is only the organ designated as its support? Because the consciousness changes according to the organ.

There is no inferiority or superiority as regards different kinds of organs or consciousnesses in the same experiential sphere.

Sometimes the mental consciousness of a psychophysical complex may be in a superior experiential sphere to the other consciousnesses--for instance, when it is meditatively concentrated.

Everything perceived by the other consciousnesses is discerned by the mental consciousness. The unconditioned factors (I, 4-5) are eternal. There are twenty-two faculties, factors which have a predominance for the psychophysical complex. They are the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch, mind (meaning all six consciousnesses), femininity, masculinity, vitality, satisfaction, frustration, contentedness, irritation, equanimity, faith, energy, mindfulness, meditation, insight, coming to know what wasn't known, understanding, and perfect knowledge. (For the definitions of these see Chapter Two.)

CHAPTER TWO: The Faculties

Vaibhāṣika: Five faculties predominate in respect of four things, and four in respect to two; five and eight with regard to affliction and purification.

The faculties which are sense-organs are really predominant in relation to the five sensory consciousnesses, and the faculty of mind (cf. I, 17) is predominant in regard to mental consciousness.

Vitality, feelings and the five faculties beginning with faith are predominant in maintaining life, in afflictions and purifications.

Coming to know what wasn't known, understanding and perfect knowledge predominate in respect to liberation.

The faculties are the loci of awareness and what conceptualizes, maintains, afflicts, prepares and purifies them.

Alternatively, there are fourteen (positive) faculties, comprising the loci of activity and the arising, maintenance and experiencing of those loci; the rest (negative) function similarly in regard to nirvāṇa.

All the information regarding the faculties which is provided by II, 7-19, 30, 60-61 and IV, 8-127 may be diagrammed as follows:
(The following abbreviations are used:

A = internal
B = noncontaminating (potentially linked to proclivities)
C = noncontaminating (never linked to proclivities)
D = can be either good or potentially linked to proclivities or not
liable to be linked to proclivities (e.g., when meditatively
concentrated)
E = both in good and bad states, can be retribution for acts
F = retribution for a good act in a good state, for a bad act in a
bad state
G = always retribution for a bad act when retribution at all
H = never retribution
I = always ethically neutral
J = always good
K = can be good, bad, or neutral, i.e., can belong to any ethical
category
L = not retribution when good, bad, or unobstructed/neutral
other than retribution
M = always retribution
N = always retribution for a good act when retribution at all.

Contaminated states are “bad”, being frustrating, but are not
necessarily “bad” in the sense of giving rise to further frustrations.
Anything which comes about as a result of retribution is necessarily
ethically neutral. Whatever arises from a conceptual construction is
never ethically neutral, and whatever arises from interest is never
retribution.)

(1) Faculty of the Eye
(2) Faculty of the Ear
(3) Faculty of the Nose
(4) Faculty of the Tongue
(5) Faculty of the Tactile Body
(6) Faculty of Mind
(7) Faculty of Masculinity
(8) Faculty of Femininity

(9) Faculty of Vitality
(10) Faculty of Satisfaction
(11) Faculty of Frustration
(12) Faculty of Contentedness
(13) Faculty of Irritation
(14) Faculty of Equanimity
(15) Faculty of Faith
(16) Faculty of Energy
(17) Faculty of Mindfulness
(18) Faculty of Meditation
(19) Faculty of Insight
(20) Coming to Know What is Not Yet Known
(21) Faculty of Understanding
(22) Faculty of Perfect Knowledge

The faculty of frustration is any disagreeable bodily feeling, and the
faculty of satisfaction any agreeable one.

8. (E146-147; T161-162) The faculty of irritation is any disagreeable
mental feeling, and contentedness is its opposite. Equanimity is neither
agreeable nor disagreeable, and may be either bodily or mental.

For 9-19, cf. Table I

22. (E180-181; T185) In the material realm an "atom" (provided it
is without sound or faculties) comprises eight substances, nine if the
tactual organ is involved, ten if another organ is.

23. (E180-181; T185) Awarenesses and accompanying mental
factors, meaning motivating dispositions, feelings, and cognitions,
necessarily arise together. All conditioned factors arise with the
characteristics of being general.

24. (E186-188; T189) The generally conditioning factors are feeling,
volution, identification, interest, contact, intellection, memory,
attention, resolve, and concentration.

25. (E177-191; T191) The good permeating factors are faith,
heedfulness, tranquillity, equanimity, shame, modesty, absence of
greed, understanding, noninjury, and energy.

26. (E191-194; T193-195) The defiled permeating factors are
delusion, heedlessness, idleness, lack of confidence, lethargy, and
agitation. Shamelessness and disregard are the bad permeating
factors.

27. (E194; T196) The afflicting permeating factors are anger,
vengefulness, craftiness, envy, spite, hypocrisy, selfishness, deceit,
arrogance, and violence.

28. (E195; T197-198) Vaibhāṣīka: Since initial and sustained thought coexist with every awareness in the realm of desire (see I, 30), every good nonmeditative awareness is accompanied by at least twenty-two accompanying mental factors.

29-30. (E197-198; T198-199) It is explained which accompanying mental factors go with bad awarenesses and which with neutral awarenesses.

31. (E199; T199) In the first meditational state the bad accompanying mental factors no longer exist, nor do regret nor sleepiness. In the state between the first and second meditational states, initial thought drops out. From the second meditational state on, sustained thought is dropped.

32. (E201-204; T200-202) Shame has to do with an emotion felt internally in regard to something done which is bad; modesty is an emotion felt in reference to the outer world.

33. (E204-207; T202-204) Vaibhāṣīka: Initial and sustained thought are the grossness and subtlety of awareness.

What is the difference between pride (mūna) and arrogance (mada)? Pride is an inflation of awareness. Arrogance is an exaltation and abolition of awareness in regard to "one's own" factors.

34. (E208-209; T205) "Citta", "manas", and "vijñāna" are synonyms (all meaning awareness).

35-36. (E209-211; T206-207) Vaibhāṣīka: Among the motivating dispositions dissociated from awareness are possession, which makes for acquisition (see II, 23), and nonpossession, which makes for dissociation, loss of possession.


40. (E224-226; T215-217) Vaibhāṣīka: The state of one who is separate from dharma is equivalent to nonpossession of the path.

41a. (E229; T221) Vaibhāṣīka: Homogeneity within a lifetime is another kind of dissociated factor.

41b-42. (E233-236; T221-224) In nonideation trance the awareness and mental states cease; one practising it experiences only karmic maturation in the Bhūthapala heaven. It presupposes entrance into the fourth meditative trance state by one desiring liberation. It is clear, and its karma is completely worked off in the next life. It is not attained by noble persons. It is experienced at one time.

43. (E236-238; T225-226) Cessation-trance is like the nonideation trance in several respects. However, cessation-trance constitutes the summit of existence, and the maturation of its karma is of two sorts or neutral. Nobles, not ordinary folk, can gain it by effort.

44. (E238-248; T226-233) Cessation-trance is obtained at enlightenment, not before. The two trances (nonideation and cessation) occur in the realm of desire and the material realm, but one's first cessation-trance must occur as a human.

45a. (E248-253; T233-238) Vitality is the life-force, the locus of heat and consciousness.

45b-46a. (E253-256; T240-247) Conditioned factors are characterized by birth, aging, duration and termination. Also by birth of birth, aging of aging, etc.

47-48. (E270-277; T250-254) Vaibhāṣīka: The collection of words, collection of phrases, and collection of syllables are dissociated factors. They occur in living beings in the realm of desire and the material realm as outflows and neutral, as does also homogeneity.

48. (E277-279; T278-279) There are six kinds of causes: efficient cause, simultaneous cause, homogeneous cause, connected cause, pervasive cause, and retributory cause.

50. (E277-278; T255) All factors are efficient causes of everything except themselves. Simultaneous causes include the elements, awareness and its companions, marks and things marked—they are each others' effects.

51. (E283-284; T257-258) Companions of awareness include mental factors, the two restraints and their marks.

52. (E291-300; T262-268) Homogeneous causes are when cause and effect belong to similar group and state: thus good factors give rise to good factors, etc.

53. (E303-307; T269-272) Associated causes are only awarenesses and mental factors which have the same support.

54. (E308-310; T273-274) Pervasive causes are defiled factors, which arise in every instance of defiled states. Only good and bad factors susceptible to being linked with defilements are retributory causes.

55. (E316-317; T277-278) The unconditioned has neither a cause nor an effect.

56-60. (E327-340) T286-296 Discussion of which kinds of results accrue from the six kinds of causes, and when.

61. (E341-342; T296-297) There are four kinds of conditions.
62. (E342-349; T297-303) Except for the very last one, awarenesses and mental concomitants are the directly antecedent conditions.
63-64. (E350-3521; T304-306) There is always a plurality of causes and conditions making for the existence of any factor. Thus there is no unique cause like God. If there were a unique cause for all events, all events would occur at the same time.
65. (E355-356; T308-309) Causal relations among the great elements and derived factors.
66-72. (E357-372; T310-315) Classification of awarenesses and mental factors in the various realms, and which came before and after which.
73. (E372-376; T323-324) At conception in the womb, in meditation, in detachment, at the end of detachment, and upon developing the good roots, awarenesses arise which never arose before in the series.

CHAPTER THREE: The World

1-3. (E379-383; T365-367) The realm of desire includes those in hells, ghosts, animals, humans and six kinds of gods--twenty states in all. The material realm is divided into four meditational states. The immaterial realm is not a state, but has four varieties as well. The stream of awarenesses depends on homogeneity and vitality.
4. (E387-392; T371-374) In these three realms there are five courses: they are undefiled-neutral, comprise living beings, and exclude the intermediate state.
5. (E393; T374-377) Beings of the five sorts occupy seven states of consciousness: (1) where bodies and ideas are different; (2) where bodies differ but ideas are similar; (3) where ideas are different but they have similar bodies; (4) where both body and ideas are similar; (5) and (7) constituting the three immaterial kinds of beings.
6. (E396; T377) The remaining sorts of beings reduce consciousness.
7b-8. (E398-401; T378-380) Another classification of states of consciousness counts the four contaminating aggregates of the relevant spheres; (the fifth) consciousness itself is not a state of consciousness.
9. (E402-403; T381) Human beings and animals are either born from an egg, born of moisture, born from the womb or are magical beings. Beings in hell or in the intermediate state, as well as gods, are magical beings. Ghosts are either magical or womb-born.
10-12. (405-411; T384-387) The intermediate state is required, since a being cannot generate itself again if it were to cease. It can't be generated as a reflection (a mirror-image), since two things can't occupy the same place. Anyway, a reflection is not (part of) the stream, (that being) caused by something else (viz., the mirror).
13-14. (E412-424; T391-394) In the intermediate state one has the form he will have in his next birth. This form is seen by those occupying the same class and by those with the divine eye. One in the intermediate state has extraordinary strength and eats odors.
15. (E426-429; T394-397) The intermediate being, its mind perverted, goes to its place of rebirth because of sexual desire. Others go motivated by a place's smell or a desire for a place of residence, whereas hell-beings hang from their feet.
16-17. (E430; T397) Not all those in the womb are of perverted mind, but all those born from eggs are. Cakravartins enter the womb fully conscious, but do not remain or leave so. Self-enlightened buddhas remain fully conscious in the womb but do not leave it thus. A Buddha is always fully conscious.
18. (E432-433; T399) There is no self, only the aggregates. It is the aggregates which reincarnate in another existence, through the medium of an intermediary existence.
20-24. (E435-439; T401-404) Concerning the dependent origination formula: ignorance > conditioning factors > consciousness > psychophysical complex > six sense-fields > contact > feelings and identifications > craving > grasping > being > birth > aging and death. It can be interpreted in several ways: one can take ignorance and conditioning factors as referring to the anterior life, the next eight to the present life, and the rest to the life to come. On this interpretation "consciousness" is the consciousness at conception in the womb, and may stand for all the aggregates at conception. Contact first arises when the child is able to distinguish causes of frustration and satisfaction; "feelings" here refers to the feelings after sexual maturity, which are followed by cravings and grasping. "Being" refers to the conditions for the new rebirth.
25. (E440-441; T405) The reason for the teaching of dependent origination as relating to three lives is to remove misunderstandings.
27. (E443; T407) From a defilement another defilement may arise.
28b-29. (E463-464; T419-420) Ignorance is itself a distinct factor, the contrary of knowledge, as amitra (a "nonfriend") is an enemy (not just anyone other than one's friend). It is a separate fetter. Ignorance is not evil wisdom, for evil wisdom is a view, views are associated with ignorance, and ignorance is an affliction of wisdom (not of ignorance itself).

30-31. (E467-473; T422-426) Types of contact, which are produced by contiguity, are six in number. Five involve impingement. The sixth contact is of three sorts, (a) pure, involving knowledge, (b) defiled, involving ignorance, and (c) neither.

32ab. (E473; T426) Six feelings are caused by contact, five bodily and one mental.

32cd-35. (E479-485; T431-435) There are eighteen kinds of feelings, corresponding to the eighteen mental ponderings. All eighteen operate in the realm of desire, twelve in the material realm, and three in the immaterial realm.

37d-38c. (E491; T438-439) Among the four states of existence rearising is always defiled by the defilements of its stage of being. The other three can be good, bad or neutral.

38d-41. (E492-496; T439-444) On what is and what is not "food" in the three realms.

42-44. (E501-506; T447-451) Death and birth happen to mental awareness and involve equanimity. They don't occur during meditation, nor do they occur to one without awareness. The mind dies in that part of the body towards which it will proceed (the feet for hell, etc.).

45-93. (E506-544; T451-479) Cosmology. Description of our world, of hells, of the sun and moon, of heavens. The sizes and length of life of the inhabitants of these regions.

94-99. (E544-557; T481-489) Buddhas appear on earth when the age of men approximates 100 years a lifetime. Self-enlightened Buddhas appear at two different times. Cakravartin kings have a lifetime of 80,000 years or more. An eon terminates through war, sickness and hunger.

CHAPTER FOUR: Karma

1. (E567-568; T551-552) Vasubandhu reduces all karma to volition and the bodily and vocal actions produced by volition.

2. (E568-569; T552) Bodily and vocal karma can be manifest or unmanifest. Manifest bodily karma determines configuration. There is no (acting in the sense of) movement, since all conditioned things are momentary, disappearing.

3. (E570-578; T552-560) Still, nothing disappears without a cause, so the cause of anything is also a destroyer. Configuration is perceived by two. An atom has no configuration.

Vocal bodily action (on the other hand) is speech.

4ab. (E579; T560) Sūtras say that there are three kinds of material form, one of which is pure; that there is increase (of dharma); that one acts by giving order to others to act, etc.

4cd. (E590; T568) Unmanifest karma in the realm of desire is derived from past elements.

5-9. (E590-600; T569-575) Impure bodily and vocal actions in each realm arise with the great elements constituting their "agents" in that realm. Pure actions arise in the great elements of the "person" who produced them. Unmanifest actions are not appropriated; they bear fruit naturally in living beings alone. That fruit is never neutral, and occurs in the realms of desire and matter.

Manifest actions only occur in the first two realms (of desire and matter), but in the material realm the only such actions are movements of the great elements—the blowing of the wind, etc. Others say there are manifest actions in all four realms.

10-12. (E600-604; T576-579) Vaibhāśika: That which originates something (samutthāna) is of two kinds; the inciting causal factor (pravartaka) called hetusamutthāna and the accompanying causal factor which originates in the same moment, called tatkṣasamutthāna.

The kind of consciousness which is given up by seeing the four truths is an inciter only. The mental consciousness given up by meditation is both an inciter and an accompanying causal factor. The five sensory consciousnesses are inciting causal factors only.

That which arises from retribution arises spontaneously without any conditioning factors being necessary. Thus retribution is neither a primary nor an accompanying causal factor.

13-15. (E605-608; T580-583) There are three kinds of unmanifest karma: that involved in discipline, that not involved in discipline, and that which is neither. Disciplined action may be according to monastic discipline (prātimokṣa), that involving meditation, and that which is
noncontaminating. Those practising monastic discipline may be of eight or (alternatively) four types, depending on whether men are classified with or separately from women. The four are: laymen, abstainers, monks and bhikṣus.

16. (E609-610; T309-310) Monastic discipline consists of following moral precepts, active good conduct, action, and restraint. According to the Saurāṇākīs, but not according to the Vaibhāṣīkīs, it does not constitute a separate kind of entity.

17-31. (E610-627; T584-600) Which are those aspirants who possess which sort of manifest and unmanifest karma and for how long is explained.

32. (E628-630; T601) Someone who takes refuge in the Buddha, the dharma and the order is actually taking refuge in the special events which make for a Buddha, the events making up the action of the order, and nirvāṇa.

33. (E631; T603-604) Whereas the monk or nun takes on chastity, it is enough for laymen and laywomen if they renounce illicit love (see IV, 67).

34. (E632-635; T605) Among the bad vocal actions (see IV, 67) it is false speech which is the worst. Avoiding proclivities is enjoined upon the layman so that the other rules can be kept.


40-44. (E646-651; T616-620) How one leaves a realm by either progressing or backsliding.

45-48. (E652-655; T621-624) Differentiation of good, bad and neutral actions and their three corresponding kinds of retributions.

In the realm of desire clean karma is merit. In the higher realms unchangeable action is good because its retribution can only take place in the realm in which the deed was done.

Clean karma breeds satisfaction in the first three meditative trances. In the fourth it breeds results that are neither satisfying nor frustrating. Bad karma breeds foul, frustrating feelings in the realm of desire.

Some say that neutral karma (that is neither satisfying nor frustrating) occurs below the fourth meditative state, because there is no maturataion in the intermediate state (between the first two stages) and because karmic maturataion of all three sorts (good, bad, neutral) can occur at the same time.

49-50. (E656-657; T624-625) There are five things that are called "feelings": feelings themselves, connections with things, supporting objects, maturataions and experiencings of feelings. These feelings are determined or not determined. Determined feeling is that experienced in this very life.

51-52. (E658-660; T626-628) Some others say there are four (kinds of karma).

A noble person does not produce any karma experienceable in a later existence.

53. (E660-661; T628-629) One in the intermediate state in the realm of desire performs twenty-two kinds of actions that mature in the same existence.

54-55. (E661-662; T629-630) Determined feeling results from action involving intense defilements or intense serenity that has to do with certain fields, or from the murder of a father or mother.

56. (E663; T631) The effects of acts are immediately experienced by five sorts: one who has just left cessation-trance, one who has just left the nonpassionate trance, one who has just left the trance of loving kindness, one who has just left the path of vision, one who has become a noble person.

57-58. (E664-667; T632-634) Feelings that result from good actions free of initial thought are only mental. Feelings resulting from bad actions are only physical. Mental disorders--fear, hallucinations, irritation--are karmic results afflicting those in the realm of desire.

59-60. (E668-669; T635) About bad (black), good (white) and mixed (black-white) karma.

61-63. (E670-672; T636-637) The kinds of acts that destroy bad karma are twelve--four patiences and the first eight paths of nonattachment in the realm of desire. The thoughts of the ninth path are those that destroy mixed (black-white) karma. The thoughts that occur while practising meditative nonattachment destroy the good karma.

Others say that retributions of both bad and neutral karma occur in hell as well as in the realm of desire. Still others say that bad karma is that which can be abandoned by vision, whereas neutral karma can be abandoned by meditation.

64-65. (E672-674; T638-639) The adept's bodily, vocal and mental acts are the three sagely (mauna) things.

There are three bad practices that are not actions, and good practice is the opposite of these.

67. (E676; T641) Six courses of bad action can be unmanifest acts.
One bad act is always of two kinds, and the rest are of two kinds when one does them himself. Seven kinds of good actions are of two kinds; they are unmanifest only when occurring during meditation.

69. (E682; T646-647) Good actions, enumerated as the abandonments of the bad ones, arise from nondesire, nonhatred and lack of false views.

72. (E684; T648-649) Even someone who has been forced into the army should never kill.

73. (E685-687; T649-651) The "taking of life" enumerated refers to willful killing, not accidental killing.

74. (E687-688; T651-652) Offenses of lust comprise intercourse with four kinds of women one should not consort with. False speech--lying--is addressing one who understands a meaning of the words used but where the speaker uses the words with a different intent.

75-78. (E689-695; T653-658) The rest of the six principal bad actions are discussed.

79-80. (E697-702; T659-663) The good roots are severed, among humans completely or gradually, by the view that they don't exist, the denial of causal relations. Both men and women may sever good roots or bad roots.

82-84. (E708-710; T666-668) Which courses of action are available in the different realms.

85. (E711-712; T669-670) Each course of action has retributioanl, outflowing, and dominant result. The retribution of murder is suffering, of outflows a short life; the dominant result is loss of energy.

86-94. (E713-720; T671-677) Details concerning the kinds and numbers of factors resulting from good, bad and neutral acts.

95. (E721-722; T677-678) But the retributioanl effect of an act can occur only in the same life, or in the next life: it cannot extend for two lives after the act. Even though they have a retribution, the highest mediational attainment don't project an action, because they don't coexist with conscious action. There are three kinds of obstructions: obstructions due to past actions, obstructions which are defilements, obstructions which are retributioanl.

96. (E722-724; T679-680) The obstructions due to actions are those coming primarily from the five grave offences: killing one's mother, killing one's father, killing a noble person, causing division in the order, and harming a Buddha. It is a graver offence to kill one's mother than it is to kill one's father.

98-102. (E725-729; T681-685) Causing divisions in the order is lying. One who causes such division falls to the avici hell for an entire eon. More about such schisms.

103. (E730-732; T685-686) The same kind of gravity does not occur if a person kills his mother thinking it's someone else, or if he kills her accidentally.

106-107. (E734-735; T689-690) Other grave offences include defiling one's mother or a noble person, killing a Bodhisattva or an adept, stealing from the order, or destroying a stupa.

108-112. (E735-739; T690-694) The retributioanl effects of acts can be severed by the acquisition of perfect patience or forbearance, or by becoming a nonreturner (one who is never reborn among human beings, but may be reborn among gods), or by becoming a noble person.

One is a Bodhisattva when he performs actions that produce (some of) the (thirty-two) marks. Only males in Jambudvipa have such marks, which arise from one hundred merits. The virtues of a Bodhisattva are described.

112c-127. (E739-755; T694-708) Giving, morality and meditation are meritorious acts separately and in combination. Whom to give to and what to give are indicated. Giving produces satisfying experience, morality produces heaven, meditation produces liberation.

CHAPTER FIVE: Proclivities

1-2a. (E759-761; T767-768) Proclivities are the roots of existence. There are six: attachment, repugnance, pride, ignorance, views, and perplexity. Dividing attachment into attachment to sensual pleasure and attachment to existence there are seven.

2b-d. (E764-765; T771) There are two kinds of attachment to existence: attachment to existence in the material realm and attachment to existence in the immaterial realm (see I, 30).

3. (E765; T772) There are five kinds of false views: belief in a self, extreme beliefs, adherence to particular views, adherence to mere rule and ritual, and other false views.

4. (E765; T773) The four noble truths counteract these traces.

5. (E766-768; T773-774) Four proclivities are abandoned through meditation in the realm of desire, and (excepting repugnance) in the
other three realms, so that there are ninety-eight proclivities in all.

8. (E773; T779) Insistence on God as cause of the world, etc., which arises from mistaken views about permanence and self, is abandoned through vision.

9. (E778-779; T781-782) There are four mistaken views falling into three of the five kinds of view. Identifications and awarenesses also can be erroneous.

10-11. (E782-785; T784-788) There are seven kinds of pride that are destroyed by vision and meditation. The enveloper of killing, etc. is destroyed by meditation, as well as the desire to leave off existing. Pride and foul regret, involving views, are never found in noble persons.

12-19. (E785-794; T788-798) On the pervasive proclivities, how they function, in which realm.

20-24. (E795-803; T798-805) Attachment, resistance and delusion are the bad roots. Three-craving, ignorance and inattention--are neutral roots. The other proclivities are not roots at all. The outsiders (bāhyaka) say four-craving, views, pride and delusion--are neutral.

Which are the questions that can be answered outright, which by making distinctions, which in relation to what, which involving complexity?

25-26. (E804-808; T806-810) Vaibhāśika: Future and past factors exist as well as present ones, because the Buddha taught it, because of two, because an object exists, because of result.

There are four kinds of Sarvāstivādins, depending on whether they teach difference in being, in definition, in state or mutually. The third view is best.

Temporal distinctions are established by their functioning.

28-31. (E819-823; T820-833) Is one who realizes the first truth (of frustration) released from previous frustrations altogether? No, since he is bound to them by the pervasive proclivities, and remains so through the fourth, immaterial stage.

32-33. (E828-829; T825-828) Doubt arises from delusion. It results in false views, and from false views arises the view of a fixed self in the body. From the view of a fixed self in the body arises adherence to mere rule and ritual; from this in turn arises adherence to particular views; from this arises attachment and pride; from that, aversion.

34. (E829-830; T828) The defilements arise when their proclivities have not been eradicated, or when an object liable to make them arise

occurs, or from careless mental attention.

36. (E831; T830-831) Ignorance is the root.

37-40. (E832-835; T831-834) Likewise the floods and bonds, which include views, are proclivities, as well as the graspings, which include ignorance. These various classifications are interrelated.

42. (E838; T837) Envy and selfishness are particularly named because they arise from ignorance itself.

47-48a. (E844; T842) The envelopers are shamelessness, disregard, envy, selfishness, excitedness, regret, lethargy and sleepiness; anger and hypocrisy also.

48b-49. (E485; T843) From attachment arise shamelessness, excitedness and selfishness. From ignorance arise lethargy, sleepiness and disregard. From perplexity regret arises. From repugnance arise envy and anger.

50-51a. (E486; T844) From attachment arise arrogance and deceit. From repugnance arise vengefulness and violence. From adherence to views arises spite. From views arises craftiness.

51b-52. (E847; T846-847) Shamelessness, disregard, lethargy, sleepiness and excitedness can be eradicated by seeing the truths and by meditation; the others can only be eradicated by meditation.

56. (E849-850; T849) Perplexity is associated with irritation. The others which are views, with the exception of false views and pride, are associated usually with satisfaction. All of them may be associated with indifference.

57. (E850; T849-850) Regret, envy, hypocrisy, violence, vengefulness and spite are always associated with frustration.

58. (E850-851; T850) Craftiness, deceit, hypocrisy and sleepiness may be associated with either satisfaction or frustration. Shamelessness, disregard, lethargy and excitedness can be associated with frustration, contentedness, satisfaction or irritation.

59-62. (E851-858; T851-857) Lethargy and sleepiness, and excitedness and regret, are two pairs that as pairs count as obstructions, since they oppose the same things.

Defilements are destroyed by comprehension, by destroying homogeneous defilements, by abandoning their objects.

61. (E860; T858-859) Destruction of homogeneous defilements takes place variously: by the arising of an antidote, by acquisition of results, or by perfection of the faculties.

64-70. (E861-870; T862-869) Discussion of the nine ascertainment
and six results of patience, and how they are attained.

CHAPTER SIX: The Saints and the Path

1. (E871; T895) The path consists of two divisions: the path of vision, where false views are abandoned, and the path of meditation.
2. (E872; T896) On the four truths.
3. (E875; T899) Contaminating factors involve one or another of three kinds of frustration.
4. (E8898; T910) Awareness of a jar ends when the jar is broken; awareness of water ends when one analyzes it. Jug and water exist (only) conventionally. What is (highest) truth is different.
6. (E892; T913-914) Meditation succeeds when the practitioner is withdrawn from society and when his awarenesses are removed from bad mental applications.
7. (E893; T914-915) Insatiability has an antidote in contentment and in wishing for little. These are forms of absence of greed.
8cd. (E894; T916) Both the desire for an object and the ideas of "mine" and "I" are removed, either momentarily or definitively, in meditation.
9-11a. (E894-897; T916-919) Description of the meditational process by which one reduces one's body to its elements: skeletal system, etc.
12. (E898-899; T921-922) Description of the Buddhist breathing meditation.
13. (E901-902; T923-925) On breathing.
14-18. (E902-909; T925-932) Discussion of the four establishments of mindfulness focussed on the flow of the material elements of the body, on feelings, on awarenesses, and on factors, meaning here primarily conditioning factors.
19. (E911-912; T932-933) Relation of the meditational stages of the aids to penetration with the establishment of mindfulness.
20-24. (E914-921; T935-942) The four aids to penetration.
25-26. (E921-924; T942-946) Immediately after the aids to penetration the first moment of the path of vision occurs. It is called "the patience (necessary) for the knowledge of factors in frustration", whose content is frustration in the realm of desires. Immediately after it arises knowledge of factors which is frustration itself. Immediately after that occurs the subsequent patience (necessary) for the

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knowledge of factors in frustration. This, and the subsequent knowledges of factors in frustration relate to frustration of the material and immaterial realms. The same sequence of four patiences and knowledges occurs subsequently for the other noble truths.

27. (E925-928; T946-949) Thus in total there are sixteen awareness-moments on the path of vision.

29-32. (E933-936; T952-955) In the path of vision those who have mild faculties are faith-followers, those with keen faculties are factor-followers. Unless they have already conquered (the proclivities) by meditation they become candidates for stream-enterer-ship. Then, when they attain the ninth awareness-moment of the path of vision, they become candidates for the once-returner state, and thence candidates for the third state (of nonreturner) by abandoning that awareness. In the sixteenth moment they achieve the state for which they were candidates and become resolved in faith or in vision.

33-39. (E938-955; T956-971) Each of the four stages has nine levels, depending on whether it is weaker or stronger. Terms for those at certain points along the way: A stream-enterer-candidate who has not started to eliminate the proclivities conquered by meditation is "one who has seven more lives to live". When three or four levels of the first stage (the stage of desire) have been eliminated he is termed "going from family to family" (kulamkula). When five levels are eliminated he becomes a candidate for once-returner-ship (sakñdāgāmin), and attains it on eliminating the sixth level. A "single-seeker" (ekavičika) is one who has eliminated the seventh or eighth level.

There are seven kinds of nonreturners: (1) one who achieves liberation in the intermediate state, (2) one who achieves it as soon as he is reborn, (3) one who gains liberation through effort, (4) one who gets liberation without effort, (5) one who goes higher to the akaniṣṭha heaven or to the summit of existence, (6) one who goes to the immaterial state, and (7) one who is liberated in the present life. Nine kinds of nonreturners go to the material realm.

44. (E956-970; T980-981) The nonreturner is a candidate for perfected being until he destroys the eighth part of the summit of existence. The ninth part is diamond-like, involving knowledge of liberation.

45-49. (E971-977; T983-990) There are two kinds of spiritual path: mundane and supramundane. The learner detaches himself by the
supramundane path from the world (at the summit of existence), from
the other realms by either path.

50-57. (E978-990; T991-1003) Then, immovable, he is aware that
he will not arise again, while retaining the insight of an adept. Then he
is a true monk. Various classes of perfected beings are distinguished.

58. (E992; T1003) Who can regress from their genus and who from
their realm.

63-64. (E1007-1011; T1016-1019) Noble persons can be of one of
seven kinds, depending on their application, their faculties, their
meditative attainment, their liberation, their being of two kinds. The
adept achieving cessation is one liberated in both of the two ways;
others are liberated through wisdom. A disciple is incomplete in
meditative attainment, in faculties and in result.


CHAPTER SEVEN: The Knowledges

(This Chapter relates primarily to the knowledges gained on the
path of vision.)

1. (E1033-1035; T1087-1088) The patiences experienced on the
path of vision are not knowledge.

2-4. (E1035-1036; T1088-1090) Awarenesses are contaminating or
noncontaminating. Contaminating awareness is conventional.
Noncontaminating awarenesses are either awarenesses of factors like
frustrations, etc. or inferential awarenesses concerning them; together
they constitute knowledge of destruction and of nonorigination.

5-6ab. (E1036-1038; T1090-1092) One can know others’
awarenesses, though not those in a higher realm, nor the past and future,
nor others’ awareness of factors and inferences.

13. (E1057-1062; T1110-1117) There are sixteen aspects, and they
constitute wisdom.

14. (E1062-1063; T1117-1118) Conventional knowledge may be
either good, bad, or neutral. All the knowledges on the path of vision
are good only.

15. (E1063-1064; T1119) Knowledge of others’ awarenesses occurs
only in the four meditational stages.

16. (E1064-1065; T1119-1120) It also involves necessarily
knowledge of others’ feelings, cognitions, and motivating dispositions.

33. (E1093-1095; T1143-1144) The great compassion of a Buddha
differs from other compassion.

34. (E1096-1099; T1145) All Buddhas are equal as far as their body
of essential teaching is concerned, and as far as their service to others,
but they differ on less essential things: caste, duration of their lives,
etc.

36-41. (E1100-1106; T1149-1156) Nonpassion is a conventional
awareness of the fourth meditative sphere, produced by immovable
(noble) humans, and helps block future defilements of others. So also
are knowledge from vows and of factors and the discriminations of
factors, objects, etymologies and perspicuities.

42-47. (E1106-1115; T1157-1167) The six higher faculties of a
Buddha are supernaturl powers: divine ear, knowing other’ intentions
and thoughts, memory of past lives, divine visual power, and the
knowledge of the destruction of frustrations. They provide awareness
of the path to liberation. Four are conventional awarenesses, five exist
in one of the four trances states. They relate to their own or a lower
sphere. The first three constitute the first establishment of
mindfulness. All are good except the divine eye and ear which are
neutral. Only the knowledge of the destruction of proclivities is found
in the adept; knowledge of others’ intentions and of past lives are said
to belong there but in that relation do not constitute wisdom.

48-53. (E1115-1121; T1168-1176) Supernatural power is
concentration, and enables one’s mind to move rapidly and create
magical beings. Magical beings can speak by their creator’s speaking
at another time and locating the speech in the magical body. He can
even locate the speech after his death (though this is not accepted by
some). Supernatural powers can also be exercised through mantras,
through medicinal plants, or through karma.

CHAPTER EIGHT: The Meditational Concentration

2. (E1129-1130; T1216-1220) The first meditational stage is
accompanied by sustained thought, joy and satisfaction; these are
successively abandoned in the other three states.

The immaterial meditational attainments are made up of the four
aggregates excluding matter.

3. (E1137; T1225) There is no matter in the immaterial attainments.
Matter arises from (karmically conditioned) awareness.

13. (E1150-1151; T1241) The consciousnesses in the higher stages
of meditational concentration are all unobstructed and neutral.

14-23. (E1151-1163; T1243-1256) How and when the attainments are accomplished.

29-38. (E1170-1185; T1264-1280) The four boundless states and the eight liberations culminating in cessation trance.

39. (E1176; T1281) The dharma of the Buddha has two aspects: āgama (the teaching itself) and adhisambhāra (the allies of enlightenment, cf. VI, 66) and their results.

CHAPTER NINE: Refutation of the Self

(This Chapter, being in prose only, unlike the rest of the Abhidharmakośa which is in verse, seems to have been originally an independent treatise. It has as its aim the refutation of the self as found in Vaiśeṣika, etc., as well as of the "person" as found in the Vāsistsputriyas.)

(E1189-1193; T1313-1315) How can we know that "self" is only a designation for a series of factors? There is no evidence of any sort for a "self" apart from the elements of constituting personality. The Vāsistsputriya admits a person (pudgala) which is neither totally identical with the aggregates nor totally different from them. Does this person exist as an entity (dravyātis) or only as a designation (prajñāpatīta)? If the person is an entity, it has to be different from other aggregates, it has to be either produced by causes, which means it can't be lasting as the Vāsistsputriya claims, or be unconditioned, in which case it has no efficacy. Thus the person can't be an entity. But if it is only a designation, then we have no argument.

Vāsistsputriya: The person is neither an entity nor just a designation. It occurs in relation to the aggregates.

Vasubandhu: What do you mean? If you mean that the term "pudgala" arises only with the aggregates, then we have no argument.

(E1193-1195; T1315-1317) Vāsistsputriya: It is rather like the case of fire and the combustible material. Fire cannot exist apart from the material, and yet the two are not identical.

Vasubandhu: But what exactly is it that is being designated as "fire", as "combustible material"?

Vāsistsputriya: It is the series of the "combustible material" which is turned into ashes by the series "fire".

Vasubandhu: But the material must exist previously to the fire in order for the fire to arise. For your analogy to be exact, the person must thus arise after the aggregates, and be transitory as well.

Vāsistsputriya: No, because fire exists inherently in the combustible material. But since their characteristics are different - "fire" being that element in the combustible material which allows for its combustion - "fire" and "combustible material" are entities apart.

Vasubandhu: One can't claim that fire is the cause of the material, and any other clear relationship between them is also not established.

Vāsistsputriya: But there is a coexistence of fire and the material; thus fire has that material as its support.

Vasubandhu: This means that fire is different from the material, but that it doesn't exist unless the combustible material does. For your analogy to be exact, the person must be different from the aggregates, and yet exist only with the aggregates.

Vāsistsputriya: But in our analogy fire is not completely different from the material, since the material is also hot.

Vasubandhu: What is the nature of heat? If one defines the hot as being the element heat, i.e., fire, then the material is not itself fire. If one extends the adjective "hot" to include the material, then two different kinds of things are being defined by the same adjective.

Vāsistsputriya: Wood being burned is called both combustible material and fire.

Vasubandhu: What then is the sense of your statement that fire exists in relation to the material? From what you just said "fire" and "combustible material" are the same, and no relation can exist between them. Thus your analogy does not demonstrate a relationship between the person and the aggregates.

(E1195-1201; T1318-1322) Vāsistsputriya: The person is neither exactly the same as the aggregates nor completely different from them.

Vasubandhu: If the expression "pudgala (person)" is used only where the aggregates occur, it is nothing but the aggregates. If it is used in relation to an independent person, then why say it arises in relation to the aggregates?

Vāsistsputriya: When the aggregates exist, the person is perceived.

Vasubandhu: By which consciousness is it perceived?

Vāsistsputriya: By all six.

Vasubandhu: It is impossible to establish the existence of a perception of a person by the visual consciousness or any other consciousness.
(E1201-1204; T1322-1327) Canonical support for the nonexistence of the person.

(E1205-1206; T1327-1328) Vātsīputriya: But there is also a sūtra which says "In the past, I had this form."

Vasubandhu: But the Buddha doesn't intend to say that there is a person which in the past had another form. This "I" is merely a metaphor for a psychophysical series. Similarly, one says "a current of water", even though this "current" really consists of a series of momentary events.

Vātsīputriya: Then the Buddha is not omniscient. For one can't know all the aggregate-moments of all times. But one can know a person.

Vasubandhu: I don't believe the Buddha is omniscient in the way the Mahāsāṃghikas do. By the word "Buddha" I mean a certain psychophysical series which is associated with a particular power which allows any awareness arising in the series to completely know any particular object--this power in the series is called "omniscience".

(E1206-1207; T1328-1330) Vātsīputriya: But there is a sūtra where the Buddha says "I will explain to you the burden, the taking of the burden, the depositing of the burden and the taker of the burden."

Vasubandhu: This sūtra does not establish the existence of a separate "taker". What it indicates is different phases in the psychophysical complex, as it itself explains.

(E1207-1214; T1330-1337) Examination of different sūtra passages where "person" is used metaphorically with the intention of reducing a questioner's confusion. Discussion of sūtras where the Buddha refuses to answer questions because whichever way he would answer would increase the questioner's confusion.

(E1214-1215; T1337-1338) Vātsīputriya: If the person doesn't exist how can there be transmigration?

Vasubandhu: The term "transmigration" is a metaphor. Just as one says "the fire is spreading", new flames in reality arising at each moment, in the same way momentary events are arising which are related to each other as cause and effect, this series having different loci.

(E1215-1218; T1339-1342) Vātsīputriya: If there is no person, and only momentary events, how can there be memory of a long past event?

Vasubandhu: For memory to occur there must be a special awareness directed at the object of memory which is connected with cognitions relating to the object or to objects similar to it, or to a resolution to remember.

Vātsīputriya: But how can one awareness have perceived the object and another totally different awareness remember it later? Yājñädatta can't remember the object seen by Devadatta!

Vasubandhu: There is no connection between Yājñädatta and Devadatta--their awarenesses are not in a relation of cause and effect. However, the awareness which perceived an object and the awareness which later remembers it are related as cause and effect. The awareness which perceived is the cause of the awareness which remembers in the same way as a seed is the cause of a future fruit, through a transformation of the intermediary events of the series.

(E1219-1220; T1342-1344) It is said that Devadatta cognizes because the psychophysical complex which is termed "Devadatta" is the cause of a consciousness' arising. What is consciousness doing? Nothing. It arises coordinately (sādhyā) with its object. Actually it does nothing in relation to the object, but it is said to perceive the object because it arises coordinately with it. This coordination consists of the fact that the consciousness has the aspect (ākāra) of the object. This is why the consciousness is said to perceive the object, even though the object is only one of its causes; the other causes, such as the sense-organ, are not related to the consciousness in the same sense that it takes its aspect. A factor gives rise to a succeeding factor which may have the same object--thus it is said to be an agent, because it is a cause. It is metaphorically said to perceive just as one says that an oil-lamp, or its flame, moves--in reality there are only successions of flame-moments. In the same way, "consciousness" is used as a term for a series of momentary awarenesses. When an awareness-moment occurs relatively to a new object it is said, metaphorically, that consciousness is perceiving its object.

(E1220-1222; T1344-1346) Sāmkhya: If a succeeding consciousness arises from an anterior one, and not from a self, why is the succeeding consciousness not always similar to the previous one, and why don't the consciousnesses arise according to a fixed succession?

Vasubandhu: Everything is constantly transforming (see II, 45). And there is a certain order as to which awarenesses arise from which.

(E1222-1226; T1346-1348) The Vaishēṣika claims that awarenesses
arise from a self. But we can use the same arguments just used against us: Why is a succeeding awareness not the same as a previous one? Why don't awarenesses arise according to a fixed succession?

Vaiśeṣika: Because there is a great diversity in the contacts of the self and the internal organ.

Vasubandhu: Contact itself cannot be established. Your own definition of "contact" implies that two entities in contact are delimited and localized. Thus, following your theory, the self cannot be omnipresent as you claim. Following your theory, also, when the internal organ is directed towards a part of the body the self must also be so directed, and thus either it isn't devoid of action, as you claim it is, or it is not eternal, which you claim it to be. You can't claim that only a part of the self is conjoined with the internal organ, for according to you the self has no parts. And if there were an immutable contact between the self and the internal organ, how could one explain the diversity of awarenesses? This diversity is also inexplicable if the self is not diverse. If you say that this diversity results from the diversity of the contacts of the selves and internal organs, which diversity results from the diversity of traces, then why not say that the diversity of awarenesses results from the diversity of traces? The self is not necessary in that case. If you say that the self is the support of the traces and the internal organ, this cannot be literally true, since there can be no physical contact with an immaterial self. If you say that the self supports the traces in the same way that the earth supports smells, then you have come over to our position, for we claim that "earth" is nothing more than a designation for a collection of smells, etc.

Vaiśeṣika: If earth is nothing but smells, etc. how can one speak of "the earth's smell"?

Vasubandhu: In the same way that one can say "the statue's body". If the self produces awarenesses because of the variety of the traces, why doesn't it produce all awarenesses at the same time?

Vaiśeṣika: Because the strongest trace prohibits the weaker ones from producing their effects. The traces are not permanent and are subject to transformation.

Vasubandhu: But what is the self doing here? The awarenesses seem to be arising from the traces alone.

Vaiśeṣika: Traces, etc., are qualities: a quality must have a substance as its substratum. And the substratum of traces must be the self.

Vasubandhu: But the entire system of substances and qualities is not proven. We think that everything that exists is a "substance" or entity.

Vaiśeṣika: If there is no self, how can there be retribution for acts?

Vasubandhu: The retribution of acts affects a psychophysical series. It is this series, or even just certain elements in it, which is considered a self, such as when it is said "I am black", etc. The self which you postulate has got nothing to do with blackness, and yet the word "I" is used in this case. In the same way, every instance of the use of the term "I" really refers to the psychophysical series, or certain elements within it.

Vaiśeṣika: When one says "I am black" this does not refer to the self but to the body which serves the self.

Vasubandhu: But all expressions of "I" and "self" are metaphorical.

Vaiśeṣika: If the notion of "self" is only in reference to elements of a psychophysical complex, how does one distinguish self and others?

Vasubandhu: Because there is no relation between those other psychophysical complexes and the notion. It is only the psychophysical complex which is in a causal relation to the notion which is designated by that term.

Vaiśeṣika: If there is no self, to what do you attribute the notion of an "I"?

Vasubandhu: The psychophysical complex itself, the experiences of which are interrelated.

Vaiśeṣika: Who is the agent or enjoyer?

Vasubandhu: What do these terms even mean?

Vaiśeṣika: The agent is one who has an independent power in relation to an action. The enjoyer is he who experiences the effects of an action.

Vasubandhu: These definitions are untenable. What does one mean by "Devadatta"? If one means a self, it is still undemonstrated. If one means a complex of aggregates, then Devadatta is an agent, but not an independent one. A bodily action depends on an awareness acting on the body, and this body and awareness themselves depend upon other causes and conditions, and in all this there is no one entity which could be designated as an independent agent. According to you, the self does not depend on causes and conditions, and it doesn't do anything, thus it can't be an agent, either. What one designates as an agent of an act is according to us the principal cause, among many causes, of the act.

Vaiśeṣika: A quality or entity can become an agent under special circumstances.

Vasubandhu: The series of causes and conditions for
an action is as follows: A memory makes the desire to act arise, from this desire to act arises an initial thought, from this initial thought arises an effort, which gives rise to a motile element, which puts the body into "motion". Where is there any room for a self in this process?

Vaiśeṣika: Without a self, how can an action in the past, which has already ceased, bring about a future effect?

Vasubandhu: The effect does not arise from the action, which has ceased. The effect arises as the last moment of the transformation of a series which originated with the act. It is the same as a fruit "arising from a seed"—in fact, it arises from the transformation of a series which has its origin in the seed. By a "series" we mean material and psychological elements which succeed each other without interruption. Each one of the momentary elements is different: thus it is said that the series is transforming. The last moment of an evolution has a special efficacy to produce a special effect. There is a difference to be noted between the force of retribution and the outcome (see I, 37-38). When the force of retribution gives its effect, the force itself ceases, thus there is only one retribution for an act, but the force of flow, which is projected by homogeneous causes, continues to operate, and only ceases by virtue of a specific antidote. The force of retribution, on the other hand, is rather like the case where one dyes a lemon-flower red, and this gives rise to a transformation in the series flower-fruit which has the result that the center of the lemon arising from the flower will also be red. But the red seed in the center of this lemon, if it is itself planted, will not give rise to another lemon with a red center. In the same way, the retribution of an action does not give rise to another retribution. Only the Buddhas know exactly how the psychophysical series, impregnated by the volitions of past actions, transform to give a retributinal effect. In no case is it necessary to assume a self or personality-entity.

174. VASUBANDHU, Bhāṣya on his Abhidharmaśāṣṭra

Since it has been doubted by some scholars that the authors of the Kośa and this Bhāṣya are the same, we have separated the summaries of the two works. "E" and "T" references are to the same texts as for the previous (#173) summary.

2.(E11-13; T56-57Z) The "accompaniments" of pure wisdom are the five pure aggregates.

5c.(E19; T59) Space does not obstruct, and is not displaced by material form.

6.(E20-2; T59-60) Calculated cessations involve disjunctions from contaminating factors gained by wisdom concerning the four noble truths. These disjunctions are "separate", since one does not achieve complete cessation by only one disjunction.

7.(E21-27; T61-62) Conditioned factors "ex-ist" since it is from and through them that one "ex-ists" to nirvāṇa. They involve actual objects in the sense of being causally conditioned.

10.(E32-35; T64-66) The two material bases are color and shape. Color and shape may occur separately.

Sautrāntika: How can a single entity be both color and shape, if these are distinct things?

Answer: Because they're found in a single thing.

Sautrāntika: Then you should admit a "manifest form" as an additional type of material form.

The eleven tangibles are: the four great elements, smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger and thirst.

11.(E38-39; T68) Unmanifest form is termed "material" because it is derived from the great elements.

13.(E44-47; T70-72) Vaibhāṣika: To be "material" is to be capable of being damaged.

Vasubandhu: Some say, however, that the characteristic of materiality is that it exercises a resistance which makes it impenetrable. But in that case, a single atom itself is not material, as it exercises no resistance.

Vaibhāṣika: But the single atom never exists in an isolated state, and in combination with other atoms does exercise resistance.

Vasubandhu: Material entities of the past and future can't really be material, as they exercise no resistance.

Vaibhāṣika: But they were exercising or will exercise it!

Vasubandhu: Unmanifest form can't be matter.

Vaibhāṣika: Yes it can. One moment of unmanifest form depends
upon previous moments which are material, just as the shadow of a
tree depends on the tree.

Vasubandhu: But unmanifest form isn't subject to transformations,
and does not cease when the manifest form does. Thus the simile of
shadow and tree doesn't apply.

Vaibhāṣīka: But unmanifest form is material, because it depends
upon the material elements of the body.

Vasubandhu: In that case, the five visual consciousnesses are also
material.

Vaibhāṣīka: No, because unmanifest form rests totally on the
material elements, as a shadow does on a tree, whereas the
consciousnesses do not rest utterly on their organs, which are only the
causes of the arisings.

Vasubandhu: But according to your own thesis each of the atoms
which make up a shadow depends upon the four great elements. Thus
they don't depend on the tree.

Vaibhāṣīka: A visual consciousness depends not only on the eye,
which is material, but also on the mind, which isn't.

14. (E48-49; T72-73) Experiencings are frustrating, satisfying, or
neither.

15. (E49-50; T72-74) Vaibhāṣīka: Unmanifest material form and the
three unconditioned factors are also included within the sense-basis of
factors or the realm of factors.

16. (E50-51; T74) The six kinds of manifesting are visual, auditory,
olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental. The seven elements comprise
the elements of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental
consciousness plus the mental element. There is no "mind" distinct
from these consciousnesses.

20. (E60-63; T79-80) Vasubandhu: If the meaning of "skandha" as
"aggregate", i.e., a group, is to be taken literally, then aggregates are
only nominal entities, since groups are not actual entities.

Vaibhāṣīka: No, because the atom itself is an aggregate.

Vasubandhu: Then don't say that the skandhas are aggregates!

Vaibhāṣīka: Every instance of matter, whether past, present or
future, is called an "aggregate".

Vasubandhu: But nonetheless they have only a nominal existence,
if they are mere groups. The material sense-fields cannot give rise to
sensory consciousnesses unless they are groups, since the individual
atoms are not perceived. Thus the sense-fields have only nominal
existence. The teaching of the aggregates has been devised to
counteract the view of a self.

21. (E64; T81) Disputes mainly concern desires involving feelings,
and opinions involving identifications.

23. (E67-68; T84) A mental consciousness may have an object which
is simultaneous, past or future, or simultaneous and past and future,
or beyond time.

29. (E79-81; T89-92) There are three kinds of resistance: that of
obstruction, that of the contact of a sense-organ with its content, and
that of awareness accompanying mental factors with their contents.
The difference between a "content" and a "supporting object" is that the
content, or object of sense, is where the sensory organ carries out its
function; the supporting object is what is grasped by awarenesses and
mental factors. But why does one speak of a "resistance" inherent in
contact with a sense-content? Because the organ cannot exercise its
activity any farther than its sense-content. But when we speak of ten
sensory domains exercising resistance, we are speaking of the
resistance of obstruction only. Kumāralātā states that though a
consciousness having a color as its content and the eye for its support
may be impeded from arising by the interposition of another material
body between the eye and the color, the mental consciousness and the
domain of mentally cognizable cannot be impeded in the same way.
For instance, if a feeling (a kind of cognizable) arises, nothing can stop
the mental consciousness from perceiving it.

30. (E82-87; T92-95) Which of the material elements are good,
which bad, which neutral? The five material organs plus-smells, tastes,
and touches are always karmically neutral. The seven mental elements
of consciousness are good, bad or neutral according to the traces
accompanying them. The factor element itself includes the traces and
thus may be either good, bad or neutral. The elements of sight and
sound are good or bad if they form part of a good or bad bodily or
verbal action; in all other cases they too are neutral.

Tastes and smells do not occur in the material realm, which includes
the first meditative trances.

Śrīlātā says that the organs of taste and smell do not function in
those trances. However, we think that if tastes and smells are lacking
there the organs of taste and smell should also be absent.

Vaibhāṣīka: No, the organs of taste and smell must be there, but
only because it makes a more elegant account.
31. (E87; T96) All material elements except the three mentioned (viz., mind, mental awareness, factor element) are always contaminating.

32. (E89-90; T97-98) Vaibhāṣīka: There are three kinds of conceptual constructions: (1) essential, (2) defining and (3) mnemonic. The five awarenesses are essential but not defining or mnemonic. That is why the five sensory awarenesses, though involving initial and sustained thought, are still constructionfree.

33. (E91; T99) For instance, the visible is appropriated if it is an integral part of a sense-organ, but not if it is external.

34. (E92-95; T99-101) Bhadanta Buddhadeva claims that all sensory organs and their objects consist of the primary material elements only. No, says the Vaibhāṣīka, the characteristics of the material elements (cf. 1, 12) are perceived by the tactile consciousness only. The ten material elements are accumulations of atoms.

35. (E95-96; T102) The visibles, olfactories, gustatories and tangibles can cut, burn or weigh if they form what is conventionally called, e.g., an "axe". They can be cut, etc., when they form e.g. "wood". Cutting means making two series of material factors, or more, out of one. The organs can neither be cut nor can they cut. For instance, if one cuts all the limbs from a body, which is the sensory element underlying tactile sensations, the body will still feel factually, and the cut limbs will no longer be sensory elements of touch. Sound does not cut, cannot be cut, and has no weight. According to some, that external material sensory elements excluding sound burn and have weight is a characteristic of one kind of secondary materiality only.

36. (E96-99; T103-105) Sounds may grow through nourishment, as vocal powers are diminished in a famished series. Which of the sensory domains are outflows? An "outflow" is where the result of a preceding factor closely resembles its cause--this is the case when one says that the same object is existing from one moment to the next, for actually it is a new factor entirely, but so similar to the preceding factor that the difference is not noticed. The five material internal sense-bases are outflows when they are also karmic results and grow through nourishment.

Objection: Sound may be the result of karmic maturation, because that pleasant voice called "sound of Brahmā" is the result of complete avoidance of harmful language.

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Vaibhāṣīka: This sound does not result immediately from the action of which you suppose it is the maturation; thus it is not the result of karmic maturation.

Objection: In that case, a bodily sensation could never be the result of karmic maturation, because it does not result immediately from an action, but rather from a change in the great elements resulting from the action.

Vaibhāṣīka: But this sensation is never engendered by the desire to have the sensation, whereas sound may be engendered by the volition to make the sound.

38. (E101-103; T106-107) Whether acquisition of the visual organ and awareness occur together or separately depends, among other things, on what meditative trance state we are thinking of.

39. (E104-109; T109-111) Objection: How can one talk about what is "personal" when there is no self?

Answer: It is consciousness that is falsely called a "self". So the "personal" elements are awarenesses or supporting objects of awarenesses.

A sensory element is termed "homogeneous" (sabhāga) with a time when it functions, "partially homogeneous" (tatsabhāga) with a time when it doesn't function. The sensory element called "mental consciousness" is always homogeneous with the time when it is destined to arise, for it always has an object; thus it can be called "partially homogeneous" only when it doesn't arise completely. A visible element is homogeneous with a series which sees it, partially homogeneous with one which doesn't.

40ab. (E109-110; T111-112) The fifteen are ten material elements--organs and objects--and five elements of consciousness. The "last three" (of the eighteen elements)--the mental element, element of factors, and mental consciousness element--comprise three sorts of factors: (a) eighty-eight proclivities, abandoned by vision, (b) the rest of the proclivities, abandoned by meditation, and (c) the noncontaminating unconditioned factors, not to be abandoned.

Objection: Ordinariness, a neutral factor, as well as bad bodily or vocal karma, are classified by you as factors to be abandoned by meditation, whereas they are in fact abandoned by the path of vision.

41. (E110-113; T113-114) The "eight parts of the factor element" are the five false views, ordinary right view, the disciple's and the adept's view.
42. (E113-118; T114-118) Vījñānavādin: If the eye sees, then the eye of someone completely engrossed in a tactual or audial consciousness also sees.

Vaihāśika: Not every eye sees. But every homogeneous eye does.

Vījñānavādin: What sees is the visual consciousness.

Vaihāśika: No, because when an object is obstructed by a screen it isn’t seen. The visual consciousness is not material, thus it exercises no resistance. Thus it should be able to penetrate a screen.

Vījñānavādin: No. The visual consciousness simply doesn’t arise when the object is obstructed.

Vasubandhu: Does the eye perceive its object by entering into close proximity with it, as does the tongue? If not, why can’t the eye see an obstructed object? And why does the eye see objects that are obstructed by glass, etc.? I say it is the visual consciousness which sees, but it needs light on the object for this seeing.

Vaihāśika: There is a śūtra which says that the eye sees.

Vasubandhu: What that śūtra means to say is that the visual consciousness sees through the locus of the visual organ. For there is also a śūtra which says that mind discerns factors, but a mental moment is already past by the time factors are cognized (cf. I, 17). It is really the mental consciousness which grasps factors. Another śūtra states clearly that the eye is the medium for seeing.

Vaihāśika: If the visual consciousness sees, what is it that discerns an object?

Vasubandhu: What is the difference between seeing and discerning an object? It is the same process designated in two different ways.

Vatsiputriya: It is the visual consciousness which sees. If the eye sees, what exactly is the action of seeing which you attribute to the visual organ?

Vasubandhu: Your objection doesn’t hold. For the distinction between agent and action can’t be made.

Dharmaguptaka: It’s the visual consciousness which sees, but since the eye is the support of this consciousness, one says that it sees.

Vaihāśika: In that case, one should also say that the eye cognizes, because it is the locus of visual consciousness.

Vasubandhu: No. In ordinary language one never says that a color is cognized; one says that it is seen. Even the Vībhāṣā itself admits that that which is "seen" is reached by the eye, but is experienced by the visual consciousness.

Sautrāntika: This discussion is vain. There is no organ which sees, nor an object which is seen, there is no action of seeing, and no agent who sees. There is nothing but the interplay of causes and effects. It is only metaphorically that one can talk about the eye seeing, consciousness discerning, etc.

43. (E118-122; T119-122) If some kind of proximity isn’t necessary (as the Vaihāśika says) why is it that one can’t see things very far away?

Vaihāśika: Some distance is necessary between the eye and a visible thing for sight to take place. For the eye doesn’t see objects clearly that are laid directly on it.

Vasubandhu: The ear may hear sounds within itself: thus the same kind of distance from the object isn’t necessary. What is even the meaning of “coming directly in touch with”?

Vaihāśika: It means that there is no object coming in between the object of sense and the organ. According to Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, it means that there is no interval between them, but this interpretation is erroneous, because atoms don’t enter into direct contact with one another. If atoms touched completely, they would merge. If atoms touched partially, there would be parts to atoms, but atoms have no parts.

Vasubandhu: But if atoms don’t touch each other, why does the aggregation of atoms not fall into pieces when it is struck?

Vaihāśika: Because the wind-element gives them cohesion. Aggregates of atoms do have parts, and thus touch.

Vasubandhu: Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is right. There is no contact between atoms. One merely says there is when there is nothing coming between them, and no interval between them. If atoms had an interval between them, the atoms could float into it, and they would no longer be separate. The reason two atoms do not merge even thought there is no interval between them is that they exercise resistance. One cannot make a radical distinction between atoms and aggregates of atoms. Thus it is absurd to say that aggregates touch but individual atoms don’t. If you admit any spatial division for atoms, then atoms have parts.

44. (E123-125; T122-125) For the organs of smell, taste and touch there must be the same number of atoms in the object as in the organ in order that the former be perceived. But for the organs of sight and hearing there is no such restriction: sometimes the object may be
bigger, sometimes smaller than the organ.

The atoms of the visual organ are situated on the pupil of the eye, the atoms of the audial organ are within the oak-leaf-shaped configuration within the ear, the atoms of the olfactory organ are within the nostrils, and the atoms of the gustatory organ are on the upper surface of the tongue. The atoms of the visual, hearing, smelling and tasting organs can all occur simultaneously (cf. I, 30), but not all atoms of the tactile organ can occur simultaneously. Always more than one atom must occur simultaneously for perception to take place. Thus individual atoms can't be perceived.

Are the supporting objects for consciousnesses also their directly antecedent conditions? (A directly antecedent condition is any condition which helps give rise to a factor which is similar to it and which follows upon it immediately--cf. II, 62.) The eye is only the support for a visual consciousness, and not its directly antecedent condition, since it does not condition the nature of the consciousness. The mental factors which arise immediately previous to a consciousness-moment are always its directly antecedent conditions, since they not only help give rise to the consciousness-moment but color its very nature. As regards a mental consciousness, its supporting objects are always also its directly antecedent conditions, though again there are directly antecedent conditions which are not its supporting object, namely the mental factors still more antecedent.

45.(E123-126; T125-126) If the eye is feeble, the consciousness is too. The object, on the other hand, has no such direct effect on the consciousness.

48.(E132-133; T130-131) Everything perceived by the other consciousnesses is sorted and discerned by the mental consciousness. The unconditioned factors (I, 4-5) are eternal. There are twenty-two faculties, factors which have a predominance for the psychophysical complex. They are the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, tactile body, mind (meaning all six consciousnesses), femininity, masculinity, vitality, satisfaction, frustration, contentedness, irritation, equanimity, faith, energy, mindfulness, meditation, insight, coming to know what wasn't known, understanding, and perfect knowledge. (For definitions of these see Chapter Two.)
the faculties Vasubandhu has no disagreement with the Vaibhāsikas.

4. (E141-142; T157-158) The last three faculties are predominant in the acquisition of liberation.

Objection: Why aren't other factors also faculties, such as the voice, the hands, the feet, etc.?

5. (E142-143; T158) Answer: Because in giving the list of faculties the Buddha wanted to highlight the supports of consciousness and that which prolongs, afflicts, and purifies them.

6. (E143-144; T159-160) On the other hand, the voice is not predominant in speech, as speech has to be learned. Hands and feet are not predominant in taking and moving, since "taking" and "moving" are really metaphors for something new arising in another locus immediately following upon something else (see Chapter Four), and snakes, etc., need neither hands nor feet to take or move. Similarly, the anus is not predominant for excretion, since heavy objects always fall in space, and it is the internal wind-element which really makes the excrement come out.

8. (E147; T162) Equanimity involves no conceptual construction, no differentiation, so it is not differentiated into mental physical.

10. (E151-168; T165-171) When a perfected being deliberately prolongs his life, the faculty of vitality involved can no longer be karmic retribution, because it is then the result of an impulse.

How can one say that the faculty of irritation is never retribution? A sūtra says that a feeling experienced as irritation may be retributory.

Vaibhāsika: But the sūtra doesn't mean to say that the irritation is the result of an action: it means only that the action is accompanied by a feeling of irritation.

Vasubandhu: The same sūtra speaks of feelings experienced as contentedness and indifference. To be consistent, you must interpret these expressions in the same way.

Vaibhāsika: The same difficulty doesn't arise. The sūtra may be interpreted as saying that contentedness and indifference are retributions in certain cases, or that the action is accompanied by contentedness or indifference.

Vasubandhu: But there is no logical ground for saying that irritation is never retribution.

Vaibhāsika: Irritation is always caused by conceptual construction, when one thinks about what one fears or doesn't like. Being the result of conceptual construction, it isn't retribution.

Vasubandhu: The same must hold for contentedness, which consequently can't be retribution, either.

Vaibhāsika: If you say that irritation is retribution, then when someone has committed a grave offence and feels regret, this is tantamount to saying that the retribution occurs immediately after the act, because regret is a kind of irritation. But we do not admit immediate retributions.

Vasubandhu: But you do admit that contentedness is retribution, and yet this may occur immediately after a good act.

Vaibhāsika: People detached from any desires do not have the faculty of irritation, but they do have faculties which are retributional; thus the faculty of irritation is not retribution.

Vasubandhu: But such people cannot have contentedness, which is retribution, either. They do have a contentedness which comes from meditation, but this is good and thus isn't retribution.

Vaibhāsika: They have contentedness, whether retribution or not.

17-21. (E171-179; T179-184) Objection: Since (see Table I in the summary of the Kōsa) only nine faculties are always ethically neutral features of a perfected being, why does the Jñānaprasthāna say that eleven are?

Answer: That passage is speaking of one who is able to gain perfection—he may experience satisfaction or contentedness as well as equanimity, e.g., after backsliding. However, one cannot have more than one at any time.

Further details about the faculties possessed in the different realms, and which go along with which.

22. (E181-185; T185-188) Do conditioned factors arise independently, or do they sometimes arise necessarily together?

Vaibhāsika: Sometimes they must arise together. For instance, a molecule (saṁghataparamāntu) must consist of at least eight actual entities: one atom of each of the great material elements (cf. 1, 12), and four atoms of derived materiality, corresponding to the visible, smell, taste and tactile. The molecules making up the simplest sentient beings must consist of at least nine atoms, the eight mentioned above plus an atom of the sense of touch.

Vasubandhu: If every molecule contains atoms of each of the four great elements, why is it that solidity is perceived only in some material agglomerations, heat only in some others, etc.?

Vaibhāsika: What is perceived is the element which is the most
intense.

Vasubandhu: How do you know that a molecule has elements which aren’t perceived?

Vaibhāṣīka: But they are in evidence anyway. Solid things may become liquid, such as when iron is melted. Thus iron contains the liquid element “water”. The element of fire exists in water, as it is colder or warmer.

Vasubandhu: How can you maintain that air contains color? If each molecule contains at least one atom of the visible, then air should have color.

Vaibhāṣīka: This is a matter of faith, not of inference. Or else, one can say that color exists in air because the air carries odors, and odor is never dissociated from color.

Vasubandhu: You say that a molecule must have at least eight atoms, which you sometimes call “substances” (dravya). Do you mean actual substances, which have an essential nature, or do you mean sense-fields, which have only distinctive general characteristics? In the first case, the minimum number of atoms given is too small, because the molecule must contain also a shape-atom, since several atoms are aggregated. It must also contain the derived materiality called “tactile”, etc. In the second case, the proposed number of atoms is too large, because the great material elements are part of the tactile sense-field, and thus the molecule consists only of four entities: the visible, smell, taste, and the tactile.

Vaibhāṣīka: In our usage “dravya” may mean both a substance in the strict sense and a sense-field. Among the eight dravyas of the molecule there are four real dravyas, the four great elements, and four sense-fields, which are four kinds of derived materiality supported by the great elements.

Vasubandhu: If each of the atoms of derived materiality is supported by four atoms of the great elements, then the molecule has twenty atoms or dravyas. Besides, your usage of the term “dravya” is ambiguous and capricious.

23.(E186; T188-189) Vaibhāṣīka: The conditioned factors constituting sentient beings always arise with possession, a connector-factor linking them together.

Vasubandhu: The accompanying mental factors may be divided into the following groups: generally permeating factors, those arising with every awareness; good permeating factors, those arising with every

good awareness; defiled permeating factors, those arising with every bad awareness; and limitedly defiled permeating factors, those arising with secondary afflictions.

24.(E187; T190) Among the generally permeating factors, “contact” means the contiguity of organ, object of consciousness, and consciousness.

28.(E194-195; T196) Some other accompanying mental factors are indeterminate: they can be associated with a good, bad or neutral awareness. They are regret, sleepiness, initial and sustained thought (see 1, 32).

31.(E200; T199) Arrogance may exist in all three realms of existence.

33.(E204-207;T202-204) Vasubandhu: How can initial and sustained thought be associated with the same moment of awareness? The Vibhāṣā compares sustained thought to cold water, initial thought to the heat of the sun, and the awareness with clarified butter which is floating on the cold water. Because of the water and the sun, the clarified butter is neither too liquid nor too compact. In the same way, initial and sustained thought may be associated with the same awareness: initial thought makes the awareness not too subtle, and sustained thought makes it not too gross.

But, for the simile to be exact, initial and sustained thought are not the grossness and subtlety of awareness, but the causes of grossness and subtlety of awareness. Besides, "grossness" and "subtlety" are relative. For instance, the awareness of the first meditational state is subtle in relation to an awareness of the realm of desires, but gross in relation to an awareness of the second meditational state. And if initial and sustained thought are grossness and subtlety of awareness respectively, then they would continue to exist even up to the next to the last of the highest immaterial meditations. But in fact they both cease after the second meditational state. Besides, it is not logical that “grossness” and "subtlety" can establish a specific difference. According to the Sautrāntikas, initial and sustained thoughts are not separable events but the collection of awarenesses and mental factors which make for speech and inner discursiveness.

Vaibhāṣīka: But what is the objection to having a subtle and gross factor coexist with one awareness?

Vasubandhu: There is no objection if the two factors are specifically different—for example, if there is a gross feeling and a subtle awareness
coexisting. But if one is speaking of two states of one kind, then it is a contradiction to speak of them as being subtle and gross simultaneously.

Vaiśeṣika: But there is a specific difference between initial and sustained thought. This difference is difficult to indicate, but it is manifested by the feebleness or strength of an awareness.

Saṃkhyā: Feebleness and strength do not demonstrate the presence of two factors which are specifically different; for each specifically different factor, there may be feebleness or strength.

Vasubandhu: Initial and sustained thought do not coexist with the same awareness. They exist successively.

35-36. (E211-218; T207-213) Vasubandhu: How can you demonstrate the existence of possession? Such a thing can neither be directly perceived, nor can it be inferred from its efficacy.

Vaiśeṣika: Possession does have efficacy, for it is the cause of the arising of events.

Vasubandhu: This reply will get you in trouble. You say that one can possess the two kinds of cessation (see I, 4-5), yet these are unconditioned, and hence don't arise. And as for conditioned factors, there can't be possession if they haven't yet arisen, nor can there be any for factors which have been abandoned by a change of realm of existence (see I, 30). So how can the first arise, and how can the second have arisen?

Vaiśeṣika: The arising of these factors is caused by a possession which is simultaneous with them.

Vasubandhu: If all factors arise because of possession, then there is no role for birth (jāti) nor for the birth of birth, events which don't pertain to sentient beings wouldn't arise (since possession exists only in psychophysical complexes), and there would be no difference in degree of the afflictions "possessed" by one in the realm of desires. If you say that these differences arise from causes other than possession, we will simply maintain that these other causes are the sole causes, and ignore possession.

Saṃkhyā: Possession is not the cause of the arising of factors, but it is the cause of their particular states. If you suppose there is no possession, what difference is there between a noble person, in the moment in which he has a worldly awareness, and an ordinary person? For us, the difference lies in the fact that the noble one, even when he has a worldly awareness, is still connected by possession to undefiled consciousness, while for those at (b), the summit, one practising the cessation-trance has hardly any consciousness at all.

12d. (E411-419; T387-391) Vaiśeṣika: There are three ways of being liberated while in the intermediate state: (1) as soon as one arrives there (dhūrugata), (2) while ideas of material things are still operative (saṃjñāgata), (3) while thoughts are occurring (vītarkagata).

13-14. (E419-426; T391-394) Objection: If the one in the intermediate state has the form of his next birth, then if an embryo dies in the womb of a dog and is replaced by the intermediate state of one going to burn in hell, the dog's womb will get burned!

Answer: Intermediate state "bodies" are neither visible nor tangible.

An intermediate being is the size of a five-year-old but has fully developed organs and, for modesty's sake, is clothed.

There is no intermediate existence in the immaterial realm.

How long does an intermediate existence last? Different opinions: no fixed time; seven days; seven weeks; for various periods depending on circumstances.

15. (E427-429; T395-396) The intermediate being sees, through its divine eye, its parents copulating, and because of its own desire for the parent of the opposite sex hates the other parent as a rival and seeks sexual satisfaction. Thus, arriving at the place of copulation the intermediate being enters the semen and blood of its parents and ceases to exist (as intermediate) as its aggregates harden.

The question arises: where do the organs, etc. of the new body come from? Two answers are possible: (1) they come from the intermediate being's organs, (2) organs arise from actions that create new elements, like leaf-worms. These descriptions apply to those born from eggs and from the womb. "Others", i.e., moisture-born ones, "go motivated by a place's smell or", in the case of magical beings, "from a desire for a place of residence." How can one desire residence in hell? Through confusion--being cold, one seeks a hot place!

24. (E439-440; T404-405) But one can also interpret the entire twelvefold dependent origination formula as taking place in a single moment, when the factor-complex is linked with defilements: there is ignorance there, conditioning factors in the form of a volition-moment, there is a consciousness-moment, there are the other aggregates accompanying this moment, there are the organs in relation to the psychophysical complex, there is contact, a feeling, a cognition-
definition of one who is separate from dharma?

Vaiśeṣika: All three.

Vasubandhu: In that case the Buddha, because he doesn't have all three kinds of patience, would become one separate from dharma.

Vaiśeṣika: But we intend a nonpossession of patience which isn't accompanied by possession.

Vasubandhu: Why bring up these totally hypothetical entities? According to Sautrāntikas the state of being separate from dharma is simply a series where the factors of the path have not arisen.

Vaiśeṣika: Nonpossession ceases with the arising of possession, or by a change of experiential sphere (cf. I, 30).

Vasubandhu: When one exchanges experiential spheres there is nonpossession of the nonpossession of the new sphere. But can there be such a thing? Doesn't this lead to infinite regress?

Vaiśeṣika: No, because one has a possession by possession of possession, and that possession of possession by the same possession.

Vasubandhu: When a good factor arises in a series three factors must co-arise: the good factor, its possession, and the possession of that possession. In the next moment, six factors co-arise: the possession of the good factor, the possession of the possession of the previous moment, the possession of that possession, and three possessions of possessions for the three possessions. In this way, possessions will keep increasing from moment to moment. It's very fortunate that they're immaterial, otherwise there'd be no room for them!

41a. (E232; T221) Vasubandhu: There is no special factor called "homogeneity within a lifetime". Such a postulate reeks of Vaiśeṣika. The homogeneity of factors in an organism can be explained in other ways.

41b-42. (E233-236; T221-224) Nonideation stops awareness and the arising of factors. One who does not conceptually identify in this way remains so for a long time, and dies immediately in heaven, being born again later in the realm of desire.

There are said to be two meditational attainments, the nonideation trance and the cessation trance. Noble persons do not place any value on the nonideation trance. Ordinary people do not value it either, and so do not reap its reward. It is experienced at one time, i.e., in the present alone.

43. (E236-238; T225-26) "Two sorts or neutral", i.e., its karmic maturing takes place either in the next life or later at the summit of existence, or else it is unnecessary in the case of one who achieves parinirvāṇa in this life.

44. (E238-248; T226-233) Although the "Western masters" (Sautrāntikas?) believe the Buddha first attained cessation-trance as an adept and subsequently became liberated, the Vaiśeṣikas deny this, holding that a Buddha needs only thirty-four moments as adept (sixteen moments of realization of the noble truths and eighteen moments abandoning the defilements), with awareness of destruction (of defilements) constituting the final step in which one abandons the summit of existence.

"One's first cessation-trance must occur as a human", for a human can fall from it. Other schools' opinions about backsliding are reviewed.

In the two meditational attainments the series of awarenesses is interrupted for quite some time. When there is emergence from the trance, how is it that awareness again arises, since the series has been interrupted?

Vaiśeṣika: There is no difficulty for us, because past factors exist (see V, 25). Thus the awareness which entered into the attainment is the directly antecedent condition (cf. I, 44) for the awareness which emerges from the attainment.

Some Sautrāntikas say that the awareness which emerges comes from the body fitted out with its faculties, not from a previous awareness. Bhadanta Vasumitra, in his treatise Pariprasthāṇa, says that there is a subtle awareness existing during cessation which is the cause of the awareness on emerging. Ghoṣaka, however, argues that all awarenesses must be accompanied by the generally permeating factors (see II, 24). And since the generally permeating factors include feelings, identifications, and volition, the presence of awareness is required and cessation would be impossible.

Bhadanta Vasumitra: A sūtra says that feelings give rise to desires, and yet this isn't the case for perfected beings, for example. So not all contacts involve feelings.

Ghoṣaka: But the sūtra clearly says that it is feelings arisen from a contact accompanied by ignorance that give rise to desires, but contacts invariably give rise to feelings.

Bhadanta Vasumitra: If there is no awareness in the meditative attainment, how can one even call it an "attainment"?
Ghosaka: It is designated that way because the great elements have reached an equilibrium which is counteractive to the arising of awarenesses.

Vasubandhu: Should these meditative attainments be considered to be existing in themselves as actual entities, or only as designations for awarenesses not arising in the series?

Ghosaka: They are entities because they prohibit awarenesses from arising.

Vasubandhu: But it isn't the meditative attainment which prohibits them from arising; it's the awareness which enters the attainment that prohibits further awarenesses from arising.

Ghosaka: If the attainment is not an entity, how can it be considered a conditioned factor?

Vasubandhu: It is designated as a conditioned factor because it has a beginning and end. But really there is no such factor as "attainment of cessation".

45a.(E248-255; T233-239) Vasubandhu: Where is the life-force located?

Vaiśākha: In heat and consciousness.

Vasubandhu: If these three factors are located in each other and continue to exist in series, how do they ever end? Which of the three ceases first?

Vaiśākha: Vitality is located in karma; when karma ceases vitality does too.

Vasubandhu: Then why don't you say that heat and consciousness are located in karma and dispense with vitality?

Vaiśākha: That which is located in karma is by necessity karmic maturation. If consciousness were supported by karma alone, then all life states would be maturations, which isn't the case.

Vasubandhu: So you say that karma supports the bodily heat and the consciousness. You still don't need a separate vitality.

Vaiśākha: It is necessary, because in the immaterial realm there is no heat.

Vasubandhu: Consciousness in the immaterial realm could be supported by karma.

Vaiśākha: You are twisting your own thesis. Before, you said that consciousness is supported by heat, and now you say it's supported by karma.

Vasubandhu: I don't deny that there's something like vitality, only
two separate entities. One can also say "the torso of a body"; this doesn’t mean that the torso is an entity separate from the body.

Vaiśānika: With the entity birth we can easily explain why the unconditioned factors don’t arise.

Vasubandhu: I say that conditioned factors arise because they exist having not existed. But the unconditioned is eternal, so how could it arise?

47. (E271-276; T251-254) Vasubandhu: Aren’t all three collections speech (vāc), and consequently sound (śabda), and thus belong among the material aggregates, not conditioning factors?

Vaiśānika: If they were only sound there would be no way to distinguish meaningless from meaningful sounds.

Vasubandhu: When I say "speech" I don’t mean just sound, but sounds which human beings have agreed to mean certain things. But once this agreement has been made, the vocal sound itself gives rise to an understanding of the meaning. So there is no necessity for a special entity "word".

Vaiśānika: We say that vocal sound produces a word, which is something separate.

Vasubandhu: But it is absurd to assume that vocal sound produces an entity "word", for the vocal sounds making up a word don’t all exist at the same time. The sounds are heard successively, and if the "word" is an entity it can’t be produced by parts.

Vaiśānika: The case is analogous to that of unmanifest karma (see I, 11). It is the last moment of a manifest bodily or verbal action which produces unmanifest karma, but this last moment depends on the previous moments of the action.

Vasubandhu: If the last moment of sound produces the word, then it would suffice to hear the last moment of vocal sound in order to understand the word. If you say that the syllables bring about a word, the same objection holds as before, because the syllables are produced successively. I hold that it is the syllables which ultimately exist, and that the word is a composite of syllables, with no more unity than a row of ants or a series of awarenesses.

50. (E280-283; T256) Though one can call all causes "efficient causes", the term is more specifically used for a generative cause. Thus the eye and color are efficient causes of visual consciousness.

51. (E283-291; T257-262) The "two restraints" are meditative trance and pure restraint.

VAIBHĀṢIKA: Simultaneous causes are factors related as cause and effect which coexist in the same moment, such as an awareness and its accompanying mental factors.

Sautrāntika: No such thing as a simultaneous cause can exist, because a cause must precede its effect.

Sarvāstivāda: A light arises at the same time as its luster, and yet the light is the cause of the luster.

Sautrāntika: The light and its luster are both effects of a complex of anterior causes: the oil, the wick, etc.

Sarvāstivāda: The relation of cause and effect is demonstrated by the existence or nonexistence of that which is called an effect in relation to the existence or nonexistence of that which is called cause. Where A isn’t, B isn’t—thus A is the cause, B the effect.

Sautrāntika: How can simultaneous factors stand in a cause-effect relation?

Sarvāstivāda: Just as three sticks may stand because they support each other, so awarenesses and mental factors support each other.

Sautrāntika: But anterior causes have gone into this result of three sticks supporting each other. And besides, there are other causes here too, such as the earth, a string, etc.

52. (E292-302; T262-269) An example of a homogeneous cause is the first stage of an embryo’s existence, which is the cause of the later stages.

The question whether a later factor can be the cause of an earlier one is discussed, citing Jñānaprasthāna both for and against. Vasubandhu’s answer is "no".

54. (E310-316; T274-277) Neutral factors are not retributive causes, because a retribution is caused only by a factor which is conjoined with craving. Factors which are never linked to defilements can only be karmically neutral. (Note the distinction between that which is intrinsically good--the factors which are never linked to defilements--and those which are karmically good--the good potentially linked with defilements.)

55. (E319-327; T278-286) How can an unconditioned factor be an efficient cause? Because it does not obstruct the occurrence of any fact, although, being timeless, it cannot produce a result.

Sautrāntika: An unconditioned factor can’t be a cause at all.

Sarvāstivāda: Then how can it be the supporting object of the awareness of it?
Sautrāntika: The "unconditioned factors" are merely absences. Space is just the absence of tangibles, calculated cessation the nonarising of future propensities, uncalculated cessation the absence of any future factors at all arising. Other definitions are reviewed.

Sarvāstivādin: If unconditioned factors don't exist how can a sūtra say, e.g., that detachment is the best of all the factors, since detachment (=cessation) doesn't exist?

Sautrāntika: Before, e.g., a sound occurs we speak of its prior absence; afterwards we speak of its posterior absence. To speak thus does not imply that the absence of sound exists; likewise for the absences which are the unconditioned factors.

The rest of this lengthy discussion turns on the interpretation of sūtras.

61. (E342; T296) The four are causal, directly antecedent, supporting, and dominant causes.

62. (E342; T297) There is discussion here of how many mental concomitants accompany the awarenesses that make up a series of factors, and of whether factors of a certain sort can only be a directly antecedent condition of another of that type or not.

The dissociated conditioning factors and material factors are not directly antecedent conditions. Nor can future factors be so, despite passages in scripture that appear to imply it.

63-64. (E352:355; T306-308) Theist: Factors arise in succession because of the desire of God that one factor arise now, another later.

Vasubandhu: If that is so, then they don't arise from a single cause, but from the desires, which are plural. Since God is supposed to be nonmultiple, His desires should be so too, and thus there can only be simultaneous generation of everything.

Theist: The desires of God are not simultaneous, because He takes notice of other causes.

Vasubandhu: Then God is not the unique cause of all things. And the causes He regards depend upon other causes, ad infinitum.

Theist: Well, let's admit that the series of causes has no beginning.

Vasubandhu: In that case, the world has no beginning, and this is contrary to your thesis.

Theist: But God wants things to arise successively.

Vasubandhu: What advantages does God get from making things?

Theist: It's for His own satisfaction.

Vasubandhu: If He needs to do something for His own satisfaction, then He isn't really sovereign. And besides, to think that God takes satisfaction in all the suffering of the world, what kind of a God is this? If you admit any other causes at all, you can't claim that God is the unique cause. Maybe to avoid denying causes which are obvious, and to avoid claiming that God is active now, which isn't apparent, the theist will say that the work of God is His first creation. But then, since God is eternal, His creation will be eternal too. All theories of a unique cause, whether called "God" or "purusa" or "pradhāna", are nonsense.

CHAPTER THREE

3. (E383-384; T366-367) The four inmaterial varieties are the bases of space, consciousness, nothingness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

Whereas the awarenesses of material beings depend on matter, the streams of awareness of the inmaterial realm depend on homogeneity and vitality. But what do those two depend on? On each other, say the Abhidharmikas, but we Sautrāntikas say they need no support other than themselves.

4. (E387-393; T371-374) The first four courses (of hell-dwellers, ghosts, animals and humans) and some of the fifth (gods) are in the realm of desire; the rest of the gods are in the other two realms.

"Undefiled-neutral", i.e., those in the five courses are karmically conditioned.

Another view is that the five courses are undefiled and good. But the Vaibhāsikas say all five realms are undefiled-neutral, although some say they involve only karmically-produced factors, while others say that some factors are the result of growth.

5. (E393-396; T374-377) Specifically, (1) humans and some gods of the first stage have differing bodies and ideas, (2) comprises Brahmā and his associates, (3) contains the Ābhāsvara gods, the highest gods of the second stage, who are sometimes satisfied and sometimes experience neither satisfaction nor frustration, (4) are the Śrūṇtrsna gods, who experience only satisfaction, (5) are those who meditate on endless space, (6) those who meditate on endless consciousness, and (7) those who meditate on nothingness.

6a. (E397-398; T377-378) "The remaining sorts of beings" include (a) those in the first three courses (hell, ghosts, animals) and (b) those at the summit of the fourth stage. For those in (a) experience limits
consciousness, while for those at (b), the summit, one practising the cessation-trance has hardly any consciousness at all.

12d. (E411-419; T387-391) Vibhajjāvādin: There are three ways of being liberated while in the intermediate state: (1) as soon as one arrives there (dhātu gata), (2) while ideas of material things are still operative (saṃjhāgata), (3) while thoughts are occurring (vītarkagata).

13-14. (E419-426; T391-394) Objection: If the one in the intermediate state has the form of his next birth, then if an embryo dies in the womb of a dog and is replaced by the intermediate state of one going to burn in hell, the dog's womb will get burned!

Answer: Intermediate state "bodies" are neither visible nor tangible. An intermediate being is the size of a five-year-old but has fully developed organs and, for modesty's sake, is clothed.

There is no intermediate existence in the immaterial realm.

How long does an intermediate existence last? Different opinions: no fixed time; seven days; seven weeks; for various periods depending on circumstances.

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24. (E439-440; T404-405) But one can also interpret the entire twelfeold dependent origination formula as taking place in a single moment, when the factor-complex is linked with defilements: there is ignorance there, conditioning factors in the form of a volition-moment, there is a consciousness-moment, there are the other aggregates accompanying this moment, there are the organs in relation to the psychophysical complex, there is contact, a feeling, a cognition-

moment, craving, grasping, rigidification of being, the arising of all these events (which is a kind of birth), their maturity (old age), and their cessation (death).

25. (E441; T406) The "misunderstandings" arise from questions such as "Did I exist in the past?", "Will I exist in the future", "Where are we?"

26. (E442-443; T406-407) Ignorance, craving, and grasping are defilements; conditioning factors and being are action. (This latter classification rests on the fact that mental action, the basic kind of action entailing retribution for Vasubandhu, is volition, the most important of the conditioning factors and the basis of being-again or rigidification of being.

27. (E443-449; T407-410) Defilements breed defilements, as when grasping arises from craving. The basic members of dependent origination (i.e., those which are neither affliction nor action) give rise to other basic members, as when the psychophysical complex arises from consciousness during conception in the womb. They may also result in defilements, as when feelings give rise to cravings. Actions arise from defilements, as when ignorance gives rise to conditioning factors. And from action, the basic members may arise, as when conditioning factors give rise to consciousness.

Vaiśeṣika: There is no infinite regress because ignorance itself also has a cause, unreasoned attention. It is not specifically mentioned in the formula because it is the same as grasping.

Vasubandhu: How do you know this? It may be associated with grasping, but also with ignorance and craving.

Vaiśeṣika: A careful examination brings the following results: with perfected beings, feeling is not the cause of craving, since only defiled feeling causes craving. That is, the kind of feelings that give rise to cravings is a contact accompanied by ignorance, and this is what one may call unreasoned attention.

Vasubandhu: Some, such as the Mahiśāsakas, assert that dependent origination is an unconditioned factor. If one means by this that it's always by reason of ignorance that conditioning factors arise, etc., and thus dependent origination is in a sense eternal, this is true. But if one means that there is a special entity "dependent origination", then it isn't.

28a. (E449-463; T410-419) A number of grammatical arguments here.
Various explanations are offered as to why the Buddha provides different definitions of dependent origination. Different interpretations of dependent origination are distinguished.

30b. (E469-470; T422-424) What is "contact"? The Sautrāntikas say that it's simply the meeting of sense-organ, object and consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins say that it's a special entity associated with awareness, different from the meeting of the three. Śrīlātā says that contact is the organ/object/consciousness which are related as cause and effect. How does the Sarvāstivādin explain the sūtra which clearly defines "contact" as the meeting together of the three?

32ab. (E473-479; T427-433) Does a contact precede the feeling it produces, or is it simultaneous with it?

Vaibhāṣika: They are simultaneous causes of each other.

Sautrāntika: Then they must be reciprocal causes of each other, and that is wrong.

Vaibhāṣika: There is no fault. Causes sometimes precede their effects but are sometimes simultaneous with them.

Śrīlātā: The contact must precede the feeling. First there are organ and object, next there is contact, which is the coming together of three things: organ, object and consciousness. Following that arises the feeling.

Vaibhāṣika: Then in the second moment there is consciousness but no feeling--how can that be?

Śrīlātā: The consciousness in the second moment is caused by an earlier contact.

Vaibhāṣika: Then a feeling produced by visual contact would be produced by an earlier auditory contact, for example. That is impossible.

Śrīlātā: No. The consciousness of color is not contact but produces a feeling at t, while the consciousness of sound is contact but does not produce feeling at t.

Vaibhāṣika: This contradicts the rule that all the generally permeating factors (including sensations, feelings, etc.) are associated with every awareness.

Śrīlātā: We do not recognize the authority for that "rule". Or, if you please, we have a different theory of "generally permeating factors". According to our (Sautrāntika) theory, although the ten factors of consciousness, feelings, etc., occur in all the kinds of stages there are, it is not that every awareness includes each and every one of those factors.

32cd. (E479-482; T431-433) There are six contented mental ponderings, six irritated ones, and six of equanimity. Each group has six since they relate to the five kinds of sense-objects and to factors as the sixth.

What does "mental pondering" (manopavicāra) mean? The Vaibhāṣikas say that the mind supports the contentment, irritation and equanimity with which sense-objects are grasped. Another opinion is that these eighteen cause the mind to reconsider sense-objects, etc.

Objects are not satisfying, irritating, etc. by nature, but may be satisfying for one person, irritating to another, etc. But all mental ponderings are impure.

37d-38c. (E491; T438-439) The "four states of existence" are intermediate existence, rearising, living and dying.

98. (E554-555; T487-488) The Kṣaṇa's theory of "social contract": Originally, when rice was first used by human beings as food, it was gathered not cultivated, and one cut it once in the morning for the morning meal, once again in the evening for the evening meal. But one person, who was too lazy to want to do both cuttings, cut a lot at a morning cutting and saved some for his evening meal. Others imitated him. With this storing of food arose the idea of "mine". The rice which was cut repeatedly ceased to grow. So efforts had to be made to make the rice grow--this was the beginning of agriculture. They divided the fields among themselves. But the stronger began to take away the fields of the weaker--this was the beginning of stealing. To prevent stealing, they held a meeting and gave a sixth of their produce to an outstanding man, who was told to guard the fields. The term kṣatrya to denote the warrior-ruler class is derived from kṣetra. The first kṣetra, Mahāsāmata, made his office hereditary: this was the beginning of dynasties. Later there were many thieves and highway-robbers. The kṣetra, or king as we call him now, punished them with the sword. Others said "We didn't do anything wrong"--this was the beginning of lying.

99. (E556-557; T489) An eon ends when life expectancy is only ten years.

100. (E557-563; T491-494) Vasubandhu's arguments against the Vaiśeṣika conception of composite whole:

(1) When the organ of the visual or tactile consciousness is in contact with one thread, the cloth is not perceived. If the composite
whole "cloth" exists in each thread, it would have to be perceived even if only one of its threads is.

(2) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the composite whole does not exist within each of its parts, how will it be demonstrated that it is anything but the collection of these parts?

(3) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the composite whole does exist within each of its parts, but that perception of one thread does not result in the perception of cloth because the perception of cloth presupposes contact of the organ with several of the parts, then if one sees the border of a cloth one would see the whole cloth.

(4) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the perception of the composite whole depends upon the perception of its central and other portions, one would never see a composite whole, because one can never see its central- and end-parts simultaneously.

(5) If the Vaiśeṣika says that these parts are perceived in succession, then the perception of cloth does not differ from the perception of a "circle" that results from hurling a torch in full arc. Objects of consciousness of such perceptions cannot be real entities in any way.

(6) When threads of different colors come together to form a cloth, how can the cloth be considered an entity? According to Vaiśeṣika, qualities like color must pervade their substances totally. Thus one substance can have only one quality of a type. So what does one do with a cloth of many colors? Unlike the Vaiśeṣika atomic theory, which needs the composite whole because atoms are absolutely imperceptible, the Vaibhāṣikas state that atoms in aggregation are perceived.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. (E568; T552) The Vaibhāṣikas assume bodily and verbal karma also, which constitute manifest and unmanifest karma (see I, 11).

2. (E569-570; T553-554) Vārṣiputriya: If things are momentary, what is the cause of their destruction?

Vasubandhu: There is no special cause of destruction, because destruction is an absence and absences need no causes. If things were not arising and ceasing all the time, nothing could ever change at all. If you say that there is no more weighty means of cognition than direct perception, and that we can see wood being destroyed by fire, so that in this case a cause of destruction is directly perceived, we must investigate the phenomenon of combustion. Actually, we do not directly perceive the destruction of the wood: all we perceive is that we don't see the wood after its prolonged contact with fire. To say that the fire is the cause of the destruction of wood rests upon an inference, and what's more, an inference which isn't foolproof. It is equally possible to say that wood-moments are perishing incessantly of themselves, and arise again incessantly except when they come in relation with fire. You admit that the destruction of a flame occurs by itself. Even in the case when a gust of wind puts out a flame, you don't say it's the wind that is the cause of the flame's destruction; you say that the flame has ceased to renew "itself"--or rather the flame-series has ceased, because of "its" relation with wind. The same for a hand covering a bell: the hand simply impedes the renewal of the continuation of the sound-series, which would in any case cease by itself.

3. (E570-578; T554-560) If destruction needed a special cause, as arising does, then there would be no case of destruction without a cause. But you admit that awarenesses, flames, and sounds perish without a special cause. If one says that the destruction of wood takes place because of fire, then one has to admit that the generative cause of something can at the same time cause its cause destruction. For example, in the process of dyeing, the color of the object being dyed is changing from moment to moment. Thus the first with the dye-stuffs is both the cause of one color's arising and the cause of another's destruction, and subsequent moments of the fire-series are causes of the next color's destruction and another one's arising, etc. But it is impossible that the same kind of thing be both the generative cause and the cause of destruction of another kind of thing. I conclude that things cease because they are by nature momentary, and the other factors are catalysts only for the nonremoval of the series. Everything being momentary, no movement of the same thing is possible.

As to the Vaibhāṣikā theory that manifest bodily karma is a shape (the changing shapes of what is conventionally called "a hand moving", "lips moving", etc.), shape as a separate entity can't be demonstrated either. The visible can in fact be reduced totally to color. When there is color in one direction in great quantity, one calls it "long". When it is seen in small quantity one calls it "short". When it spreads in four directions one calls it "quadrangular" (caturasraka). When it is equal
in every direction from the center one calls it a "circle".

What is termed "shape" is really perceived by two different kinds of organs. One can tell that something is "long" by the eyes, one can also do so by the organ of touch.

Vaibhāṣika: But the tactile organs don't directly perceive shape: they only construe it from arrangements of the soft, hard, etc.

Vasubandhu: In the same way, shape isn't directly seen by the eye, but construed from arrangements of color.

Vaibhāṣika: When we get the idea of a shape from touch, it's not that touch directly perceives it--rather we remember the shape that we saw and tell by touch that the tactile sensation corresponds. Just as when we see the color of a fire we remember its heat, or when we smell the fragrance of a flower we remember its color.

Vasubandhu: In this case, there is a strict correlation; fire is always hot, etc. But there is no tactile sensation which is invariably associated with a shape. In a variegated tapestry one sees various shapes. In the same part of it one can construe two or three different ones. Thus there are various kinds of visibles in one place, following your theory, and this is impossible.

Vaibhāṣika: If shape isn't distinct from color, then the shape of one thing couldn't differ from another's when their colors are the same.

Vasubandhu: No. "Long" refers to real things arranged in a certain way, just as ants may form lines or circles.

Vaibhāṣika: When an object is far away one can see its shape before its color.

Vasubandhu: Actually, one sees its color, but mainly indistinctly.

Vaibhāṣika: Well, what is manifest karma to you, then?

Vasubandhu: I admit that manifest karma is shape, but I deny that shape is a special sort of entity.

Vaibhāṣika: But there must be a real entity underlying manifest karma.

Vasubandhu: A bodily action is actually a thought which puts the body into activity.

Vaibhāṣika: But a śūtra clearly states that there are two kinds of karmic results: volition and the action after volition. How can you distinguish these?

Vasubandhu: There are two kinds of volition. One is preparatory, the next is the thought "which raises a hand", etc.

Vaibhāṣika: In that case, you're actually denying manifest karma as an entity.

Vasubandhu: True.

Vaibhāṣika: If there is no manifest action, unmanifest karma can't exist either, as it always depends on the manifest sort.

Vasubandhu: The goodness or badness of a long-past decision brought into effect by others rests on the volition involved in that decision and its traces in the series. Thus, the concept of "unmanifest karma" isn't necessary.

4ab. (E579-590; T560-568) If you say that the śūtras mention a kind of materiality which exercises no resistance, and that this must refer to unmanifest karma, I reply that someone in meditation may see a skeleton, etc., and yet this materiality occupies no locus and exercises no resistance. If you say that there is a śūtra which says there is a materiality not liable to connection with proclivities this may also refer to such meditatively-seen materiality. If you say that there is a śūtra which says that merit increases, this phenomenon can as well be explained as volition. If you say there is no way to make the instigator of a murder responsible for the act if there is no unmanifest karma, I say that the thought of the instigator is bad in itself and carries its retribution by a transformation of "his" series.

Vaibhāṣika: Was this preference for a "transformation of a series"?

Vasubandhu: Actually, both the theory of unmanifest karma and the theory of transformation of the series are difficult to demonstrate. But it is easier to see how a volition transforms a mental series than how a certain material factor suddenly arises which has nothing to do with the awarenesses of the instigator. If you say that without unmanifest karma there is no violation of the prāṇāmaya rules when a monk who has committed misdeeds does not admit them, the badness of this violation can be explained by me by his decision to stay silent.

4cd. (E590; T568) As soon as one performs an action those great elements constitute a set of unmanifest karma, which set then generates the set in the next moment, and so on, and thus karma is stored up for later retribution.

8b. (E597; T573) Actions are good or bad depending on the factors involved. Factors are good or bad (1) from the highest standpoint (e.g., liberation is absolutely good), (2) in terms of their intrinsic nature (e.g., medicine), (3) through their association with goods or bad things (a particular medical treatment), (4) because of the goodness or badness of their cause (e.g., cow's milk).
10. (E600; T576) For instance, someone may have the intention to go to the village (inciting causal factor), but he may die at the next moment so no accompanying causal factor ever occurs.

The kind of consciousness which is given up by seeing the four truths is an inciter only. The mental consciousness given up by meditation is both an inciter and an accompanying causal factor. The five sensory consciousnesses are inciters only.

That which arises from retribution arises spontaneously, without any conditioning factors being necessary. Thus retribution is neither an inciter nor an accompanying causal factor.

12. (E603-605; T579-580) According to you, is manifest karma good, bad or neutral according to the character of its inciter or of its accompanying causal factors?

Vaibhāṣika: What is the point of this question?

Vasubandhu: The view of a self in the body and views regarding the impermanence and permanence of the elements constituting personality are, according to you, inciters (see IV, 11). They are always obstructed but neutral (i.e., they are liable to be connected with afflictions, but are karmically neutral). If the manifestation which follows upon these views has the same karmic nature as they do, it has to be unobstructed but neutral too. And according to you, a retribution-causing action which is unobstructed but neutral in the realm of desires does not exist. Or otherwise you must abandon your first thesis in IV, 11. As regards the view that manifest actions follow the karmic nature of their accompanying causal factors, the manifest action of a person undergoing monastic discipline could not be good in that case, if his awarenesses at the time are bad or neutral.

Vaibhāṣika: The unmanifest karma has the same karmic nature as its inciter when it is an awareness susceptible to abandonment by meditation. It is not of the same nature as its inciter when it is an awareness susceptible to abandonment by right views, for example the awareness that the self exists, because in that case there is, in between the inciter and the manifest karma, another inciter, an awareness susceptible to abandonment by meditation, turned outwardly, accompanied by the initial and/or sustained thought (see II, 33) which results in the view of a self. The first primary causal factor is neutral, the second is bad, the manifest karma is bad. From an inciter susceptible to abandonment by right view there arises another inciter susceptible to abandonment by meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second inciter arises manifest karma which is of the same nature.

Vasubandhu: But if manifest karma is not good, bad or neutral according to its secondary causal factors, then your theory—that views are inciters, that they generate manifest karma, that an awareness susceptible to abandonment by right views doesn't engender a manifest karma, and that there is no manifest karma in the realm of desires which is obstructed by the neutral—becomes unintelligible.

50. (E657; T625) "In this life, etc.": in this life, the next life, or one still later.

Others say that karmic retribution that has begun to be experienced in one life can continue to be so in a later life. Others, the Vaibhāṣikas, disagree.

51-52. (E558-560; T626-628) "Some others", viz., the Dārṣṭāntikas, who classify karma into (1) karma whose time of maturation is determined but whose kind of maturation is not; (2) karma whose kind of maturation is determined but whose time is not; (3) karma whose time and kind of maturation are determined; (4) karma whose time and kind of maturation are not determined.

There is no bad action in the three higher realms. Good actions in hell produce good or neutral karmic results in later existences, but not in hell itself, for there is no good retribution in hell.

54. (E661; T630) All actions other than those mentioned are not determined.

65. (E673; T639) The three bad practices that are not actions are covetousness, malice and false view.

Dārṣṭāntika: No, they are mental acts (citing textual authority).

Vaibhāṣika: But sūtras tell us that defilements are not actions (re-explaining the authoritative text cited).

67. (E676-677; T641-642) The principal six bad actions are the taking of life, stealing, offences of lust—as when one steals another's wife, or ravishes a young girl—false speech, slander, harsh or unconsidered speech.

Vaibhāṣika: If one has someone else do such an act it constitutes his unmanifest karma, except for offences of lust, which must always be committed by the agent and so are always manifest actions.

Vasubandhu: The entire Vaibhāṣika concept of manifest and unmanifest karma has already been rejected. It is the volitions to do these acts which are bad, as well as the volition which sets the body or
voice into activity to perform them.

"One bad action always of two kinds" is adultery, since one must do it in person.

68. (E677-780; T642-646) The taking of life means the taking of animal as well as of human life. Even to willfully kill the smallest animal is a bad action, and carries a karmic retribution. In fact, it is even wrong to cut the leaves off a tree, or to trample down green plants so that they're destroyed. There are different motives for the taking of life: because of desire; for the sake of robbery; just for the "fun" of it; for the sake of defending oneself or others; because of hatred; because of false views, such as when a kind man thinks he has to have criminals executed, when the Persians think their old people should be killed, or when one says that one should kill snakes, scorpions, etc., or when one is convinced there is no future life or no retribution for killing. Stealing may also come about through desire, or through hatred, or from false views (such as when a king thinks criminals' possessions can be taken away). Offences of lust may of course usually take place through desire, but also through hate and through false views, such as when the Persians have sexual intercourse with their mothers. False speech may also arise from the same three causes.

73. (E685-687; T650-651) Objection: How can there be murder, since aggregates are momentary?

Reply: Taking away the life of an aggregate-series is murder.

According to the Jains, even nonintentional killing is murder. By analogy, even touching someone else's wife without her consent constitutes a case of adultery. And the Jain teachers are themselves guilty, because they preach terrible austerities.

74. (E687-688; T651-653) "Four kinds of women"--intercourse with (1) one who shouldn't consort with (mother, daughter, another's wife), (2) one's wife in an improper way, (3) in an unsuitable place or (4) time.

There are different views about the case of intercourse with someone mistaken for someone else.

79-80. (E697-702; T659-663) Only humans can sever good roots, not animals, not gods, etc., and indeed only some humans, though opinions differ as to which.

81. (E703-708; T664-666) There is retribution for each intended action. If someone has committed a murder he may be reborn as a human being, but his life will be either short or miserable.

82-84. (E708-710; T666-668) E.g., killing doesn't occur in hell, nor do stealing or adultery or lying. Gods don't kill one another (though perhaps they can cut off each others' heads, etc.), but they can kill those in other realms.

85. (E710-712; T669-670) E.g., the retributinal result of bad action is a hellish existence. The outflowing result will lead to a short life; the dominant result of killing is reduction of life's force. Three results are rehearsed for each of the ten courses of bad action.

95. (E721-722; T675-778) But the retributinal effect of an act can occur only in the same life, or in the next life: it cannot extend for two lives after the act. Even though they have a retribution, the highest meditational attainments don't project an action, because they don't coexist with conscious action. There are three kinds of obstructions: obstructions due to past actions, obstructions which are defilements, obstructions which are retributinal.

96. (E722; T679) The obstructions due to actions are those coming primarily from the five grave offences: killing one's mother, killing one's father, killing a noble person, causing divisions in the order, and harming a Buddha. It is a graver offence to kill one's mother than it is to kill one's father.

97. (E724-725; T680-681) The five grave offences can't be committed by eunuchs, etc., and a human born of demons does not offend in killing his parents.

103. (E730-732; T686-686) The same kind of gravity does not occur as in full-fledged cases if a person kills his mother thinking it's someone else, or if he kills her accidentally.

105. (E732-734; T688-689) The action which has the greatest good retribution is that mental action which allows entry into the highest meditational attainment.

107cd. (E735; T690) The retributinal effects of acts can be severed by the acquisition of perfect patience or forbearance, or by becoming a nonretourner or by becoming a noble person.

CHAPTER FIVE

1:2a. (E760-764; T767-771) It is because of the proclivities which have arisen in series that karma is accumulated for future retribution. Since to the Vaibhāṣika past and future factors don't change in 644
fundamental nature, he can regard the traces and the defilements themselves as identical. For the Sautrāntika, however, they are truly seeds of defilement, i.e., proclivities.

Objection: What does the expression "attachment to sensual pleasure" mean? If one says that attachment to sensual pleasure is itself a trace, this contradicts the sūtra which makes a distinction between attachment to sensual pleasure and its trace. If one interprets "attachment to sensual pleasure" to mean the trace laid down by attachment to sensual pleasure, then it would have to be for the Vaibhāṣika a possession, and would therefore be a conditioning factor dissociated from awareness. But this is in contradiction to the Abhidharma, which says that attachment to sensual pleasure can be accompanied by the three kinds of feelings (see I, 4), for a conditioning factor dissociated from awareness cannot be accompanied by feelings.

Vaibhāṣika: The expression should be taken in the first sense. In the sūtra, "trace" also includes all the defilement's consequences. Besides, the traces cannot be dissociated from awareness, because they defile and so hinder awarenesses.

Sautrāntika: The expression should be taken in the second sense. But a trace is neither associated with an awareness nor dissociated from an awareness, because a trace is not an entity. A trace is simply a defilement-series in a nonmanifest state. It is a seed (bija). And by "seed" we mean a certain capacity or power (sakti) to produce this defilement again, which has arisen from a past occurrence of the same kind of defilement.

4. (E765-766; T773) All proclivities can be abandoned by the truth of frustration. Extreme beliefs can be abandoned by the truth of the origin of frustration and the truth of the cessation of frustration.

5. (E766-768; T773-774) Attachment, repugnance, ignorance and pride can be abandoned by meditation. Other false views can be abandoned by all four noble truths, and so can attachment to views and perplexity. Adherence to rule and ritual can be abandoned by the truth of frustration and the truth of the path. Some people claim that a non-Buddhist can't abandon the traces which are counteracted by a knowledge of the truths. But yet these people may meditate, and be separate from the traces of the realm of desire.

There are thirty-six proclivities in the realm of desire (twelve views, four perplexities, five attachments, five repugnances, five ignorances, and five prides), and thirty-one in each of the material and immaterial realms; thus the total of ninety-eight.

6. (E769-772; T774-776) Of the ninety-eight proclivities eighty-eight are destroyed by vision when calmed through patience; the other ten are destroyed by meditation.

Can non-Buddhists destroy proclivities by vision? There are texts that speak of non-Buddhists detached from all views. But how can that be--they have not destroyed the views of the realm of desire?

Vaibhāṣika: They lose that detachment when they accept a view.

7. (E772-773; T777-778) The five views explained (cf. V, 3 above). "Extreme beliefs" are beliefs in persistence or in nihilism. Although all five views listed in V, 3 are false, those classified as "false views" in the list are those that are the worst, e.g., denying the four truths. "Adherence to views" is to consider wrong views as right ones. And "adherence to mere rule and ritual" covers all sorts of false beliefs about causes and effects as well as about what is and is not the path.

8. (E773-775; T778-780) The belief that suicide or asceticism is noble has nothing to do with the view of the permanence of the self. So how can one say that it is abandoned by the knowledge of the truth of frustration? It is rather the knowledge of the truth of the origin of frustration which makes for its abandonment.

Vaibhāṣika: But this belief is an error concerning frustration.

Vasubandhu: But it is equally an error concerning the path.

There are four perverted views (meaning views which invariably give rise to frustration). They are: considering what is impermanent as permanent, what is frustrating as satisfying, what is impure are pure, what isn't self as self.

9. (E778-780; T780-784) For the Sautrāntika, but not for the Vaibhāṣika, the reversal relating to "self" also includes the belief in "mine", "my".

10. (E782-785; T784-788) The seven kinds of pride are basic pride, greater pride, the pride that is more than pride, the pride of thinking "I am", conceit, the pride of deficiency, and false pride. Basic pride is any inflation of awareness which thinks "I am superior" or "I am equal" relative respectively to an inferior or an equal. Greater pride is thinking "I am superior" or "I am equal" in relation respectively to an equal or a superior. The pride of thinking "I am" is when the aggregates are taken as a self. Conceit is thinking one has attainments when one doesn't. The pride of deficiency is thinking one is only a little bit inferior to one vastly superior. False pride is thinking one has qualities
one doesn't have. The Jñānaparasthāna, however, says that all of the following views are pride: "I am better", "I am equal", "I am worse", "Somebody else is better than me", "Somebody else is equal to me", "Somebody else is worse than me", "Somebody else isn't better than me", "Somebody else isn't equal to me", "Somebody else isn't worse than me".

12.(E782; T788) There are eleven pervasive proclivities.

25-26.(E803-808; T806-810) Vaibhāsika: The proof of the existence of past and future as well as present lies in the fact that consciousness is the result of "two", its organ and its content. A mental consciousness, for instance, arises in regard to a content only when this object is already past, because it belongs to a previous moment. A factor can only arise with an existing object as content. If past and future factors did not exist, then there would be factors without objects. If the past did not exist, how could good and bad actions give their retribution? For when the retribution arises the actions are past.

Explanations of the existence of past and future: (1) Bhadanta Dharmatrāta: The manner of being of a factor in the three times differs, but the factor itself does not differ. Example: a golden vase which one makes into something else golden - its shape is altered but not its color. (2) Ghosaka: When a factor is past, it has the characteristic of a past event; but it is not disconnected from the characteristics of future and present factors. And so on for the rest. Example: A man attached to one woman isn't unattached to other women. (3) Bhadanta Vasumitra: Factors in the three times differ by their condition, not by their nature. Example: A bead in an abacus signifies "one" in the one-place, "ten" in the ten-place, etc. (4) Buddhadeva: The three times differ by relative otherwise. That is, a factor is called present, future, or past in relation to what precedes and what follows. Example: The same woman is a daughter and a mother. To the Viśhāṣa, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta's view is untenable because it is the same as Śāṅkhyā's. Ghosaka's is untenable because factors in the three times are not distinguished. Buddhadeva's is untenable because the three times would exist at the same time, a past event, for instance, being both previous to and successive to other things would be both previous and subsequent, a moment could be both past and future, etc. Thus, says the Viśhāṣa, the theory of Bhadanta Vasumitra is to be accepted.

Vasubandhu: If the past and the future exist, then why call them "past" and "future"?

Vaibhāsika: When the factor exercises its function it is present. When it does not exercise its function it is future. When it has exercised its function and its function has stopped, then it is past.

Vasubandhu: But a nonsimultaneous eye does not exercise its efficacy (see I, 39). Does this mean it isn't present? If you say that its function is to give and receive an effect, then homogeneous causes (see II, 59), which give their effect when past, are present when past.

27.(E808-819; T810-820) If a factor exists always, why doesn't it always exercise its function? If its functioning ceases, why not the factor itself?

Vaibhāsika: A conditioned factor which hasn't yet arisen is called future; one having arisen but not having been destroyed is present; one which has been destroyed is past.

Vasubandhu: If they all exist, how can they be not yet arisen or already destroyed?

Vaibhāsika: Because the essential nature of a factor continues to exist.

Vasubandhu: How can you even talk about anything arising at all if everything exists all the time?

Vaibhāsika: But there is a sūtra which says that past and future actions exist.

Vasubandhu: The past is that which existed, the future is that which will exist. In this sense, they exist, but they don't exist in the way the present does.

Vaibhāsika: But I didn't say they exist as the present does! They exist in the manner of past and future.

Vasubandhu: In the sūtra the word "exists" is used in the same sense as when one says "there is (exists) nonexistence of the flame before it arises", etc.

Vaibhāsika: But there is a sūtra which clearly says that past actions exist.

Vasubandhu: That only means that past actions have exercised a function the results of which carry on into the present. Anyway, there is another sūtra which says that the eye which arises came from nowhere, and the eye which ceases disappears.

Vaibhāsika: The expression "it exists after it was nonexistent" means only that after being nonexistent in the present it became existent in the present.
Vasubandhu: What does that mean? In this example the eye doesn't differ from present time. (In the Viśhāṣā time is explained as a conditioned event's arising and ceasing.) As to the argument that the past and future exist because consciousness arises as the result of past and future events, are these events really generative conditions of the consciousness, or only conditions inasmuch as they're its supporting objects? A future event, which may arise in a thousand years or may never arise, may of course be an object of consciousness (as an anticipation, for instance), but it is difficult to see how it can be the generative condition of a present factor.

Vaibhāṣīka: If past and future factors don't exist, how can they be objects of consciousness?

Vasubandhu: Something which does not exist can be an object of consciousness, such as when there is consciousness of fantasies.

Vaibhāṣīka: If that which does not exist can be an object of consciousness, a thirteenth sense could be an object of consciousness too. (Remember there are only twelve sense-fields, see I, 14).

Vasubandhu: What is the object of consciousness relating to the statement you have just made? If you say that "thirteenth sense" is only a name and no existent entity, then you have just admitted that an object of consciousness need not exist. What is the object of consciousness which relates to the consciousness of the prior absence of a certain sound?

Vaibhāṣīka: The object of consciousness is the sound itself and not its prior absence.

Vasubandhu: But if a future sound, for which there is no prior absence, exists, why does one have the idea that it doesn't exist?

Vaibhāṣīka: It doesn't exist as a present factor, thus one has the idea that it doesn't exist.

Vasubandhu: But you are claiming that it is the same factor which is past, present, and future! Or if you say that there is a difference between the future sound and the present one, and that the judgment "it doesn't exist" relates to the first, then this is tantamount to saying that the present one exists after not having existed.

Vaibhāṣīka: If the nonexistent could be an object of consciousness, how is it that the future Buddha in his last life said that it's impossible for him to perceive anything which doesn't exist?

Vasubandhu: In the context, he was contrasting himself with other religious teachers who claim a nonexistent enlightenment for themselves. Besides, if everything that is thought is real, there is no place for any investigation into things, and the future Buddha of this passage is not different from the other religious teachers. Again, the Buddha speaks of knowing what exists as what exists, and what doesn't exist as what doesn't exist.

Vaibhāṣīka: But if past and future factors do not exist, past acts could have no effects.

Vasubandhu: In a retributory process the effect of an act doesn't occur immediately after the act. It occurs through a special transformation in the series where the act, i.e., the volition, previously arose. If you assert that past and future factors exist, you are then forced to say that their effects always exist too; thus what effect can an action bring about?

Vaibhāṣīka: But if past and future factors don't exist, how can one be bound by a past or future defilement?

Vasubandhu: One is bound to the past defilement because of the existence of its traces in the present; one is bound to a future defilement by the existence of a trace which helps give rise to a future defilement.

32.(E828; T826) Delusion is the same as ignorance. The doubt intended in the passage of the Kośā is principally doubt as regards the four noble truths.

34.(E829-830; T828) The fundamental causes of defilements are traces; objects are causes as sensory contents, and careless mental attention is cause as application.

36.(E831; T830-831) Ignorance is the "root" of all the defilements and their traces; one can speak of it as a "contaminant" inasmuch as it is an evil influence.

41.(E836; T835) The fetters are attraction, repugnance, pride, ignorance, views, adherence to views, rules, etc., perplexity, envy and selfishness.

48a.(E844; T842) Anger and hypocrisy are added by the Vaibhāṣīkas.

52-54.(E846-848; T845-847) Lethargy, excitedness and sleepiness can be bad or neutral in the realm of desire. The rest of the envelopers are always bad, while the afflictions are neutral there. Deceit and craftiness occur in the material realm as well as in the realm of desire. Except for pride and sleepiness, which are eliminated by practice, all the defilements are eliminated by correct view.
Attachment is associated with the faculties of satisfaction and contentedness, repugnance is associated with the faculties of frustration and depression, and ignorance may be associated with any feeling. False views are associated with frustrations concerning those of good actions and with satisfaction concerning those of bad actions.

The two pairs constitute obstructions to perceptual identification in the first case, to peace in the second. In any case, all the defilements count as obstructions.

"An antidote" such as the path of liberation: "acquisition of results", i.e., the result of stream-enterer, etc.

Ascertainments are of two kinds—those constituting knowledge and those constituting abandoning. There are nine of them: three for the realm of desire, three for the material realm, three for the two higher realms taken together, and the destruction of the proclivities in each of three realms. The six results of patience are the first six ascertainments.

CHAPTER SIX

The path of meditation may be either mundane or supramundane; the path of vision is always supramundane.

According to the four noble truths, which are the objects of the path of vision, how can it be said, for instance, that all conditioned factors liable to be connected with distress are frustrating only? For in fact they may be linked with satisfaction, etc.

There are three states of frustration. The first is the state of frustration itself, the second is the state of frustration inherent in conditioned factors, and the third is the state of frustration inherent in transformation. Thus, even the conditioned factors associated with satisfaction are frustrating, because this satisfaction is transitory, and thus they are frustrating by the state of frustration inherent in transformation.

Vasubandhu: But why aren't they perceived as frustrating in themselves?

Vaiśehāsika: It's just like the case of an eyelash, which is not felt in the palm of the hand but which causes pain when it is put in the eye. In the same way, ignorant people do not see that conditioned factors associated with pleasure are really frustrating, but noble ones do.

Vasubandhu: But the path itself is conditioned. Thus it is frustrating, too.

Vaiśehāsika: No, for the definition of "frustration" is that it be contrary, whereas this is not the case for the path.

Vasubandhu: Why is only frustration spoken of as one of the truths, when there is also satisfaction?

Vaiśehāsika: Because there is so much more frustration than satisfaction. In the same way one calls a pile of lentils with which there may be mixed some beans "a pile of lentils".

Vasubandhu: But how can one regard as frustrating feelings which are experienced as satisfying?

Vaiśehāsika: Because they are impermanent, and this impermanence leads to frustration.

Vasubandhu: This is confusing two aspects in conditioned factors. Impermanence and frustration are not the same.

Vaiśehāsika: But there is a sûtra which says that all feelings are conjoined with frustration. And there is also an argument by reasoning: The causes of satisfaction may themselves give rise to frustration. Thus drink or food, when ingested excessively, do so. Since it is illogical that the same thing be the cause of two contrary results, one must conclude that even when the result is perceived as satisfying there is really some frustration there. What is sometimes perceived as satisfying may be only the remedy or the transformation of a frustration. For instance, someone carrying a heavy burden may put this burden on the other shoulder, and thus feel some pleasure, but really this is only a transformation of frustration.

Vasubandhu: Satisfaction does exist in itself. If your criterion for frustration is that someone perceives it as such, in the same way our criterion for satisfaction is that someone perceives it as such. No sensation which is in itself desirable becomes in itself undesirable. If noble persons don't like satisfaction, it's not because of its nature itself, but because of its effect of making one lose good qualities. If satisfaction were undesirable in itself, who would ever be attached to it? As to the sûtra cited, the Buddha clearly states there that he is speaking of the frustration coming from the transformation and impermanence of satisfaction, and not of the state of frustration itself. If all feelings were frustrating, they would never have been categorized as triple by the Buddha. You claim that all satisfaction is accompanied by some frustration, but this cannot empirically be seen to be the case.
To say that satisfaction means only less frustration is also not possible, because the satisfaction felt in the first three meditational states would then be "less frustration", and then this satisfaction fades in the fourth meditational state. This would be then "more frustration"! As for your argument that the causes of satisfaction can be causes of frustration, it is inexactily put. For there are not any absolute causes of satisfaction and frustration. It depends on the state of the perceiver. But if the state of the perceiver is uniform, a cause of satisfaction is always a cause of satisfaction and never a cause of frustration. As for your argument about transferring a burden to another shoulder, this is really satisfaction, because relief, and cannot in any way be interpreted as a transformation of frustration.

4. (E890; T910-911) Though four noble truths have been spoken of by the Buddha, he also speaks of the "two truths", the conventional and highest or ultimate truth. Conventional truths arise when things have not been completely analyzed, such as when one speaks of a pot as a pot, water as "water", etc. Ultimate truth is where one analyzes all the constituent parts of some "thing" to such an extent that the very notion of the "thing" disappears. The conventional is a kind of truth because a person is not lying when he calls a pot a pot, and as far as conventional designations are concerned, he is using them properly. But further analysis will show that no pot really exists as an entity.

5. (E890-891; T912-913) There are three phases in the seeing of the four noble truths. First, one studies them from other sources, then contemplates what one has studied, and finally one engages in real meditation. This corresponds to the three kinds of insight: insight through study, insight through reflection, and insight through meditation.

12. (E898-899; T921-922) In meditation on breathing one is conscious of how many inhalations and exhalations are made, how the air enters and leaves the lungs, how the air currents enter parts of the body; the breath is analyzed into material elements, etc.

20-24. (E914-921; T935-942) The aids to penetration are heat, summit, patience and supreme factors.

As a woman one may acquire the highest worldly factors and be reborn as a man; thus there is uncalculated cessation of femininity.

The aids to penetration are lost at death by those other than noble ones; noble persons lose them when they quit this earth either at death or by moving to another realm. Specifics provided about their acquisition, loss or retention by nobles and by those who transmigrate.

More details about the expectancies of a transmigrator, a self-enlightened one, a Bodhisattva.

27. (E925-928; T947-949) Debate on the question of whether there can be full understanding, a notion which is rejected by Vasubandhu as being incompatible with the idea of progressive path of vision.

34ab. (E940-944; T959-962) Objection: "One who has seven more lives to live" actually will be reborn twenty-eight more times--seven as a human, seven in the intermediate states, seven as gods and seven more in intermediate states.

Vaibhāṣika: But twenty-eight is four groups of seven, and there is no eighth type of rebirth in the same realm.

Vasubandhu: Yes there is: the one who attains the summit of existence is reborn eight times in the same realm.

Vaibhāṣika: The reference is only to rebirths in the realm of desire.

One who becomes a stream-enterer as a human will be reborn among humans to attain liberation; one who attains it as a god will be liberated as a god.

Why can't a stream-enterer backslide? Because he does not do things that would produce rebirth, since his good roots and purity preclude it.

39. (E953-955; T970-971) Three kinds of nonreturners who go to the material realm are those who achieve liberation in the intermediate state, those who achieve liberation on rebirth, and those who "go higher." Each is of three sorts depending on how long it takes them to gain liberation.

44. (E966-970; T981-982) All traces of defilements are finally removed with the diamond-like meditational concentration. This type of concentration may occur on the path of vision, in any of the meditational states, or in any of the immaterial meditation attainments. The diamond-like meditational concentration occurring at the last of the immaterial meditational attainments, i.e., the attainment of the cessation of awareness and feelings, results in the practitioner becoming an adept (āṣāṅka, literally "one who has nothing further to learn"), or noble person. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, but not according to the Sautrāntikas, one may backslide from the state of being a noble person.

58-60b. (E996-1006, T1006-1012) Why one can't backslide from the perfected state explained, citing scripture and giving arguments.
There are three kinds of backsliding: from what is attained, from what is not yet attained, and from experiencing. The Buddha experiences only the first; the immovable perfected ones only the first two; perfected beings experience all three. But one who has fallen away cannot die, and does not misbehave.

63-64. (E1007-1011; T1016-1019) Seven kinds of noble persons: (1) faith-followers, (2) factor-followers, (3) resolved in faith, (4) of attained views, (5) eye-witnesses, (6) liberated by wisdom, (7) liberated both ways.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. (E1033-1035; T1087-1088) The patiences are not knowledge because at the moment of their existence doubts still exist. But it is the very patiences themselves which make the doubts cease.

11. (E1054-1055; T1107) When one knows the awareness of another one does not know it as the other knows it; one isn’t aware of its content, but only knows that the other’s awareness is contaminated. One knows, that is, the specific characteristic of its content but not its general properties; one knows mental but not material factors; one knows present factors but not past or future ones. One knows these in meditation, not by ordinary vision.

12. (E1055-1057; T1108-1109) (Cf. also VI, 67) Enlightenment is knowledge of the cessation of factors as well as the non-(further)-arising of factors. When one knows "Frustration is fully known by me, the origin of frustration has been abandoned by me, the cessation of frustration has been realized by me, the path has been cultivated by me", this is knowledge of cessation. When one knows "Frustration is fully known by me and doesn’t have to be known by me again", etc., "the path has been cultivated by me and doesn’t have to be cultivated again", this is the knowledge of non-(further) arising (VI, 7). These knowledges may be regarded as both ultimate and conventional, because the subsequent judgments relating to "me" can be only conventional.

13. (E1057-1062; T1110-1117) The knowledges on the path of vision have the following aspects as objects: for the truth of frustration impermanence, frustration, emptiness, and absence of self; for the truth of the origination of frustration, causes as past seed, originating (proximate) cause, successive causes as forming a series, conditions as the collection of co-factors; for the truth of the cessation of frustration, cessation of defiled aggregates, calm because of the annihilation of greed, hostility, and confusion, exalted because free of all trouble, and related to liberation; for the truth of the path, the path itself, logic (for the path is based on logical means and in itself contains means), mode of progress, and leading to liberation. These aspects constitute wisdom. They relate to both subject and object. Awarenesses and accompanying mental factors are subject and object; all other factors, whether conditioned or unconditioned, are only objects.

28. (E1083-1085; T1136-1137) The powers of a Buddha include special knowledges. These are: the power of knowing what is possible and what impossible, the power of knowing the retributions for acts, the power of meditations, deliverances, concentrations and special attainments, the power of knowing others' faculties, the power of knowing others' various dispositions, the force of knowing paths that go everywhere (into all the life(destinies)), the power of the knowledge of former lives and their loci, the power of knowing the death and rebirth of beings, the power of knowing how to destroy all distress.

32. (E1090-1093; T1141-1143) The special grounds of the confidence of a Buddha rest on these knowledges. The three special establishments of mindfulness of a Buddha are his indifference to whether his hearers accept, don’t accept, or partially do and partially don’t accept his teachings.

33. (E1093-1095; T1143-1144) The Buddha’s great compassion is impartial, extends to all sentient beings, is produced after great preparation, is grounded in the noble truths, has not the slightest admixture of hostility.

43. (E1109-1110; T1159-1160) The four higher faculties that are conventional awarenesses are divine eye, divine ear, memory of past lives and knowledge of supernatural powers.

Why don’t the "five" (excluding knowledge of destruction of proclivities) exist in the immaterial realm? The first three have material things as contents, knowledge of others' minds involves material colors and shape, and the memory of past lives pertains to the realm of desire.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. (E1126-1128; T1216-1218) The Sautrāntika objects that if
meditational concentration is to be defined as "one-pointed awareness" then it is awareness itself, and not a special kind of entity as the Vaibhāśikas claim.

Vaibhāśika: No, meditational concentration is a special kind of factor by which awareness become concentrated. The concentrated awareness themselves are not meditational concentration.

Vasubandhu: Since awarenesses are momentary, all of them, whether meditatively concentrated or not, have only one object. You may say that meditational concentration makes it so that the second awareness is not distracted from the object of the first awareness. But in that case, meditational concentration is doing nothing as far as the first awareness is concerned, and yet you consider the first awareness to be associated with meditational concentration. Also, you have defined meditational concentration as a generally permeating factor (cf. II, 24), a factor occurring with every awareness. Thus all awarenesses must be meditatively concentrated.

Vaibhāśika: No, because in nonmeditational states the meditational concentration occurring with an awareness is not very strong.

Vasubandhu: For the Sautrāntika, meditational concentration is the meditatively concentrated awarenesses themselves and nothing else.

2. (E1130-1131; T1219-1220) In the second meditational stage there is no more thought; the third meditational state has no more joy; and the fourth finally discards satisfaction for a pure equanimity.

3. (E1131; T1220) Some schools say there is some matter in the immaterial attainments; they are called "immaterial" because they are less material than other factors. Vasubandhu rejects this claim, arguing that it contradicts various theses propounded elsewhere, is illogical, and that alleged textual authority for it is based on misunderstandings.

9. (E1143-1147; T1231-1236) Vaibhāśika: The satisfaction existing in the meditational states is not bodily pleasure but a mental state arising from tranquillity.

Dārśāntika objection: The satisfaction of the meditational states is bodily, for all satisfaction has a bodily aspect. The idea that "satisfaction" stands for an aspect of tranquillity is untenable, for in that case, since tranquillity increases, satisfaction should increase too. The Vaibhāśika also wishes to subsume all "joy" under the faculty of satisfaction.

We, however, maintain that there is joy which is not simply satisfaction.

24. (E1163; T1256) Three special meditational attainments may be named the meditational concentration on emptiness, on the signless, and on the wishless.

25cd. (E1165; T1259) There are further succeeding meditational concentrations which focus on the emptiness of emptiness, the signlessness of the signless, and the wishlessness of the wishless.

29. (E1170; T1264) From meditational concentration arise the four boundless states: loving kindness, compassion, sympathy and equanimity. They are called "boundless" because they can be applied to innumerable sentient beings, their merit is boundless.

175. VASUBANDHU, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā on Pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅgaṇīḍesa

The work is available in Tibetan, and a small portion of it exists in Sanskrit.524 This portion has been edited by Giuseppe Tucci,525 comprising sections of the discussions of ignorance, feeling, thirst, grasping and existence among the twelve components of the Buddhist chain. Two sections—on sanskāra and on viṣṇu—in the Pratītyasamutpāda-vibhaṅgaṇīḍesa have been edited and translated in Muroji (see note 524), who also provides a helpful brief summary of the entire work in French and a summary of the two sections he deals with.

176. VASUBANDHU, Aparāmitāyuhṣūtripadeśa526

Summary by K. Timura

"This work consists of two parts, viz., the verse and the prose... The verse part contains twenty-four verses, each of which has four lines. In this part Vasubandhu expresses at first his undivided devotion to Amitabha... The next twenty-one verses describe the adornment of the Pure Land. In the last verse Vasubandhu confesses his aspiration to be born in the Pure Land with others.

"In the prose part, Vasubandhu interprets the verses and explains the Five spiritual Gates, viz., the Gate of Worship, the Gate of Praise, the Gate of Aspiration, the Gate of Perception and the Gate of Merit Transference. The Gate of Worship means bodily action and the Gate of Praise moral action. The Gate of Aspiration is solely and exclusively