Abhidharmakośabhāsyam

Volume II
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Translator's Introduction

This work is Volume II of a translation of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, a work first translated into French by the great Belgian scholar Louis de La Vallée Poussin, and now here translated into English from the French and the Sanskrit.

This present volume contains Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam.

Chapter III, the Loka-nirdeśa of "Instruction concerning the World" is a description of the physical world, its inhabitants, and its various hells and the heavens of the gods.

Some interesting topics are raised in Chapter III: how rebirth or transmigration takes place; an analysis of each of the parts of the schema of dependent origination; whether there can be such a thing as premature death in a world ruled by karma; the various measurements of time and space; the cosmic cycle or kalpa; and the career of the Bodhisattva. There is also a discussion of whether there are one or many Buddhas in the cosmos, a recurring debate topic in Far Eastern Buddhism. This chapter also contains a discussion on whether the intermediate state of existence (antarābhava) exists or not. This intermediate state is well known to students of Tibetan Buddhism as the bardo state, a state discussed at length in the Tibetan Book of the Dead. Chapter III is a very interesting chapter.

Chapter IV, the Karma-nirdeśa or "Instruction concerning Karma" is, as its title indicates, a presentation of the Buddhist teaching of karma, or consciously willed action, its moral tone, and its subsequent results. This Chapter contains the teaching on the precepts for the seven types of Buddhist believers, both lay and clerical; it also contains a discussion of avijnaptirūpa, the physical matter that does not inform anyone of its presence except through the cultivation of morality. The concept of avijnaptirūpa later became an important topic of discussion in Far Eastern Buddhism.

Vasubandhu was also concerned with the nature of karma and of the problem of the subsistence of the influence of karma, given the
Buddhist teaching of the non-substantiality and perpetual impermanence of all things. In order to discuss this matter further, Vasubandhu also composed a work, the *Karmasiddhi-prakarana*, which has recently been published in an English translation.¹

Chapter IV is a very important chapter, detailing as it does the moral life of the Community, and its related philosophical problems.

Leo M. Pruden

¹ See the *Karmasiddhi Prakarana, the Treatise of Action by Vasubandhu*, by Etienne Lamotte, English translation by Leo M. Pruden, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1988.
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CHAPTER THREE

The World

Oṃ. Homage to the Buddha.

The author wishes to explain the diverse topics of mind that are produced in Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Ārūpyadhātu, the realms of desire, physical matter, and no physical matter (ii.66-73).

What are these three realms?

1a-c. Kāmadhātu consists of hell, the Pretas, animals, humans, and six gods.¹

Kāmadhātu consists of four complete realms of rebirth (gati, iii.4) and one part of the heavenly realm of rebirth, namely the six groups of gods, the Cāturmahārājikas, the Trāyastrimśas, the Yamas, the Tuṣītas, the Nirmāṇaratis, and the Paranirmitavasavartins; plus the physical world (bhājanaloka, iii.45) that contains these beings.

How many places (sthāna) are there in Kāmadhātu?

1c-d. Twenty, through the division of the hells and the differences in the continents.

The twenty places are eight hells (iii.58): Sarījiva, Kālasūtra, Sarīghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Tapanā, Pratāpana, and Avīci; four continents (iii.53): Jambudvīpa, Pūrvavideha, Avaragodānīya, and Uttarakuru; and six heavenly abodes as above (iii.64). And the Pretas and animals. Hence, from Avīci hell up to the heaven of the Paranirmitavasavartins, there are twenty places which constitute, with the physical world which rests on the circle of wind (iii.45), Kāmadhātu.

2a-b. Above is Rūpadhātu, of seventeen places

The seventeen places of Rūpadhātu are above Kāmadhātu,
Each of the dhyanas contains three stages or spheres, with the exception of the fourth.

The First Dhyāna is made up of the Brahmakāyikas, the Brahmapurohitas, and the Mahābrahmanus.

The Second Dhyāna is made up of the Parittābhas, the Apramānābhas, and the Ābhāsvaras.

The Third Dhyāna is made up of the Parittasubhas, the Apramānāsubhas, and the Subhakṛtusnas.

The Fourth Dhyāna is made up of the Anabhrikas, the Punyaprasavas, the Brhatphalas, [and the five Śuddhavāsikas:] Avṛhas, Atapas, Sudṛśas, Sudarśanas, Akanisthas. These seventeen places constitute Rūpadhātu.

But the Kāśmirians say that Rūpadhātu is made up of only sixteen places. In the heaven of the Brahmapurohitas there rises, they say, a lofty dwelling which is named the Heaven of Brahmā, inhabited by a single ruler—such as a terrace or a high place—but which does not constitute a stage (bhūmi).

3a. Ārūpyadhātu is not a place.

In fact non-material dharmas do not occupy a place: likewise the material dharmas when they are past or future, avijnāpti and the nonmaterial dharmas, do not occupy a location. But

3b. It is fourfold through its mode of existence.

Ākāśānantisayatana, Vijñānāntyayatana, Ākīrmcanyāyatana, and Naivasaṁjñānasamjñāyatana (or Bhavagra) constitute Ārūpyadhātu which is thus of four types. “Existence” means the appearance of the skandhas in a new existence by reason of action: it is not through one and the same action that one obtains these different āyatanas that are superior to one another. But this superiority does not imply difference of stage. Where a person exists who possesses an absorption [which produces an existence in Ārūpyadhātu], here the existence in question begins; here too, at the end of this existence, the intermeditate being who is called to take up a new existence will be formed [in Kāmadhātu.
or Rūpadhātu] (See below, note 36).

***

The mental series, the mind and mental states (citta and caitta, ii.23) of material beings is supported on physical matter, rūpa, and in this way can exist. What is the support of the mental series of beings in Ārūpyadhātu?

3c-d. Here the mental series exists supported by the nikāya and the vital organ.10

According to the Ābhidhārmikas, the mental series of beings in Ārūpyadhātu has for its support two dharmas disassociated from the mind, nikāyasabhāgata, genre or genus, and jīvitendriya, the vital organ (ii.45).

11 The mental series of material beings is not supported by these two dharmas, because they lack force; but the mental series of nonmaterial beings possess the necessary force, because they proceed from an absorption from whence the idea of physical matter has been eliminated.

But, one would say, genre and the vital organ of material beings is supported by physical matter: but what is the support of genre and the vital organ for nonmaterial beings?

These two support one another. Among material beings, genre and the vital organ do not have the force necessary to support one another, but they have this force among nonmaterial beings, because they proceed from a certain absorption.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the mental series, mind and mental states, does not have, among nonmaterial beings, any support which is external to it. This series is strong and can serve as a support.

Or rather, we say that the mind is supported by the mental states, and the mental states by the mind, in the way that you say that genre and the vital organ support one another.

The series of minds of a new existence is “projected” by a certain cause (action-defilement, karma-kleśa); if this cause is not free from attachment to physical matter, the mind will be reborn with matter, and its series will be supported by matter; if this cause is free from
attachment to physical matter—as in the case for absorption which is the cause which projects an existence in Ārupyadhatu—the mind will be reborn and will exist without relation to physical matter.

***

What is the meaning of these terms, Kāmadhatu, etc., 12

Dhātu is that which carries (dadhāti) 13 a svalakṣaṇa (namely the kāmas, etc.); or dbātu signifies gotra as has been explained above (i.20a, English trans. p. 78).

1. Kāmadhatu can be understood as "a dhātu associated with kāmas," by omitting the middle word "associated with" (saṁpravṛyukta), as we say "diamond ring" (vajravalaka) for "a ring decorated with diamonds" (vajraṇa saṁpravṛyuktoṅguliyakah), or "pepper potion" (maricapānakā) for "a potion mixed with pepper."

In the same way Rūpadhatu signifies "a dhātu associated with matter."

We have the adjective arūpa or "free from matter," from whence the abstract noun ārūpya, absence of matter. 14

Or rather rūpa is that which is susceptible to being struck (rupana), to resistance (i.24, English trans. p.85); arūpa, by absence of rūpa; ārūpya, the fact of being such. Ārūpyadhatu is that which is associated with ārūpya.

2. Or rather these terms are compounds the first term of which is a genitive: Kāmadhatu, the receptacle of dhātu of the kāmas; Rūpadhatu, the receptacle of matter; Ārūpyadhatu, the receptacle of ārūpya.

What is kāma?

Concupiscence, the desire to eat by mouthfuls (kavaḍikārāhāra, iii.39) and sexual desire. [Kāma does not signify the object of desire, which is called more exactly kāmaguna, but "that which desires," kāmyata aneneti kāmabh]. We will see this by the following stanzas.

Śāriputra said to an Ājivika, "The fine things of this world are not kāmas; kāma is the desire that the imagination nourishes among humans. The objects of the universe are of little importance: the sage overcomes all desire with regard to them." The Ājivika answered, "If the fine things of this world are not kāmas, if kāma is the desire that is nourished by the imagination, the same Bhikṣu would be a 'taster of the kāmas' when he produces bad imaginations." Śāriputra answered, "If the
fine things of this world are kāmas, if kāma is not desire which the
imagination nourishes, then the Master himself would be a taster of the
kāmas when he sees objects.”

***

Should one consider as “integral” to one Dhatu [= as being of the
domain of a Dhatu], all the dharmas that are produced in this Dhatu?  
No, but merely the dharmas with regard to which there develops, and
in which there resides craving (rāga) proper to this Dhatu, craving of
Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and ĀArūpyadhātu.

What is the craving proper to each Dhatu?

The craving that develops, that resides in the dharmas of this Dhatu.

This is the example of the tether: “To whom does this tether
belong?” “To the owner of this horse.” “To whom does this horse
belong?” “To the owner of this tether.” This answer does not teach us
anything.

We have enumerated the places that constitute Kāmadhātu.

“Craving proper to Kāmadhātu” is the craving of the being who is not
detached from this place, who has not rejected craving with regard to the
dharmas of this place. The same for the other two Dhatus.

Or rather, “craving proper to Kāmadhātu” is the craving of a being
who is not absorbed (samābīta); “craving proper to Rūpadhātu, to
Ārūpyadhātu” is craving relative to the absorption of dhyāna, to the
absorptions of ārūpya.

***

The mind17 by which one creates magical objects in the sphere of
Kāmadhātu is the result of a dhyāna.

But this mind is produced only among beings detached from
Kāmadhātu.

How can one say that this mind is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu? In
fact this mind is not produced among a being not detached from
Kāmadhātu, and, when this mind is produced among a being detached
from Kāmadhātu, it cannot be for him the object of a craving of the
order of Kāmadhātu. This mind is hence of the sphere of Kāmadhātu.
without there being, with regard to it, any craving of the order of Kamadhatu: this is a difficulty that contradicts your definition of the Dhatus.

This mind is of the sphere of Kamadhatu because a craving of the order of Kamadhatu is produced with regard to it in a person who intends to speak of this mind as belonging to another, or who remembers having possessed it previously, or who sees magic creations. Or rather because this mind creates some odors or tastes: now a mind of the sphere of Rupadhatu cannot create odors or tastes because beings in Rupadhatu are detached from both of these.

***

Is this triple Dhātu unique?

The triple Dhātus are infinite, like space; although there has not been any production of new beings, and although innumerable Buddhas convert innumerable beings and cause them to obtain Nirvāṇa, the beings of innumerable Dhātus are never exhausted.

***

How are the three Dhātus arranged?

Horizontally, as the Sūtra proves, "as when the cloud Īśādhāra rains, there is no interval or discontinuity of the drops of water that fall from space, so too towards the East there is no interval or discontinuity of universes (lokadhātus) in a state of creation and of dissolution; as towards the East, the same towards the South, the West and the North." The Sūtra does not add "toward the zenith and the nadir."

According to another opinion, the universe superimposes itself toward the zenith and the nadir, for, according to other Sūtras, the universes are arranged towards the ten cardinal points. There is then a Kāmadhātu above Akaniṣṭha and an Akaniṣṭha below Kāmadhātu.

***

Whoever is detached from one Kāmadhātu is detached from the Kāmadhātus of all the universes; the same for the other two Dhātus.
Whoever produces the abhijñā or higher knowledge of magical power in the First Dhyāna, creates a magical being that can only be the Brahmāloka of the universe wherein the creator of this magical being is born; not in the other universes (vii.50b).

***

4a-b. In these Dhātus, there are five realms of rebirth that have been designated by their names.26

The five gatis or realms of rebirth are hellish beings, animals, Pretas, humans, and gods. In Kāmādhātu there are the first four realms of rebirth and a part of the heavenly realm of rebirth; the other parts of the heavenly realm of rebirth exist in the other two Dhātus.

The stanza speaks of “five realms of rebirth” in the Dhātus. Is there then a part of the Dhātus that are not included in the realms of rebirth?

Yes. The good, the bad, the physical world, and intermediate existence are included in the Dhātus. Whereas, as for the five destinies

4b-d. They are undefiled-neutral, they are the world of beings, and they do not include intermediate existence.27

The realms of rebirth are undefiled-neutral, being the result of retribution (ii.57).28 In the contrary hypothesis, the five realms of rebirth would be confounded: [in fact, a person can do actions which are repaid through a hellish rebirth, or by a heavenly rebirth: but if action were to be intergal to the realms of rebirth, the human realm of rebirth would be at one and the same time hellish and heavenly. A being born in Kāmādhātu is filled with the defilements of this sphere (bhūmi) and can be filled with the defilements of higher spheres.]

They are sattvākhyā (i.10b), only pertaining to living beings: the physical world is not included within the realms of rebirth.

Intermediate existence is not a realm of rebirth (see below p. 373, line 12; iii.10).

The nature of the realms of rebirth is illustrated by many texts: 1. The Prajñāpti says, “The four wombs (yoni, iii.8c) exist in the five realms of rebirth; but do the five realms of rebirth contain all four wombs? Intermediate existence, which is an apparitional womb, is not
included within the five realms of rebirth.”

2. The Dharmaskandha (TD 26, p. 498b23-c11) says, “What is the eye-element (cakṣurdbhātu)? Subtle matter derived from the primary elements which, in hell, among animals, among the Pretas, among the gods, among humans, among beings born in an absorption, and among intermediate beings, is eye, eye-organ, eye-source of knowledge, eye-element.”

3. The Sūtra itself says that intermediate existence is not included among the realms of rebirth: “There are seven bhavas or existences: existence in hell, animal, Preta, heavenly, human, plus karmabhava and intermediate existences (antarābhava).” This Sūtra indicates the five realms of rebirth (hellish, etc., existences) with their cause, namely action, karmabhava (iii.24a), and their access, namely intermediate existence through which a being arrives at a realms of rebirth. At the same time this Sūtra shows that the realms of rebirth are undefiled-neutral, since it distinguishes the realms of rebirth (hellish, etc., existences), from the causes of these realms of rebirth, namely action which is non-neutral (=good, bad).

4. This last point is again proved by a Sūtra which the Kāśmirians read: “Śāriputra said, ‘Venerable One, when the hellish cankers (āsravas) become active, one does and one accumulates actions which should be renumerated by hell. These action of the body, voice, and mind, torturous, corrupted, ‘tainted’ (iv.59) action have for retribution rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, samskāras and vījñāna in hell. When this retribution is realized, there is what is called hell. Venerable One, outside of these five dharmas, one cannot maintain the existence of any being in hell.” [This says that a being in hell does not exist outside of these five dharmas which are retribution, thus undefiled-neutral].

But how can this thesis accord with the declaration of the Prakaranagrantha (according to Saeki, this is a summary of TD 26, p. 702a8-711b5): “All the latent defilements (anuṣayās) reside in and develop in realms of rebirth?”

The answer is that this declaration refers to the initial mind (saṃdhicitta) of the realms of rebirth, which can be of five types, abandoned through Seeing the Four Noble Truths or through Meditation: hence all the latent defilements can reside there. As one says ‘village’ for ‘the confines of the village,’ the Prakaraṇa can express itself
as it does.

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According to another opinion, the realms of rebirth are both good and defiled. In fact, say the followers of this opinion, the argument quoted from the Sūtra of the Seven Existences (note 29) does not hold: it is maintained that action is separate from the five realms of rebirth, but this does not prove that it is excluded from them. Among the five corruptions (kasāya) the corruption of defilements (kleśakaśāya) and the corruption of views (drṣṭikaśāya, iii.95a) are quoted separately: shall one say that views are not a defilement? Action (karmabhava) is also included within the realms of rebirth.34 It is quoted separately because it is the cause of the realms of rebirth.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Does your reasoning apply to the intermediate existence which would then be a realm of rebirth?35

No. The word gati or realm of rebirth signifies “the place where one goes.” Now the intermediate existence begins in the place where death has taken place.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] This is also the case for the existences of Ārūpyadhatu which then are not included among the realms of rebirth.36

We say then that intermediate existence is so called because it is intermediate between two realms of rebirth, but it is itself not a realm of rebirth. If it were a realm of rebirth it would not be intermediate, and so it would not be called an intermediate existence.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Admitting that you have refuted the argument taken from the Sūtra of the Seven Existences, what do you make of the declaration of Śāriputra (above, p. 372, line 20)?

Śāriputra says that there is a being in hell when the retribution of hellish actions is realized; it does not say that the realm of rebirth is part retribution, part non-retribution. The text says that there does not exist any being in hell outside of these dharma, rūpa, etc.: its intention is to negate the reality of any person passing from one realm of rebirth into another, not to affirm that the skandhas (rūpa, etc.) of the beings in hell are solely retribution.

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For the Vaibhāṣikas, the realms of rebirth are exclusively undefiled-neutral dharmas. Among the Vaibhāṣikas, some think that they are dharmas of retribution (vipākaja); others think that they are dharmas of retribution and accumulation (aupacayika). 37

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In the three Dhātus with their five realms of rebirth, there is, in ascending order,

5a-6a. Seven abodes or types of consciousnesses (vijñānasthitis), namely: 1. beings different in bodies and ideas; 2. beings of different bodies but similar in ideas; 3. beings similar in body but different in ideas; 4. beings similar in body and ideas; and 5.-7. three classes of non-material beings.38

According to the Sūtra (Madhyama, 24, 11):

1. "Material beings different in bodies and ideas, namely humans and certain gods, are the first vijñānasthitis."

What are these certain gods?39 The six gods of Kāmadhātu (i.i) and the gods of the First Dhyāna (world of Brahmā) except the prathamā-bhinirvṛttas.40

They are of different bodies, because their color, their marks (clothes, ornaments, etc.), and their figures (height, etc.) are not identical. They are of different ideas, because their ideas, ideas of pleasure, displeasure, neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure, are not identical.41

2. "Material beings different in bodies but of similar ideas, namely the prathamābhinirvṛtta Brahmakāyika42 gods, are the second vijñānasthitis."

All these prathamābhinirvṛtta gods are of similar ideas, for all have the same idea of a single and same cause, Brahmā, who thinks, "They are created by me," and the associates of Brahmā who think, "We are created by Brahmā;"43 there is diversity of body, for one is Brahmā, and the others his followers through their height, their greatness, their bodies, their speech, their clothing and their ornaments.44

We read in the Sūtra that these gods remember, "We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long," and so on to "when he made the
vow, ‘May other beings be born here in my company!’, we were born in his company.” There is no difference of color, mark, or figure among them: thus

(See iii.90c-d). We ask then where were these gods when they saw Brahmā?

According to certain masters [who take their authority from the Sūtra that teaches that the Brahmakāyikas are reborn in the world of Brahmā after dying in Ābhāsvara Heaven], they saw Brahmā when they were in Ābhāsvara Heaven.

But, we would say, when they fell from Ābhāsvara Heaven, a heaven of the Second Dhyāna, they lost the Second Dhyāna, and the Second Dhyāna is necessary to the memory of a past existence in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna (vii.44a). Further, they have not re-acquired the Second Dhyāna since they have fallen into the erroneous view (e.g. śīlavrata-parāmarśa) of considering Mahābrāhma as a creator: one cannot say that this erroneous view can accompany the Second Dhyāna, since no erroneous view (or any defilement, kleśa) of a certain sphere has ever had a lower, inferior sphere as its object.

According to another opinion, they saw Brahmā when they were in the intermediate existence (antarābhava) which proceeded their birth in the world of Brahmā.

But one would object that this intermediate existence is very short for it cannot have any slowing down of birth in this world. How then can they say, “We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long?”

As a consequence, a third opinion, one would say: It is in the world of Brahmā itself that these gods remember the past of Brahmā. At the moment when they are born there, they saw him who being born before them, who lasts a long time. Having seen him, they think: “We have seen this being . . . ;” and they know the vow that he made through memory of the sphere of the First Dhyāna which they obtained through the very fact of their birth; or rather because Brahmā told them.

3. “Material beings similar in body but of different ideas, namely the Ābhāsvara gods, are the third vijnānasthiti.”

The Sūtra, in naming the highest gods of the Second Dhyāna, the Ābhāsvaras, also designates the Parīttābha and the Apramāṇābha gods. If it were otherwise, to which vijnānasthiti would these two classes belong?
these gods have similar bodies. They have ideas of pleasure and of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure: thus there is diversity of ideas.

In fact, it is said (Vibhāṣā, TD, p. 707b6),—wrongly according to us (kila),—that these gods, fatigued with the sensation of mental pleasure—which is the sensation proper to the Second Dhyāna—pass into the threshold (sāmantaka) absorption of this Dhyāna, an absorption which allows the sensation of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure (viii.22). Fatigued from this second sensation, they again take up the Second Dhyāna and the sensation of mental pleasure. In this same way kings fatigued with the pleasures of lust (kāmasukha) take up the pleasure of government (or of dharma), and fatigued with dharma take up again the pleasure of lust.

One would object that it should hold for a god of the Third Dhyāna (Śubhakṛṣṇas, etc.: fourth vijñānasthiti) as for the gods of the Second Dhyāna: yet the gods of the Third Dhyāna do not pass into sāmantaka, and always possess the sensation of pleasure.

But this objection is in vain. The Śubhakṛṣṇas do not become fatigued with the pleasures of the Ābhāsvaras, since they are calm, whereas the pleasures of the Ābhāsvaras, being mental pleasures, trouble the mind and are not calm.

The Sautrāntikas are of a different opinion. They quote the Śūtra (Saptasūryavāyākaraṇa, Dīrgha TD 1, p. 138b25, and Madhyama, TD 1, p. 429a22): "Beings that are born for a short time in Ābhāsvara Heaven know poorly the laws of the destruction of the universe. When the destruction of the universe takes place through fire, they see the flames rising and destroying the palace of the world of Brahmā: they are frightened, grieved, confused, 'May these flames not rise up to here!' But the beings who have lived for a long time in Ābhāsvara Heaven know of these cosmic changes and reassure their frightened companions, 'Do not be afraid, friend! Do not be afraid, friend! Already previously this fire, having burnt the Palace of Brahmā, disappeared.' Then one sees indeed how the gods of the Second Dhyāna have different ideas: at the burning up of the world's Dhyāna, they have ideas of the arriving or the non-arriving of the flames amongst them, and they have ideas of fear and no fear. The explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas then, that these gods exchange the sensation of pleasure and indifference, is not good.

4. "Material beings of similar bodies and ideas, namely the
Subhakṛtsnas, are the fourth vijnānasthiti."

They have the same ideas, because they have the sensation of pleasure.

In the First Dhyāna, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas defiled since they are associated with śīlavrataparāmarśa; in the Second Dhyāna, there is diversity of ideas, namely good ideas of the Dhyāna proper and of its threshold absorption; and in the third Dhyāna, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas arisen from retribution.

5. - 7. The first three Ārūpyas are the last three vijnānasthitis as it says in the Sutra.50

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What are the vijnānasthitis? The five skandhas of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu for the first ones (see iii.7c), and four skandhas for the last three.

Why are not the rest vijnānasthitis?

6b. The rest reduce the vijnāna.51

The "rest" refers to the painful realms of rebirth (durgati, apāya: hell, etc.), the Fourth Dhyāna, and the Fourth Ārūpya (=Naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana) which is called Bhavāgra or the summit of existence.

Here, in these realms, the vijnāna is reduced, or cut off:52 in the painful realms of rebirth, painful sensation damages the vijnāna; in the Fourth Dhyāna, an ascetic can cultivate asaṁjñīnasamāpatti, the absorption of unconsciousness (ii.42), and in this Dhyāna there is also asaṁjñīka, namely the dharma (ii.41b) that creates the Unconscious Gods (Asaṁjñīsattva); in Bhavāgra, the ascetic can cultivate nirodha-samāpatti (ii.43a), the absorption of the cessation of ideas and sensations.

According to another explanation (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 708a14), vijnānasthiti is "the place where those who are here desire to go, the place from whence those who are there do not desire to fall." These two conditions are absent in the painful realms of rebirth. As for the Fourth Dhyāna, all those who are in it desire to leave it: Prthagjanas desire to pass to the realm of the Asaṁjñīsattvas; Āryans desire to pass to the
Suddhāvāsikas [or to the Ārūpyāyatanas; and the Suddhāvāsikas desire to realize the calm of extinction, śāntanirodha].

Bhavāgra is not a viññānasthiti because there is little activity of the viññāna in it.

The seven viññānasthitis,

6c-d. With Bhavāgra and unconscious beings, are the nine “dwellings of beings.”

For creatures dwell therein as they will.

7a. There are no other dwellings of beings, for elsewhere one lives without desiring it.

"Elsewhere" refers to the painful realms of rebirth. Beings are brought there by the Rākṣasa which is Karma and live there without desiring it. This is not one of the “dwellings” in the same way that a prison is not a dwelling.

If one Sūtra says that there are seven viññānasthitis, according to another Sūtra

7b. There are four other sthitis.

These four are: rūpa as an abode of viññāna, (rūpopagā viññānasthitih), vedanā or sensation as an abode of viññāna (vedanopagā viññānasthitih), ideas as an abode of viññāna (samjñopagā viññānasthitih), and the samskāras or forces as an abode of viññāna (samskāropagā viññānasthitih).

7c-d. They consist of the four impure skandhas, which are of the same sphere as the viññāna.

The consciousness or viññāna can grasp visible things and the other skandhas of a different sphere as its object: but it cannot grasp them as object under the impulse of craving; thus they are not considered as its
abode or *sthiti* (see above, note 16).

But why is the fifth *skandha*, the consciousness itself (mind and mental states), not considered as an abode of the consciousness?

The Vaibhāṣikas observe that the *sthiti*, "that upon which, or within which one grasps" is opposed to *sthātar*, "he who grasps." Devadatta is opposed to the horse that he is sitting on. The king is not the throne. Or again *vijñānasthiti* signifies an abode of the mind, and the *dharmas* upon which the mind rides in order to move forward, are like the sailors on the ship: now the mind does not ride on the mind in order to move; hence the mind is not an abode of the mind.

But another Sūtra says, "There is delight (*nandi-saumanasya*=satisfaction) and attachment with regard to this food which is the consciousness" (iii.40a). If there is delight and attachment with regard to the consciousness then the consciousness rides in it and resides in it.59 On the other hand, you teach that the five *skandhas* (including the consciousness) constitute the sevenfold abode of consciousness (iii.5a); why do you not add the consciousness to the fourfold abodes of consciousness?

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: When we consider, without making any distinction between the *skandhas*, the process attached to the consciousness with regard to its arising which is made up of the five *skandhas*, then we can say that the *vijñāna* is a *vijñānasthiti*. But, if we consider the *skandhas* one by one, we see that matter, sensation, ideas, and the *samskaras*—which are the support of the consciousness, and are associated or coexistent with the consciousness—are the causes of the defilement of the consciousness: but the consciousness is not, in this way, the cause of the defilement of the consciousness, since two consciousnesses do not coexist. Thus

7d-8a. Taken separately, the consciousness is not defined as an abode of the consciousness.

Further, the Blessed One described the four abodes of consciousness as "a field," and he describes the consciousness, accompanied by desire, as "a seed."60 He does not give the seed as a field of the seed; and we see indeed that the *dharmas* that coexist with the consciousness merely serve as its field.
Do the four *sthitis* contain the seven, and do the seven contain the four?
No.

8b. The correspondance admits of four cases.
First case: the consciousness is included among the seven, but not among the four.
Second case: the four *skandhas* (excluding the consciousness) of the painful realms of rebirth, the Fourth Dhyāna and Bhavāgra, are included among the four.
Third case: the four *skandhas* are included among the seven, and are also included among the four.
Fourth case: the other *dharman* are included neither among the seven nor among the four, [namely the consciousness of the painful realms of rebirth, etc., and the pure *dharman*].

We have said that the three Dhātus include five realms of rebirth, etc.

8c-d. There are here four “wombs” of beings, beings born from eggs, etc. 61

*Yoni* or womb signifies birth. Etymologically, *yoni* signifies “mixture”: in birth—birth being common to all creatures—beings are mixed together in confusion. 62

“Womb of beings born from eggs” are those beings who arise from eggs, geese, cranes, peacocks, parrots, thrushes, etc.

“Womb of beings born from wombs” are those beings who arise from a womb, elephants, horses, cows, buffalos, asses, pigs, etc. 63

“Wombs of beings born from moisture” 64 are those beings who arise from the exudation of the elements, earth, etc.,—worms, insects, butterflies, mosquitos.

“Womb of apparitional beings” 65 are those beings who arise all at once, with their organs neither lacking nor deficient, 66 with all their
major and minor limbs. These are called upapāduka, apparitional, because they are skillful at appearing (upapādana), and because they arise all at once [without an embryonic state, without semen and blood]; such as gods, beings in hell, or beings in an intermediate existence.  

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How are the wombs distributed among the realms of rebirth?

9a. Humans and animals are of the four types.

Humans can be born from an egg, such as Śaila and Upaśaila who were born from the eggs of a crane; the thirty-two sons of (Viśākhā), the mother of Mrgāra; and the five hundred sons of the King of Pañcāla.

Humans can be born from moisture, such as Māndhātar, Cāru Upācaru, Kapotamalini, Āmrapāli, etc.

Apparational humans (ii.14) are humans at the beginning of the cosmic period (prāthamakalpika, ii.14, iii.97c).

Animals are also of four types. These types are known through common experience. Nāgas and Garuḍas are also apparitional (see below, note 83).

9b-c. Beings in hell, intermediate beings, and the gods are apparitional too.

These three classes of beings are exclusively apparitional.

9d. Pretas are also born from a womb.

They are of two types, apparitional and born from a womb. That they are born from a womb results from a discourse that a Preti had with Maudgalyāyana, "I gave birth to five sons a night, to five sons a day: I ate them and was not satisfied."

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What is the best womb?
The apparitional womb.
But the Bodhisattva in his last birth evidently possesses "mastery
relating to arising” (*upapattivāsatva*). Why did he then choose to be born from a womb? (See iii.17)

There are two answers to this question. 1. The Bodhisattva sees great advantage in it: by reason of their relationship with him, the great Śākya clan enters into the Good Law; and, recognizing in him a member of the family of the Cakravartins, persons experience a great respect towards him; persons are encouraged seeing that, being a man, he has realized this perfection. If the Bodhisattva were not born from the womb, we would not know his family, and persons would say, “What is this magician, a god or a Piśāca?” In fact non-Buddhists masters calumniously say that at the end of one hundred cosmic periods there would appear in the world such a magician who devours the world through his magic.

2. Others explain that the Bodhisattva has taken up the womb in order that his body remains as relics after his Nirvāṇa: through the adoration of these relics, humans and other creatures by the thousands obtain heaven and deliverance. In fact, the bodies of apparational beings, not having any external seed (semen, blood, bone, etc.), do not continue to exist after their deaths, like a flame which disappears without remnant. But we see indeed that this explanation cannot be admitted by the masters who attribute *rdḥi ādhisṭhāniki* to the Buddha.

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One question arises from another.

If the bodies of apparitional beings disappear at their deaths, how can the Sūtra say, “The apparitional Garuḍa seizes the apparitional Nāga in order to eat it?”

The text says that he seizes the Nāga in order to eat it, not that he does eat it.

Or rather he eats the Nāga as long as the Nāga is not dead: but he does not feast on the dead Nāga.

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What is the least desirable of the wombs?

The apparitional womb, for it embraces all hellish realms of rebirth,
all heavenly realms of rebirth, plus one part of the three other realms of
rebirth, plus intermediate beings.  

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What is an intermediate being, and an intermediate existence?

10. Intermediate existence, which inserts itself between exis­tence at death and existence at birth, not having arrived at the
location where it should go, cannot be said to be born.

Between death—that is, the five skandhas of the moment of
death—and arising—that is, the five skandhas of the moment of
rebirth—there is found an existence—a "body" of five skandhas—that
goes to the place of rebirth. This existence between two realms of
rebirth (gati) is called intermediate existence.

This existence is produced: why not say that it arises (upapanna);
why not attribute birth (upapatti) to it?

We say that it is arising (upapadyamāna); but it is not born (see
iii.40c). In fact as its etymology indicates (pad=gam, upapanna=upagata),
to be born is to arrive. Intermediate existence (or intermediate being),
when it begins, has not arrived at the place where it should go, namely to
the place where the retribution of actions is manifested and achieved.

According to other sects, there is a cutting off, a discontinuity
between death and birth: but there is no intermediate existence.

This opinion is false, as reasoning and Scripture prove.

lla-b. Being similar to the series of rice, existence does not
reproduce itself after having been interrupted.

The momentary dharmas exist in a series; when they appear in a
place distant from that in which they have been found, it is because they
are reproduced without discontinuity in intermediate places, such as the
series that constitutes a grain of rice and which one transports to a
distant village by passing through all the villages in the interval. In the
same way, the mental series takes up birth after being reproduced
without discontinuity (intermediate existence) from the place where
death took place.

But, one would say, a reflection (pratibimba) arises on a mirror, on
the water, etc., without being continuous to the image (bimba) with which it forms a series. Hence the elements of arising do not depend on the elements forming an uninterrupted series between the place of death and the place where they reappear.

llc-d. The existence of the reflection is not proved; should it be proved, the reflection is not similar; hence it does not serve as an example.

A reflection is a thing in and of itself (dravya) namely a certain type of color (varṇa). The existence of the reflection is not proved.

12a. For two things do not exist in the same spot.

a. In one and the same spot, a person placed to the side of a mirror perceives the rūpa or physical matter of this mirror, matter derived from the primary elements (upādāya rūpa); a person placed facing (the mirror) perceives his own reflection, which is a "certain type of color," derived matter. Now one can admit only that two derived matters exist at the same time in the same spot, for each of them should have as its support two distinct groups of primary elements.

b. Two persons who both look at the same object, a jar, etc., see it at the same time. Now two persons placed at the two sides of a pond see the reflection of the object that faces them: the same reflection is not seen at the same time by both of them.

c. Shade and sunlight do not coexist in the same spot. Now, if one places a mirror in the shade (i.10a), in a shed situated close to a pond lit by the sun, one would see in this mirror the reflection of the reflection of the sun on the surface of the water.

It is thus proved, by these three observations, that a reflection is not a real, substantial thing (dravya).

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The Karikā is liable to another interpretation. "For the two things do not exist in the same spot": the "two things" are the surface of the mirror and the reflection of the moon. We do not see, in the same spot, the surface of the mirror and the reflection of the moon, reflected in the mirror: this reflection appears recessed, at a depth, like the water in a
well. Now if a real physical matter, the reflection, should arise, it would arise on the surface of the mirror, and would be perceived as being on the surface of the mirror. A reflection is thus only an illusory idea taking the form of the reflection (pratibimbakaram bhrantam vijñanam). Such is the power of this complex, mirror and object, that it produces the seeing of a reflection, of an image resembling the object. Incomprehensible is the power of the dharmas and the variety of this power.

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Let us admit nevertheless the real existence of the reflection. It still cannot serve as an example in your reasoning, for it cannot be compared to arising. It is not similar to arising:

12b. For it does not form a series.

The reflection does not form a series with the object reflected, because the reflection arises supported by the mirror, and because the reflection is simultaneous to the object reflected. But on the contrary death and arising form a series, the second being later to the first and being produced in another place than the first without there being a cutting off between them [due to intermediate existence].

12b. For it arises from two causes.

It is by reason of two causes that a reflection arises, by reason of the mirror and of the object. The principal of these two causes is the cause upon which it takes its support in order to arise, namely the mirror. But it happens that arising, or birth, proceeds from only one cause; and it never has a principal cause which is not death. Arising has no external support in the case of apparitional beings, because they appear suddenly in space. And these external elements cannot be the principal cause for the beings that arise from semen, blood, or mud, since these items are absent from the mind.

Reasoning thus proves the existence of an intermediate being since arising proceeds from death without there being any discontinuity between these two existences.

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Scripture also proves the existence of an intermediate being.

12c. The intermediate being is called by its name.

The Sūtra says, "There are seven existences (bhavas): existence in hell (naraka), as an animal (tiryagyoni), as a Preta, as a heavenly being (deva), and as a human (manusya), as well as karmabhava and antarābhava." 91

If the school that we are combating does not read this Sūtra, at least they read the texts pertaining to Gandharvas.

12c. It is the Gandharva.

We read in the Sūtra, "Three conditions are necessary for an embryo to descend, [in order for a son or daughter to be born]: the woman must be in good health and fertile, the pair must be united, and a Gandharva must be ready." What is the Gandharva if not an intermediate being? 92

But our opponents do not read the Sūtra in these terms! They replace the third condition by a text that says, "a dissolution of the skandhas [that is, one dying] must be made ready." 93

Very well, but one doubts if they could explain the Āśvalāyana-sūtra, 94 which says, "This Gandharva which is made ready,—do you know if it is a Brahmin, a Ksatriya, a Vaiśya, or a Śudra? Do you know if it comes from the east, the south, the west, or the north?" This expression "to come" shows that it refers to an intermediate being, not to a "dissolution of the skandhas."

If our opponents do not read this Sūtra,

12d. An intermediate being is proved by the text relative to the Five.

The Blessed One teaches that there are five types of Anāgāmins: one who obtains Nirvāṇa in an intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāyin), one who obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as he is reborn (upapadyapariri

vāyin), one who obtains Nirvāṇa without effort (anabhisa

mārparinirvāyin), one who obtains Nirvāṇa by means of effort (anabhisa

mārparinirvāyin), and one who obtains Nirvāṇa by going higher (urdvasrotas). 95

Certain masters (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 357b21) maintain that an antarāparinirvāyin is a saint who obtains Nirvāṇa after having been
reborn among some so-called Antara gods. But they should then admit the existence of Upapadya gods, etc. An absurd opinion.

12d. And by the Sūtra of the gatis.

By the Sūtra of the Seven Satpurusagatis. This Sūtra teaches that one should distinguish three types of antarāparinirvāyins on the basis of their differences of duration and place: the first is similar to a spark that is extinguished as soon as it arises; the second to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight; the third to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight, but later, and without falling back into the sun. Given this text, it is pure fantasy to suppose that an antarāparinirvāin is an inhabitant of a heaven of the Antara gods, for these Antaras cannot be divided into three classes by reason of duration and place.

But yet other scholars—(the Vibhajyavādins as the Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 357a4-358a25 testifies)—present the explanation here. An antarāparinirvāin obtains Nirvāṇa, that is, eliminates the defilements, either in the interval of his lifetime, or in the interval of his cohabitation with the gods. He is threefold: he is termed a dhātugata if he obtains Nirvāṇa having just arrived in the Dhātu [that is, in a heaven of Rūpadhātu, and as a consequence if he eliminates the defilements that cause him to be reborn in Rupadhatu whereas they (the defilements) are still in a seed-like state]; he is called a samjñāgata if he obtains Nirvāṇa later, at a moment when the idea (samjñā) of the objects of Rūpadhātu is active in him; and he is called a vitarkagata if he obtains Nirvāṇa still later, at a moment when the vitarka (volitions, etc.) produced by these objects is active. In this way we would have three antarāparinirvāyins conforming to the definitions of the Sūtra and who obtain Nirvāṇa in the interval of the duration of their life, that is, without achieving the end of their life as gods of the heaven where they were reborn. Or rather, the first antarāparinirvāin obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as he has taken possession of a certain divine existence; the second after having experienced a heavenly bliss; and the third, after having entered into company or conversation with the gods.

An objection: if an antarāparinirvāin is a saint who is reborn, experiences bliss, and enters into the company of the gods, what will an upapadhyparirvāin be, literally "one who obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as
he is reborn?"

We answer that an upapadyaparinirvāyin enters entirely into their company; and, as this answer is not conclusive, we further answer that an upapadyaparinirvāyin reduces the duration of his life by much [and more than an antarāparinirvāyin]: [he is called an upapadya because he obtains Nirvāṇa āyur upahatya].

But we must observe that all these persons, the dbātu, etc., go to the same place. Thus they do not correspond to the examples of the Sūtra. On the other hand, there are saints in Ārūpyadhātu who obtain Nirvāṇa without having fully lived their lives to the end (iii.85a), and yet no antarāparinirvāyins are there. This point is illustrated in the metrical formula,

\begin{align*}
\text{By the } dhyānās, & \text{ four decades;} \\
\text{by the } ārūpyas, & \text{ three heptades;} \\
\text{by ideas, } & \text{ one hexade:} \\
\text{thus is the group bound.} & \end{align*}

Yet if our adversaries do not read this Sūtra, what can we do about it? The Master has entered Nirvāṇa, and the Good Law no longer has a leader. Many sects have been formed that change the meaning and the letter to their fantasies. We say that, for the masters who admit these Sūtras, the existence of an intermediate being or the "skandhas in the interval" is proved both by Scripture and reasoning.

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Yet there are some difficulties:

a. We must reconcile the doctrine of an intermediate being with the Sūtra on Māra. This Sūtra says, "The Māra called Dūśin, [having struck the head of Vidura, the disciple of Krakucchanda,] fell, with his own body, into great Avīci Hell." Actions very grave (by intention and in scope) and complete (that is, "accumulated," iv.12) ripen before death itself. Māra then felt a retribution in this life before feeling a retribution in hell. The text thus means that Māra was enveloped, while still alive, by the fires of hell; that he dies; and that he then takes up an intermediate existence which leads to hell where birth in hell takes place.
b. According to the Sūtra, there are five ānāntaryā transgressions: he who commits them is immediately born in hell (samanāntarāṁ narakeṣūpapadyate, iv.97). We hold that the expression “immediately” signifies “without intermediary,” without passing through another realm of rebirth (gati): which is an action “retributable in the next existence” (upapadya, iv.50b). If you take the Sūtra literally, you come to absurd conclusions: you would have to say that one must have committed the five crimes in order to be reborn in hell and you would have to say that the transgressor is reborn in hell immediately after the transgression, or that he is reborn there without dying here. Moreover, according to our doctrine, rebirth in hell is immediate; it is not preceded by a “birth” as an intermediate being. We maintain that, by its nature, the intermediate being is “arising” (upapadyaṁaṇa) because he is turned towards the birth (upapatti) that follows death; we do not say that he is born (upapanno bhavati) (iii.10d). 102

c. You should explain the stanza, “Your life is approaching its end, Oh Brahmin; you are old and sick; you are in the presence of Yama; there is not for you any intervening (antarā) dwelling (vāsa) and you have no provision.” 103

[Vasubandhu:] You think that this stanza shows that there is no intermediate existence. But we understand the words antarā vāsa in the sense of dwelling among humans: “Once dead, you shall not reappear here;” or rather, the text means that “No one can retard the progress of the intermediate being that you are going to become on the way to the place of your rebirth in hell.”

The one who denies the existence of intermediary beings asks us upon what do we base ourselves in order to for us to say that such is the intention of this text, or that such is not its intention.

We would reply with the same question.

If, in this manner, the two objections are made equal, what proof can you come to? Let us observe that for the Sūtra on Māra, etc., the explanation of the person who denies the existence of intermediate beings, and our explanation, are not contradicted by the text itself. The texts are thus not conclusive for or against intermediate beings. Texts that are conclusive and which serve as proof are those which can be interpreted in only one way: [as we have quoted, pp. 386-387.]
What is the form of an intermediate being?

13a-b. Being projected by the same action that projects the *pūrvakāḷabhava*, an intermediate being has the form of this being, that is, the being of the realm of rebirth to come after his conception.

The action that projects the *gati* or the realm of rebirth—an existence in hell, etc.—is the same action that projects the intermediate existence by which one goes to this realm of rebirth. As a consequence *antarābhava* or intermediate existence has the form of the future *pūrvakāḷabhava* (p. 39, line 19) of the realm of rebirth towards which he is going.

Objection: In the womb of a dog, a sow, etc., there can die in its embryonic stage a being who should then be reborn in any one of the five realms of rebirth. Let us suppose then that this embryo is replaced by an intermediate being destined to go to hell. This intermediate being, if he has the form of a being in hell, will burn the womb of the dog.

Answer: Even in a perfect state (*pūrvakāḷabhava*), beings in hell are not always incandescent, for example the "annexes" (*utsadas*, iii.58d). But even if one believes that intermediate beings bound for hell are incandescent, as their bodies are "ethereal" (*accha*, transparent, viii.3c), they are not any more tangible than they are visible. There is thus no adherence of the intermediate being. Thus the womb is not burned; moreover the influence of actions is opposed to this.

The dimensions of an intermediate being are those of a child of five or six years of age, but his organs are perfectly developed.

The intermediate being of the Bodhisattva is similar to the Bodhisattva in the fullness of his youth; he is adorned with the major and minor marks; that is why, when this intermediate being comes to enter his mother's womb, he illumines a thousand universes with their four continents.

But we know that the mother of the Bodhisattva saw in a dream a small white elephant enter her side. This was only an "omen," because for a long time the Bodhisattva has been disengaged from animal rebirth. King Kṛkin also saw ten dreams: an elephant, wells, a pole, sandalwood, a park, a young elephant, two monkeys, cloths, and
contests, which were omens. Furthermore, intermediate beings do not enter into the womb by splitting open the side, but rather by the door of birth: this is why the eldest of twins is the one born last.

But how do you explain the stanza of the Bhadanta Dharma-subhūti, "Changing his body into that of a white elephant having six tusks and four feet, he enters the womb and lies therein in full consciousness as a Rṣi entering a forest?"

There is no reason to explain this text: it is neither Sūtra, nor Vinaya, nor Abhidharma; it is a personal composition. But if it demands an explanation, we would say that this stanza describes the Bodhisattva just as his mother saw him in a dream.

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An intermediate being in Rūpadhātu is complete in size and is dressed by reason of his great modesty (iii.70c). The Bodhisattva in his intermediate existence who, through the force of her vow, was clothed in her intermediate existence: she entered the womb and left it dressed, and she remained dressed until her Nirvāṇa and cremation. But lacking modesty, other intermediate beings of Kāmadhātu are nude.

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What is the pūrvakālabhava which is parallel to antarābhava?

13c-d. This is before death, after conception.

Bhava is existence, the skandhas.

In intermediate existence, the five skandhas enter two realms of rebirth: upapattibhava, which is the skandhas at the moment of their entry into a realm of rebirth, at the moment of their pratisamādhi (iii.38 and p.); and pūrvakālabhava which is all the skandhas of the following moments until death, the last moment of the realm of rebirth and which will be followed by a new antarābhava. There is no antarābhava in Ārūpyadhātu.

***
Let us return to the intermediate being:

14a-b. He is seen by the creatures of his class, and by the divine eye.

He is seen by the intermediate beings of the class,—heavenly, etc.,—to which he belongs. He is also seen by the pure divine eye, that is, by the divine eye that is obtained through higher knowledge (abhijñā, vii.55d), for this eye is very pure. He is not seen by a natural divine eye or a divine eye obtained through birth, such as the divine eye of the gods.

According to other masters, a heavenly intermediate being sees all intermediate beings; a human intermediate being sees all intermediate beings with the exception of heavenly intermediate beings, and so on.

14b. He is filled with the impetus of the supernormal power of action.

He is a karmarddhevegañā: endowed (-vān) with the impetus (vega) which belongs to supernatural power (rddhi)—that is, the movement through space—which issues from action (karman) (vii.53c). The Buddhas themselves cannot stop him because he is endowed with the force of action.

14c. His organs are complete.

He is sakalaṭkṣa; akṣa signifies indriya.

14c. No one can resist him.

He is an apratīghavān: a pratiṣṭha is a strike that repels; an apratīghavān is one in whom there is no pratiṣṭha. Even a diamond is not impenetrable to him. For, they say, when we split open a mass of red hot iron we find that some small animals are born inside it.

When an intermediate being is to be reborn in a certain realm of rebirth, from this realm of rebirth, by force,

14d. He cannot be turned away.

A human intermediate being, ceasing to be such, will never become a heavenly intermediate being. He will go to be born in the realm of rebirth with a view to which he has been formed.
Does an intermediate being of Kāmadhātu eat, like the other beings of Kāmadhātu, solid food (iii.39)?

Yes, but not coarse food.

14d. It eats odors.\(^{120}\)

From whence it gets its name of Gandharva, "he who eats (arvati) odors (gandham)." The meanings of the roots are multiple: arv, if one takes it in the sense of "to go," justifies "he who goes to eat odors" (arvati gacchati bhoktum). We have gandharva, and not gandhārva, as we have sakandhu, or karkandhu.

A Gandharva of low rank\(^{121}\) eats unpleasant odors; a Gandharva of high rank eats pleasant odors.

How long does an intermediate being exist?

a. There is no fixed rule, says the Bhadanta.\(^{122}\) It lasts as long as it does not encounter the coming together of the causes necessary for its rebirth. In fact an intermediate existence and the existence that follows are projected by the same action and form part of the same nikāyasabhāga, [of the same existence, ii.41]:\(^{123}\) it is for this reason that, when the life (or the vital organ, jīvitendriya) of an intermediate being comes to an end, there is no death.

Objection: There is a mass of meat as big as Mount Meru which, in the summer rains, changes into a mass of worms. It is in this spot that intermediate beings arrive, being reborn in these worms arising together in such a large number; or rather, from whence do these intermediate beings come?

There exists an infinite number of small animals having short life, coveters after odors and tastes; perceiving an odor, they remember the taste that was associated with it, and they eventually die, coveting these odors and tastes. When they die, they had in their minds (vibodhya) an action the nature of which was to produce an existence among worms; and, by their desire for odors and tastes, they are reincarnated among worms. Or rather it is only when the external causes necessary for the
birth of worms (namely, a great mass of decomposition) is brought together in a great amount that the action which should produce existence among worms enters into activity with a view to their retribution. In the same way a certain being accomplishes actions which should be remunerated as a Cakravartin: these action will not enter into activity before the moment of the cosmic period has come when human life is twenty-four thousand years in length (iii.95). It is for this reason that the Blessed One declared that the retribution of actions is incomprehensible (Samyukta, 21).

b. The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: An intermediate being lasts seven days. If the complex of causes necessary to reincarnation has not been realized, then the intermediate being dies and is reborn.

c. Other scholars say that it lasts seven weeks.

d. The Vaibhasikas say: As it desires birth, it lasts only a short time and then its life is reincarnated. If the complex of external causes is not realized, then one of two things happens: either old actions are such that a birth should take place in such and such a place, and should be of such and such a nature, and, in this case, these actions cause the complex of causes to be realized; or rather this determination is absent, and, in this case, birth takes place in another place, and it is of another nature.

According to others (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 360c25), if the causes have not come together, the intermediate being is born in conditions analogous to those where he would have been reborn. Cattle are not born during the rains, nor gods in autumn, nor black bears in winter, nor horses in summer. But on the other hand, there is no season for buffalos, etc. The intermediary being who, if it is the season of rains, would be reborn a cow, is reborn a buffalo; in the same way a jackal instead of a dog, a brown bear instead of a black bear, or an ass instead of a horse.

But we admit a similar theory. We know in fact that existence and intermediate existence are projected by the same action. One cannot say that an existence as a buffalo is preceded by an intermediate existence as a cow.

***

How does reincarnation take place?

15a-b. The mind (matti) troubled by defilements, goes, through
its desire for sex, to the place of its realm of rebirth.

An intermediate being is produced with a view to going to the place of its realm of rebirth where it should go. It possesses, by virtue of its actions, the divine eye. Even though distant he sees the place of his rebirth. There he sees his father and mother united. His mind is troubled by the effects of sex and hostility. When the intermediate being is male, it is gripped by a male desire with regard to the mother; when it is female, it is gripped by a female desire with regard to the father; and, inversely, it hates either the father, or the mother, whom it regards as either a male or a female rival.\(^{131}\) As it is said in the *Prajñāpti*, "Then either a mind of lust, or a mind of hatred is produced in the Gandharva."

When the mind is thus troubled by these two erroneous thoughts, it attaches itself through the desire for sex to the place where the organs are joined together, imagining that it is he with whom they unite. Then the impurities of semen and blood is found in the womb; the intermediate being, enjoying its pleasures, installs itself there. Then the skandhas harden; the intermediate being perishes; and birth arises that is called "reincarnation" (*pratisaṃdhi*). When the embryo is male, it remains to its right in the womb, with its head forward, crouching; female, to the left of the womb, vagina forward;\(^{132}\) with no sex, in the attitude in which one finds the intermediate being when it believes it is having sex. In fact, when an intermediate being possess all the organs, it then enters as a male or female and places itself as befitting its sex. It is only after reincarnation that a developing embryo can lose its sex.

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What is the support (*āśraya*) of this matter which is from the primary elements, the organs of the new being, its eyes, etc.?\(^{2133}\)

According to one opinion, the primary elements of the blood and semen. According to another opinion, their support are some primary elements different from these, arisen from actions, and which repose (*saṃnīśraya*) in the semen and blood.

First opinion: semen and blood do not have any organs. When an intermediate being perishes, it has some organs and so constitutes what is called the first embryonic stage, or *kalala*. In the same way the arising
of a bud takes place at the same time as the destruction of its seed. In this same manner the Scriptural texts are justified which say that "the body is produced from the kalala which consists of semen and blood" [mātāpītraśucikalalasambhūta, literally: in the impure wombs of the father and mother], and that "after a long time, Oh Bhikṣus, you increase the cemetery and grasp the drop of blood." Second opinion: The organs have different primary elements for their support, as is the case for the organs of leaf worms [for these, through the force of their actions, repose on the primary elements of the leaves, and there arises other primary elements that take on the nature of organs.]

One would object that the phrase in the Sūtra, mātāpītraśucikalalasambhū is not explained in this hypothesis. According to the Sūtra, the body (with its organs) comes from the kalala which is semen and blood (mātāpītraśuci). But the word kalala is placed there to designate some other primary elements that arise reposing on the semen and blood: [reposing on semen and blood they arise, together with the semen and blood, from other primary elements that are called kalala and which include the organs.]

***

It is in this manner that beings who are born from wombs and eggs go to the places of their rebirth (gati). For other beings, say the masters of the Abhidharma, the modes vary according to the case.

15c. Other go in their desire for odor or in their desire for residence.

Beings which arise from moisture go to the place of their rebirth through their desire for its odors: these are pure or impure by reason of their actions. Apparitional beings, through their desire for residence there. But how can one desire a residence in hell? [The mind of an intermediate being is troubled by lust and hatred, as we have seen, when it goes to be reincarnated in a womb.] In the present case, an intermediate being is also troubled in mind and misunderstands. He is tormented by the cold of rain and wind: he sees a place burning
with hot fires and through his desire for warmth, he runs there. Or he is tormented by the heat of the sun and hot winds: he sees a cold place of frozen fires, and through his desire for coolness, he runs there. According to the ancient masters, he sees these things in order to experience the retribution of actions that should be retributed in hell; he sees beings similar to him and he runs to the place where they are.

***

Intermediate heavenly beings—those who go towards a heavenly realm of rebirth—go high, like one rising up from a seat. Humans, animals, Pretas, and intermediate beings go in the manner in which humans, etc., go.

15d. Beings in hell hang from their feet.

As the stanza says, "Those who insult Rṣis, ascetics and penitents fall into hell head first."  

***

We have said that the intermediary beings who are reincarnated in a feminine womb (jarāyuja and andaja) go there troubled in mind, through their desire for sex. Is this a general rule?

No. The Sūtra teaches that there are four ways to descend into, (abide and leave) the womb (garbhāvakrānti). 

16. The first enter in full consciousness; the second, further, dwell in full consciousness; the third, further, leave in full consciousness; the fourth accomplishes all these steps with a troubled mind. Beings born from eggs are always of this last class.

The first do not dwell and do not leave in full consciousness; the second do not leave in full consciousness; the third, in all these moments, are in full consciousness; the fourth are, in all these actions, without full consciousness. Here are the four garbhāvakrāntis that the author teaches, in his sloka in an order different from that of the Sūtra. Beings born from eggs are always troubled in mind.
But can we say that a being born from an egg enters into a womb? Without doubt. One who is born from an egg is now entering into a womb. Or rather we have here an anticipatory designation. In the same way that the Sutra says *samskritam abhisamkaroti*, and, in the world, one says, "to cook the rice porridge," or "to grind the flour."

***

What does the full consciousness and the absence of full consciousness in the entering, in the abiding, and in the leaving consist of?

A being with little merit enters because he thinks, "The wind blows, the heavens rain; it is cold; it storms; people are in an uproar," and because, wishing to avoid these wearinesses, he believes that he is entering into a shelter, a thicket, a hut of roots and leaves, or rather he takes shelter at the foot of a tree or against a wall. Then he imagines himself resting in this thicket, in this hut, and eventually leaves it. There is an error of ideas and resolution. The same for a being rich in merits, who believes he is entering a park, a garden, a palace, a terrace, or a pavilion; he believes this and he rests there and eventually leaves it.

A being who has full consciousness knows that he enters into the womb, that he dwells there, and that he leaves it.

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The Sutra also teaches

17. Three *garbhāvakraṇīnis*,—the Cakravartin and the two Svayambhūs,—by reason of their great purity of action, of knowledge, and of action and knowledge.

The two Svayambhūs are the Pratyekabuddhas and the Saṃbuddha. All these designations are "anticipatory": one means to speak of a being, who, in this existence, will become a Cakravartin, etc.

The Cakravartin enters in full consciousness, but does not reside in full consciousness and does not leave in full consciousness. The Pratyekabuddha resides in full consciousness, but does not leave in full consciousness. The Buddha is always in full consciousness.

The first has a great outflowing of merit and he is made resplendent
through actions; the second has knowledge obtained through instruction, reflection and mediation; and the third has merit, instruction, etc.: both action and knowledge.

The fourth *garbhāvakrānti*, that of not full consciousness, pertains to beings without great actions and great knowledge.

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The non-Buddhists, who believe in an *ātman*,¹⁴⁵ say, "If you admit that a being (*sattva*) goes to another world, then the *ātman* in which I believe is proved."

In order to refute this doctrine, the author says,

18a. The *ātman* does not exist.¹⁴⁶

The *ātman* in which you believe, an entity that abandons the *skandhas* of one existence and takes up the *skandhas* of another existence, an internal agent of action, a Puruṣa,—this *ātman* does not exist. In fact the Blessed One said, "Actions exist, and results exist, but there is no agent who abandons these *skandhas* here and takes up those *skandhas* there, independently of the casual relationship of the dharma. What is this causal relationship? Namely, if this exists, then that exists; through the arising of this, there is the arising of that; *pratītyasamutpāda.*" (French trans. v. p. 57, ix. p. 260).

Is there then, ask the non-Buddhists, a type of *ātman* that you do not negate?

18a-d. Only the *skandhas*, conditioned by defilement and action, go reincarnating themselves by means of the series of intermediate existences. As an example: the lamp.

We do not deny an *ātman* that exists through designation, an *ātman* that is only a name given to the *skandhas*. But far from us is the thought that the *skandhas* pass into another world! They are momentary, and incapable of transmigrating. We say that, in the absence of any *ātman*, of any permanent principal, the series of conditioned *skandhas*, "made up" of defilements and actions (i.15a, on *abhisamāskṛta*), enters into the mother's womb; and that this series, from death to birth, is prolonged and displaced by a series that constitutes intermediate existence.
19a-c. In conformity with its projecting cause the series grows gradually, and, by virtue of the defilements and actions it goes again to another world.

Actions the nature of which is to be retributed in life (āyusya karman, ii.10a) differ according to beings: all the series of skandhas are not then projected at the same time in the existence where they have arisen. The series continues then to increase to the extent that it was projected. This growth is gradual, as Scripture teaches: "There is first the kalala; the arbuda arises from the kalala; the pesin arises from the arbuda; the ghana arises from the pesin; and from the ghana there arises the prasakha, hair, body-hair, the nails, etc., and the material organs with their supports." The kalala, etc., are the five stages of the embryo.

Then, when the embryo, this throne, is ripe, there arises within the womb winds arisen from the maturity of action which causes the embryo to turn and places it towards the portal of its birth: it is difficult to move like a great mass of hidden impurity. Sometimes, either through the unfavorable conditions of the mother’s eating, or by reason of actions, the embryo perishes. Then an expert woman, after having anointed them with all sorts of drugs, puts her hands filled with a sharpened blade into this wound hideous, bad-smelling, and wet with all sorts of impurities which is the womb. She pulls out the embryo after having cut it up limb by limb. And the series of the embryo, by virtue of aparaparyāyavedanīya action (iv.50b), goes somewhere else.

Or else the birth is fortunate. The mother and the servants take the new-born baby into their hands which are like knives and acids for this body now as sensible as an open wound. One washes the child; one nourished it with milk and fresh butter, and later with solid foods: thus does he grow. By reason of this development, the organs mature and the defilements enter into activity, from whence actions arise. And when the body perishes, the series passes into another existence by reason of these defilements and actions, through the medium of the intermediate existence, as mentioned previously.

19d. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning.
actions: the circle of existences is thus without beginning. In order for it to begin, it would be necessary for the first item to have no cause: and if one dharma arises without a cause, then all dharmas would arise without causes. Now the determination of time and place show that a seed produces a shoot, that a fire produces cooking: hence there is no arising that does not have causes. On the other hand, the theory of a single and permanent cause has been refuted above (ii.65): hence the cycle of existence has no beginning.

But birth, coming from causes, would not take place if its causes are destroyed, in the same way that a shoot would not arise if its seed is burned.

***

The series of skandhas develops in three existences,

20a. Pratityasamutpāda or dependent origination has twelve parts in three sections or time periods.152

The twelve parts of dependent origination are ignorance (avidyā), the samskāras, the consciousness, nāmarūpa, the six āyatanas, contact, sensation, desire, attachment, existence, birth, and old age and death.

20b. Two for the first, two for the third, and eight for the middle.

Ignorance and the samskāras existed in a past existence, birth and old age and death will exist in a future existence, and the eight other parts exist in the present existence.

Are the middle parts to be found in the present existence of all creatures?153

No, they are not.

Why is this?

20c. At least to consider the series that has all of its parts.

This refers to a "complete person," a parīpūrin, that passes through all of the states that constitute these parts. Such persons are not beings who die before their time, [for example, in the course of their embryonic life], nor are they beings of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu. It is certain that the Sūtra that enumerates these eight parts refers to beings in
Kāmadhātu: the Mahānidānaparāyaṇasūtra says, “Ānanda, if the consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb . . .” (Dīgha, ii.63).

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Pratītyasamutpāda can be divided into two parts: past existence (1-2) and its effects (3-7); and the causes of future existence (8-10) and future existence (11-12).

What are, in this conception of pratītyasamutpāda, its different parts?

21a. Ignorance is, in a previous life, the state of defilement. [Ignorance does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, iii. p. 87, 90, v.12, nor merely to the totality of the defilements, “all the klesas,”] but rather, in a previous life, the series (with its five skandhas) which is defiled, the condition of defilement (klesa-avasthā). All the defilements in fact accompany ignorance, and are activated through ignorance. In the same way, when one says that the king is coming, one understands that his courtiers are accompanying him.

21b. The samskāras are, in a previous life, the state of action. The series of the previous life, which does good, bad, or neutral actions, constitute the samskāras.

21c. The consciousness is the skandhas at conception. The five skandhas, in the womb, at the moment of reincarnation (pratisamādhī) or arising constitute consciousness.

21d-22a. Nāmarūpa (is the series) from this moment on, until the production of the six āyatanas.

Nāmarūpa is made up of the five skandhas, in the womb, from arising, as long as the six organs are not manifested. It is proper to say, “as long as the four organs . . .,” [for the mana-āyatana and the kāya-āyatana exist from arising or conception, pratisamādhiśane]; it is now at the moment when the four organs, eye, etc., appear that these two preexisting organs are found to be “arranged” [in a group of six].
22b. Six āyatanas before coming together of the three or contact.

The six āyatanas are the five skandhas from the first appearance of the organs until the moment when the coming together of the organ, the object of consciousness, and the consciousness takes place.

22c-d. There is sparsa, or contact, until the moment when the capacity to distinguish the cause of pleasure, of suffering, etc., is acquired.

Contact [which begins at birth] lasts until the moment when the infant becomes capable of distinguishing, "This is a cause of pleasure..."

23a. There is contact before sexual union.

Contact, which the Kārika terms vitti, exists for as long as desire for sexual union is not in action. [This state is termed vedanā, sensation, because one experiences the cause of vedanā: it is hence avasthā vedanāprakāraṇī.]

23b. Desire ("thirst") is the state of one who desires pleasure and sexual union.

There is then in activity concupiscence relative to the objects of desire (kāmagunas, iii. p. 6), visible things, etc., and sexual union. This state of "thirst" or desire ends when one begins, under the influence of this desire, to search out these pleasures.

23c-d. Upādāna or attachment is the state of one who runs around in search of the pleasures.

One runs everywhere in order to acquire these pleasures (v.40). [Or rather upādāna is the fourfold defilement (v.38): the period during which this fourfold defilement is active is called upādāna.] Running around in this manner

24a-b. He does actions which will have for their result future existence (bhava): this is bhava.

[Bhava signifies "action," for existence takes place by reason of it, bhavatya anena.] Action done and accumulated in the search for pleasures will produce reexistence. The period during which one does this action
constitutes bhava.

24c. Jāti is the new reincarnation.

The five skandhas at the moment when reincarnation takes place after death is jāti. The "part" that receives the name of consciousness in a present existence is called jāti in a future existence.

24d. Old age-and-death lasts until sensation.

From jāti until sensation,—which is here termed vid—there are four parts of the present existence, nāmarūpa, the six āyatana, contact and sensation which are, in a future existence designated by the expression old age and death, the twelfth part of this twelvefold series.

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It is also said that pratīyāsamatpāda is fourfold: momentary or of one moment (ksanika); prolonged (prākarsika: extending over many moments of many existences); serial (sāmbandhika, through the union of causes and effects); and static (āvasthika: embracing twelve states, or periods, of the five skandhas).\(^{157}\)

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How is pratīyāsamatpāda momentary?

When a person in prey to the defilements commits murder, the twelve parts are realized in one and the same moment: 1. his moha (aberration) is ignorance (avidyā); 2. his "volition" (cetanā) are the samskāras; 3. his distinct consciousness of a certain object is consciousness; 4. the four skandhas\(^ {158}\) coexisting with the consciousness is nāmarūpa; 5. the organs in relation to nāmarūpa are the six āyatanas;\(^ {159}\) 6. the application of the six āyatanas\(^ {160}\) is contact; 7. to experience contact is sensation; 8. desire (rāga) is thirst; 9. the paryavasthānas\(^ {161}\) associated with thirst are attachment; 10. bodily or vocal action that proceeds [from sensation or thirst] is bhava; 11. the emersion (unmājjana=utpāda=production) of all these dharmas is jāti; 12. their maturity (paripāka) is old age; and their rupture is death.
It is also said that *pratītyasamutpāda* is both momentary and serial at the same time. The Prakaraṇa says, "What is *pratītyasamutpāda*? All the conditioned (*samśkrita*) dharmas. What are the dharmas produced through dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*)? All the conditioned dharmas."\(^{162}\)

Static (*āvasthika*) *pratītyasamutpāda* is made up of the twelve states (*āvasthā*) embracing the five *skandhas*.

It is also prolonged (*prākarsikā*), extending itself over three consecutive existences.

Among these four, what is the type of *pratītyasamutpāda* that the Blessed One has here—in the *Sūtra of the Twelve Parts*—the intention to teach?

25a. According to the School, it is static *pratītyasamutpāda*.\(^{163}\)

According to the School the Blessed One distinguishes the twelve parts only with respect to static *pratītyasamutpāda*.

But if each of the parts is a complex of the five *skandhas*, why use the designations "ignorance," etc.?

Because the Sūtra expresses itself in an intentional manner, whereas the Abhidharma teaches the characteristics of things.\(^{164}\) On the one hand *pratītyasamutpāda* is given as static, prolonged, and pertaining to living beings (*sattvākhyya*); and on the other hand, as momentary, serial, and pertaining to both living and non-living beings (*sattvāsattvākhyya*).

Why does the Sūtra teach *pratītyasamutpāda* as only pertaining to living beings?

25c-d. In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the interval in between.
And it is for this same reason that it teaches a \textit{pratīyāyasamutpāda} in three sections.

Ignorance or aberration relating to the past, as when one asks, "Did I exist or not exist in the past? How and as what did I exist?" Relating to the future: "Will I exist in the future? . . ." Relating to the interval in between: "What is this? How is this? What are we? What will we be?" \footnote{165}

This threefold aberration is destroyed by the teaching of the succession: ignorance . . . old age and death. For it is said in the Sūtra, "Whoever, Oh Bhiksus, knows, through \textit{prajñā}, \textit{pratīyāyasamutpāda} and the \textit{dharma}s produced through dependence, will not turn himself towards the past by asking if he existed . . ."

According to others, the last three terms of the middle section, —thirst, attachment, and \textit{bhava},—are also taught in order to cause aberration relating to the future to cease; for they are the causes of future existence. \footnote{166}

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This twelvefold \textit{pratīyāyasamutpāda} is also threefold, defilement (\textit{klesa}), action (\textit{karman}), and foundation (\textit{vastu}); it is twofold, cause and result.

\footnote{26a-b. Three parts are defilement, two are action; seven are foundation and also result. 167}

Ignorance, thirst, and attachment are, by their nature, defilements; the \textit{samskāras} and \textit{bhava} are action; consciousness, \textit{nāmarūpa}, the six \textit{āyatana}, contact, sensation, \textit{jāti}, and old age and death are foundation, so called because they are the support (\textit{āśraya=adhiśṭhāna}) of the defilements and action. The parts that are foundation are result: the five that are not foundation are cause, being both defilement and action in nature.

Why are cause and result taught at length in the section of present existence—two parts of defilement, two parts of action, five parts of foundation—whereas, a similar exposition is absent for the past and future?

In the future, one has two parts for result.
26b-c. In two sections, cause and result are abbreviated, for one can infer them from the teaching of the middle.

From the teaching of the defilements, action and foundation, relating to present existence, one can deduce the complete exposition of cause and result in past and future existences. All useless descriptions should be omitted.

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But if *pratītyasamutpāda* has only twelve parts, transmigration would have a beginning, since the cause of ignorance is not indicated; and it would have an end, since the result of old age and death is not indicated. Thus one must add new parts, and to infinity.

No, for the Blessed One has implicitly indicated the cause of ignorance and result of old age and death.

27. From defilement there arises defilement and action; from whence foundation; from whence a new foundation and defilement: such is the manner of existence of the parts of existence or bhavāṅgas.¹⁶⁸

Defilement arises from defilement, as attachment arises from desire.

Action arises from defilement, as consciousness from attachment, or the *samśkāras* from ignorance.

A foundation arises from action, as *vijñāna* from the *samśkāras*, or birth from existence.

A foundation arises from a foundation, as *nāmarūpa* from consciousness; the six *āyatanas* from *nāmarūpa* . . . sensation from contact, or old age and death from birth.

Defilement arises from a foundation, as desire from sensation.

Since such is the manner of existence of the various parts of dependent origination it is clear that ignorance has either a defilement or a foundation for its cause; it is clear that old age and death (=the rest of the foundation from consciousness to sensation, above, p. 404, line 6, has defilement for a result.

Thus the teaching is complete. That the Blessed One wanted to
illustrate this manner of existence of the parts results from the conclusion of the Sūtra, "Thus there takes place the production of this great mass which is nothing but suffering."\(^{169}\)

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But there is another explanation: \(^{170}\) a. It is said, in another Sūtra,\(^{171}\) that ignorance has incorrect judgment (ayoniso manasikāra) for its cause, and, in still another Sūtra, that incorrect judgment has ignorance for its cause.\(^{172}\)

Consequently ignorance is not without a cause and one avoids the objection of infinite regression.

b. But incorrect judgment is not named in the Sūtra in question, the Pratītyasamutpādāvatāra.

Without doubt; but it is included in attachment: thus one does not have to separately name it here.\(^{173}\)

This explanation is without value. How is incorrect judgment included in attachment? Indeed, it is associated (samprayukta) with attachment, but it can as equally well be associated with ignorance or with desire. Let us admit that it may be included in attachment, but can one draw from this the conclusion that the Sūtra, by naming attachment, says that incorrect judgment is the cause of ignorance? In other words, I indeed hold that incorrect judgment is included in attachment; but it does not follow that the Sūtra could dispense with terming it a separate part, the cause of ignorance. One could just as well omit ignorance and desire.

Another master speaks next.\(^{174}\) A Sūtra teaches that ignorance has incorrect judgment for its cause.\(^{175}\) A Sūtra teaches that incorrect judgment has ignorance for its cause and observes that it is produced at the moment of contact, "By reason of the eye and a visible thing there is produced a defiled judgment which arises from error (moha=avidyā)."\(^{176}\) A Sūtra explains the origin of desire, "Desire arises by reason of a sensation which itself arose from a contact wherein there is ignorance."\(^{177}\) Hence the ignorance that coexists with sensation proceeds from the incorrect judgment which is produced at the moment of contact. Hence ignorance is not without a cause; there is no reason to add a new term: incorrect judgment, the cause of ignorance, arise itself from
an ignorance designated as aberration (moha). [This is circular reasoning, cakraka.]

Well and good, says the author; but this is not explained in the Pratīyāsamutpādasūtra and it should be explained there.

There is no reason to explain it in clearer terms, for one reaches these conclusions through reasoning. In fact, to the Arhats, sensation is not a cause of desire: from whence we conclude that sensation is a cause of desire only when it is defiled, associated with ignorance. Contact, when it is not accompanied by error, is not a cause of this defiled sensation; contact accompanied by error is not produced in an Arhat, who is free from ignorance; thus the contact that pratīyāsamutpāda indicates as the cause of sensation, a cause of desire, is the contact that is accompanied by ignorance. [We then have sāvidyasparśapratyaya vedanā / sāvidyavedanāpratyaya trṣṇā: sensation conditioned by contact associated with ignorance, desire conditioned by sensation associated with ignorance]. From there we again take up the reasoning indicated above: we prove that, according to the Sūtra, incorrect judgment is produced at the moment of contact.

But, says the author, the idea that reasoning, supported on occasion by Sutras, permits omitting indispensable terms—in the incorrect judgment in question, with the reciprocal causality of incorrect judgment and ignorance—leads to absurdity. [One could just as well omit contact, sensation, the samāskāras or birth].

The true answer to this objection—that, since there is no indication of any other parts before ignorance and beyond old age and death, samsāra is without beginning or end—is the following: the enumeration of the parts of dependent origination is complete. In fact, doubt with reference to the question of knowing how present existence is conditioned by preceding existence, and how future existence is conditioned by present existence, is the only point that the Sūtra wants teach: thus it says, "In order to cause error relating to the past, the future, and their interval to cease" (iii.25c, p. 68).

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The Blessed One said, "I shall teach you, Oh Bhikṣus, pratīyāsamutpāda and the dharma produced in dependence (pratīyā-
What difference is there between \textit{pratītyasamutpāda} and these \textit{dharmas}?

None, according to the Abhidharma. For, as we have seen above (p. 405), both are defined as being “all the conditioned \textit{dharmas}.”

\textbf{***}

A difficulty. “All the conditioned \textit{dharmas}” means the \textit{dharmas} of the three periods. How can future \textit{dharmas} which have not yet arisen, be termed “produced in dependence,” \textit{pratītyasamutpanna}? We would ask you how future \textit{dharmas} which are not yet “created” (\textit{kṛta}) are called “conditoned” (\textit{saṁskṛta})?

Because they are “thought” (\textit{cetita}) by the volition (\textit{cetanā}) which is termed \textit{ābhisaṁskārika}, that is, “executing a retribution.”

But if this is so, how will future pure \textit{dharmas} (the \textit{dharmas} of the Path) be conditioned?

They are thought by a good mind with a view to acquiring them. But then Nirvāṇa itself will be conditioned, for one desires to acquire it.

When one calls future \textit{dharmas} “produced in dependence,” one uses an inadequate expression, justified by the identity of nature of future \textit{dharmas} with past and present \textit{dharmas} that are “produced,” in the same way that future \textit{rupa} is called \textit{rupa} by reason of the identity of its nature with \textit{rupa}, even though one cannot qualify it as \textit{rupyate} in the present.

\textbf{***}

What is the intention of the Sūtra in distinguishing \textit{pratītyasamutpāda} from the \textit{dharmas} produced in dependence?

28a-b. \textit{Samutpāda} is the cause, whereas \textit{samutpanna} is the result.

The part that is a cause is \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}, because, there takes place arising from it. The part that is a result is \textit{pratītyasamutpanna}, because it arose; but it is also \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}, because, from it, arising takes place. All the parts, being cause and result are at one and the same
time both \textit{pratityasamutpāda} and \textit{pratityasamutpanna}. Without this
distinction, nevertheless, there would be non-determination and con-
fusion (\textit{avyavasthāna}), for a part is not \textit{pratityasamutpāda} through
connection to the part through connection to which it is also
\textit{pratityasamutpanna}. In the same way a father is father through
connection to his son; and a son is son through connection to his father;
in the same way cause and result, and the two banks of a river.

But the Sthavira Pūrṇāsa\textsuperscript{184} says: What is \textit{pratityasamutpāda} cannot
be \textit{pratityasamutpanna}. Four causes: 1. future \textit{dharma}s [which are
\textit{pratityasamutpāda} because they are a cause of future \textit{dharma}s, but not
\textit{pratityasamutpanna} because they are not \textit{utpanna}]; 2. the last \textit{dharma}s
of the Arhat [which are solely \textit{pratityasamutpanna}]; 3. past and present
\textit{dharma}s, with the exception of the last \textit{dharma}s of the Arhat, [which
are both \textit{pratityasamutpāda} and \textit{pratityasamutpanna}]; and 4. the
unconditioned \textit{dharma}s, [which are neither \textit{pratityasamutpāda} nor
\textit{pratityasamutpanna}, because they have no result and they do not arise,
ii.55d].

The Sautrāntikas criticize: [All this teaching, from “Static \textit{Pratitya-
samutpāda ...} (p.405)” to “What is \textit{pratityasamutpāda} cannot be
\textit{pratityasamutpanna},”\textsuperscript{185} —are these personal theses, fantasies, or the
sense of the Sūtra? You say in vain that it is the sense of the Sūtra. You
speak of a static \textit{pratityasamutpāda} of twelve parts which are so many
states (\textit{avasthā}) made up of the five \textit{skandhas}: this is in contradicition to
the Sūtra wherein we read, “What is ignorance? Non-knowledge
relating to the past ... ”\textsuperscript{186} This Sūtra is of explicit sense, clear
(\textit{nītārtha}=\textit{vibhaktārtha}); you cannot make it a Sūtra whose sense is yet
to be deduced (\textit{neyārtha}).\textsuperscript{187}

[Answer of the Sarvāstivādins:] Nothing proves that this Sūtra is of
clear sense; the fact that it expresses itself by means of a definition does
not prove anything; for the Blessed One gives definitions which solely
bear on the essential or major elements of the object to be defined.\textsuperscript{188}
For example, in the \textit{Hastipadopamasūtra}, to the question “What is the
internal earth element?”, the Blessed One answers, “The hair, the
body-hair, etc.”\textsuperscript{189} Certainly hair, etc., are still other \textit{dharma}s,—visible
things, smells, etc.,—but the Blessed One refers to their principal
element, which is the earth element. In the same way, the Blessed One
designates a state in which ignorance is the major element as ignorance.
[Answer of the Sautrāntikas:] This example proves nothing. In fact, in the Hastipadopamasūtra, the Blessed One does not define hair, etc., by the earth element; he does not say "What is hair, etc.? The earth element," in which case the definition would be incomplete. But he defines the earth element through the hair, etc.; and his definition is complete, for there is no earth element in the body which is not included in the description, hair, etc. In the same way, the definition of pratītyasamutpāda is complete; there is nothing to add to it.

[Answer of the Sarvāstivādins:] The definition given in the Hastipadopamasūtra is not complete. In fact there is earth element in tears, mucus, etc., as one can see by another Sūtra.190 Yet the earth element of tears is not indicated in the Hastipadopamasūtra.

[Answer of the Sautrāntikas:] Perhaps the definition of the Hastipadopamasūtra is incomplete, seeing that you are able to show that there is something lacking in it. It remains for you to say what is lacking in the definitions that the Sūtra gives for ignorance, etc. Why define ignorance as "a state with five skandhas" by introducing heterogeneous dharmas [the five skandhas] into ignorance? One can only consider as a part of dependent origination a dharma the existence or nonexistence of which governs the existence or nonexistence of another part. Thus a state having five parts is not a "part." The five skandhas (sensation, etc.) exist in the Arhat, but he does not possess any samśkāras which could produce a consciousness part of dependent origination, that is, a punyopaga, apunyopaga, or āniniyopapaga vijñāna.191 And thus following. Hence the Sūtra (note 186) is not to be taken literally.

As for the four cases of Pūrṇāśa, his first case—that the future dharmas are not "produced by dependence"—is contradicted by the Sūtra which gives birth and old age and death as "produced by dependence": "What are the pratītyasamutpānas? Ignorance . . . birth, and old age and death." Would one say that birth and old age and death are not future states? This is to take away the three sections from the theory of pratītyasamutpāda.

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Certain schools192 maintain that pratītyasamutpāda is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) because the Sūtra says, "Whether the Tathāgatas
appear or not, this dharma nature of the dharmas is unchanging."

This thesis is true or false according to the manner in which one interprets it. If one means to say that it is always by reason of ignorance, etc., that the samskāras, etc., are produced, but not by reason of any other thing, and not without cause; that, in this sense, pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda is stable, and eternal (nitya), we approve. If one means to say that there exists a certain eternal dharma called pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda, then this opinion is inadmissible. For utpāda, production or arising, is a characteristic of anything that is conditioned (saṃskṛtālaksana, ii.45c); an eternal dharma, as arising or pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda would be by supposition, cannot be a characteristic of a transitory or conditioned thing. Moreover arising is defined as "existence succeeding upon nonexistence": what relationship (abhisambandha) can one suppose exists between an unconditioned arising and ignorance, etc., a relationship that would permit one to say "pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda of ignorance, etc.?" Finally the expression pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda would become absurd: since prati-itya-samutpāda signifies "production by having gone to the cause" (pratya yam prāpya samudbhavaḥ), how could a dharma be both eternal and pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda at one and the same time?

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What is the meaning of the word pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda? Prati has the sense of prāpti, "to obtain, attain": the root i signifies gati, "to go;" but with the prefix modifying the sense of the root, prati-i signifies "to attain," so pratiṣṭhya signifies "having attained;" pad signifies sattā, "existence;" and following are the prefixes sam-u, "to appear, prādubhāva." Thus pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda signifies "having attained appearance."

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This explanation is not admissible; the word pratiṣṭhānaṃ pr Таpāda is not good, [say the Grammarians]. In fact, of two actions by one and the same agent, the previous action is shown by the verb in the gerundive: snātva bhunkte = "after having bathed, he ate." Now one cannot
imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced,\textsuperscript{196} goes first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced. There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority."

The objection of the Grammarians\textsuperscript{197} is without value.\textsuperscript{198} Let us ask them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely? Do you say that a future thing\textsuperscript{199} arises? How can you attribute to that which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent?"

Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.

In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?

The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" (utpādābhimukho'ṅāgataḥ).\textsuperscript{200} So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.

Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent (kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriyā) which here is the action of arising (bhūti). Now one does not maintain that the action of arising (bhūti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii. English trans. p.247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as conventional expressions, the words, "it arises, it is produced after having gone to the pratyayas." The meaning of the expression pratītyasamutpāda is as indicated in the Sūtra,\textsuperscript{201} "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this." (See below, p.415) The first phrase("If that exists . . .") refers to pratītya, and the second ("Through the arising of that . . .") to samutpāda.

Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is preexistent to its arising.” As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: “Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes,” or rather: “Having bathed, he lies down.” One does not speak in this manner of anyone who bathes, closes his mouth and lies down.

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Some other masters avoid the objection relative to the use of the gerundive by giving a very different explanation of the word pratityasamutpāda: prati has a distributive meaning; sam signifies “coming together”; ityā signifies “good at leaving,” “that which does not last;” and the root pad preceeded by ut signifies “appearance,” “arising.” We then have pratityasamutpāda which signifies “arising together, by reason of such and such a coming together of causes, of perishable things.”

This explanation holds for the expression pratityasamutpāda; but it does not take into account texts such as: a visual consciousness arises “By reason (pratitya) of the eye and visible things.”

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Why does the Blessed One define pratityasamutpāda in two ways, “1. If that exists, then this exists;” and 2. “From the arising of that, this arises?”

1. For many reasons: 1. to be more specific. In the first formula, it results that the saṁskāras exist when ignorance exists; but it does not result that the saṁskāras come into existence through the sole existence of ignorance. The second formula specifies that it the arising of ignorance that precedes the arising of the saṁskāras; 2. in order to indicate the succession of the parts of dependent orgination: if that (ignorance) exists, then they (the saṁskāras) exist; from the arising of that (saṁskāras)—and not from any other thing—this (consciousness) arises; 3. in order to indicate the succession of existences: if previous existence existed, then there is present existence; from the arising of present existence future existence arises; 4. in order to indicate the nature of causality which differs according to the case: the causality of the
parts is either immediate: "if that exists, then this is," or not immediate: "from the arising of that, this arises." For example, defiled samāskāras can immediately succeed ignorance; or they can be separated from it by good samāskāras (ii.62a). But ignorance is the immediate cause of the samāskāras, and a mediate cause of consciousness.

ii. According to another explanation, the Blessed One taught in this manner in order to refute the theory of non-causality (ahetuvāda), the thesis that a thing exists in the absence of a cause, and the theory of one non-arisen cause, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, etc.

This explanation is not good, for the second formula suffices to refute these two theories.

iii. But certain non-Buddhist teachers imagine that "since the ātman exists as a support (of ignorance), then the samāskāras, consciousness, etc., exist, being produced; that if ignorance is produced, then the samāskāras are produced," and so on. In other words, they posit an ātman which serves as a substrate to the successive causation of the dharmas. In order to refute this opinion, the Blessed One specified, "That which arises (the samāskāras) through the arising of such a thing (ignorance) exists by reason of the existence of this one thing that arises, and not by reason of the existence of a certain substrate." The first formula would permit us to say, "If the ātman exists as a support and if ignorance, etc., exists, then the samāskāras, etc., exist." This second formula permits us to say, "It is true that the samāskāras, etc., arise by reason of the arising of ignorance, etc.; but this is on the condition that there exists a certain substrate." The two formulas together make these explanations untenable: "The samāskāras have ignorance for their cause [that is: if ignorance alone exists ...] ... thus the production of this large and autonomous mass of suffering takes place."

iv. The Masters think that the first formula indicates non-abandoning, non-cutting off: "If ignorance exists, not being abandoned, then the samāskāras exist, are not abandoned;" whereas the second formula indicates arising: "Through the production of ignorance, the samāskāras are produced."

v. According to another opinion, the first formula indicates duration, and the second indicates arising: "As long as the flux of causes lasts, the flux of results exists; by the sole production of a cause, its result is produced."
We observe that it is a question of arising: the Blessed One said in fact: "I shall teach you pratītyasamutpāda." Further, why would the Blessed One first teach duration and then arising?

Another explanation (of the same master): The formula: "If that exists, then this exists," signifies: "If the result exists, then the destruction of its cause exists." But let us not think that a result arises without a cause: "From the arising of that, this arises."

But, in order to express this sense, the Blessed One should have said, "If that exists, then this does not exist;" and he should have first indicated the arising of the result. Once the result arose, he could say, "When the result has arisen, the cause is no more." If the Sūtra should be understood as this master understands it, how does it happen that, wishing to explain pratītyasamutpāda, the Blessed One first explained the destruction of its cause?

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How do the samāskāras exist by reason of ignorance? How does old age and death exist by reason of birth? Let us briefly answer this question.

The fool or Prthagjana does not understand (aprajāna) that pratītyasamutpāda is merely the samāskāras, that is, conditioned (samskṛta) dharmas—[this lack of prajñā is avidyā āvenikī, only non-wisdom, not associated with desire]—and this produces a belief in an ātman (v.7, 12), and egotism (v.10a); it accomplishes the threefold action,—bodily, vocal, mental,—with a view to agreeable sensation, and to the sensation of indifference; non-meritorious action, with a view to agreeable sensation in this life; meritorious action, with a view to agreeable sensation in a future life in Kāmadhatu; and "immoveable" (ānīśīya) action, with a view to agreeable sensation of the first three Dhyānas and the sensation of indifference of the higher stages (iv.46a). These actions are the samāskāras that exist by reason of ignorance.

Given the force of the projection of action, the series of the consciousness, due to the series of the intermediary existence, goes into such and such a realm of rebirth, as long as it may be, in the manner in which a flame goes, that is, in a perpetual renewing. That is the consciousness which exists by reason of the samāskāras: in thus
understanding the consciousness, we are in agreement with the
definition that the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* gives for the consciousness:
"What is the consciousness? The six groups of consciousnesses."  

With the consciousness as an antecedent, nāmarūpa arises in this
realm of rebirth. This is the five skandhas, conforming to the definition
of the *Vibhaṅga*: "What is nāman? The four nonmaterial skandhas.
What is rūpa? All rūpa . . . These two,—the nāman and the rūpa,—are
called nāmarūpa."

Then, through the development of nāmarūpa, there arises in their
times, the six organs: these are the six āyatanas.

Then, encountering their object, a consciousness arises, and, through
the coming together of the three (consciousness, the six āyatanas and a
visaya), there is contact, which is susceptible of being experienced
agreeably, etc.

From that, the threefold sensation, agreeable, etc., arises.

From this threefold sensation, there arises a threefold desire; desire
for kāma or desire for agreeable sensation of the sphere of Kāmadhātu,
in a being tormented by suffering; desire for rūpa, or desire for agreeable
sensation of the three Dhyānas and the sensation of indifference of the
Fourth; all desire for Ārūpya.

Then, from the desire relating to sensation, there arises a fourfold
attachment (*upādāna*): attachment to the object of sense pleasure
(*kāmopādāna*), attachment to views (*dṛṣṭyupādāna*), attachment to
rules and rituals (*śilvatopādāna*), and attachment to theories con-
cerning the soul (*ātmavādopādāna*). The kāmas are the five objects of
pleasure (*kāmaguṇa*, iii.3, p. 368). The views, sixty-two in number, are
as explained in the *Brahmajalasūtra*. Sīla is rejecting immorality (*daubśīlya,*
iv.122a); vrata is the vow to act like a dog, a bull, etc.; for example the
Nirgranthas and their nudity, the Brāhmanas with their staffs and
antelope hides, the Pāśupātas with their tuft of hair and their ashes, the
Parivrājakas with their three staffs and their nudity, and the rest: to tie
oneself down to the observation of these rules is *śilvatopādāna* (v.7).
Ātmavāda is the person himself, and ātmabhāva, is that relating to
which one says āman.

According to another opinion, ātmavāda is both a view of soul
(*ātmadarśti*) and thoughts pertaining to a soul (*asmimāna*), for it is by
reason of these two that one says āman, that one affirms the existence
of an ātman (ātmavāda): if Scripture uses the word vāda, "affirmation," it is because the ātman does not exist. It is said in fact, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech, thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me' or 'mine.'" Attachment to the kāmas, views, etc., is chanda or desire, and rāga or craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva, "What is attachment? It is chandarāga." Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence: this is bhava. The Sūtra says, "Ānanda, action that produces a new existence is the nature of bhava." By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the consciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being nāmarūpa in nature. Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sūtra. It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)—that is, without any relation to an ātman—there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end.

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The theory that has just been taught—according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas—is a theory of the Vaibhāṣikas.

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What is avidyā (ignorance)? The non-vidyā, that which is not vidyā. Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyā. It is an absence of vidyā, "ignorance." This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv. 2b-3b) and avidyā must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-d. Avidyā is a separate entity (dharma), the opposite of vidyā or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc. The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend. Rta or
satya is truth; non-truth (anṛta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anarthā) and the not-to-be-done (akāryā) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.\

Thus avidyā—"non-knowledge"—is the opposite of vidyā, a real separate dharma. The Sūtra defines it as the cause of the samśkāras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negation. Further,

29a. Because it is declared to be bound (saṁyojana), etc.

The Sūtra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (saṁyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anusayā), a canker (āśrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyā, the eyes, etc.

Yet the prefix nān—the privative a—has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (apurtra). Should we not think then that avidyā is bad vidyā, that is, bad prajñā?

29b. Avidyā is not bad prajñā, because this is seeing (darśana).

Bad prajñā (kuprajinā) or defiled prajñā would be a type of seeing (dṛṣṭi); one of the five bad views (v.3). Now avidyā or ignorance is certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes (saṁyojanas).

[The Sautrāntikas:] Avidyā would be the defiled prajñā which is not seeing by nature, [for example prajñā associated with rāga or craving].

This is impossible,

29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,

In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidyā (ignorance) is among the mahābhūmika klesas (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii.26a); now all the mahābhūmika klesas are associated with them, thus avidyā (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajñā in nature; thus avidyā is not prajñā, for two items of prajñā cannot be associated.

29d. and because ignorance is defined as a defilement of prajñā.

The Sūtra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajñā defiled by ignorance is not purified." Now prajñā cannot be defiled by
praṇā: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of praṇā, then ignorance is not praṇā.

[Reply of the Sautrāntikas]. Good praṇā can be mixed with defiled praṇā, as when moments of good and defiled praṇā succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with craving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not active, samudācaran; but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids craving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausṭhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way praṇā, defiled by ignorance (bad praṇā), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.

What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar? Ignorance is not, in its nature, praṇā.

The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements (kleśas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements, it cannot be named separately among the yokes (saṃyojanas), etc.; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, “The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated,” but rather, “The mind defiled by ignorance . . . .” Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, “The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated?” In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the praṇā: now it says, “Praṇā defiled by ignorance is not purified.”

If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of praṇā, you should define it.

Ignorance is the non-saṃprakhyāna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of action and its result. [Saṃprakhyāna is the same thing as praṇā, discernment, or jñāna, knowledge].

What is non-saṃprakhyāna?

It is not-saṃprakhyāna, nor absence-of-saṃprakhyāna, in the same way that avidyā is not non-vidyā or absence-of-vidyā. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of saṃprakhyāna.

Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asaṃprakhyāna.
Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self nature or essence, but definitions through function. For example, the eye is defined as "the pure rūpa that serves as a support for the eye consciousness" because one does not know this invisible rūpa except through inference (Chap. ix, French trans. p. 231.). [In the same way the unique nature of avidyā is known through its action (karman) or activity (kārita); this action is contrary to vidyā so it is thus a dharma contrary (vipakṣa) to vidyā].

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The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following terms: asmūti sattvamayanā.238

Does this mayānā differ from asmimāna (v.10)?

The Bhadanta answers: As the Sūtra says,239 "I know, I see—through the perfect abandoning and the perfect knowledge of desire, of views, mayānās, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self ātmāgrāha); to the idea of mine (mamāgrāha), to asmimāna,240—without shade,241 Parinirvāṇa." [This Sūtra shows that mayānā—in the singular since it is a genre—is distinct from asmimāna].

So be it, there is mayānā; but from whence do you hold that it is ignorance?

The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayānā with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimāna.

But could it not be a māna other than asmimāna? [Māna is in fact six or sevenfold, v.10]. However we would have to say too much in order to complete this examination. Let us stop here.

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As for nāmarūpa,242 rūpa has already been explained (i.9).

30a. Nāman are the skandhas that are not rūpa.243

The four nonmaterial skandhas,—sensation, ideas, samskāras, and consciousness, are called nāman, for nāman signifies "that which bends, yields," (namatīs nāma).
The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the object (arthā) by reason of name (nāman), the organs, and the object. 244

In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjñākarana, ii.47a, English trans. p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc., or a single thing, "rupa," "taste," etc.

Why is samjñākarana termed "name?"

Because the samjñākarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayati nāma) towards their object.

According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed nāman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend, that is, go towards another existence. 245

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We have already explained the six āyatanas (i.9).

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30b. There are six contacts. They arise from encounter. 246

The first is the contact of the eye, and the sixth is contact of the manas or mind (Dīgha, iii.243, etc.)

They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its object, and a consciousness.

One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objects and their corresponding consciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhātu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (manovijñāna) arises (i.172); and the object (i.e., dharmas) of this consciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?

There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the object (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental consciousness; or rather because the organ, the object and the consciousness produce the same single effect, namely the contact.
What is the nature of contact?

The masters are not in agreement.

Some—[the Sautrāntikas]—say: Contact is merely the coming together itself. According to the Sūtra, “The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact.”

Others—[the Sarvāstivādins]—say: Contact is a dharma associated with the mind (ii.24, English trans. p. 190), distinct from any coming together. According to the Sūtra of the Six Hexades, “The six internal sources of consciousness (āyatanas, eye, etc.), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc.), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires.” The Sūtra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal āyatanas, external āyatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas, for the Sūtra does not contain any repetition or double usages].

[The Sautrāntikas explain this Sūtra:] If the Sūtra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmāyatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.

[Reply of the Sautrāntika, the Bhadanta Śrīlabha:] Every eye and visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. Thus what is defined as contact in the Sūtra, “Six collections of contacts,” is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).

But how do the Sarvāstivādins, who maintain that contact exists apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a consciousness, explain the Sūtra, “The coming together (saṃgati), the encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact?”

They do not read the Sūtra in this form; or rather they say that the expression is metaphorical: when the text says “the coming together,” it means “the result of the coming together.”

But this discussion is taking us too far afield.
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The Ābhidhārmikas think that contact is a dharma, a separate entity.

30c-d. Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is so-called through denomination.\(^{254}\)

The contact of the eye, the ear, etc., have sapratigha organs (i.29b) for their support (āśraya); thus they are termed pratigha sparśa taking their name from their support.\(^{255}\)

The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called adhvivacanasamsparsa.\(^{256}\)

What is the meaning of the term adhvivacana?

Adhvivacana is a name.\(^{257}\)

Now name is the object (ālambara) par excellence of contact associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;' through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, 'It is blue.'"\(^{258}\)

Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name—a contact of denomination—from its characteristic object.

According to another opinion,\(^{259}\) one takes into account the fact that only the mental consciousness is activated (pravartate) with regard to its objects (color, etc.), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression or speech (adbikṛtya vacanam = vacanam avadhārya):\(^{260}\) mental consciousness is thus adhvivacana. The contact (sparśa) that is associated with it is thus called adhvivacanasamsparsa.

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The sixth contact is of three types:

31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are respectively pure, defiled, other.\(^{261}\)

These are the contacts associated with vidyā, that is, with pure prajñā; with avidyā, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with naivavidyā-nāvidyā, that is, with good, but impure prajñā.
In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated with all the defilements and which is always active, one distinguishes the two:

31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy which are associated with hatred and with desire.

Contact in its totality, is threefold.

31d. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (sukhavedya), etc. These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc., = sukha\text{vedaniyā}, etc.] (Pāṇini, 5, 1.1); or rather because "that" is felt or can be felt (vedyate tad vedayitum vā sakyam) (Pāṇini, 3, 1.169).

"That" is sensation, vedānā. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (sukham vedyam), is a contact that is called sukha\text{vedya}. There is in fact an agreeable (sukha) sensation there.

We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.

32a. Six sensations arise from contact. That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc.

32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.

The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (ā\text{fraya}) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the manas: its support is the mind (manas) so it is mental or caitasya.
[The Sautrāntikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous
to contact.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that sensation and contact are simulta-
neous, being sahabhūbetu, "reciprocal causes" (ii.50a).

[The Sautrāntikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that
which produces" (janaka) and "that which is produced" (janya)?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Why would they not be?

[The Sautrāntikas:] When two things arise together, how could the
dharma "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the dharma
"to be produced," which has already arisen?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This argument (śādhanā) only repeats the thesis
(pratijñā) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which
produces" and "that which is produced."

[The Sautrāntikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis,
there would be reciprocal causality of two dharmas arisen together.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this
consequence. We define sahabhūbetu as ye mithabphalāḥ, "The
dharmas that are results of one other are a sahabhu cause" (ii.50c).

[The Sautrāntikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sūtra
condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there
arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not
say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye,
the contact of the eye arises." And again the thesis that "Two things
arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the
characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the dharma which
produces another dharma is not simultaneous to this other dharma: a
seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes dadhi; a blow precedes the noise;
and the manas (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness
(manovijñāna) (i.17).

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier
than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be
simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual
consciousness; or the primary elements (mahābhūtas) and "secondary
(bhautika) matter."
[The Sautrāntikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.

The Vaibhāṣikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the shoot and its shade.265

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According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Śrīlābha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the “coming together,” that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third. And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.

[Śrīlābha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] According to you, there would thus be simultaneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.

[Śrīlābha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompanied by sensation.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (ṣarvatrāga) or mahābhūmika dharmas (ii.23c-d). This rule
establishes that ten dharmas,—sensation, contact, idea, etc.—are associated with every mental state.

[Srīlābha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?

[The Vaibhāṣīkās:] On the Śāstra or Abhidharma.

[Srīlābha:] We recognize Sūtra and not Śāstra as authority. For the Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sūtra. Or rather we propose for the doctrine of the mahābhūmikas an interpretation different from yours.

[The Vaibhāṣīkās:] What then is the meaning of the expression mahābhūmika?

[The Sautrāntikās:] There are three bhūmis or spheres, 1. savitarka-savicāra: Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, 2. avitarka-savicāra: the intermediate dhyāna, and 3. avitarka-avicāra: the Second Dhyāna, etc. (viii.23c); three other bhūmis, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good, bad, and neutral dharmas]; and three other bhūmis, of Śaiksas, Āśaiksas, and neither-Śaiksā-nor-Āśaiksā [that is, the pure dharmas of the Śaikṣa and Āśaikṣa, and the impure dharmas, ii.70c]. The mental dharmas which are found in all these bhūmis are called mahābhūmika [these are sensation, volition, as ii.24]; those which are found only in a good bhūmi are called kusalamahābhūmika [these are faith, etc., as ii.25]; those which are found only in a defiled bhūmi are called klesamahābhūmika [these are ignorance, etc., as ii.26]. But all these dharmas are called mahābhūmika, kusalamahābhūmika, and klesamahābhūmika, because they can be found in the bhūmi proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists in all the bhūmis, as too ideas, volition, etc.: but this does not mean that every mental state includes all these dharmas, sensation, etc.

Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamahābhūmikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sūtras would suggest this idea.

[The Vaibhāṣīkās:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sūtra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact; together there arises (sahajāta) sensation, ideas, volition."

[The Sautrāntikās:] This Sūtra say that sensation, ideas and volition arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity, but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sūtra, for example, says, "He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) with compassion." Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sūtra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc.).

[The Sarvāstivadins:] But the Sūtra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not separate." "Mixed" signifies "arisen together." From this Sūtra we conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.

[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", saṁsṛṣṭa? We read in the Sūtra that you have just quoted, "That which he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate); that about which he thinks, he grasps an idea of (samjñātī); that about which he grasps an idea of, he discerns (vijñātī)." In other words, the same thing is the object (ālambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object—which is our opinion—or because they are simultaneous, as you say.

[The Vaibhasikas: The word saṁsṛṣṭa refers to simultaneous things. It is said in fact that life (āyus) and warmth (usmaka) are saṁsṛṣṭa. They cannot be saṁsṛṣṭa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sūtra says, "The coming together of the three is contact." How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.

But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.

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We have explained, in summary, mental (caitasa) sensation.

32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the objects of the mind (manopavicaras).

Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicaras of satisfaction (samanasya), six of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii.7): these are the upavicaras of satisfaction relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicaras of dissatisfaction and indifference.

How does one distinguish these eighteen?

In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the upavicaras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference; considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated with the mental consciousness; and considering their objects, they are six: having visible things, sounds, etc., for their objects. We answer then that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three qualities.

There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicaras: the object of manopavicara relating to visible things is only these visible things. But, as for the three dharmopavicaras—the three upavicaras (satisfaction, etc.) relating to the dharmas—one would distinguish: they can arise relating to the distinct dharmas of the five sense objects; in this case, their object presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on one, two, three, . . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds, . . . dharmas); in this case, their object is mixed.

What is the meaning of the expression manopavicara?

Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaction, etc.) called manopavicara?

The Vaibhāsikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible things, etc., as an object (upavitaranti = ālambante)."

According to another opinion, "Because satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference cause the manas to reconsider (upavīcarayanti) visible things, etc." For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc.) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kāyikā) sensation as manopavicāra.

Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc.) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc., to which it is associated, i.33, trans. p. 97); and it is no longer upavicārika, [that is, susceptible of “consideration,” samsthirikā].

2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyāna (viii.9b), which is of the sphere of a single manas, not placed among the manopavicāra?

[The Vaibhāṣikas say (wrongly),] “Because, initially, that is, in Kāmadhātu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas. [In Kāmadhātu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any dukkha-upavicāra which would oppose the sukha-upavicāra that you imagine.”

3. But, if the upavicāras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have to take into account the Sūtra which says, “Having seen visible things through the eye, he considers (upavicārati) the visible things which satisfy (saumanasyasthānāya).” The relationship is characterized, in the Sūtra, by the visual organ and by upavicāra.

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicāras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicāras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the asubbhās (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc., vi.9), which are produced by the visual consciousness, are of the sphere of the manas: these meditations, in fact, suppose absorption; 2. on the other hand, the Sūtra says, “Having seen visible things...,” it does not say, “Seeing visible things...,” which would justify your objection; 3. there is upavicāra of the visible things, etc., without having seen them, etc. (For example one can “consider” the visible things that one intends to speak of, with satisfaction). If it were otherwise, a being in Kāmadhātu could not “consider” the visible things, sounds and tangible things of Rūpadhātu [which he does not perceive], and a being of Rūpadhātu would not be able to consider the smells and tastes of Kāmadhātu; 4. the Sūtra says, “Having seen visible things... he
considers visible things,” because his “consideration” is “clearer” when it
bears on an object which is “experienced.” It is not doubtful that, having
seen a visible thing, one cannot consider the sound [which accompanied
the visible thing]; there is here “consideration” or upavicāra, of a sound
not experienced: but the text, in order to avoid any confusion, makes a
correspondence between the organs and the objects which correspond
to them.

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The objects are given, in the Sūtra, as saumanasyasthānīya, etc.,
“which produce satisfaction, dissatisfaction, or indifference.” Are they
such by their natures?

No. The same object can be saumanasthānīya for one person, but
daurmanasyasthānīya for another. It all depends on the “series,” on the
dispositions of the mind itself.

***

Among the manopavicāras, how many are in Kāmadhātu? Which
Dhātu takes the manopavicāras of Kāmadhātu for its object? The same
questions for the other two Dhātus.

33a. In Kāmadhātu all of the manopavicāras have their own
Dhātu for their object.

The eighteen manopavicāras are produced among beings in
Kāmadhātu, but all can have Kāmadhātu for their object.

33b. Rūpadhātu is the object of twelve.

Twelve of them can have Rūpadhātu for their object, with the
exception of the three manopavicāras (of satisfaction, dissatisfaction,
and indifference) relative to odor and the three relative to taste, since
odors and tastes do not exist in Rūpadhātu (i.30b).

33c. The highest Dhātu (=Ārūpyadhātu) is the object of three.

Three, namely the dharmanopavicāras, can have Ārūpyadhātu for
their object, but not the fifteen others, since visible things, etc., do not
exist in Ārūpyadhātu (viii.3c).

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In Rūpadhātu, one must distinguish the first two Dhyānas and the last two.

33d. In two Dhyānas, twelve.

In Rūpadhātu the upavicāras of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) are completely absent. [In the first two Dhyānas there exists six upavicāras of satisfaction and six of indifference].

34a. All have Kāmadhātu for their object.

These twelve can have Kāmadhātu for their object.

34b. Eight have their own Dhātu for their object.

Eight of them can have Rūpadhātu for their object, with the exception of the upavicāras of odor and taste.

34c. Two have Ārūpyadhātu for their object.

Two can have Ārūpyadhātu for their object, namely the dharmo-pavicāras of satisfaction and indifference.

34d. But, in the other two Dhyānas, six.

The upavicāras of dissatisfaction and satisfaction are absent in the last two Dhyānas.

34e. Kāmadhātu is the object of six.

There remains then the six upavicāras of indifference which have the visible things, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible things, and dharmas of Kāmadhātu for their object.

34f. Of their own Dhātu, four.

The visible things, sounds, tangible things, and dharmas of Rūpadhātu.

34g. The highest Dhātu (=Ārūpyadhātu) is the object of one.
The *dharmas* of Ārupyadhāātu.

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In Ārupyadhāātu, one must distinguish the preliminary absorption of Ākāśānantyāyatana and the absorption which follows it:

35a. In the preliminary stage of Ārupyadhāātu

In the Kārikā, the word "arūpisāmantā" signifies Ākāśānantyāyatana-nasāmantaka (viii.22). Four *upavicāras*: the *upavicāras* of indifference (*upekṣa*) with regard to visible things, sounds, tangible things and *dharmas* of the Fourth Dhyāna are produced in this absorption.

35b. four have Rūpadhāātu for their object.

This is the opinion of the masters who think that the mind of this absorption is *vyavacchinnālambana*, that is, that it considers visible things, sounds, etc., separately.

According to other masters, this mind is *paripinditālambana*: it considers the five *skandhas* of the Fourth Dhyāna without any distinction; for these masters, this absorption is thus made up of only one *upavicāra* which has for its object the Fourth Dhyāna, namely the *dharmopavicāra* of mixed objects.

35c. One has the highest sphere for its object.

In this same absorption, in Ārupyadhāātu, there is only the *dharmopavicāra*.

35d. In Ārupyadhāātu itself, one,

In the principle (*maula)* Dhātu, or Ārupyadhāātu itself, there is only one *upavicāra, dharmopavicāra*

35e. which has its own Dhātu for its object.

which has Ārupyadhāātu for its object. As we shall see, the mind, in the principle absorption of Ārupyadhāātu, does not grasp lower Dhātus for its object (viii.21).

35f. All of these eighteen are impure.
There is no upavicāra which is pure.

A being born in Kāmādhātu who has not taken possession of a good mind of Rūpadhātu [by penetration into Anāgamya, viii.22; who is all the more not detached from Kāmādhātu and who has not entered into the Dhyānas], is in possession of (saumanvāgata; ii.36b): 1. the eighteen upavicāras of Kāmādhātu; 2. the eight upavicāras of the First and Second Dhyāna (four of satisfaction and four of indifference, having visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas for their objects). The upavicāras of satisfaction and indifference, having for their object the odors and tastes of Kāmādhātu, which are produced in the Dhyānas, are not defiled [since the possessor of the Dhyānas is in Kāmādhātu]: hence the being in question is not filled with these upavicāras [for a being in an lower sphere is filled with the defiled dharmas of the superior spheres]; 3. the four upavicāras (of indifference) of the last two Dhyānas [same remark as for 2]; and 4. an upavicāra (dharmopavicāra) of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu, also defiled.

When this being has obtained a good mind of Rūpadhātu [by penetrating into Anāgamya], but is not detached from Kāmādhātu, he is filled with: 1. the eighteen upavicāras of Kāmādhātu; 2. the ten upavicāras of the First Dhyāna: four upavicāras, defiled, of satisfaction, by omitting the upavicāras of odor and taste, and the six upavicāras of indifference of the sphere of Anāgamya; 3. as above for the other Dhyānas and Ārūpyadhātu.

One can decide any other case on the basis of these principles.

A being in one sphere of Dhyāna is in possession of a single upavicāra of Kāmādhātu, the dharmopavicāra of indifference associated with a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmāṇacittā, vii.49c).

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Another master: It is in this way that the Vaibhāṣikas understand the upavicāras; but we understand the Sūtra in a different way. One cannot say of one who is detached (vītarāga) from an object, a visible thing, etc., that he produces upavicāras with regard to this object. All the satisfactions, etc. (saumanasya, etc.), are not upavicāras, though they are impure. They are upavicāras when they are “defiling” (sāṅklesika), following the expression of the Sūtra, “when one has sympathy,
antipathy, or indifference not proceeding from exact consciousness." And it is in order to combat these upavicāras that the six "manners of being, or perpetual methods" (satatavihāra) are taught.293 "Having seen a visible thing with the eye, there is no sympathy and no antipathy: he remains indifferent in full mindfulness and conscious . . ."294 We can show that our interpretation is correct by observing that the Arhat is not without experiencing a satisfaction of a worldly order (and consequently impure), but good, having a dharma for its object295 (that is, the dharmayātana, i.24, or the adhigama or āgama, viii.39a). What he arrests is the satisfaction which, being defiled, is upavicāra.296

By distinguishing those states of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference on the basis of those which have craving for their principle component and those which have "leaving" (the desire for liberation) for their principal component, we have the thirty-six "points of the Master" (śāstrpada), so called because this distinction has been taught by the Master.297

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The divisions of the parts of existence (bhavāṅga) called sensation, and which we have just described, are still very numerous.

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The other parts of existence will not be explained here.

36a. The others have been explained or will be explained later.

The consciousness and the six āyatanas have been explained in the First Chapter (i.16,9); the samskāras and existence will be explained in Chapter Four; desire and attachment, in Chapter Five.

***

We have said (iii.26) that pratītyasamutpāda is defilement (kleśa), action (karman) and a "substantial entity" (vastu).

36b-d. It is explained that defilement is like a seed, a Nāga, a root, a tree, a husk of grain.298
As a stalk, leaves, etc., arise from a seed, so too defilement arises from defilement, action, and a real, substantial entity.

A pond where Nāgas live does not dry up; in the same way the ocean of births where this Nāga which is defilement remains does not dry up.

The tree whose root is not cut off continues to grow even through one cuts and re-cuts its greenery; in the same way, as long as this root, defilement, is not cut off, the realms of rebirth continue to grow.

A tree gives forth flowers and fruits at different times; in the same way it is not at one and the same time that this tree, the defilement, gives forth a defilement, action and a substantial entity.

Grain, even though intact, does not germinate when it is stripped of its husk; in the same way action must be associated with this husk which is defilement in order to bear fruit in a new existence.

37a-b. Action is like grain with its husk, grass, flower.

Action is like grain with its husk. It is like grass that dies when the fruit is ripe: in the same way, when the action has matured, it no longer matures any more. It is like a flower, the immediate cause of the arising of the fruit: in the same way it is the immediate cause of retribution.

37c. The substantial entity (vastu) is like food and drink. 299

Food and drink are not reproduced in food and drink: they are not good except by being consumed: so too the "entity" which is retribution. A new retribution does not preceed from retribution, for, in this hypothesis, deliverance would then be impossible.

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The series (sānītāna) of the skandhas, in its continual process, is only a succession of the four existences (bhava) that we have defined (iii.10 and foll.), namely intermediate existence (antarābhava), existence as arising (upapattibhava), existence in and of itself (pūrvakālabhava), and existence at death (naraṇabhava).

37d-38b. Among the four existences, existence as arising is always defiled, and by all the defilements of the sphere to which it belongs.
It is always defiled, never good or neutral. When arising takes place in a certain sphere (bhūmi: Kāmadhūtu, First Dhyāna, etc.), all the defilements (kleśa)\(^{300}\) of this sphere defile it. The Ābhidhārmikas say, "Among the defilements, there is not a single one that does not defile the mind at rebirth (pratisamādhibandha); but rebirth takes place solely through defilements, not by the wrappings (paryavasthānas) called svatantra [, through jealousy, egoism, anger, or hypocrisy, which are only associated with ignorance] (v.47).

Although this state—the state of death—is bodily and mentally "weak" (mandika),\(^{301}\) when a person has habitually practiced a certain defilement,\(^{302}\) this defilement, thus "projected," becomes active at the moment of death.

38c. The other existences are of three types.\(^{303}\)

Intermediate existence (antarābhava), existence in and of itself (pūrvakālabhava), and existence at death (maraṇabhava) can be good, bad, or neutral.

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Are the four existences produced in all the Dhātus?

38c. Three in the Ārūyas.\(^{304}\)

With the exception of intermediate existence. All four existences exist in Kāmadhūtu and Rūpadhūtu.

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We have finished the exposition of pratītyasamutpāda. Now how do beings, once they are born, last?

38d. Everyone lasts through food.\(^{305}\)

A Sūtra says, "A dharma has been proclaimed by the Blessed One who knows and sees, that all beings last through food."

There are four foods, food by the mouthful (kavaṭikāra āhāra),
contact (sparśa), mental volition (manahsārīcetanā), and consciousness (vijnāna). 306

Food by the mouthful is coarse or subtle. Food by the mouthful of intermediate beings (who nourish themselves on odors, from whence their name of Gandharva, iii.30c), the food of the gods, and the food of humans at the beginning of the cosmic age (prāthamakālpīka, iii.97c) is subtle, because this food, like oil poured out into the sand, completely penetrates into the body and does not give forth any excrement (nisyandābhaśvat). 307 Or rather the food of subtle beings is subtle, for example a being born from moisture (yūka, etc.), one newly-born (bālaka), [the embryonic being,] etc.

39a-b. Food by the mouthfuls exists in Kāmadhātu; it consists of three āyatanas.

Only beings free from desire with regard to this food arise in the two higher Dhātus; thus this food exists only in Kāmadhātu.

It consists of odors, tastes, and tangible things. In fact, odors, tastes and tangible things are put in the mouth—that is, in pindas or small balls—and then swallowed. This twofold operation is made by the mouth and the nose which separate the morsels.

But how does one attribute the quality of food to odors, etc., which are also found in shade (chāyā) and warm light (ātapa, i.10a), in flames (jvalā), and in the light [of gems, etc.] (prabha)? 308

But such odors, etc., are not put in the mouth and swallowed.

According to the School, the definition, “Food consists of three āyatanas,” refers to the generality of the cases. [The odors which are found in the shade, etc., are not food; but, in the majority of cases, odor pertains to food].

But 309 we think that, even though they are not swallowed, like the others, since they contribute to the duration of a being, these odors are included in the category of subtle food; as for example bathing and unguents (snānābhyaṅgavat; see i. trans. p. 103).

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But why is rūpāyatana, a visible thing (color and figure) not a food? In fact, one swallows it by the mouthfuls.
39c-d. Rūpāyatana is not food, for it comforts neither its organ nor those delivered.  

Food is that which comforts the organs and the primary elements (the mahābhūtas) which are the support of the organs. Now a visible thing, at the moment when it is swallowed—when this food, introduced into the mouth, is eaten—does not comfort either its organ (the eye), or the primary elements which are the support of the eye. Nor does it comfort the other organs, since it is not their object. Without doubt, as long as one sees it, it causes pleasure and satisfaction, it comforts: but, what is comfort and food in this case is not the visible thing, but the agreeable contact which has the visible thing for its object. The explanation that we formulate here is confirmed by the fact that an agreeable visible thing does not comfort those liberated beings who see it. [If a visible thing were to perform the function of food when one sees it, it would comfort persons delivered from the desire for mouthfuls of food, namely the Anāgāmins and Arhats, as odors, tastes, etc. comfort these same liberated beings when they partake of them.]

40a-b. In the three Dhātus, contact, volition, and consciousness, when they are impure, are food.

Contact is what arises from the cooperation of the three (iii. p. 97); mental volition is mental action (mānasa karman, iv.lc); and consciousness is the consciousness skandha.

Why are they not food when they are pure? The Vaibhāṣikas say, “Food signifies that which makes existence (bhava) grow; now if it were pure, it have the destruction of existence for its result.” It is a doctrine conforming to that of the Sūtra, that food has for a result causing to endure (sthiti), causing to go (yāpana) “those that exist” (bhūta), of favoring (anugraha) “those desiring re-existence (sambhavaisin).” Now contact, volition, and consciousness, when they are pure, do not produce any of these two results.

Those that exist signifies beings who have been born; but what is the meaning of the expression “desiring re-existence?” It refers to antarābhava, intermediate existence or being, which the Blessed One designated by five names:

40c-41a. Mind created (manomaya), desiring re-existence (sambhavaisin).
bhavaisin), Gandharva (an eater of odors), intermediate existence (antarābhava), and arising (nirvṛtti).

An intermediate being is called manomaya, because he is produced by the manas alone, and because he exists without being supported by any exterior element, semen, blood, flower, etc.

He is called abhinirvṛtti, because his nirvṛtti or arising is with a view (abhi-mukhi) to arising proper (upapattiḥbhava, existence of arising). That abhinirvṛtti signifies an intermediate being results from the Sūtra “After having realized (abhinirvartya) a painful body, he will be reborn in a painful world;” and also from the Sūtra that says, “Such a person has abandoned the bonds which cause abhinirvṛtti, without having abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti or existence.” in a painful world; and also from the Sūtra that says, “Such a person has abandoned the bonds which cause abhinirvṛtti, without having abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti or existence.”

There are four cases: 1. An ascetic detached from Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, when he is an Anāgāmin: he has abandoned the bonds which cause abhinirvṛtti or intermediate existence, since he will no longer be reborn in the Dhātus where existence itself is proceeded by an intermediate existence; but he has not abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti, existence proper, for he will be reborn in Ārupyadhātu; 2. an Anāgāmin destined to obtain Nirvāna in an intermediate existence (an antarāparinirvāya, iii. p. 387): he is bound with the bonds of abhinirvṛtti, but freed from upapatti; 3. an Arhat, who has abandoned the two types of bonds; and 4. all other persons who are not included in the preceeding categories, who have not abandoned any of the two types of bonds.

According to another explanation, the bhūtas (p. 441, line 31) are the Arhats: the word sambhavaisin designates all beings who desire (satṛṣṇā), and who are as a consequence reborn.

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What are the foods that fulfill these two functions of causing to last and “favoring [re-existence]”? According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the four foods perform these two functions. Food by the mouthful has for its result the re-existence of
those who are attached to it. This is proved by the Sūtra. The Blessed One said, "The four foods are the root of sickness, abscesses, and thorns. [Sickness, abscesses, and thorns signifies the five upādānakandhas of a new existence]; and are the condition (pratyaya) of old age and death. [And old age and death is the old age and death of a future existence, see above, p. 404]."

[It is evident that food by the mouthful causes living beings to last.] But how does mental intentional action, or volition (manahsaṁcetanā), possess this power?

Once upon a time there was a man, who in a time of poverty desired to go to another land. But he was exhausted by his hunger and his two sons were young. Feeling that he was going to die, he filled a sack with ashes, placed this sack on a wall, and encouraged his sons by telling them that this sack contained grain. The two children, through hope, lived a long time. But another man came and took the sack and opened it. The children saw that it was ashes, and their hope being crushed, they died.

So too once upon a time some merchants travelled by ship on the open sea; tormented by hunger and thirst, they saw in the distance a mass of foam and believed that it was a river; hope gave them the force to go to that place and prolong their life; but, arriving, they found out what it was, and their hopes being crushed, they died.

We also read in the Sarvatiparyāya, "Large marine animals reach firm ground, lay their eggs on the beach, bury them in the sand, and go back to the ocean. If the mother forgets the eggs, they will perish."

This edition cannot be correct, for it is impossible that the mind of another would be food. Thus we should read, "If the eggs think of their mother, they will not perish; but if they forget their mother, they will perish."

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Yet one cannot doubt that all the impure dharmas increase bhava or existence. Why did the Blessed One teach that the foods are four in number?

Because he refers to the essentials:

41. Among the foods, two have for their result the growth of the
āśraya (the body) and the āśrita (the mind), and two have for their result the projection and the production of a new existence.329

The āśraya is the body with its organs, which is the support (āśraya) of what is supported (āśrita) by it: namely the mind and its mental states. Food by the mouthful makes the body grow, while contact makes the mind grow.330 These two foods which cause that which is born to live, and which are similar to a wet-nurse, are the major items for the duration of a being who is born.

Mental volitional action (manahsāṃcetanā) which is active, projects a new existence; this new existence, thus projected, is produced (nirvṛttta) from the seed which is the consciousness “informed” through action.331 Mental volitional action and the consciousness are thus the two foods which cause birth, which are similar to a mother, and which are the major items for the production of the existence of a being who has not yet been born.

Is everything which is “by the mouthful” (kavadikāra) food?332 There are “mouthfuls” which are not food. Four cases: 1. kavadikāra which is not food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the diminution of the organs and the destruction of the primary elements which support them; 2. food without being kavadikāra: namely contact, mental volitional action, and the consciousness; 3. kavadikāra which is food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the primary elements; and 4. neither kavadikāra nor food: sound, etc.

The same, by changing the terms, for the other foods.

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Is there contact, mental volitional action, and consciousness, which has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the elements, without this contact, etc., being food?

Yes: those which belong to a sphere different from the sphere in which the being in question is born, and, in all the spheres, those which are pure.333
That which consumed (paribhukta) is harmful to one who has consumed it (praibhoktar) nevertheless receives the name of food. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, in fact, it is for two moments that the thing consumed performs the function of food: 1. as soon as it is consumed, it dispels hunger and thirst; and 2. digested, it increases the organs and the primary elements (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 676c25).

This leads to another question. How many foods are there is the different realms of rebirth, and in the different wombs? All are in all. How can you say that there is, in the hells, food by the mouthful? The red balls of fire and molten copper are food. If this is the case, if that which is harmful is food, then the theory of the four cases [of the Saṁgītīparyāya, note 332] is rejected, as well as the definitions of the Prakaranagrantha (7.5; see also Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 674a1, 676a26, and 779c4) which says, "What is food by the mouthful? Mouthful by reason of which there is increase of the organs, and the increase and maintenance of the primary elements," and the rest.

The doctrine of the existence of food by the mouthful in the hells is not in contradiction with the definitions that you appeal to. These definitions, in fact, are applied to food insofar as it increases. But the objects of consummation which have for their result to diminish, nevertheless possess, in the hells, the characteristics of food: they dispel, at least for a time, hunger and thirst. Further, in the prādeśika hells (iii.59c), food by the mouthful exists as among humans. Hence food by the mouthful exists in the five realms of rebirth.

With respect to food by the mouthful, let us examine the Sūtra: There is one who feeds one hundred non-Buddhist Rṣis detached from
Kāmadhātu, and there is one who feeds a single jambuṣaṇḍagata prthagjana: but this last gift is much more fruitful that the first.” What does the expression “jambuṣaṇḍagata prthagjana” mean?

[Three opinions in the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 678a26] 1. According to the first opinion, jambuṣaṇḍa signifying Jambudvīpa, so this signifies, “All beings inhabiting Jambudvīpa who have a stomach.”

This explanation is inadmissible; for the expression “a Prthagjana . . .” cannot designate “all beings . . .” Were it to have such a value, we do not see why the Sūtra would teach that a gift made to an infinite number of Prthagjanas is more meritorious that one made to a smaller number, to one hundred Ṛsis: for such would stand of itself, and there would be nothing surprising about it.

2. According to the second opinion, the Prthagjana in question is the Bodhisattva close to Bodhi.

3. According to followers of the third opinion, the second opinion is unsustainable: in fact a gift made to such a Bodhisattva is of incalculable merit, and is of a merit superior to a gift made to one hundred koṭis of Arhats. The terms of the comparison would be much too low. Thus, say the Vaibhāṣikas, this Prthagjana is the person who has obtained the so-called nirvedhabhāgīya roots of good.

In our opinion, the expression jambuṣaṇḍagata does not etymologically signify ”possessor of the nirvedhabhāgīyas;” the usage does not give that sense to this expression; neither the Sūtra nor the Śāstra uses it in this sense: the word jambuṣaṇḍagata, “seated under the Jambu tree,” refers to but one Bodhisattva, [as it is said, “The Bodhisattva Sarvārthasiddha, having left in order to go see Kṛṣigrāmaka, sat at the foot of a jambu tree, and entered into the First Dhyāna.”] The Bodhisattva is a Prthagjana, detached from Kāmadhātu: one can thus compare him with the non-Buddhist Ṛsis detached from Kāmadhātu and say that a gift made to him is more meritorious that a gift made to Ṛsis.

Without doubt, a gift made to this Bodhisattva is more meritorious than a gift made to an infinite number of Ṛsis: and if the Sūtra says that it is more meritorious than a gift made to one hundred Ṛsis, it is because the Sūtra explains the gradation of merit by multiples of one hundred: “to feed one hundred animals, to feed one immoral person, to feed one hundred immoral persons . . .” we observe that, to proceed with these
comparisons, the Sūtra does not further speak of a *jambuṣandagata*. It does not say, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaāpanna is incomparable greater than a gift made to a *jambuṣandagata*"—which it would say if *jambuṣandagata* were to signify "a possessor of the nirvedhabhāgīyas"—but rather, taking up again the Ṛṣis as the term of comparison, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaāpanna is incomparably greater than a gift made to one hundred non-Buddhist Ṛṣis.

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We have seen what the *pratīyasamutpāda* of beings is, and how beings last. We have seen also how death results from the exhaustion of life (*āyus*), etc. (ii.45a, trans. p. 269). It remains for us to say which consciousness is present at the moments of death and birth.

42a-c. Breaking, taking up again, detachment, loss of detachment, death and birth are regarded as proper to the mind consciousness.\textsuperscript{343}

It is through a single mental consciousness that the breaking and the taking up again of the roots of good take place; the detachment either from a Dhatu, or from a *bhūmi* (First Dhyāna, etc.), and the loss of this detachment; and death and birth. What is true of birth is evidently true of the beginning of the intermediate existence: it is useless to speak of it.\textsuperscript{344}

42d. Death and birth, with the sensation of indifference.

The term *cyuta* is the equivalent of *cyuti* or death; the term *udbhava* is the equivalent of *upapatti*, arising.

The mind consciousness, at death and at birth, is associated with the sensation of indifference, *upeksā*, that is, with the sensation that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable. This sensation is not active; the other sensations are active and, as a consequence, an arising and a dying consciousness cannot be associated with them, for, in this hypothesis, it would itself be active.

43a. Neither the one nor the other in "absorption," nor for "one without thought."\textsuperscript{345}
Death and birth take place in the mind consciousness (manovijñāna), [for and by the manovijñāna]. But death cannot take place in a person whose mind (citta = manovijñāna) is absorbed. An absorbed mind is found in a sphere—First Dhyāna, etc.—dissimilar to Kāmadhātu where we suppose the one dying and the one being born is found. On the other hand, if we consider a being who dies or who is born in a sphere of absorption, then his mind is certainly not absorbed, for an absorbed mind is only absorbed through effort; it is ābhisanaskārika: thus it is always active (patu). Finally, an absorbed mind is anugrahaka: that is to say, by its nature, it tends to last, to cause to last; hence it is not suitable to a cutting off of the series.

There is no longer any death or birth for “one without thought,” [a person who has entered into nirodhasamāpatti and asamjñisamāpatti, ii.41d]. One who is without thought cannot be killed: when his body (āśraya = the sense apparatus, iii.41) begins to decay—either by the action of the sword or of fire, or by the exhaustion of retribution of the absorptions—then, of necessity, the mind bound to the body [and existing as a seed in the body] becomes present and dies.

The state of non-thought is also incompatible with birth, for it is lacking any cause for the cutting off of the mind, and because there cannot be a birth without defilement.

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Existence at death (maranabhava) can be good, bad, or neutral. Concerning the death of the Arhat,

43b. He obtains Nirvāṇa in two neutral minds.

Namely, in an airyāpathika mind or in a vipākaja mind. At least according to the masters who believe that, in Kāmadhātu, a vipākaja mind can be indifferent (upeksā,iv.48); but, for the masters of an opposing opinion (iv.47), one cannot obtain Nirvāṇa in an airyāpathika mind.

Why is the last mind of the Arhat necessarily neutral?

Because this type of mind, being very weak, is suitable to the cutting off of the mind, that is, to the definitive cutting off of the mind.
In which part of the body does the consciousness perish at death?

When death or "falling" (cyutī) takes place at once, the kayendriya (organ of the body or of touch) perishes at the same time as does the manas.

43c-44a. When death is gradual, the manas dies in the feet, at the navel, in the heart, accordingly as the being goes below, among humans, among the Suras, or is not reborn.351

Adhoga, "who goes below," is one who should be reborn in the painful should be reborn in the human realms of rebirth; suraga, "who goes among the gods," is one who should be reborn in a heavenly realm of rebirth. The consciousness of these beings dies respectively, in the feet, the navel, or in the heart.

Aja, "who is not reborn," is the Arhat: his consciousness also dies in the heart; but according to another opinion, in the head.352

How does the consciousness die in a certain part of the body?

Because it is in such a part that the destruction of the organ of touch takes place.353 [The activity of the consciousness which is nonmaterial and outside of space, is bound to this organ—which alone remains as its support or āśraya, iii.44]. The consciousness dies through the destruction of the organ of touch, which takes place in a certain place. Towards the end of life, the organ of touch perishes bit by bit; at the end it remains only in a certain part of the body where it finishes by disappearing; in the same way water placed on a hot rock diminishes gradually and finishes by disappearing in a certain place.

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It is thus that gradual death takes place; in general, the dying person is afflicted by some sensations which break the vital parts.

44b. The vital parts are split by water, etc.354

Marmāni,355 or vital parts, are those parts of the body which cannot be damaged without death ensuing.
When one of the elements,—water, fire or wind,—is extremely troubled, the vital parts are as if they were split by terrible sensations which are like sharp knives. By saying that the vital parts are split, we do not mean to say that they are split like wood. Rather one should understand that they are henceforth incapable of activity quite as if they were split.

Why are the vital parts not split by trouble of the earth element?
Because there are only three dosas, namely bile, phlegm, and wind, which are in order the elements of water, fire, and wind.

According to another opinion, since the world perishes by these three elements (iii.100a), death also takes place by these three elements.\textsuperscript{356}

The vital parts of the gods are not split. But five premonitory signs appear to a god being approached by death: 1. some of his clothes and some of his ornaments give off unpleasant sounds; 2. the light of his body diminishes; 3. some drops of water remain attached to his body after his bath; 4. in spite of his natural mobility, his mind is fixed on an object; and 5. his eyes, naturally fixed, are troubled, opening and closing. And there are five signs of death: 1. his clothes become dirty; 2. his aura fades; 3. sweat appears in his armpits; 4. his body emits a bad odor; and 5. the god no longer enjoys his seat.\textsuperscript{357}

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The Blessed One classified beings who arise, last, and die,\textsuperscript{358} into three categories: those predestined to health, predestined to loss, and not predestined.

\textsuperscript{44c-d.} An Āryan and one guilty of ānantarya transgressions are predestined, the first to health, the second to loss.\textsuperscript{359}

What is “health,” samyaktva?\textsuperscript{360}
According to the Śūtra, the complete abandoning of affection, hatred, error, and all of the defilements, [that is, Nirvāṇa].

What is an Āryan?
One in whom the Path arises, that is, the Pure Path. He is an Āryan because he “has gone far” (ārād yātaḥ) from evil,\textsuperscript{361} since he possesses disconnection (visamīyoga, ii.55d, p.) from the defilements.
How is the Āryan predestined to health?
Because he will certainly obtain Nirvāṇa.

But a person who acquires the mokṣabhāgīyas (vi.24c) will also certainly obtain Nirvāṇa. Why not consider him predestined to health?
Because he can commit transgressions which make him “predestined to loss;” or rather because, if he is in fact predestined for Nirvāṇa, the moment of his arrival at Nirvāṇa is not fixed, as is the case for the Āryans beginning with “he who, at a maximum, will be reborn seven times” (saptakṛtvahparama, vi.34a).

What is loss, mithyātva?
The hellish, animal, and Preta realms of rebirth. A person who commits ānantaryā transgressions (iv.96) will cerainly be reborn in hell; he is thus predestined to loss.

One who is not predestined (aniyata) is one who is not predestined to health or loss. Whether he becomes predestined to one or the other, or whether he continues to not be predestined, depends in fact on his future actions.

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We have described the world of human beings; let us pass to a description of the receptacle or physical world (bhājanaloka). 362

45. Here is how it is thought that the receptacle world is arranged: at the bottom there is a circle of wind, immeasurable, with a height of sixteen hundred thousand leagues. 363

The great chiliocosm (iii.73) is arranged as we shall explain. At its bottom there arises, through the force of the predominant actions of beings (adhipatiphala, ii.58, iv.85), a circle of wind which rests on space. 364 It is sixteen thousand yojanas (iii.88) thick; it is immeasurable in circumference; and it is solid: a mahānagna 365 could strike at it with his vajra and his vajra would break without the circle of wind being scratched.

46a-b. The circle of water, eleven hundred twenty thousand high.

By the predominate actions of beings, there falls from massed
clouds, upon the circle of wind, a rain the drops of which are like the shafts of a carriage.\textsuperscript{366} This water forms a circle of water, with a thickness of eleven hundred twenty thousand yojanas.

How do these waters not flow over the edge?\textsuperscript{367}

Some say that the waters are sustained by the force of the actions of beings, as food and drink which do not fall in the intestines before being digested.

According to another opinion, the waters are sustained by the wind, like grain in a basket.

Then the water, agitated by a wind which the force of actions gives rise to, becomes gold in its upper part, as churned milk becomes cream:\textsuperscript{368}

46c-d. Then, the circle of waters is no more than eight hundred thousand leagues in height; the rest becomes gold.\textsuperscript{369}

Then there is above the circle of water now reduced to eight hundred thousand yojanas, a sphere of gold, three hundred twenty thousand yojanas thick.

47a-48a. The circle of water and gold have a diameter of twelve hundred three thousand four hundred and fifty leagues; triple for its perimeter.\textsuperscript{370}

These two circles have the same dimensions.

On the circular sphere of gold which thus rests on the water,

48b-49c. There are Meru, Yugandhara, Īśādhara, Khadiraka, Mount Sudarśana, Āśvakarna, Vinataka, and Mount Nimindhara; beyond are the continents; on the edge is Cakravāda.\textsuperscript{371}

Nine great mountains rest on the sphere of gold. In the center there is Meru; concentrically, the other seven are arranged around Meru; Nimindhara forms the exterior rim that envelops Meru and the six inner wall-mountains\textsuperscript{372}—whence its name. Beyond [Nimindhara] lie the four continents. Enveloping all is Cakravāda, thus named because it encircles the universe with its four continent and also because it has the form of a wheel.

49d-50a. Seven mountains are made of gold; the last is made of iron; and Meru is made of four jewels.
Yugandhara and the six mountains that surround it are made of gold; Cakravāda is made of iron; Meru has four faces which are respectively, from north to west, made of gold, silver, lapis and cristal. Each of these substances gives its own color to the part of space which faces it. Since the face of Meru which is turned towards Jambudvipa is made of lapis, our heaven is thus similar in color to lapis.

What is the origin of the different substances that make up Meru? The waters which have fallen on the sphere of gold are rich in different potentialities; under the action of the winds which possess different efficacies, they disappear and make room for different jewels. It is thus that the waters are transformed into jewels: the water is the cause, the jewels are a result different from the cause, and there is no simultaneity. This is quite different from the concept of transformation (parināma) that the Sāmkhyas imagine.

What do the Sāmkhyas understand by parināma? They admit that dharmas arise and disappear within a permanent substance (a dharmin or dravya).

How is this incorrect?

One cannot admit the simultaneous existence of a permanent dharmin, and of dharmas arising and disappearing.

But the Sāmkhyas do not hold that there is a dharmin separate from the dharmas; they say that a dharma, when it is transformed (parināma), becomes the support of different characteristics: this dharma they call dharmin. In other words, transformation (parināma) is only the modification (anyathābhāvamātra) of a substance (dravya).

This thesis is not correct.

Why is it not correct?

Because there is a contradiction in terms: you admit that that (the cause) is identical to this (the result), but that this is not like that.

The gold, silver, jewels and the land thus formed are brought together and piled in heaps by the winds which are produced by the force of actions. They make up the mountains and the continents.

50b.-51b. Meru is immersed in the water to a depth of twenty-four thousand leagues and rises above the water some eighty thousand leagues. The immersion of the eight other mountains diminishes each by a half. The mountains have equal width and height.
The mountains rest on the sphere of gold and are in the water to a depth of eighty thousand *yojanas*. Meru rises out of the water for the same number of *yojanas*, and is thus, both in and out of the water, one hundred sixty thousand *yojanas* in height. Yugandhara rises out of the water for forty thousand *yojanas*, Ḡaḍās for twenty thousand *yojanas* and thus following until Cakravāda which rises out of the water for three hundred twelve *yojanas* and a half. The mountains are as wide as they extend out of the water. [For example, if a mountain extends out of the water to a height of twenty thousand *yojanas*, it is then twenty thousand *yojanas* wide]. [The word dhana, in the Kārikā, has the sense of “wide”].

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51c-52c. The seven Sītās, of which the first is of eighty thousand leagues, form the interval between the mountains. This is the inner ocean, triple in circumference. The other Sītās diminish by a half. The rest is the great outer sea, of three hundred twenty-two thousand leagues.

The Sītās are located between the mountains, from Meru to Nimindhara: the Sītās are full of water endowed with the eight qualities: cold, clear, light, tasty, sweet, not fetid, and harming neither the throat nor the stomach.

The first, between Meru and Yugandhara, is eighty thousand leagues in width. In exterior circumference, to the shore of Yugandhara, it is triple this, thus two hundred forty thousand *yojanas*. The size of the other Sītās diminishes by a half: the second Sītā, between Yugandhara and Ḡaḍās for twenty thousand *yojanas* in width, and so on to the seventh, between Vinataka and Nimindhara, which is twelve hundred fifty *yojanas* wide. The calculation of the circumferences presents no difficulty. The seven Sītās are the inner ocean. The rest, that is, the water between Nimindhara and Cakravāda, is the great outer sea; it is full of salt water, and is three hundred twenty-two thousand *yojanas* wide.

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53b-55d. There is Jambudvīpa, three sides of two thousand, in the form of a carriage, and one side of three and a half; eastern Videha, like a half-moon, three sides like Jambu, and one side of three hundred fifty; Godāṇiya, of seven thousand five hundred, round, with a diameter of two thousand five hundred; and Kuru, of eight thousand, square, parallel.

In the outer sea, corresponding to the four sides of Meru, there are four continents (dvīpas):

1. Jambudvīpa has three sides of two thousand yojanas in length, one side of three yojanas and a half: it thus has the shape of a carriage. In its center, resting on the sphere of gold, is the “diamond throne” where the Bodhisattva sits to attain vajropamasamādhi (vi.44d) and so to become an Arhat and a Buddha: no other place, and no other person can support the vajropamasamādhi of the Bodhisattva.

2. Eastern Videha or Purvavideha has the shape of a half-moon; it has three sides of two thousand yojanas, thus of the same dimension as the long side of Jambu, and one side of three hundred fifty yojanas.

3. Godāṇiya, which faces the western side of Meru, is round like the moon; it is seven thousand five hundred yojanas [in circumference], and two thousand five hundred through the center.

4. Facing the northern side of Meru is Kuru or Uttarakuru which has the shape of a seat; it is square: its sides, of two thousand yojanas each, form a circumference of eight thousand yojanas. To say that Kuru is “parallel” means that its four sides are of the same dimension.

Such is the shape of the continents, and such is the shape of the faces of the persons who reside in them.

56. There are eight intermediate continents: Dehas, Videhas, Kurus, Kauravas, Cāmaras, and Avaracāmaras, Śāthas and Uttaramantrins.

These continents are designated by the name of their inhabitants. Dehas and Videhas are located on both sides of Purvavideha; Kurus and Kauravas on the sides of Uttarakuru; Cāmaras and Avaracāmaras on the sides of Jambudvīpa; and Śāthas and Uttaramantrins on the sides of Godāṇiya.

All of these continents are inhabited by human beings. Never-
theless, according to one opinion, one of them [namely Cāmara] is reserved for Rakṣasas.

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57. Here, to the north of the nine ant-Mountains, lie the Himavat; beyond it, but on this side of the Mountain of Perfume, is a lake deep and wide by fifty leagues.

By going toward the north in this Jambudvīpa, one encounters three ant-Mountains, [so called because they have the shape of an ant]; then three other ant-Mountains; then three other again; and finally the Himavat (= the Himālayas).

Beyond that, this side of the Gandhamādana ("the Mountain of Perfume"), lies Lake Anavatapta from whence there flows out four great rivers, the Gaṅgā, the Sindhu, the Vakṣu and the Sītā. This lake, fifty yojanas wide and deep, is full of a water endowed with the eight qualities. Only persons who possess magical powers can go there. The Jambu tree is located near this lake. Our continent receives its name of Jambudvīpa, either from the tree, or from the fruit of the tree which is also called Jambu.

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Where are the hells, and what are their dimensions?

58. At the bottom, at twenty thousand leagues, is Avīci, of this same dimension; above, the seven hells; all eight have sixteen utsadas.

Beneath Jambudvīpa, at a distance of twenty thousand yojanas, lies the great hell Avīci. It is twenty thousand yojanas high and wide; its sun is thus found forty thousand yojanas below the sun of Jambudvīpa.

Why is this hell named Avīci?

Two explanations: 1. because there is not, in this hell, any interruption (vici) of suffering. Suffering is interrupted in the other hells. In Sarījīva, for example, bodies are first crushed and reduced to dust; then a cold wind revives them and gives them feeling: from
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whence the name of Sañjīva; 2. because there is no agreeable (vīci) state there.\textsuperscript{398} In the other hells all agreeable sensation which arises from retribution is absent; but here there is some agreeable sensations which are “an outflowing” (niṣyanda, ii.56c).

Above Avīci are seven hells one above the other: Pratāpana, Tapaṇa, Mahāraurava, Raurava, Saṅghāta, Kālasūtra, and Sañjīva. According to another opinion, these seven hells are placed at the same level as Avīci.

Each of the eight hells has sixteen utsadas (See p. 458, line 15). This results from a declaration of the Blessed One, “... There are eight hells there that I have revealed, difficult to get out of, full of cruel beings, each having sixteen utsadas; they have four walls and four gates; they are as high as they are wide; they are encircled by walls of fire; their ceiling is fire; their sun is burning, sparkling fire; and they are filled with flames hundreds of yojanas high.”\textsuperscript{399}

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What are the sixteen utsadas?

59a-c. Kukūla, Kuṇapa, Kṣuramārga, etc., and the River are located at the four cardinal points of these hells.\textsuperscript{400}

At each gate of these hells there is found:

1. The Kukūla, a fire where one is pushed down to ones knees. When beings put their feet in there, they lose their skin, flesh and blood, which rearises when they take their feet out.\textsuperscript{401}

2. The Kuṇapa, a mire of excrements, where there are water beasts called Sharp-moutthes, whose bodies are white and heads black, which can bite the damned through to their bones.\textsuperscript{402}

3. The Kṣuramārga, or Kṣuradhārāmārga, the great road of razor blades; here beings lose their skin, flesh, and blood when they put their feet on it.\textsuperscript{403}

Asipattravana, the forest whose leaves are swords; when these swords fall, they cut off major and minor parts of the body, which are then devoured by the Śyāmaśabala dogs.\textsuperscript{404}

Ayahsalmālīvana,\textsuperscript{405} the forests of thorns, thorns sixteen digits in length. When beings climb these trees, the thorns turn downwards, but they turn upward when they descend the tree.
Birds, Iron-beaks, tear out and eat the eyes of the damned.

These three places of suffering constitute a single utsada because they have in common punishment through injury.

4. The fourth utsada is the river Vaitaraṇī, of boiling water loaded with burning ashes. On both sides there are persons (purusa) armed with swords, lances and javelins, who push back the damned who would get out. Whether they plunge into the water or emerge, whether they go up or down the current, whether they traverse in the two directions or are tossed about, the damned are boiled and cooked, as the grains of sesame or corn poured into a cauldron placed over the fire.

The river encircles the great hell like a moat.

The four utsadas are sixteen in number by reason of their difference of place, since they are located at the four gates to the great hell.

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What is the meaning of the word utsada? They are called utsadas because they are places of supplementary torment: in the hells the damned are tormented, but they are additionally so in the utsadas.

According to Manoratha (above, note 170), after having been shut up in the hells, the damned then fall into the utsadas.

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One question leads to another. We have just spoken of the "persons" who stand on the banks of the Vaitaraṇī. Are the "guardians of hell" (narakapāla) beings? They are not beings.

Then how do they move?

Through the actions of beings, like the wind of creation.

Then how do you explain what the Venerable Dharmasubhūti said, "Those who are angry, who take pleasure in cruel actions and transgressions, who rejoice in the sufferings of others, are reborn as Yamarākṣasas?"

The demons who torment the beings in hell are not termed Yamarākṣasas, the "guardians of hell" as you think; but rather the servants of Yama who, on the order of Yama, throw the damned into
hell.

According to another opinion, the "guardians of hell" are beings. Where does the retribution of the cruel acts take place that these guardians commit in the hells?

In the same hells. Since the retribution of ānāntara transgressions (iv.97) takes place in these hells, why would the retribution of the actions of the guardians not be possible here?

But why are not the guardians, who are found in the midst of fire, burned?

Because the force of action marks a boundary to the fire and prevents it from reaching the guardians, or rather because this same force causes the bodies of the guardians to be made up of primary elements of a special nature. 412

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59c-d. There are eight other hells, the cold hells, Arbuda, etc. 413

These hells are called Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Aṭāṭa, Hahava, Huhuva, Utpala, Padma, and Mahāpadma. Among these names, some (Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Utpala, Padma, and Mahāpadma) indicate the form that the beings in hell take: they take the form of an arbuda, a lotus...; the others indicate the noise that the damned make under the bite of the cold: aṭāṭa...

These cold hells are located under Jambudvīpa, on a level with the great hells.

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How is there place, under a single Jambudvīpa, for the hells which are indeed wider than Jambudvīpa? 414

The continents, like piles of grain, are wider at their bases. The great ocean does not sink into a deep, steep cavity around the continents. (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 866a21; Cullavagga, 9, 1.3).

The sixteen hells are created through the force of the actions of beings (ii.56b, iii.90c, 101c, iv.85a); there are hells,—the prādesika hells,—created through the force of individual actions, the actions of one
being, of two beings, of many beings. Their variety is great; their place is not determined: river, mountain, desert, and elsewhere.  

The principal place of the hells is below. As for the animals, they have three places, the land, the water, and the air. Their principal place is the Great Ocean; the animals that are elsewhere are the surplus of the animals.

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The king of the Pretas is called Yama; his residence, which is the principal dwelling of the Pretas, is located five hundred leagues under Jambudvipa; it is five hundred leagues deep and wide. The Pretas that are found elsewhere are the surplus of the Pretas. The Pretas differ much one from another; certain of them possess supernatural powers and enjoy a glory similar to that of the gods; see the *Avadānas* of the Pretas.

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Upon what do the sun and the moon rest?

Upon the wind. The collective force of the actions of beings produces the winds which create (*nirmā*) the moon, the sun and the stars in heaven. All these astral bodies revolve around Meru as if transported by a whirlpool.

What is the distance from here to the moon and the sun?

60a. At mid-Meru lie the moon and the sun.

The moon and the sun move at a level with the summit of Yugandhara.

What are their dimensions? Respectively.

60b. Fifty and fifty and one leagues.

The disk of the moon is of fifty *yojanas*; the disk of the sun is of fifty-one *yojanas*.

The smallest among the “houses” (*vimāna*) of the stars is of one *krośa* (iii.87c); [the largest is of sixteen *yojanas*].

The force of the actions of beings forms, smaller than and external
to the house of the sun, a disk of fire-stone, hot and luminous; and, for the house of the moon, a disk of water-stone, cold and luminous. Their function, according to circumstances, is to cause to arise and last the eye, the body, fruits, flowers, crops, and herbs; and to destroy them.

In a universe with its four continents (iii.73) there is a single sun and a single moon. Yet the sun does not fulfill its function at the same time in the four continents.

61a-b. Midnight it sets, midday it rises at the same moment.

When it is midnight in Uttarakuru, the sun sets in Purvavideha, it is midday in Jambudvipa, and it rises in Godānīya, and so on. (Dirgha, TD 1, p. 147c6-14).

By reason of the variety of the progress of the sun, the days and nights grow longer and shorter.

61c-62b. The nights grow longer after the ninth day of the second quarter of the second month of the rains, and they grow shorter after the ninth day of the second quarter of the fourth month of winter. Reverse for the days. The days and the nights grow longer little by little accordingly as the sun goes towards the south or towards the north.

The nights grow longer from the ninth day of the clear quarter of Bhāḍrapada on, and grow shorter from the ninth day of the clear quarter of Phālguna on. Reverse for the days: when the nights become longer, the days become shorter, and vice versa. The days and the nights grow longer and shorter gradually, in proportion to the sun going towards the south or towards the north of Jambudvipa.

Why does the disk of the moon not appear completely full at the beginning of the bright quarter?

62c-d. The moon is covered by its shadow by reason of its proximity to the sun, and one sees it incompletely.

This is the teaching of the Prajñāpti, "When the house of the moon moves in the vicinity of the house of the sun, then the light of the sun
falls on the house of the moon. Consequently, the shadow falls on the opposite side, and the disk appears incomplete.”

But, according to the ancient masters, the Yogācārins, the manner of its moving is such that the moon appears sometimes complete, sometimes incomplete.

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To what class of beings do the inhabitants of the houses of the sun, the moon and the stars belong?

These are the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, and the only ones among these gods who inhabit houses; but there is a great number of Cāturmahārājakāyikas who inhabit the earth, in the pariśandās—the stages or terraces—of Meru and elsewhere.

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63-64. There are four terraces, the distance between them being ten thousand leagues, extending out sixteen, eight, four and two thousand leagues. They are the Karoṭapāṇis, the Mālādharas, the Sadāmattas and the two Mahārājikas; and also on the seven mountains.

The first terrace is ten thousand leagues above the water, the second ten thousand leagues above the first and so on. They thus reach up to the middle of Meru. The first terrace extends out from Meru sixteen thousand leagues; the others, in their order extend out eight, four, two thousand leagues. On the first terrace reside the Yakṣas “Pitcher in their Hand”: on the second, the “Wearers of Crowns;” on the third the “Always Intoxicated” (sadāmatta, which the Kārikā calls sadāmada): all these gods belong to the Cāturmahārājakāyikas. At the fourth terrace are the Four Kings in person with their attendants: these gods are called the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, the Four Great Kings.

As the Cāturmahārājakāyikas inhabit Meru, so too they have villages and towns on the seven mountains of gold, Yugandhara, etc. Also the gods of this class are the most numerous of the gods.
65-68. The Thirty-three Gods are at the summit of Meru, the sides of which are eighty thousand (leagues). At the corners, four peaks which the Vajrapāṇīs inhabit. In the middle, with sides of two thousand five hundred, with a height of one and a half, is a village called Sudarśana, of gold, with a variegated and smooth sun. There is Vaijayanta, with sides of two hundred fifty. On the outside, this village is adorned with Caitraratha, Pāruṣyā, Miśra and Nandana (Parks); at a distance of twenty thousand leagues from these Parks, at the four sides, there are excellent fields. At the northeast Pārijāta, in the southwest Sudharmā.

1. The Trayastrimśas or Thirty-three Gods \(^{432}\) inhabit the summit of Meru; the sides of this summit are of eighty thousand yojanas. According to other masters, the sides of each are twenty thousand, and the circumference is eighty thousand. \(^{433}\)

2. At the corners, there are peaks (kuṭa), five hundred yojanas high and wide, where the Yakṣas called Vajrapāṇīs reside.

3. In the middle of the plateau of Meru there is the royal city of Śakra, the chief of the gods, a city called “Beautiful to Look At” (Sudarśana). \(^{434}\) Its sides are two thousand five hundred yojanas; its circumference is ten thousand; its height one yojana and a half; \(^{435}\) it is of gold; it is adorned with one hundred and one types of colors; and the same for its sun. This sun is soft to the touch, like the leaf of the cotton tree; it rises and falls to facilitate its progress.

4. In the middle of this city there is the palace of Śakra, the chief of the gods, called Vaijayanta: it makes all the other residences blush by its richness and its gems. Its sides are two hundred fifty yojanas.

Such are the adornments of the city itself.

5. Ornaments outside of the city are the four Parks: \(^{436}\) Caitraratha, Pāruṣyaka, Miśraka, and Nandana, fields of play for the gods.

6. At the four sides \(^{437}\) of these Parks, from a distance of twenty yojanas on, there are four fields of play with a marvellous sun, \(^{438}\) delightful and which appears to rival them.

7. The magnolia tree called Pārijātaka \(^{439}\) is, for the Thirty-three Gods, the place par excellence for pleasure and for love; its roots go
down fifty *yojanas*; it is one hundred *yojanas* high; with its branches, leaves and petals, it covers fifty *yojanas*.

The fragrance of its flowers spreads one hundred *yojanas* away with the wind, fifty against the wind.

So be it, it can spread to one hundred *yojanas* with the wind, but how can it go against the wind?

According to one opinion, one says that it spreads to fifty *yojanas* against the wind, because it does not go beyond the tree [which covers in fact fifty *yojanas*].

[But this explanation does not hold: for] the text says that it goes against the wind.

We say then that the fragrance does not go against the wind, that it perishes where it arises: but such is the quality of this fragrance that, even though it would be arrested by the lightest divine wind, it gives birth to a new "series" of identical fragrances. Nevertheless, the fragrances become weak, weaker, entirely weak and are completely arrested, incapable of going as far as it does when the wind is favorable.

Does the series of this fragrance have for its support only its own primary elements which constitute the fragrance? Or rather should one suppose that the wind becomes perfumed? [In the same way as, when the grains of sesame are perfumed by flowers, there arises a new odor which is no longer the fragrance of the flowers.]

The opinion of the masters is not fixed on this.

Yet the Blessed One said, "The fragrance of flowers does not go against the wind, neither does the fragrance of good go against the wind; but the satpurusa goes in all directions." How do you reconcile this statement with the theory that fragrance "goes against the wind?"

This statement refers to odors of the world of humans, which, it is quite evident, does not go against the wind.

The Mahāsākas read, "The fragrance [of the flowers of the Pārijātaka tree] go with the wind for a hundred *yojanas*; in the absence of wind, to fifty."

8. In the southeast lies Sudharmā, the room where the gods come together (*devasabhā*) in order to examine the good and the evil deeds committed by human beings.

Such is the arrangement of the receptacle or physical world of the Thirty-three Gods.
69a-b. Above, the gods reside in "houses." 

The gods higher that the Thirty-three Gods reside in vimānas or aerial abodes. These gods are the Yāmas, the Tuṣitas, the Nirmāṇaratis, and the Paranirmitavaśavartins, plus the gods of Rūpadhātu, namely sixteen categories of gods beginning with the Brahmakāyikas. In all, twenty-two types of gods live in the physical world and occupy set residences. [There are many other gods, the Kṛiḍāpramośakas, the Prahāsakas, etc., which a summary treatise like this does not take into account].

69b-d. There are six gods who taste pleasure; they unite through coupling, an embrace, the touch of hands, a smile, and a look.

The Cāturmahārajākāyikas, Trāyastrimśas, Yāmas, Tuṣitas, Nirmāṇaratis and Paranirmitavaśavartins are the gods of Kāmadhātu. The higher gods are not in Kāmadhātu.

The Cāturmahārajākāyikas and the Trāyastrimśas live on the ground; thus they unite by coupling, like humans; but they appease the fire of their desire through the emission of wind, since they do not have any semen. The Yāmas appease the fire of their desire by embracing, the Tuṣitas by the touch of hands, the Nirmāṇaratis by smiling, and the Paranirmitavaśavartins by looking at each other. Such is the doctrine of the Prajñāpti.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 585b27), these expressions of the Prajñāpti, "embracing," "touching of the hands," etc., do not indicate the mode of union—for all the gods couple—but the duration of the act. The more ardent the desire by reason of the more pleasurable object, so much shorter is the duration of the union.

A small god or goddess appears on the knees, or from out of the knees of a god or goddess; this small god or goddess is their son or
daughter: all the gods are "apparitional" (iii.8c).

70a-c. Among these gods, their newborn are similar to infants of five to ten years.

From five to ten years according to the category of the gods. Young gods grow up quickly.

70c-d. The gods of Rūpadhātu are complete and clothed. 449

The gods of Rūpadhātu, from their birth, are complete in their development; they are born fully clothed.

All the gods speak the Āryan language. 450

In Kāmadhātu,

71a-b. There are three "arising" of the objects of desire: the gods of Kāmadhātu together with humans. 451

1. There are beings whose objects of desire (kāmaguṇa) are placed (by outside factors) at their disposition; but they are able to dispose of these objects. These are humans and certain gods—namely the first four classes of gods.

2. There are beings whose objects of desire are created by themselves; and they dispose of these objects which they create. These are the Nirmāṇaratis.

3. There are beings whose objects of desire are created by others but who themselves dispose of these objects created by others. These are the Paranirmitavāsavartins. 452

The first enjoy the objects of desire which are presented to them; the second enjoy objects of desire which they create at their will; and the third enjoy objects of desire that they create or have others create at their will. These are the three arisings of the objects of desire (kāmopapattis).

In Rūpadhātu,

71c-d. There are three "arising of pleasure": the nine spheres of three Dhyānas. 453

The nine spheres of the first three Dhyānas are the three "arising of pleasure." The gods of the first three Dhyānas, for long periods, pass their time pleasantly through pleasure born from separation from the defilements, through pleasure consisting of joy arisen from absorption
(samādhiya: seeing the disappearance of vicāra and vitarka) and through pleasure free from joy (nihprītikasukha, seeing the disappearance of satisfaction or saumanasya). By reason of their absence of suffering, and by reason of their duration, these arisings are indeed “arisings of pleasure” (sukhopapatti).

In dhyānāntara there is no pleasure consisting of joy. Is this an “arising of pleasure?”
This is to be discussed.454

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At what height are the twenty-two heavenly residences situated, starting from the Cāturmahārājikas to the highest gods of Rūpadhātu?
It is not easy to calculate this height in yojanas, but

72a-b. To the extent that there is descent from one residence, to this extent there is ascent towards a higher residence.455

In other words, to the extent that a residence is above Jambudvīpa, to that extent it is below its next higher residence. For example, the fourth house of the Cāturmahārājikas, the dwelling of the Cāturmahārājikas themselves is forty thousand yojanas above here; to the extent that this residence descends to here, to that extent this residence ascends to the residence of the Trāyatrimśas, [on the summit of Meru, eighty thousand yojanas from here]. As many yojanas as there are from Trāyatrimśas to here, that many are there from Trāyatrimśas to the Yāmas. And thus following: the Akaniṣṭhas are above the Sudarśanas the same number of yojanas that the Sudarśanas are above Jambudvīpa.

Above the Akaniṣṭhas, there are no more residences (sthāna). This is because this residence is higher than the others, no residence is superior to it, and so it is called a-kanisṭha.456 According to another opinion, this residence is called agha-niṣṭha, because agha signifies “assembled matter”, and this residence is the limit (niṣṭha) of this matter.457

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Can a being born in an inferior residence go to a higher house and see its superior beings?
72c-d. The gods do not see their superiors without magic or the assistance of another.

When they possess magical powers, or when they are assisted by a being possessing magical powers or by a Yama god, the Trayastrimśas can go to the Yāmas; and thus following. 458

A being born in an lower residence can see a being born in a higher residence who makes a visit to an inferior residence, but not if this being belongs to a higher Dhātu, or to a higher bhūmi; 459 in the same way that one cannot feel a tangible things [higher in Dhātu or bhūmi], because it is not of the sphere [of a lower organ]. 460 This is why beings higher through their Dhātu or bhūmi do not descend with their own bodies, but with a magic body of the sphere of the bhūmi to where they wish to descend (Digha, ii.210).

According to another school, 461 if a being of a higher bhūmi so desires, lower beings can see him in the same way as they see a being of their own bhūmi.

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What are the dimensions of the houses of the Yāmas and the other gods?

According to one opinion, the houses of the four types of higher gods of Yāma have the dimension of the summit of Meru.

According to others, the dimension of the First Dhyāna is the dimension of the universe with its four continents; that of the Second, the Third, and the Fourth Dhyāna is, respectively, the dimension of a small, medium and great chilicosm.

According to another, the first three Dhyānas have, respectively, the dimension of a small, medium and great chilicosm; the Fourth Dhyāna is without measure. 462

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What is a small, a second, and a third chilicosm?

73-74. One thousand four-continents, moons, suns, Merus, dwellings of the Kāma gods, and world of Brahmā, make up a
small chiliocosm; one thousand small chiliocosms make a
dichiliocosm, the middle universe; and one thousand dichilio-
cosms make a trichiliocosm. The destruction and the creation of
the universes lasts the same time.  

A sāhasra cūḍika lokadhātu, or small chiliocosm is made up of one
thousand Jambudvīpas, Pūrvavidehas, Avaragodāniyas, Uttarakurus,
moons, suns, Merus, dwellings of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas and the
other gods of Kāmadhātu, and worlds of Brahmā. One thousand
universes of this type make a dichiliocosm, a middle universe
(dvisāhasro madhyamo lokadhātuḥ). One thousand universes of this
type make a trichiliomegachiliocosm (trisāhasramahāsāhasro loka-
dhātuḥ).

The periods of destruction and creation are equal in length. The
stanza uses the word samabhava in the sense of vivarta.

In the same way that the dimensions of the physical worlds differ, in
that same way the dimensions of the beings inhabiting them differ:

75-77. The inhabitants of Jambudvīpa have a height of four, or of
three elbows and a half; those called Pūrva, Goda and Uttara, by
doubling each time. The bodies of the gods of Kāmadhātu
increase, by quarters of kroṣa, until a kroṣa and a half. The bodies
of the gods of Rūpadhātu are at first a half yojana; then increase
by a half; beyond the Parīttābhas, the bodies double, and reduce
three yojanas from the Anabhrakas on.

Humans of Jambudvīpa generally are three elbows and a half,
sometimes four elbows in height; the Pūrvavidehakas, the Avara-
godāniyakas, and the Auttarakauravas are respectively eight, sixteen,
and thirty-two elbows in height.

The Cāturmahārājakāyikas are a quarter of a kroṣa (iii.88a) in
height; the height of the other gods of Kāmadhātu increases successively
by this same quarter: the Trāyastriṃśas, by half a kroṣa; the Yāmas, by
three quarters of a kroṣa; the Tuṣitas, by one kroṣa; the Nirmāṇaratīs, by
a kroṣa and a quarter; and the Parinirmitavāśavartins, by a kroṣa and a
Chapter Three

half.

The Brahmakāyikas, who are the first gods of Rūpadhātu, are a half-yojana in height; the Brahmaṇapurohitas, one yojana in height; the Mahābrahmans, one yojana and a half in height; and the Pārīttābhassas, two yojanas in height.

Beyond the Pārīttābhassas, the dimensions double: Apramāṇābhassas are four, Abhāsvaras, eight, and the same until the Subhakṛtsans, who are sixty-four yojanas in height. For the Anabhrakas, one doubles this number but subtracts three: they are then one hundred twenty-five yojanas in height. One continues doubling, from the Puṇyaprasavas on who are two hundred fifty yojanas in height, to the Akanīṣṭhas, who are sixteen thousand yojanas in height.

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The length of life of these beings also differs. With regard to humans:

78. Life, among Kurus, is one thousand years in length; in the two continents, it diminishes twice by half; here, it is indeterminate: nevertheless it is ten years at the end and incalculable at the beginning.463

The lifespan of beings in Godānaïya is half the lifespan of beings in Uttarakuru, thus five hundred years in length; the life of beings in Pūrvavideha is two hundred and fifty years in length.

In Jambudvīpa, length of life is not determined, sometimes it is long, sometimes short.466 At the end of the cosmic age or kalpa (iii.98c), at its minimum, it is ten years; whereas the lifespan of humans at the beginning of the cosmic age (prāhamakaḷpika, iii91a) is incalculable: one cannot measure it by counting in thousands, etc.

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The lifespan of the gods of Kāmadhātu is an integral of the length of a day:

79a-80b. Fifty human years make a day-and-night for the lowest gods of Kāmadhātu, and these gods live a life of five hundred
years. For the higher gods, double the day and the life.\textsuperscript{467}

Fifty human days make a day in the life of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, whose lifespan is of five hundred years of twelve month of thirty days.\textsuperscript{468} For the Trāyastriṃśas, one day equals one hundred human years, and their lifespan is one thousand years in length; for the Yāmas, one day equals two hundred human years and their lifespan is two thousand years in length; and so on.

But there is no sun or moon above Yugandhara; how is a day of the gods determined, and how are the gods illumined?

Day and night are marked by the flowers which open or close, like the kumuda and the padma in the world of humans; by the birds that sing or that are silent; and by sleep which ends or begins.\textsuperscript{469} Furthermore the gods themselves are luminous.

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As for the gods of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu:

80b-81d. There is no day and night for the gods of Rūpadhātu; their lifespans are calculated in kalpas whose number is fixed by the dimensions of their bodies. In Ārūpyadhātu, a lifespan of a thousand kalpas which increases as much. These kalpas are, from the Parittābhas on, mahākalpas; below, halves.\textsuperscript{470}

The gods of Rūpadhātu whose bodies are half a yojana in height—the Brahmakāyikas—live a half kalpa; and thus following to the Akanisthas, whose bodies are sixteen thousand yojanas in height, and whose lifespan is thus sixteen thousand kalpas in length.

In Ākāśānantiyāyatana, a lifespan is twenty thousand kalpas in length; fifty thousand kalpas in length in Vijñānānantiyāyatana, sixty thousand kalpas in length in Ākīrmatīyāyatana, and eighty thousand in Naivasaṁjñāyānamsatāyatana or Bhavāgra.

But to which kalpas does this refer: to intermediate kalpas (antarakalpas), to kalpas of destruction (saṁvarta), to kalpas of creation (vivarta), or to great kalpas (mahākalpas, iii.89d)?

From the Parittābhas (lower gods of the Second Dhyāna) on, they refer to the great kalpas; below (Brahmapārisāgyas, Brahmapurohitas,
Mahābrahmans) they refer to half great kalpas. In fact, there are twenty antaraka kalpas during which the world is created[: Mahābrāhma appears from the beginning]; then twenty antaraka kalpas during which the world lasts; and then twenty antaraka kalpas during which the world is destroyed[: Mahābrāhma disappears at the end]. Thus the life of Mahābrāhma lasts sixty intermediate antaraka kalpas: these sixty make a kalpa and a half; half a great kalpa (or forty intermediate kalpas) is considered to be a kalpa.

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What is the length of a lifespan in the painful realms of rebirth? Let us examine in order the first six hot hells, the last two hot hells, animals, Pretas, and the cold hells.

82. In six hells, Śaṁjīva, etc., a day and night has the length of the life of the gods of Kāmadrītu; with such days, life as for the gods of Kāmadrītu.

A day in the six hells,—Śaṁjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṁghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, and TaPanā,—is equal in this order to the life of the gods of Kāmadrītu, the Caturmahārājākāyikas, etc.

The damned in Śaṁjīva have, like the Caturmahārājākāyikas, a life of five hundred years of twelve months of thirty days; but each of these days has the length of the total lifespan of the Caturmahārājākāyikas. Same relationship between the damned of Kālasūtra and the Trāya-strīṃśas, and between the damned of TaPanā and the Paranirmitava-savartins.

83a-b. In Pratāpana, a lifespan of a half antahkalpa; in Avīci, a lifespan of one antahkalpa.

In Pratāpana, a lifespan lasts one half of an antaraka kalpa; in Avīci, one antaraka kalpa.\(^{471}\)

83b-d. The life of animals is one kalpa in length at most; the life of the Pretas is five hundred years with its days the duration of a month.

The animals that live the longest time live one antaraka kalpa; these
are the great Nāga Kings, Nanda, Upananda, Aśvatsatra, etc. The Blessed One said, "There are, Oh Bhikṣus, eight great Nāga Kings who live a kalpa and who sustain the earth . . . ."472

The days of the Pretas have a length of one human month; they live five hundred years made up of days of this length.

84. Life in the Arbudas is the time of the exhaustion of a vāha, by taking a grain of sesame every one hundred years; the others by multiplying each time by twenty.473

The Blessed One has indicated the length of a lifespan in the cold hells only through comparisons, "If, Oh Bhikṣus, a Magadhan vāha of sesame of eighty khāris 474 were full475 of sesame seeds; if one were to take one grain each one hundred years, this vāha would be empty before a lifespan of beings born in the Arbuda hell would end: this is what I say. And, Oh Bhikṣus, twenty Arbudas make, Oh Bhikṣus, one Nirarbuda . . . ." (See above, note 413).

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Do all beings, whose length of lifespan has just been indicated, live the full length of this lifespan?

85a. With the exception of Kuru, there is death before their time.476

The life of beings in Uttarakuru is fixed; they necessarily live one thousand years: their length of life is complete.477 Everywhere else there is antarāṁṛtyu, "death in the course of, in the middle of, a complete life," or premature death. Nevertheless certain persons are sheltered from premature death, namely the Bodhisattva who, in Tuṣita, is no longer bound to birth; a being in his last existence [who will not die before having obtained the state of Arhat];478 one who has been the object of a prediction by the Blessed One; one who is sent by the Blessed One;479 a Šraddhānusārin and a Dharmānusārin (vi.29a-b) [who will not die before having become a Śraddhādhimukti and a Drśtiprāpta]; a woman pregnant with the Bodhisattva or with a Cakravartin, etc.480

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We have explained the residences and the bodies by measuring them in terms of *yojanas*, and lifespans by measuring them in terms of years; but we have not explained *yojanas* and years. These can be explained only through the means of words (*nāman*); one must then say that it is the limit (*paryanta*) of words, etc.

85b-c. An atom (*paramāṇu*), a syllable (*aṅkṣara*), and an instant (*kṣaṇa*) is the limit of matter, of words, and of time.\(^{481}\)

A *paramāṇu* is the limit of physical matter (*rupa*); so too a syllable is the limit of words, for example, *go*; and an instant,\(^{482}\) the limit of time (*advān*).

What is the dimension of an instant?

If the right conditions (*pratyaya*) are present, the time that it takes for a *dharma* to arise; or rather the time that it takes for a *dharma* in progress to go from one *paramāṇu* to another *paramāṇu*.\(^{483}\)

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According to the Ābhidhārmikas, there are sixty-five instants in the time that it takes a healthy man to snap his fingers.\(^{484}\)

85d-88a. *Paramāṇu, aṅu, lobarajas, abrajas, saśarajas, avirajas, gorajas, chidrarajas, likṣā*, that which comes out of the *likṣā*, *yava*, and *aṅguliparvan*, by multiplying each time by seven; twenty-four *aṅgulis* make one *hasta*; four *bastas* make one *dhanus*; five hundred *dhanus* make one *kroṣa*, the distance a hermitage should be located; and eight *kroṣas* make what is called one *yojana*.\(^{485}\)

[Thus seven *paramāṇus* make one *aṅu*, and eight *aṅus* make a *loharajas*.

*Avirajas* signifies *edakrajās*, and *chidrarajas* signifies *vātāyana-cchidrarajas*.

"That which come out of the *likṣā*’ is the *yūka*.

The author does not say that three *aṅguliparvans* make one *aṅguli*, for that is well known.\(^{486}\)]

A hermitage, *aranya*, should be located one *kroṣa* from a village.\(^{487}\)
88b-89c. One hundred and twenty $kṣāṇas$ make one $tātksaṇa$; sixteen $tātksaṇas$ make one $lava$; we obtain a $muhūrta$ or hour, an $ahorāta$ or one day and night, and a $māsa$ or month, by multiplying the preceding term by thirty; a $samvatsara$ or year, is of twelve months by adding the $ūnarātras$. 488

One $muhūrta$ equals thirty $lava$s. Thirty $muhūrtas$ make one day and night; a night is sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, and sometimes equal to a day.

There are four months of winter, of heat, and of rain; 489 twelve months which, with the days called $ūnarātras$, make a year. The $ūnarātras$ are the six days which, in the course of the year, one should omit (for the calculation of the lunar months). There is a stanza about this: "When one month and a half of the cold, hot, rainy season has elapsed, the learned omit one $ūnarātra$ in the half-month that remains." 490

We have explained the year; we must explain the $kalpa$ or cosmic period.

89d. There are different types of $kalpa$: 491

There is a distinction between a small $kalpa$ ($antaraka$), 492 a $kalpa$ of disappearance ($samvatta$), 493 a $kalpa$ of creation ($vivarta$), and a great $kalpa$.

90a-b. A $kalpa$ of disappearance lasts from the non-production of the damned to destruction of the receptacle world.

The period that extends from the moment when beings cease being reborn in hell until the moment when the world is destroyed is called a $samvarta$-kalpa, a $kalpa$ of destruction.

"Destruction" is of two types: destruction of the realms of rebirth, and destruction of the Dhatu.

It is again of two types: destruction of living beings, and destruction
of the physical world.

1. When no being is reborn in hell—even though beings in hell continue to die—the period of twenty small *kalpas* during which the world lasts is terminated; and the period of destruction begins.

When not a single being remains in the hells, the destruction of beings in hell is achieved, and the world has been destroyed to that extent: if a being of this universe has committed any actions which should be retributed in hell, the force of these actions causes him to be reborn in the hell of another universe not in the process of destruction.\(^{494}\)

2. So too is the destruction of animals and Pretas. The animals that reside in the great ocean disappear first; those that live with humans will disappear at the same time as do humans.\(^{495}\)

3. Among humans of Jambudvipa, a person enters by himself, without a teacher, by reason of *dharmatā*,\(^{496}\) into the First Dhyāna. Coming out of this Dhyāna, he exclaims, "Happy is the pleasure and the joy that arise from detachment! Calm is the pleasure and joy that arise from detachment!" Understanding these words, other persons also enter into absorption and, after their death, pass into the world of Brahmā. When, by this continual process, there does not remain a single person in Jambudvipa, the destruction of the persons of Jambudvipa is finished.

The same for the inhabitants of Pūrvavideha and Avaragodāniya. The inhabitants of Uttarakuru are incapable of detaching themselves from Kāmadhātu and, as a consequence, of entering into *dhyāna*: they are also reborn, not in the world of Brahmā, but among the gods of Kāmadhātu.

When a single human being no longer remains, the destruction of humans is finished, and the world has been destroyed to this extent.

4. The same then holds for the gods of Kāmadhātu, from the Cāturmahārājakāyikas to the Paranirmitavāsavartins, who enter into *dhyāna* and are reborn in the world of Brahmā, and who successively disappear. When a single god no longer remains in Kāmadhātu, the destruction of Kāmadhātu is finished.

5. It then happens, by reason of *dharmatā*, that a god of the world of Brahmā enters into the Second Dhyāna. Coming out of this Dhyāna, he exclaims, "Happy is the pleasure and joy that arise from absorption!
Calm is the pleasure and joy that arise from absorption!" Understanding these words, other gods of the world of Brahmā enter into the Second Dhyāna and after their death, are reborn in the heaven of the Ābhāsvaras. When a single being no longer remains in the world of Brahmā, the destruction of beings (sattvasamvaranī) is finished and the world has been destroyed to that extent.

6. Then, by reason of the exhaustion of the collective action which has created the physical world, and by reason of the emptiness of the world, seven suns successively appear, and the world is entirely consumed from this sphere with its continents to Meru. From this world thus inflamed, the flame, conducted by the wind, burns the houses of the world of Brahmā. Even though it is well understood that the flame that burns these houses is a flame of Rūpadhātu, the destruction of Kāmadhātu has not yet taken hold of Rūpadhātu. But it is said that the flame goes from this world and burns the world of Brahmā, because a new flame arises in relation to the first one.

So too, mutatis mutandis, is the destruction through water and through wind, which are similar to destruction through fire but which extend higher.

The period that extends from the moment when beings cease to be born in the hells until the moment when the physical world has been destroyed is what is called a samvarakalpa, a kalpa of disappearance.

90c-d. The kalpa of creation lasts from the primordial wind until the production of hellish beings.

From the primordial wind (prāgāvāyu) until the moment when beings arise in hells.

The world, which has been destroyed as we have seen, stays destroyed for a long time—during twenty small kalpas. There is only space where the world once was.

1. When, by reason of the collective action of beings, there appears the first signs of a future physical world; when some very light winds arise in space, then this period of twenty small kalpas during which the world remained destroyed is finished; and the period, also of twenty small kalpas, during which the world is created, begins.

The winds come gradually and, finally, constitute a circle of wind; then there arises all of the receptacles as we have just described: a circle
of water, a sphere of gold, Meru, etc. The mansion of Brahmā appears first and then all the mansions until those of the Yāmas. But this is only after the circle of wind arises.  

The physical world is thus created, and the world is now created to this extent.

2. When a being, dying in Ābhāsvāra, is born in the mansion of Brahmā which is empty; other beings, dying one after the other in Ābhāsvāra, are born in the heaven of the Brahmapurohitas, the Brahmakāyikas, the Paranirmitavaśavartins and the other gods of Kāmadhātu; in Uttarakuru, Godānīya, Videha, and Jambudvīpa; among the Pretas and animals; and in the hells. The rule is that the beings who disappear last reappear first.

When a being is born in the hells, the period of creation, of twenty small kalpas, is finished, and the period of duration begins.

[The first small kalpa of the period of creation is used for the creation of the physical world, the mansion of Brahmā, etc.] During the nineteen small kalpas that complete this period, until the appearance of the beings in hell, the lifespan of humans is infinite in length.

91a-b. A small kalpa, in the course of which a lifespan, from infinite, becomes a lifespan ten years in length.

Humans, at the end of the period of creation, have an infinitely long lifespan; their lifespan diminishes when creation is achieved, until it is not more then ten years in length (iii.98c-d). The period in which this diminution takes place constitutes the first small kalpa of the period of destruction.

91c-d. The eighteen kalpas which are of augmentation and of diminution.

A lifespan, which is now ten years in length, increases until it is eighty thousand years in length; then it decreases and is reduced to a length of ten years. The period in which this increase and this decrease takes place is the second small kalpa.

This kalpa is followed by seventeen similar ones.

92a. One, of augmentation.

The twentieth small kalpa is only of increase, not of decrease. The lifespan of humans increases from ten years to eighty thousand years in
length.

How high, by increase, do these increases go?

92b. They go to a lifespan of eighty thousand.\(^{502}\)

But not beyond. The time required for the increase and the decrease of the eighteen kalpas is equal to the time that the decrease of the first kalpa and the increase of the last take.\(^{503}\)

92c-d. In this way then the world stays created for twenty kalpas.

The world remains created for twenty small kalpas thus calculated. As long as this period of duration lasts,

93a-b. During the same length of time, the world is in the process of creation, in the process of disappearance, and in a state of disappearance.

The creation, the disappearance, and the period when the world disappears lasts a total of twenty small kalpas. There are not, during these three periods, any phases of increase and decrease of lifespan, but these periods are equal in length to the period during which the world remains created.

The physical world is created in one small kalpa; it is filled during nineteen; it is emptied during nineteen; and it perishes in one small kalpa.

Four times twenty small kalpas make eighty:

93c. These eighty make a great kalpa.

This is the extent of a great kalpa.

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Of what does a kalpa consist?
The kalpa is by nature the five skandhas.\(^{504}\)

***

It is said that the quality of Buddhahood is acquired through cultivation that last three asamkhya kalpas. To which among the four types of kalpas does this refer?

93d-94a. The quality of Buddhahood results from three of these
Of these great *kalpas* that we have just defined.

But the word *asamkhyya* (=*asamkhyaya*) signifies "incalculable;" how can one speak of three "incalculables?"

One should not understand it in this manner, for, in an isolated (*muktaka*) Sūtra, it is said that numeration is to the sixteenth place.

What are these sixteen places?

One, not two, is the first place; ten times one is the second place; ten times ten (or one hundred) is the third; ten times one hundred (or one thousand) is the fourth . . . and so on, each term being worth ten times the preceding: *prabheda* (10,000), *lakṣa* (1000,000), *atilakṣa*, *koṭi*, *madhya*, *ayuta*, *mabāyuta*, *nayuta*, *mahānayuta*, *prayuta*, *mahāprayuta*, *karīkara*, *mahākarīkara*, *bimbara*, *mahābimbara*, *aksobhya*, *mahāksobhya*, *vivāha*, *mahāvivāha*, *utsaṅga*, *mahotsaṅga*, *vāhana*, *mahāvāhana*, *tiṣibha*, *mahātiṣibha*, *betu*, *mahābetu*, *karabhā*, *mahākarabhā*, *indra*, *mahendra*, *saṃāpta* (or *samāptam*), *mahāsaṃāpta* (or *mahāsaṃāptam*), *gati*, *mahāgati*, *nimbarajas*, *mahānimbarajas*, *muḍrā*, *mahāmuḍrā*, *bala*, *mahābala*, *saṃjñā*, *mahāsaṃjñā*, *vibhūta*, *mahāvibhūta*, *balakṣa*, *mahābalakṣa*, and *asamkhyya*.

In this list eight numbers have been lost.

A great *kalpa* successively numbered (=multiplied) to the sixteenth place is called an *asamkhyeya*; if one begins again, one has a second, and a third *asamkhyeya*. An *asamkhyeya* [*kalpa*] does not receive its name from the fact that it is incalculable.

But why do the Bodhisattvas, once they have undertaken the resolution to obtain supreme Bodhi, take such a long time to obtain it?

Because supreme Bodhi is very difficult to obtain: one needs a great accumulation of knowledge and merit, and of innumerable heroic works in the course of three *asamkhyeya* *kalpas*.

One would understand that the Bodhisattva searches out this Bodhi so difficult to obtain, if this Bodhi were the sole means of arriving at deliverance; but such is not the case. Why then do they undertake this infinite labor?
For the good of others, because they want to become capable of pulling others out of the great flood of suffering.

But what personal good do they find in the good of others?
The good of others is their own good, because they desire it.

Who believes this?

In truth, persons devoid of pity and who think only of themselves believe with difficulty in the altruism of the Bodhisattvas; but compassionate persons believe in it easily. Don’t we see that certain persons, confirmed in the absence of pity, find pleasure in the suffering of others even when it is not to their benefit? In the same way one must admit that the Bodhisattvas, confirmed in pity, find pleasure in doing good to others without any egoistic concerns. Don’t we see that certain persons, ignorant of the true nature of the conditioned dharmas (i.e., the samāskāras) that constitute their pretended “self,” are attached to these dharmas through the force of habit, as completely devoid of personality as these dharmas are, and suffer a thousand pains by reason of this attachment? In the same way one must admit that the Bodhisattvas, through the force of habit, detach themselves from the dharmas that constitute the pretended “self,” no longer consider these dharmas as “me” and “mine,” increase compassionate solicitude for others, and are ready to suffer a thousand pains because of this solicitude.

In a few words, there is a certain category of persons, who, indifferent to what concerns them personally, are happy through the well-being of others, and are unhappy through the suffering of others. For them, to be useful to others is to be useful to themselves. A stanza says, “An inferior person searches out, by all means, his personal well-being; a mediocre person searches out the destruction of suffering, not well-being, because well-being is the cause of suffering; an excellent person, through his personal suffering, searches out the well-being and the definitive destruction of the suffering of others, for he suffers from the suffering of others.”

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During what periods do the Buddhas appear, during a period of increase or during a period of decrease?

94a-b. They appear during the decrease to one hundred.
The Buddhas appear during the period of the decrease of lifespan, when the length of life decreases from eighty thousand years to one hundred years in length.

Why do they not appear when life decreases from one hundred to ten years?

Because the five corruptions (āyuḥkasāya, kalpakasāya, klesakasāya, drṣṭikasāya, and sattvakasāya) then become very strong.

In the final period of the decrease of lifespan, the length of life (or āyus) becomes bad, base; being corrupted, it is called a kaṣāya or "corruption;" the same for the other corruptions.

The first two corruptions deteriorate the vitality and the means of subsistence. The next two corruptions deteriorate the good; the corruption of defilements deteriorate beings through laxity (kāmasukha-hallikā); the corruption of views through the practice of painful asceticism; or rather the corruption of defilement and the corruption of views deteriorate respectively the spiritual good of householders and of wanderers. The corruption of beings deteriorates beings from the physical and the mental point of view; it deteriorates their height, beauty, health, force, intelligence, memory, energy, and firmness.

During what periods do the Pratyekabuddhas appear?

94c. The Pratyekabuddhas appear in the course of two periods.

They appear during the period of increase and during the period of decrease of lifespan. One distinguishes in fact two types of Pratyekabuddhas: those that live in a group (vargacārīn), [and who also appear during the period of increase], and those who live like a rhinoceros.

a. The first are the ancient Śrāvakas [who will obtain the first or second result of the Śrāvakas under the reign of a Buddha].

According to another opinion, there are also Prthagjanas who have realized, in the vehicle of the Śrāvakas, the nirvedhābhāgīyas (vi.20); in the course of a subsequent existence, by themselves, they will realize the Way. The masters who follow this opinion find an argument in the
Pārvakathā520 where they read, "Five hundred ascetics cultivated painful austerities on a mountain. A monkey who had lived in the company of Pratyekabuddhas imitated the attitudes of the Pratyekabuddhas in front of them. These ascetics then imitated the monkey and, they say, obtained the Bodhi of the Pratyekabuddhas." It is clear, say these masters, that these ascetics were not Āryans, Śrāvakas; for, if they had previously obtained the result of the Śrāvakas, namely liberation from rules and rituals (śīla-vrataparāmarśa, v. French trans. p. 18), they would not have given themselves up later to painful austerities.

b. The Pratyekabuddhas who are "like a rhinoceros" live alone.

94d. The Rhinoceros by reason of one hundred kalpas.521

The Rhinoceros has cultivated for one hundred great kalpas in his preparation for Bodhi, [that is, he has cultivated morality, absorption, and prajñā]. He obtains Bodhi (vi.67) without the help of the teaching or āgama, but alone. He is a Pratyekabuddha because he himself brings about his salvation without converting others.

Why does he not apply himself to the conversion of others? He is certainly capable of teaching the Law: he possesses the comprehensions (pratisamvids, vii.37b): [and even if he does not possess them,] he can [through his pranidhijnāna, vii.37a] remember the teachings of the ancient Buddhas. He is no longer deprived of pity, for he manifests his supernormal power with a view to being of service to beings.522 He can no longer say that beings are "unconvertible" in the period in which he lives, for, in this period—the period of decrease of life—beings can detach themselves from Kāmādhātu by the worldly path.523 Why then does he not teach the Law?

By reason of his previous habit [of solitude], he finds pleasure in, and aspires to absence of turmoil; he does not have the courage to apply himself to making others understand the profound Dharma: he would have to make disciples; he would have to conduct the multitude who follow the current against the current, and this is a difficult thing. Now he fears being distracted from his absorption and of entering into contact (samsarga, vi.6a) with humans.524

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95-96. The Cakravartin Kings do not appear when lifespan is under eighty thousand years in length; they have a wheel of gold, a wheel of silver, a wheel of cooper, and a wheel of iron; in inverse order, he reigns over one, two, three, or four continents; but never two at once, like the Buddhas; they triumph through spontaneous default, personal influence, fighting, or the sword, but always without doing evil.  

1. The Cakravartin Kings appear from the period when the lifespan of humans is infinite to the period when their lifespan is eighty thousand years in length; not when life is shorter, for then the world is no longer a suitable receptacle for their glorious prosperity.

They are called Cakravartins, because their nature is to reign (rājyaṁ cakreṇa vartayītum).  

2. There are four types of Cakravartin Kings, Suvarṇacakravartin, Rūpyacakravartin, Tamracakravartin, and Ayaścakravartin, accordingly as their wheel (cakra) is of gold, silver, copper, or iron: the first is the best, the second is almost best, the third is mediocre, and the fourth is inferior. The Cakravartin whose wheel is iron reigns over one continent, the Cakravartin whose wheel is copper reigns over two continents, and so on.

This is the doctrine of the Prajñāpti. A Sūtra, in fact, speaks only of a Cakravartin King having a wheel of gold, by reason of his greater importance, "When, to a king of royal and consecrated race—who, even in the days of his youth, on the fifteenth day, having washed his head, having undertaken the obligations of youth, ascends accompanied by this ministers to the terrace of his palace—there appears in the east the jewel of a wheel having a thousand rays, a wheel having a rim, having a hub, complete in all ways, beautiful, not made by the hand of an artisan, all in gold—this king is a Cakravartin King."  

3. Two Cakravartins, the same as two Buddhas, do not appear at the same time. The Sūtra says, "It is impossible in the present, or in the future, for two Tathāgatas, Arhats, perfect Buddhas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following. It is impossible. It is the rule that there is only one. And this holds for the Cakravartins as for the Tathāgatas."  

Here a question is raised. What is the meaning of the expression "in
the world?" Does this mean "in a great Trisahasra universe" (iii.74), or "in all the universes?" 532

According to one opinion, the Buddhas do not appear elsewhere [that is: in two great universes at once] 533 because the coexistence of two Buddhas would create an obstacle to the power of the Blessed Ones. A single Blessed One applies himself wheresoever: where a Blessed One does not apply himself to the converting of beings, other Blessed Ones do not apply themselves either. Further, we read in the Sūtra, "'Śāriputra, if someone comes and asks you if there now exists someone, a Bhikṣu or a Brāhmin, who is equal 534 to the ascetic Gautama with regard to Samyaksamāññabodhi, what would you answer him?'

"'If someone were to interrogate me thus, Oh Venerable One, I would answer him that there does not exist now anyone, Bhikṣu or Brāhmin, who is the equal of the Blessed One. And why would I respond in this manner? Because I have heard and understood of the Blessed One, that it is impossible, both in the present and in the future, for two Blessed Ones, Arhats, perfect Buddhas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following.'" 535

Objection: How then are we to understand what the Blessed One said in the Brahmāsūtra, 536 "I exercise my power even over a great Trisahasra universe?"

This text should not be taken literally: it means that without making an effort (without making a special act of attention), the Buddha sees as far as this limit. When he desires it, his seeing goes wherever he wills it without limit. 537

According to other schools, the Buddhas appear at the same time, but in many universes. Here are their arguments. One sees that many persons apply themselves at the same time to the preparations [for Bodhi]. Certainly, it is not proper that many Buddhas should appear at the same time in the same spot (=in the same universe); but, on the other hand, nothing prevents many Buddhas from appearing at the same time: thus they appear in different universes. 538 The universes are infinite in number, so even if the Blessed One lives an entire kalpa, he cannot go about in the infinity of the universe as he does here; all the more so if he only lives a human lifetime.

What is this activity of the Blessed One?

He wills that a person's faculty (faith, etc.)—by reason of such a
person, of such a place and of such conditions of time, due to the disappearance of such a defect and to the realization of such a cause, and in such a manner—if not arisen should arise, and if not perfected should be perfected.

Objection: But we have quoted the Sūtra, "It is impossible for two Tathāgatas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following."

Answer: There is reason to examine if this text refers to one universe—a universe with its four continents, a great Trisāhasra universe—or to all universes. Let us observe that the rule which concerns the appearance of the Cakravartin Kings is formulated in the same terms as those that concern the appearance of the Tathāgatas. Would you deny that Cakravartin Kings could appear at the same time? If you do not deny this, why not also admit that the Buddhas, which are the foundation of merit, appear at the same time in different universes? What is wrong with numerous Buddhas appearing in numerous universes? Innumerable beings would thus obtain both temporal well-being and supreme happiness.

Objection: But in this same spirit, you should also admit that two Tathāgatas can appear at the same time in one universe.

Answer: No. In fact, 1. their simultaneous appearance in a universe would be without utility; 2. the vow of the Bodhisattva is to "become a Buddha, a protector of the unprotected, in a world blind and without a protector;" 3. respect with regard to a single Buddha is greater; 4. greater also is the haste to conform to his Law: persons know that a Buddha is rare, and that they will be without a protector once the Buddha is in Nirvāṇa or when he goes elsewhere.

4. It is by their wheel of gold, silver, etc., that Cakravartin Kings conquer the earth. Their conquest differs according to the nature of their wheel.

A Cakravartin King with a golden wheel triumphs through pratyudyāna. Lesser kings come towards him, saying, "Rich districts, flourishing, abundant in living things, full of men and sage men—may Your Majesty deign to govern them! We ourselves are at your orders."

A Cakravartin King with a silver wheel goes towards them himself, and then they submit to him.

A Cakravartin King with a copper wheel goes to them; they make
preparations for resistance, but they submit to him.

A Cakravartin King with an iron wheel goes to them; they brandish their arms, but then they submit to him.

In no case does a Cakravartin King kill.

5. Cakravartin Kings cause beings to enter the path of the ten good actions (karmapatha, iv.66b). Also, after their death, they are reborn among the gods.

6. The Sūtra says, "When Cakravartin Kings appear in the world, the seven jewels also appear: a wheel, an elephant, a horse, a treasure, women, a treasurer, and a military advisor." Do these jewels which are living beings,—the jewel of elephants, etc.,—arise through the actions of others?

No. A being accumulates actions which should be retributed by a birth related to a Cakravartin King, by a birth as a jewel of an elephant, etc.: when a Cakravartin King appears, his own actions make this being arise.

7. There are many difference between the Cakravartin Kings and other men, notably that these Kings possess, like the Buddha, the thirty-two marks of the Mahāpuruṣa.

97a. But the marks of the Muni are better placed, more brilliant, and complete.

But the marks of the Buddha outweigh those of the Kings in that they are better placed, more brilliant, and complete.

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Did humans have kings at the beginning of the kalpa?

No.

98. In the beginning, beings were similar to the gods of Rūpadhātu; then, little by little, through attachment to taste, and through laziness, they made provisions and attributed parts to themselves; a protector of the fields was, by them, retributed.

Humans at the beginning of the cosmic age were similar to the beings of Rūpadhātu. The Sūtra says, "There are visible beings, born of the mind, having all their members, with complete and intact organs, of fine figure, of beautiful color, shining by themselves, travelling through the air, having joy for their food, and living a long time."
Yet there appeared the "juice of the earth," the taste of which had the sweetness of honey. One being, of greedy temperament, having perceived the smell of this juice, took pleasure in it and ate it; the other beings then did the same. This was the beginning of eating by mouthfuls (kavadikāra, iii.39). This eating made their bodies become coarse and heavy and their luminosity come to an end: and then darkness appeared. And then there appeared the sun and the moon.

Because of the attachment of beings to taste, the juice of the earth gradually disappeared. Then prthiviparpata, appeared, and beings attached themselves to it. Prthiviparpata disappeared and a forest creeper appeared and beings then became attached to it. This creeper disappeared and then rice grew, unworked and unseeded: this rice, a coarse food, gave forth waste: beings then developed organs of excretion and sexual organs; they then took different forms. Beings with sexual differences, by reason of their previous habits, were seized by this crocodile which is wrong judgment; they conceived an active desire for pleasure and so had sexual intercourse. It is from this moment on that the beings of Kāmadhātu were possessed by the demon which is craving.

One cut rice in the morning for the morning meal, and in the evening for the evening meal. One being, of lazy temperament, made provisions. The others imitated him. With provisions arose the idea of "mine," the idea of property: then the rice, cut and recut, stopped growing.

Then they distributed the fields. One was the owner of one field; one seized the goods of another. This was the beginning of robbery.

In order to prevent robbery, they came together and gave a sixth part to an excellent man in order that he protect the fields: this man was given the name kṣetrapa or guardian of the fields, and, as he was a kṣetrapa, he received the name of kṣatriya. Because he was very esteemed (sammata) by the multitude (mahājana), and because he charmed (rañī) his subjects, he became the Rāja Mahāsaṃmata. This was the beginning of dynasties.

Those who abandoned the householder's life received the name of Brahmins.

Then, under a certain king, there were many bandits and thieves. The king punished them by the sword. Others said, "We have not committed such actions," and this was the beginning of lying.
98c-d. Then, through the development of the courses of action, life shortened to a length of ten years.\textsuperscript{554}

From this moment on, the bad courses of action, murder, etc., increased and the lifespan of humans became shorter and shorter. It was reduced, finally, to a length of ten years.

There are thus two dharmas: attachment to taste and laziness which are the beginning of this long degeneration.

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A small kalpa terminates when a lifespan is ten years in length. What happens then?

99. The kalpa terminates through iron, sickness, hunger, which last respectively seven days, seven months, and seven years.\textsuperscript{555}

The end of the kalpa is marked by three calamities.\textsuperscript{556}

1. In the period when the kalpa draws to its end, their lifespans being reduced to ten years in length, persons, full of forbidden craving and slaves of unjust greed, profess false doctrines. The spirit of wickedness arises in them: they conceive thoughts of hatred; as soon as they see one another, as a hunter who sees game, everything that falls into their hand,—a piece of wood, aconite plants,—becomes a sharp weapon, and they massacre one another.

2. In the period when the kalpa draws to its end, their lifespans being reduced to ten years, persons, full of forbidden craving and slaves to unjust greed, profess false doctrines. Non-human beings (Piśācas, etc.) emit deadly vapors, from whence incurable sicknesses arise by which humans die.

3. In the period when the kalpa draws to its end... the heavens cease to rain, from whence three famines arise, the famine of the boxes (cañcu), the famine of the white bones, and the famine when one lives by tokens.\textsuperscript{557}

The famine of the boxes is called this for two reasons. What is today a samudgaka, was in this period called cañca; and cañcu is the same as cañca.\textsuperscript{558} Persons, overwhelmed with hunger and weakness, die all in a group; and, with a view to being useful to persons of the future, they place seeds in a cañcu. This is why this famine is called cañcu.
The famine of the white bones is called this for two reasons. Bodies become dry and hard, and when they die, their bones soon become white. Persons gather up these white bones, boil them and drink them.\footnote{559}

The famine of tokens is called this for two reasons. Beings, in houses, eat according to the indication of tokens, "Today it is the turn of the master of the house to eat; tomorrow it is the turn of the mistress of the house . . ." And, with the tokens, persons search out grains in the empty earth; they are boiled in much water, and drunk.\footnote{560}

Scripture teaches that person who have, for a single day and night, undertaken abstention from murder, or have given one myrobalan fruit or a mouthful of food to the Saṅgha, will not be reborn here in this world during the period of knives, sickness, or famine.

4. How long a time do these periods last?

Killing lasts seven days, sickness lasts seven months and seven days, and famine last seven years, seven months and seven days. The conjunction \textit{ca} ("and") in the stanza shows that one must add the different lengths of time.

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The continents of Videha and Godānīya do not know the three calamities: yet wickedness, bad color and weakness, and hunger and thirst reign therein when Jambudvīpa is overwhelmed by knives, sickness, and famine.

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We have described destruction by fire, and have said that the other destructions are accomplished in a similar manner.

100a-b. There are three destructions: through fire, water, and wind.\footnote{561}

When all beings have disappeared from the lower physical worlds, having come together in a \textit{dhyāna} heaven, the destructions take place: through fire, by reason of the seven suns; through water, by reason of the rain; and through wind, by reason of the disorder of the wind
element. The effect of these destructions is that not one atom of the destroyed physical world remains.

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[Here arises the problem of a whole and its part \((avayavin, avayava)\), of a substance and its qualities \((gunin, guna)\), iii.49d].

Certain non-Buddhist masters—[Kanabhuj, etc.]—say that the atoms are eternal, and that, as a consequence, they remain when the universe is dissolved. In fact, say these masters, if it were otherwise, coarse bodies would arise without cause \((ahetuka)\).

[The Buddhists:] But we have explained (iii.50a) that the seed of a new universe is wind, a wind endowed with special powers which have their beginning in the actions of creatures. And the instrumental cause \((nimitta)\) of this wind is the wind of Rūpadhātu\(^{562}\) which is not destroyed. Further, a Sūtra of the Mahīśāsakas says that the wind brings the seeds\(^{563}\) in from another universe.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] But even if the seeds were so brought in, we do not admit that gross bodies,—shoots, stalk, etc.,—arise from a seed, from a stalk, etc.[: for seeds, shoots, etc., are merely \(nimittakāraṇa\), instrumental causes, not \(samavāyikarāṇa\), material cause];\(^{564}\) we say rather, that the shoot, etc., arises from its parts, and that these parts arise in turn from their parts, and so on to the most minute parts which arise from the atoms.

[The Buddhists:] What then is the efficacy \((sāmarthya: use, purpose)\) of a seed with regard to its shoot?

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] The seed has no efficacy with regard to the veneration \((janana)\) of the shoot, except that it provokes the aggregation of the atoms of the shoot. It is impossible in fact for a certain thing to arise from a thing having another nature: if such generation were possible, there would be no rule in generation. [One could then make mats out of cotton threads].

[The Buddhists:] No. Different does come from different, but according to certain rules, as sound arises, or the products of cooking, etc. [Sound arises from striking, which is different in nature from sound, but not different from everything that is different from sound.] The potentiality \((sakti)\) of all things is determined.
[The Vaiśeṣikas:] Your examples are not valid. We admit that gunadharmas or attributes (sound, etc.) arise either from that which is similar or from that which is different (saṁyoga, etc.); but this does not hold in the same way for dravyadharmas (or substances) which arise from the similar things.\(^{565}\) It is thus that viṇa threads,—and not other threads—give rise to a mat, and that only cotton threads give rise to cotton cloth.

[The Buddhists:] Your example does not prove this, for it is not, itself, proven. You say that a thing arises from a similar thing, since a mat arises from viṇa threads: but, a mat is the viṇa threads themselves disposed in a certain manner and which take the name of mat; cloth is threads disposed in a certain manner. In the same way a row of ants is only ants.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] How do you prove that cloth is not a thing distinct from threads?

[The Buddhists:] When an organ (of sight or touch) is in relation with a thread, the cloth is not perceived. Now, if the cloth exists [created by each thread,] why would it not be perceived? You say that the cloth does not exist, integrally, in each thread: this is to acknowledge that the cloth is only the collection of its parts which are each constituted by a thread: for how would you prove that the parts of a cloth are a thing other than the threads? You say that the cloth exists integrally in each thread, but that one does not perceive it in each thread because the perception of the cloth supposes a union of the organ and the cloth in such a way that the numerous creative elements of the cloth are perceived: in this hypothesis, it would suffice to see the fringe in order to see the cloth. You say that, if one does not see the cloth when one sees the fringe, it is because the central parts, etc., are not in relation with the organ: this is to admit then that one would never see the cloth, for the central parts and the extremes which are supposed to create the cloth are not perceived together. You say that they are perceived successively: this is to acknowledge that the whole (the entity cloth, avayavin) is not perceived; and this is to acknowledge too that the idea of cloth or of mat has for its sole object the parts of the cloth or the mat. How do we have, from all evidence, the idea of a circle from the circle formed from the circular trajectory of a brand? Further, cloth cannot be a thing other than thread, for, in the hypothesis where it would be otherwise, when the
threads are different in color, different in nature, and different in disposition, one could not attribute either color, or nature, or disposition to the cloth. You say that the cloth is different in color: this is to acknowledge that different creates different; further, to suppose that one of the sides is not variegated, in looking at it one would not see the cloth, but rather would see it "variegated." But do you dare say that the cloth, made of threads of different dispositions, is of different dispositions? It would be truly too diverse to be an entity! Consider again the entity which is the light of fire: its heating and illuminating power varies from beginning to end; one cannot recognize in it either color or tangible qualities.

[The Vaiśeṣikas: But if the "all," cloth, is not distinct from its "parts," and if the atoms, not perceptible to the organs, do not create a coarse body perceptible to the organs—a body distinct from the atoms—then the world is invisible: but one can see a cow.]

[The Buddhists:] For us, the atoms, although suprasensible, become sensible when they come together: the Vaiśeṣikas also attribute the power to create coarse bodies to the united atoms; the factors of visual consciousness should be united in order to produce a consciousness; and persons who suffer from ophthalmia see masses of hair, not hairs one by one.

[The author having refuted the doctrine of a whole, avayavin, distinct from its parts, avayava, now refutes the doctrine of substances, gunin, distinct from their attributes, guna.]

[The Buddhists:] What one understands by atom (paramāṇu) is physical matter (rūpa), etc.; it is thus certain that atoms perish at the destruction of the universe.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] An atom is a thing in and of itself (dravya); a thing in and of itself is distinct from physical matter, etc.; and physical matter can perish without an atom perishing.

[The Buddhists:] The distinction between a thing and its attributes is inadmissible: for no one distinguishes, "This is earth, water, fire: these are the attributes of earth, namely, its color, its taste, etc." And yet you affirm that a thing, earth, etc., is perceptible to the eye, etc. [Thus you cannot say that one does not perceive it because it is suprasensible]. Further, when wool, cotton, opium juice, or incense is burned, one no longer has the idea of wool, cotton, etc., with regard to its ashes: thus the
idea has for its object, not a thing in and of itself whose color would be an attribute, but its color, its taste, etc. You say that, when an unfired clay jug has been submitted to the action of fire, we say that it has always been the same jug; and that, as a consequence, the jug is a thing other than its color, that it stays the same even though its color changes. But, in fact, if we were to recognize the unfired jug in the fired jug, it is because its figure remains similar: as one recognizes a row of ants. In fact, who would recognize the jug if one does not see in it certain characteristics observed initially?

Let us here stop this discussion of these infantile theories.

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What is the upper limit of the destructions?

100c-101d. Three Dhyānas, beginning with the second, are, in order, the top of the destructions; by reason of the community of the nature of destructions and the vices of the first three Dhyānas. As for the Fourth Dhyāna, no destruction, by reason of its non-agitation: this is not that it is eternal, for its mansions are produced and perish along with the beings who live therein.

1. The Second Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by fire: everything below it is burned; the Third Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by water: everything below it is dissolved; the Fourth Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by wind: everything below it is dispersed. "The top of the destruction" is the name of that which remains when the destruction is finished.

The heaven of the First Dhyāna then perishes by fire: in fact, the vice or imperfection of the First Dhyāna is vitarka-vicāra; these burn the mind and are thus similar to fire. The Second Dhyāna perishes by water: in fact, it has joy for its vice. This, being associated with physical well-being, rends the body soft and flabby: it is similar to water. This is why the Sūtra teaches that the sensation of suffering is destroyed by the suppression of all solidity of the body. The Third Dhyāna perishes by wind: in fact, it has inbreathing and outbreathing, which are wind, for its vice.
The external vices of a Dhyāna (that is, the calamities which destroy a Dhyāna heaven) are of the same order as the internal vices which affect the person who has entered into this Dhyāna. (See viii. French trans. p. 126). 569

2. Why is there no destruction by the earth element as by the fire element, etc.?

What one calls the physical world is earth, and as a consequence can be opposed by fire, water, and wind, but not by earth itself.

3. The Fourth Dhyāna is not subject to destruction, because it is free from agitation. The Buddha said in fact that this Dhyāna, being free from internal vices, is non-movable (ānejya). 570 The external vices have thus no hold on it and, as a consequence, it is not subject to destruction.

According to another opinion, the non-destruction of the Fourth Dhyāna is explained by the force of the Śuddhavāsakāyika gods whose abode it is. These gods are incapable of entering into Ārūpyadhātu, and are also incapable of going elsewhere [to a lower sphere]. 571

The receptacle world of the Fourth Dhyāna is not eternal, but by this fact, it does not constitute a “sphere;” like the stars, it is divided into diverse residences; these different mansions, the abodes of beings, arise and perish with these beings. (Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 692b19).

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What is the order of succession of these three destructions?

102. Seven by fire, one by water; and when seven destructions by water have thus taken place, seven by fire followed by the destruction by wind. 572

After seven series of seven successive destructions by fire, destruction is then done seven times by water; the eighth series of seven destructions by fire is followed by one destruction by wind. The physical worlds, in fact, last by reason of the duration of the gods who are reborn therein by the force of their absorptions. There are fifty-six destructions by fire, seven by water, and one by wind: this is what justifies the declaration of the Prajināpti 573 that the Śubhakṛṣṇa gods live sixty-four kalpas. (iii.80d).

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1. According to Buddhaghosa (Atthasālīna, 62), Kāmādhātu is made up of four bad realms of rebirth (hellish beings, animals, Pretas and Asuras, see iii. 4a), humans and the six classes of gods: in all eleven divisions (padesa).

The six gods of Kāmādhātu (Burnouf, Introduction, 603, 608; Hastings, article, "Cosmogony and Cosmology"; names explained in the Vāyākhyā) are an old list, sometimes reduced to five names (Trāyastriṁchas, etc. Parinirmanavāsāvartins subject to Māra, Saṇhāyutta, i.133). Each category has chiefs or a king, Anguttara, iv.242. Above there are, in Dīgha, i.215, the Brahmākāyikas and Mahābrahmā; in Anguttara, i.210, the Brahmākāyikas and the higher gods; in Mahāniddesa, 44, the Brahmākāyikas. (See below, note 4).

The Vāyākhyā explains the words naraka, etc. First opinion: from the root nṛ (naye, Dhammapada, i.847), "Beings are led there by transgression"; second opinion: from the root r (gati-prāpanayoh or gati vīśeṣanayoh [the reading of the Vāyākhyā], i.983, vi.111) preceded by a negation; third opinion: from rān, rānī, "beings do not rejoice therein"; fourth opinion, that of Saṁghabhadra, "Beings do not obtain (f = prop) protection there."

2. Vāyākhyā: All of the Dhyānas belong to the three realms, corresponding to weak, medium, and strong absorptions: thus the Fourth Dhyāna contains the stage of Anabhārakas, Punyaprasasas, Vṛhatphalas. But a strong absorption of the Fourth Dhyāna can be mixed with an anāśrava absorption (as explained in vi.43); from whence there are five new places: Avṛhas, etc. The Fourth Dhyāna is thus made up of eight stages.

3. We are reminded of the four bhavānāpattis of Majjhima, iii.147: the Parittābhas gods, the Appamāṇābhas gods, the Saṁkhaliṭhābhas gods, and the Parisuddhābhas gods.

4. This is the opinion of the Bahirdeśakas (Vāyākhyā) or the Pāscātayas (Vibbhaśa, TD 27, p. 509a22), "the Westerners." This refers to the masters in Gandhāra. In this country, there are some Sautrāntikas, but when the Vibbhaśa speaks of Pāscātayas, it means the extra-Kashmirian Sarvāstivādins, or those of Gandhāra.

The Mahāvyutpattis has four names for the First Dhyāna: Brahmapārisādyās, Brahmapurohitās, and Mahābrahmānās. From whence, according to Georgy, and Hodgson, there are four distinct heavens; Remusat and Burnouf (Introduction, 608) have discussed their various sources. In the Kośa the Pārisādyas are omitted, and Brahmapārisādyās are the inferior class. Elsewhere (iii.5a, etc.) Brahmapārisādyās is the generic name for all the gods of the First Dhyāna, of all of gods of the world of Brahmā.

Vāyākhyā: He is called Brahmā, because he is produced by broad, large (brhat) roots of good. Who is he? He is called Mahābrahmā. He is great, mahaṁ, because he has attained the intermediate dhyāna (viii.23); because he is born and dies before and after all others (iii.6a, Para. 2); and because he is distinguished by his stature, etc. They are called the Brahmapārisādyās, because the kāya, that is to say, the nivasā, or dwelling, of Mahābrahmā is theirs (tasya kāya nivāsa esam vidyate). Some are called Brahmapurohitās, because Brahmā is placed (dhyate) at their head (pura esām). And some are called Mahābrahmānās, because ayurvarṇādibhir vīleśāvib mahaṁ brahmā esām.

The Vāyākhyā explains the names of the gods in very clear language (Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 119). Saṁghabhadra is in agreement. For details on all the gods, see iii. 64.

   a. Pāli sources. Rūpadhātu (or world of Brahmā, see above, note 1) contains sixteen places: 1.-9. three places for each one of the first three Dhyānas; 10.-11. the Vehapphalas and Asaṅgassatas for the Fourth Dhyāna; 12.-16. five Suddhāvāsas, reserved for the Anāgāmins. Variants: Majjhima, i.329; iii.147, etc.
   b. The "correct opinion of the Sarvāstivādins" admits sixteen places, by assigning only two places to the First Dhyāna.
   c. The masters of the West (the Vaibhāṣīkas of Gandhāra, Pāscātayas, and Bahirdeśakas) admit seventeen places, by assigning three places to the First Dhyāna (a special place for the Mahābrahmānās).
d. Some other Bahirđeśakas (Kośa, ii.41d) admit seventeen places, by assigning two places to the First Dhyāna, and a special place to the Asarhjnisattvas in the Fourth Dhyāna.

e. Eighteen places, by assigning three places to the First Dhyāna (a special place for the Mahābrāhmaṇas) and a special place to the Asarhjnisattvas.

This is the opinion of Śrīlabda (Śrī-lo-to, Watters, i.355, the author of a Sautrāntika Viśuddhiśāstra), according to P'u-kuang and Fa-pao who quote Sarīghabhadra according to whom: “the Sthavira admits eighteen places”. This is the opinion of the Mahāyāna Sthiramati or Sāramati (TD, 31, number 1606, Grand Vehicle).

f. The Yogācāras also admit the number of eighteen, but they place the Asarhjnisattvas in the heaven of the Vṛhatpatalas, and obtain the number of eighteen by recognizing the Mahēśvaradevas (compare Mahāyutpatti, 162.7, Mahāmaheśvarāyatana).

Yuan-hui and other commentators say that the School (nikāya) of the Sthaviras admit eighteen places, wrongly interpreting the expression “the Sthavira” of Sarīghabhadra, (a) because, among the twenty schools, there is a School of the Sthaviras (but Ts'e-yuan, P'u-kuang and Fa-pao say that “the Sthavira” of Sarīghabhadra is Śrīlabda); (b) because they do not know that eighteen is the number of the Sautrāntika Śrīlabda, whereas seventeen is the established number in the Sautrāntika system. The Viśuddhiśāstra attributes the opinion of seventeen places to the Western Masters, the Gandhārans. Among these masters, there are some Sautrāntikas, but many are Sarvastivādins. The Viśuddhiśāstra designates a divergent opinion of the Sarvāstivādins school by the expression “Western Masters”, and not the Sautrāntikas; this is why Sarīghabhadra says only, “There are others who say (that the places are seventeen in number) . . .” and does not say “another School” . . .

Saeki gives, in resume, “Sixteen places: the correct opinion of the Sarvāstivādins. Seventeen places: a. Westerners (separate Mahābrāhmaṇas) and b. some other masters (separate Asamjñāṇins). Eighteen places (by distinguishing the place of Mahābrāhmaṇa from that of the Asamjñāṇins): and the Sthavira (a) Śrīlabda, a Sthavira not included among the twenty schools, who is also termed a Mulasautrāntika; and (b) the Sthavira, who is included among the twenty schools, and who is termed the Mūlasthavira. Further, Sthiramati (Sāramati) (and the Yogācārans).”

6. This “dwelling” is dhyānāntarikā, Kośa, ii.41d.

7. I believe that I correctly understand Hsüan-tsing and Paramārtha (i-sheng so chū 一生所居 which should be corrected to read i-cbu一主); but the Kośa, in many places, speaks of some “Great Brahmas”, Mahābrāhmaṇas: these are the Mahābrāhmaṇadevas of the Pāli texts, the followers or the court of the one, sole king (see Kośa, vi.38b); the Vyākhyā explains their name: “They are Mahābrāhmaṇas because Brahmā is the greatest among them by his duration of life, his color, etc.”

8. Beal, Catena, 94, “Following the Kosha Shaster, it is said that Brahmā has no distinct abode, only in the midst of the Brahmapurohita Heaven there is a high-storied tower, and this is (the abode of Brahmacarya).”

9. The problem as to whether there is rūpa in this dhātu or not, is discussed viii.3c.

10. As we will see iii.41, the mind and mental states, in the first two Dhātus, are an āśīta (a thing supported) which have for their āśraya (support) a body endowed with organs. The mind “falls”, or dies, when the organs are destroyed. On nikāya = nikāyasabbāga, ii.41, see below iii.7c, nikāyasabbāga = upapattiyāyatana.

11. Hsüan-tsing corrects: The mental series of material beings is not supported on these two, because they lack any force: they are strong among non-material beings because they proceed from an absorption from whence the notion of matter has been eliminated. But why not admit that the mental series of non-material beings is directly supported on this absorption? Why is there an intermediate support? Furthermore, the “genus” and vital organ of non-material beings is supported by matter . . .

12. See ii.14, viii.3c.
13. Vibbha, TD 27, p. 387b26-27: As we have prthivdhatu, etc.

14. This explanation holds for the expression ārupyadhātu: but when one speaks of the non-material absorptions (vii.2), ārupya should be understood as equivalent to rūpa, or rather as signifying “favorable to Ārupya[dhatu]” (Vyākhyā).

15. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 199a6. The first stanza is quoted in Āṅguttara, iii.411, where it is attributed to a deity (devatā). In Sanskrit as in Pāli it begins with na te kāmā yāni cīrāṇī loke / sanīkalparāgāḥ puruṣasya kāmab. The two other stanzas, to my knowledge, are absent in the Pāli. The Vyākhyā gives the last two lines.

The argument of the Ājivika does not hold. He thinks that a Bhikṣu ceases to be a Bhikṣu if he is a kāmopabhogin; and, if kāma = desire, then the Bhikṣu would be kāmopabhogin, and would lose the quality of Bhikṣu, even when he does not enjoy these objects. But the Bhikṣu, through desire, corrupts his morality and his precepts, without losing the quality of Bhikṣu: by this he transgresses by his body or speech the boundary of the rules of the Tathāgata.

In Kāśāvatthu, viii.3-4, the Theravādins establish against the Pubbaseliyas that kāma, in the expression ākāmabhāt, does not signify “object of desire”, as rūpāyatana or “visible matter”, etc., but rather “desire.” They quote the stanza of the Āṅguttara, iii.411 and Samyutta, i.22, as does Vasubandhu.

Compare Vibhanga, 256 quoted in Atthasālīni, 164-5; the distinction between the vatthukāmas and the kilesakāmas, Mahāniddesa to Suttanipāta, 766; Compendium, p. 81, n. 2.

16. Some dharma are produced (samuddharanta) in Kāmadhātu which are of the sphere of Rūpadhātu and Ārupyadhātu, for example the different absorptions (viii.19c); a person can experience “desire” (rāga) with respect to these absorptions: but as this desire has a dharma of a higher sphere for its object, it does not lodge in him: like a foot on a burning paving-stone (v.2, 39).

So too among the beings of Kāmadhātu some anāsāravas, or “pure” dharma are produced, namely the mental states which constitute the Path: these dharma are not the object of “desire” (rāga) in any Dhatu (v. 16, viii.20c): they are thus adhātupatita or adhātvāpita, foreign to the Dhatu.

From whence the principle that it is “thirst” which determines the spheres (Kāmadhātu = one sphere, Rūpadhātu = four spheres); viii.20c.

All dharma with respect to which the “thirst” of a being in Kāmadhātu develops is also of the sphere of Kāmadhātu.

17. See vii.49-51.

18. There are four anantas: ākāso ananto, cakkavālāni anantāni, sattakāyo ananto, buddhaññam anantam (Atthasālīni, 160).

19. Pu-kuang (quoted by Saeki, viii.5b) says, “If one follows the opinion of the Mahīśāsakas, there is an arising of new beings (yu shih ch’i yu ch’ing 有始起有情 = asty ādyatpannah sattvaḥ) which do not arise from action-defilement (karmakleśa)”.

20. Vibbha, TD 27, p. 966b11-27, mentions two opinions, a horizontal disposition, and a horizontal and vertical disposition of the universe, and the difficulties that they present. Compare Dīgha, i.33.

21. This Sūtra is Samyukta, 34.7; it is used in the Lokaprajñāpti, beginning (trans. in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 196).

22. The Īṣādhāra, “the cloud the drops of which have the dimension of a pole,” is one of the four clouds at the beginning of the cosmic age, Siksāsamuccaya, 247, Koṭa, iii.90c (A "rain" Nāga of Waddell, JRAS, 1894, 98.)

23. The opinion of the Dharmauguptakas according to Pu-kuang. The opinion of Sthiramati, Tsa-chi (TD 31, number 1606), etc.
24. For example, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 120b26, *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 493b8.

25. On the disposition of the universe, see the references in Hastings, article "Cosmology", 137b (Mahāvastu, i.122; *Lotus Sūtra*, Chap. xi; Avatāmśaka). See below iii.45, 73.

26. Are there five or six gatis?

*Kathavatthu*, viii.1. Regardless of *Majjhima*, i.73 (*paśca kbo pan'mā sāriputta gatayo ...*), the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas maintain that the Asuras constitute a separate gati. But the Kālakaṭṭjakas are placed among the Pretas, and the Vepacitti (*Sāraṇyutta*, i.221, *Dialogues*, ii.280, *Brehmen*, 749) among the Devas. (According to the version and the note of Aung-Rhys Davids.)


Yet there are four apāyas or painful realms of rebirth: the damned, animals, Pretas and Asuras (References: Rhys Davids-Stede). These are the aṅgaṇagatis of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 147, the akkhunās of the *Dīgha*, iii.264, and the duggatis of the *Petavattu*, which are lacking in the paradise of Amītābha (Sukhvāvatī, 11).

In the *Lotus Sūtra*, we sometimes have six gatis (Burnouf, 309), sometimes five (Burnouf, 377).

Nāgārjuna’s *Letter to a Friend* gives five gatis; the same for the inscription of Bodh-Gayā (Fujishima, *JA*s. 1888, ii.423; Chavannes, *RHR*. 1896, ii).

But six gatis in the *Dharmasamgraha*, 57, and other sources named *ibidem*.

Notes of Kyokuga Saeki. i. The Asuras 1. are included among the Pretas (*Vibhāṣa* and *Sarībhinnahṛdaya*, TD 28, number 1552); 2. are not included among the gatis (Buddhabhīmī, etc); 3. are a sixth gati (Mahāsāṃghikas, etc); 4. are included among the Pretas and the animals (*Śaddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*); and 5. are included among the Pretas, the animals and the gods (Sagāthasūtra). ii. The Sūtra says that there are five gatis. How can one maintain that there are six? Some five centuries after the Buddha’s demise, there were many schools; the schools were not in agreement; some held to five gatis, others to six. The first make the Sūtra say that there are five gatis, the others that there are six. *iii.* In the Mahāyāna, the *Avatāmśaka* says that there are six gatis.

27. See below note 37.

28. Definition of gati in *Kāraṇaprajñātīpi*, translated in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 345. We see there that nārakānīkāyasabhāgata, nārakāyatanasamamāgama, and anuvṛtāvyakrtanārakarūpadmi as well as nārakeṣu pratisamdhīḥ are nārakagati.

29. This Sūtra, discussed in *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 309b15, is the *Saptabhavasūtra*. The schools which deny intermediate existence contest its authenticity, see Samghabhadra, translated in *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 23, note.

30. Vasubandhu means: Only the Kaśmirians read this Sūtra; this Sūtra is muktaka, that is, it does not form part of the Āgamas.

According to *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 865a18.

31. If the gatis are undefiled-neutral dharman, the Prakaraṇa should say how these dharman are abandoned through meditation, “The anussayas abandoned through meditation and the universal anussayas are active and develop with respect to the gati” (see i.40c and Chapter V); it should not say, "all the anussayas", for among them there are those that are not active in undefiled-neutral dharman.

32. This is the explanation of the *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, 371b16.

Samādhi = pratisamādhi = upapatibhava of the Kośa, iii.13c, 38. We have pratisamādhi = viṁśa, the element of "reincarnation", *Paṭisanbhidāmagga*, i, p. 52; pratisamādhi and viṁśa, *Vīśuddhamagga*, 548, 659.

33. According to iii.38, ii.14.

34. Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 199c7) differs: "You say that karmabhava is mentioned here because it is the cause of the realms of rebirth: it would be fitting also to mention the skandhas which are also the cause of the realms of rebirth."
35. One could say that intermediary existence is a realm of rebirth, even though it is mentioned separately in order to indicate that it is the access to other realms of rebirth.

36. *śrīpya na gatī syāc śyās āvadatā / śrīpyagā hi yatra cyavante vihāre u vrkṣamāle u yāvac caturbhīṣam dhyānabhūman tatra āvadatāya* (in whichever place beings die, beings ‘who should go to the śrīpya’, śrīpya), either in a monastery, at the foot of a tree, or in the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna, are reborn from this place from an ākāśānanta existence, etc. (See above iii.3b).

37. The undefiled-neutral dharmas can be either vipākajāta or avapacayika (i.37, ii.57). Saṅghabhadra adopts the opinion of the second masters.

We see ii.10 that the jñiturandriya is exclusively retribution, but that the five material organs,—the mental organ, and the four sensations—are sometimes retribution, sometimes not retribution.


The Sūtra (Mahāvyutpatti, 119.1-7) has: 1. rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā nānātvakāya nānātvasaṁjñīnās tadyathā manusaḥ ekatvā ca devāḥ, 2. . . . nānātvakāya ekatvasaṁjñīnās tadyathā devā brahmākāyaḥ prabhāmanābhinirvṛtyāḥ, 3. . . . ekatvakāya nānātvasaṁjñīnās tadyathā devā abhāsvarāḥ, 4. . . . ekatvakāya ekatvasaṁjñīnās tadyathā devā śubhakṛtsnāḥ, 5. ākāśānantarāyatanam (better: ājatanopāgataḥ), 6. viññānānantarāyatanam, 7. ākīncañyāyatanam.

Dīgha, ii.68 (ii.253, 282, Anguttara, iv.39, v.53), “There are seven viññānāthaśītas and two āyatanas (which are joined to the viññānāthaśītas in order to make nine saṁvāsas, Kośa, iii. 6c): 1. santi Ānanda sattā nānātakaśyā nānattasaṁjñīno sattvā ekacce ca devā ekacce ca viññāpāṭikā . . . 2. sattā nānattakaśyā ekatvasaṁjñīno . . . and as above to subhakṛtsnāḥ; 5. santi Ānanda sattā sabbaso rūpasatvaṁnānāṁ samatikkaṁ paṭijhasatvaṁnāṁ atthagamā nānattasaṁjñānāṁ amānāsikāraṁ ananto ākāśo ti ākāśānāncayaṁyātanaṁpāga; 6. . . . viññānānāncayaṁyātanaṁpāga; 7. . . . ākīncañyāyatanāpāga.

39. The gods of the First Dhyāna are, according to the system of the Foreign Masters (habirdesakanyaya): 1. the Brahmākāyikas, 2. the Brahmāpurohitas, 3. the Mahābrahmans (mahābrahmānās ca). For the Masters of Kāśmīr, the Mahābrahmans do not form a “place” (sthāna) distinct from the Brahmāpurohitas (as we have seen, p. 366).

The viññāpāṭikas of the Pāli text are missing.

40. The Vibhāṣā (707a) omits the “gods of the First Dhyāna,” because these gods are not necessarily different in ideas (note of Kyokuga Saeki).

Hsiian-tsang and Paramārtha translate prabhāmanābhinirvṛtya as those who arise at the beginning of the kalpa; the Lotsava has, literally, daṁ por byun ba.

41. We follow the version of Paramārtha. Vasubandhu (as the Lotsava and Hsiian-tsang) explains the expression nānātvakaśyā as “difference of ideas because their ideas are different; endowed with this difference, they have different ideas.” On nānattasaṁjñīna, the references of Rhys Davids-Stede and of Franke, Dīgha, p. 34, n.8.

42. The Brahmākāyikas are all the gods of the First Dhyāna; by naming the first ones, one names the others.

43. Compare Dīgha, i.18, iii.29. Brahmā thinks, “mayā ime sattā nimmittā . . .”; the other gods think, “imittā mayam dhūtā brahmanā nimmittā.”

The Tibetan can be translated, “The aspect of the idea not being different, they are of the same idea.” Paramārtha is very clear: “Because they have the similar idea that Brahmā is their sole cause.” Saṅghabhadra refutes an objection: “Their ideas are different, since the Brahmākāyikas think that they are created, whereas Mahābrahmā thinks that he creates.” In fact, he says, both have the idea of a single cause, the idea of creation (nimmittā).

44. Height = āroha (uttarata); greatness, breadth = paripāha (sthāntyapramāṇa); body = ākṛti, or “figure”, and as a consequence equivalent to sarīra. [There is, furthermore, vedanāvīgra, “mass of sensation”, etc.]; speech = vāgbhūṣa (vāguccāraṇa): Hsiian-tsang and Paramārtha translate: voice, sound (=vāg bbāsah).
45. The Dīgha differs. We have the formula for Brahmā's desire, "... abhava aññaṁ pi sattā uṭhattam agaccheyyati," and the thought of the gods, "imāṁ hi mayam addasāṁ ādha paṭhamam upapannam / mayam ‘pan'āmba pacchā upapannā." "for we have seen him arise here before us, and as for us, we have arisen after him."

46. P'kuang (TD 41, p. 153a20) says that there are three answers to this question; Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 462c20) mentions six responses; and the Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 508c3) gives five answers of which Vasubandhu reproduces the first three.

47. Intermediate existence can be prolonged only when the intermediate being should be reincarnated into Kāmadhātu, iii.14d.

48. According to the Vyākhyā.

Paramārtha understands: "The gods remember the past in the world of Brahmā; they formerly saw [=in a preceding existence in the world of Brahmā] Brahmā of long life and lasting for a long time; later, they see him anew; and as a consequence they say . . . ."

Hsiian-tsang: "The gods remember the past of this being in this world itself; they have seen him previously . . . ."

49. Destruction of the universe by fire, iii.90a-b, 100c-d.

50. See viii.4.

51. The Vyākhyā: paribhidyate’neneti paribhedah.


53. Addition of Hsiian-tsang who follows Saṅghabhadra (whom the Vyākhyā quotes ad iii.7a), "The Aryans who are in the first three heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna, desire to enter among the Šuddhavāsas (last five heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna) or into Ārūpya; and the ŠŚuddhavāsas desire Nirvāṇa."

54. Vyākhyā: cittacaitītānahā mandapracāṇavād abalavād viññānam na tiṣṭhati.

55. Fa-pao says that the Sūtra does not teach the nine sattvāvāsas, but the Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 706b13) is plain: "Why have we created this Śāstra? In order to explain the meaning of the Sūtra. The Sūtra teaches seven viññānasaṁsthitis, four viññānasaṁsthitis, and nine sattvāvāsas, but it does not explain their distinctions and it does not say how they are included or are not included in one another . . . ."

The Sūtra of the Nine Dwellings of Beings: nava sattvāvāsah / katame nava / rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā nānātva-vaśāya nānātvasaṁśānāmas tadyathā manuṣyā ekaṭyaś ca deva / āyam prathamaḥ sattvāvāsah . . . . The fifth dwelling is that of the Unconscious Ones: rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā asaṁjñāno-pratisaṁjñānāh / tadyathā deva asaṁjñāsatvāh / āyam prācimamah sattvāvāsah . . . . The ninth dwelling: arūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā ye sarvaśa äkīrṇa-canyāyatanām samatikramya naiva-saṁjñānaśaṁjaṁyatanam upaśām-padya vibharanti / tadyathā deva naiva-saṁjñānaśaṁjaṁyatanapagāḥ / āyam navamarah sattvāvāsah. This is very close to the edition of the Dīgha, iii.263, 288, Āṅguttara, iv.401.

The Mahāvyutpatti, 119, adds the naiva-saṁjñānaśaṁjaṁyayatanas (9th sattvāvāsa) and the asaṁjñānaśaṁjaṁyayatanas to the viññānasaṁsthīs; the same for the Dīgha, ii.68, which places the asaṁjñānaśatvās before naiva-saṁjñāna.

56. Hsiian-tsang adds: "With the exception of the place of the Asaṁjñānaśatvās, the Fourth Dhyāna is not a dwelling, as explained above."

The Vyākhyā observes that Vasubandhu enumerates the painful realms of rebirth through signs (mukhamātra); this refers also to the gods of the Fourth Dhyāna which is not a "dwelling," for no one desires to remain there. Saṅghabhadra is of this opinion. Some other commentators think that Vasubandhu, excluding only the painful realms of rebirth, holds the Fourth Dhyāna to be a dwelling: they have to defend this opinion.
57. See viii.3c.

_Dīgka_, 9.7, _Sāmyuktā_, 3.6. _Dīgka_, iii.228, enumerates the four _vijñānasthāthi_ according to the _Sāmyutta_, ii.54: _rūpapāyaṇa_ and _āvusoro viññāṇam tīṣṭhamānām tīṣṭhati_ _rūpārayam_ _nandāpasevanam_ _uddhīna_ _virūḥīna_ _vepalam āpajjati_ / _vedanāpayaṇam_. . . The Sanskrit edition should be the nearest: the notable variant being the preference accorded to the expression _rūpopagā_. The meaning is clear: "It is by going to the visible, to sensation, to ideas, to the _samskṛtras_, that the mind takes its support; it is with visible matter as its object and for its place that, associated with pleasure, the mind develops . . ."

But the Abhidharma (_Vibhāṣā_, _TD_ 27, p. 706b16) attributes to the Sūtra the expressions _rūpopagā vijñānasthāthi, vedanopagā vijñānasthāthi_ . . . the grammatical explanation of which is not easy.

a. The Vaibhāṣikas understand: _Vijñānasthāthi_, or "dwelling of the _vijñāna_", is that upon which the mind resides (_tīṣṭhati_). This dwelling, this object of the mind, is _upaga_, that is to say "near" (_samipacariniḥ_) the mind. It is, by its nature, "visible." Being visible and near, it is termed _rūpopagā_.

b. Bhagavadviṣeṣa says that the Sautrāntikas have two explanations: 1. _Vijñānasthāthi_ means the duration of the mind, the non-interruption of the series of the mind (_vijñānasthitam upaccheda_). Visible matter is "approached" (_upagamyate_), and it is "made one's own" (_taddhārikṛyate_) by this _sthiti_. The _sthiti_ is thus _rūpopagā_: "duration of the mind which approaches the visible." 2. _Sthiti_ means "thirst" (_trṣṇa_), for thirst causes the mind to last. We thus have _vijñānasthāṭhi_ = "duration of the mind, consisting of thirst". This thirst "approaches" visible matter, and attaches itself to it. We thus have: _rūpopagā vijñānasthāṭhi_ = "thirst attaching itself to visible matter and causing the _vijñāna_ to last." But, in these two explanations, _vijñānasthāṭhi_ is distinct from visible matter; now it is visible matter which is _vijñānasthāṭhi_. We must then hold to explanation a. (But this explanation is absurd from the grammatical point of view. Also) some others explain _rūpopagā vijñānasthāṭhi_ as _rūpasvabhāva vijñānasthāṭhi_: "The object wherein one fixes the mind and consisting of visible matter." In fact the root _gam_ is understood in the sense of _svabhāva_, as we have _khakhaṭakharagata_, etc. (But, we would say, _gata_ is not _upaga_).

58. The _Vibhāṣā_, _TD_ 27, p. 706b20 and foll., examines whether these _skandhas_ are _sattvākhyā_ or _asattvākhyā_. Two opinions.

59. _Sāmyukta_, TD 2, p. 103a3; _Sāmyutta_, ii.101 (Nettipakaraṇa, 57): _viññāṇe ca bhikkhāve dādhre atthi nandiatthi rāgo atthi tanthi patitthitam tattha viññāṇam virūḥham._

The word _abhydrudha_ (a term employed in order to designate a sailor riding on a ship) should correspond to _virūḥha_ of the _Pāli_.

60. _Sāmyukta_, _TD_ 2, p. 9a7. Compare _Sāmyutta_, iii.54.

The four _skandhas_ of the past and the future are the _sthūtis_ of past and future _vijñāna_.

61. "Matrix, or "womb" is a useful equivalent. Better: "Four modes of birth, arising".

The theory of the four _yonis_ in their relationship with the five _gatis_ is presented in the _Kāraṇaprajñāpti_, Chap. xv (Cosmologie bouddhique, 345). Vasubandhu borrows his information from this work (the story of Kapotamālīni, of the Bhikṣuṇī "born in the hermitage", etc.). The same subject studied in _Visuddhimagga_, 552.

_Dīgka_, iii.230: _catasso yonivo, anṭḍajayoni, jalābujayoni, saṁsedajayoni, opapātikayoni_; _Majjhima_, i.73: _andajā yoni_. . . (with definitions); _Visuddhimagga_, 552, 557; _Mabāvyutpatti_, 117: _jarāyujāḥ, andajāḥ, saṁvedajāḥ, upapādulākāḥ_.

62. _Yoni_ = _ske gnas_; in _Hsiian-tsang, sbeng_ 生 = to be born, to arise; in _Paramārtha, tsa_ 雜 = to mix; _sukraśoṇitaśamāṃpi yoniḥ_; in _Praśastapāda_ (Viz. S. S. p. 27) which defines the _yonijas_ and _ayonijas_.

64. "Arisen from perspiration": bhūtānām prābīvādīmām svarśvedād dravatvalakṣaṇāj jātāh...
Maññhima: ye sattā pāññatimacche vā... jāyanti.

65. Upāpādika sattva, sems can skye ba pa, Hsüan-tsang: hua-sheng yu ch'ing 化生有情 Paramārtha: ise jin sheng ch'ung sheng.

Upāpādika in Mahāyānatattva, Kośavākyāhā, and Mahāvastu; upapādika in Divya, Avaśā, naśataika; upapādika in Caraka (quoted in Windisch, Geburt, 187), which corresponds to the Jaina uvavādyā, and the Pāli upapattika.

Upāpātika, upapattika, opapātika (defined in Sūmaṅgalavilāsimī: cātivā uppajjanakasattā: "one who, (immediately upon) death, is reborn").

A very long bibliography from the Lotus Sūtra, 394: "came into the world by a miracle", Senart, JA., 1876, ii,477, Windisch, Geburt, 184, to S. Levi, JA., 1912, ii,502 (who quotes Weber, Childers, Leumann, etc.).

Upāpātika simply signifies "birth, arising" (cyūtyūpāpātajjāna, vii.29, etc.) and not necessarily "casual and unusual birth" (Rhys Davids-Stede).

66. Organs not lacking is avikalendriyāḥ; organs not deficient is abhīmendriyāḥ: the organ of the eye is bhīṣa when one is one-eyed or when one squints. The members, aṅga, are the hands, the feet; the "sub-members" are the fingers, etc.

67. Maññhima: katamā ca opapātikā yoni / devā nerayikā ekacce ca manussa ekacce ca vinipātikā.

68. Two merchants whose ship had burned found (samadhigata) a crane on the sea shore. From this union there were born the Sthāравira Śaila and Upaśaila (Vākyāhā). According to another source, "Śaila = mountain, Upaśaila = small mountain; a crane produced two eggs there, from whence there was born two men, and hence their names."

69. The thirty-two eggs of Viśākha, Ralston-Schiefner, p. 125. The eggs of Padvāvatī, Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i,81 ("Lait de la mere").

70. Five hundred eggs were born to the queen of the King of Pañcāla: they were placed in a box (manjasa) that was abandoned in the Ganges. The King of the Licchavis found the box and in it, five hundred young men (Vākyāhā).

71. Māndhātar was born from a swelling (piṭaka) which formed on the head of Uposadha; Cāru and Upacāru were born from a swelling which formed on the knee of Māndhātar (Cakravartin Kings, see Kośa, iii.97d). Divya, 210, Ralston-Schiefner, p. xxxvii, Buddhacarita, i,29), and the references of Cowell (Viśnupurāṇa, iv,2, Mahābhārata, iii.10450), Hopkins, Great Epic, 1915, 169.

72. Kapotamālinī was born from a swelling on the breast of King Brahmadatta.

73. Āmrapālī was born from the stem of a banana-tree.

See the story of Āmrapālī and Jivaka in Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, iii,325, (translated between A.D. 148 and 170); Ralston-Schiefner, p. lii. A birth considered as "apparitional," in "Sisters," p. 120.

74. Compare Maññhima, i,73, Vibbhangā, 416.

75. This paragraph according to Vibbhaṇa, TD, 27, p. 626c17 and also according to the Kāraṇaprajñāpīti, xv (Coscologie bouddhique, p. 345-6) where Vasubandhu deviates on a point: "The Pretas are solely apparitional. However certain masters say that they are also born from a womb. One Preta in fact said to Maudgalyāyana..." The Vākyāhā observes that the discourse of the Preti appears to indicate that her sons are apparitional; if they were born from a womb, the mother would be satisfied. But this fecundity is explained by the speed with which the sons of the Preta are constituted, and the violence of the mother's hunger explains how they do not satisfy as food.

We have the Petavatthu, 16: kālēna paṇca paṭṭāmi sāyam paṇca paṇḍāpare / vijayaśvāna khādāmi te pi na bonti me alam // The Vākyāhā furnishes fragments of the Sanskrit stanza: [abam] rātrau paṇca suṭān diva paṇca tathāparān / janayivā [pi khādām] nāsti trīpīs tathāpi me //
In Ceylon the *nījhamatanhikapētās*, which are exclusively apparitional, are distinguished from the other Pretas which are of the four types. See Rhys Davids-Stede, s. voc. *pēta*.

76. The fifth of the Bodhisattvavasītās of the *Mahāvyutpattī*, 27; defined in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 347.

77. In the *Mahāvastu*, i.145, "the Buddhas are produced through their own virtues and their birth is miraculous (*upapādāka*)"; i.154, "Rahula descended directly from Tūṣita into the bowels of his mother; his birth is marvellous without being, for that, like that of the Cakravartins, and like that of those of *upapādāka* birth." On these texts and other Lokottaravadins declarations of the *Mahāvastu*, see Barth, J. des Savants, Aug. 1899. Compare Lalita, Lefmann, 88.

78. These Tīrthikas are Maskarin, etc. We read in the *Nirgranthasāstra*: *rddhim bhadanta ko darṣayati / mayavi gautamaḥ*, and elsewhere, referring to the Bhagavat, the passage quoted by Vasubandhu: *kalahastasyātayyād eva nividālo loke māyāvi prādurbhāya lokāni bhāksayati* (*Vṛkṣāyā*). ("to devour the world" is to "live at the expense of the world," *upajīva*). Compare Majjhima, i.375: *samaṇo bhante gotamo māyāvi...* *Samyutta*, iv.341; *Commentary of the Therāgāthā*, 1209.

Vibhaṣā, TD 27, p. 38b11. "The Tīrthikas slander the Buddha saying that he is a great magician who troubles the mind of the world." And p. 139a23: The Pāṭali-tīrthika says, "Gautama, do you know magic? If you do not know magic, you are not omniscient; if you do know it, you are a magician."


80. According to the *Suvarnaprabhāsa*, relics are as illusory as the Buddhas (JRAS. 1906, 970).

81. There is *kāyanīdhanā*, that is to say *kāya-nīśa*: the body disappears (*antarādhyate*) at death... This is the teaching of the *Kāranaprajñāpīti*.

82. On the preservation of relics and *rddhi*, vii.52.

The *Vṛkṣāyā* explains: "The thing that the magician consecrates (*adhiṣṭhāti*) saying, 'may this thing be thus' is termed *adhiṣṭhāna*. This thing is the object (*prayaṣjana*) of this *rddhi*, or this *rddhi* is produced in this thing: thus this *rddhi* is called *adhiṣṭhānī*.

83. On the four types of Garūḍas and Nāgas (W. de Visser, *The Dragon in China and Japan*, 1913), and in which order the first eat the second, *Dirgha*, TD 1, p. 127b29, *Samyutta*, iii 240, 246.

There are sixteen Nāgas safe from the attacks of the Garūḍas (Sāgara, Nanda, etc.), note of W. de Visser. See iii.83b, Beal, 48.

84. Saṁghabhadra (TD 29, p. 467b29) mentions a second opinion, that the womb of perspiration is the most extended.

85. See p. 390.

A bibliographic summary of *antarābhava*.

*Kośa*, iii.10-15, 40c; iv.53a-b, vi.34a, 39.

*Kathavatthu*, vii.2. The Theravadins deny *antarābhava* against the Sammitiyas and the Puṇṇasālīyas. These latter stress the existence of an Anāgāmin called Antarāparinīrvaṇin (see below p. 386 and iii.40c); they do not attribute *antarābhava* to creatures who are going to hell, to the *Asaññāsattas*, or to Āruṇḍāvahātu.

Sammitiyanikāyaśāstra, TD 32, number 1646, Third Chapter.

*Kāranaprajñāpītāśastra*, vi.5 (Cosmologie bouddhique, 341).

Sects that deny *antarābhava* are the Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravadins, Kukkuttikas, Mahāsāṃghikas (Vasumitra), Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, and Vibhajyavadins (*Vibhaṣā*, TD 27, p. 356c14). The *Vṛkṣāyā* mentions many opinions: no *antarābhava*; *antarābhava* preceding birth in the Three Dhātus; *antarābhava* preceding birth in Kāmadhātu; finally,—the sole correct opinion,—*antarābhava* preceding birth in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.

Vibhaṣā TD 27, p. 352b18-366a1: "Even though there is a difference in time and place between death and birth, because in the interval, there is no destruction following upon birth, these Schools
do not admit antarābhava." In Visuddhimagga, 604, as in Madhyamakavṛtti, 544, birth immediately follows upon death: tesāṃ antarikā nattibhi.

Brahmanical sources, notably Slokavārttikā, Āśrama, 62: "Vindhyavāsin has refuted antarābhabhavadeha"; Goldstucker s. voc. antarabhava and ativābika, ativābika; Sāṁkhyaśūtra, v.103. (A. B. Keith, Karmamimāṃsā, p. 59, Bulletin School Oriental Studies, 1924, p. 554, thinks that this Vindhyavāsin is not the Sāṁkhya master, about which see Takakusu, "Life of Vasubandhu," JRAS, January, 1905.)

On the manner in which "the disembodied jiva, before it secures a new āyatana (body) wanders about like a great cloud." see Hopkins, Great Epic, 39, JAOS, 22, 572; the demon body which undergoes death in order to go to hell, Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya, iii.7.

Diverse references, JRAS, 1897, 466; JA. 1902, ii.295; Nirvāna (1925), 28; Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 207; Sūtrālamkāra, p. 152, Madhyamakavṛtti, 286, 544. On the Bar-do, see Jaschke and Sarad Candra Das (and a very rich literature).

86. This causes a difficulty. We have seen that the gati is undefiled-neutral. Now arising is always defiled (iii. 38) and death can be good or defiled. How can one say that intermediate existence, which is to be found between death and arising, is found between two gatis, gatyor antarāle?

Answer. At the moment of death as at the moment of arising there exists the nīkāyasabhaga, the jīvītendriya, the jñāti, etc, and the kāyendriya (ii.35), which are undefiled-neutral and are as a consequence, with no difficulty, gati by their very nature.

87. The first term refers to the action which projects the existence (divine, human, etc.), the second to actions which complete the existence (caste, stature, etc), according to iv.95.

Or rather: the place where the retribution projected by the action is manifested, namely the nāmarūpa, and where the āyatana is completed.

88. Four schools, the Mahāsāṅghikas etc., do not admit antarābhava, see the Commentary to the Samayabheda of Vasumitra in the Materiaux of J. Przyluski; the same for the Mahāsāṅghikas (Saeki).

89. The Vākyāyāna says: atracaryā Guṇamatiḥ sabā śiśyenaścārya Vasumātreṇa svanikāyanurāgabhāvitmatir vyākyānyavāyāpām apāya pratyavasthānapara eva vartate / vayam iha śāstrārtha-vivaranam praty aḍriyāmaha na taddāṣṭaṇāṁ niḥṣāravādā bahuvaktaśayābhāyāc ca.

Yaśomitra, in the introductory stanzas to the Vākyāyāna, notes that he follows "the commentators, Guṇamati, Vasumitra, etc.", in the places where they are correct; in the commentary to i.l, p. 7 (Petrograd edition), he condemns the explanation that Guṇamati and his student Vasumitra give to tasmaī namaskṛtya. From the gloss that we have here, it results that Guṇamati and Vasumitra belong to another sect or school (nīkāya). Details are lacking.

90. Compare Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, ii.200.

91. See above, note 29.

92. Majjhima, ii.156: jānanti ṃana bhonto yathā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti / jānāma mayam bho yathā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti / idha māṭiptu ra ca sanniṇpatā honti māṭa ca utumī hoti gandhabba ca paccasābhāvoti hoti / evam tīmaṃ sanniṇpatā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti. The same formula, Majjhima, i.265. (A propos these formulas, Rhys Davids-Stede say that the Gandharva "is said to preside over child-conception") (For other modes of conception, asucipanena, etc., see Samantabhadādika, i.214, Mālinda, 123, which repeats the formula of the Majjhima.)

(We can compare the avakṛṇti of nāmarūpa which takes place when the viśāna is pratiṣṭhita, Sāriyutta, ii.66; elsewhere we find avakṛṇti of the viśāna, ibid i.91.)

A different redaction, Divyā, 1.440: trayāṇaṁ sīhaṁ nāmaṁ sarinmukhābhavā puṭrā jāyante dubitaraś ca / katameṣāṁ trayāṇaṁ / māṭāpurārā jākatuzzasa bhavataḥ sarinmukhatā tu/ māṭā kālo bhavaṁ rūpaṁ / gandharvabhaḥ pratyvapasthitā bhavati / esāṁ trayāṇām . . . (The reading gandharvapratyvapasthitā that Windisch retains, Geburt, p. 27, is certainly faulty: four Mss. have pratyvapasthitā).

Our text has garbhāvakṛṇtiḥ, descent of the embryo (and not: puṭrā jāyante . . .); it places the
qualities of the woman before the union of the parents; for the rest it follows the Divya.

Discussed in Viibbāya, TD 27, p. 363b2; kalāya signifies "not sick"; details on rūmāiśi.

On the Gandharva, see the sources mentioned in note 85. Also the remarks in Hist. de l'Inde (Cavignac, Hist. du Monde, vol. iii), i.287. Oldenberg, Religion du Veda, 209, has indeed shown that the Buddhist Gandharva is "the animated seed which, passing from an old existence to a new existence, waits and instantly grasps on to the act of generation in order to become an embryo, or garbha." (Against Hillebrandt, who makes the Gandharva a genie of fertility; same conception in Rhys Davids-Stede: the Gandharva "is said to preside over child conception." Also against Pischel who makes the Gandharva an embryo). Gandharva is the "Veda-ized" or "Brahmanized" name of the disembodied spirit as "primitives" conceived it.

93. According to the Lotsava. Hsian-tsang: "... a Gandharva is made ready. If he is not the intermediate being, what will the Gandharva be? How could a dissolution of the former skandhas be made ready? If they do not read this text, how do they explain the AfvaldyanasMra} Vydkhya: skandhabbhedā ca pratyupasthita iti maraṇabhavaḥ.

94. The Assaldyanasutta, Majjhima, ii.157, gives a more archaic recension of our text.

95. Samyukta, 37.20, Dirgha, TD 1, p. 51c12, Digha, iii.237; Kośa, vi.37.

Whatever we may think of the Antaraparinirvāyin of the Kathāvatthu, viii.2 and the Puggalapaññātī (quoted below note 97), the definition that the Anguttara, ii.134, gives of this saint, presupposes a belief in intermediate existence (See below iii.40c - 41a).

96. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 427a11, Anguttara, iv.70, Kośa, vi.40. I have compared the Sanskrit version, reproduced in full in the Vyākhya, with the Pāli version, JRAS, 1906, 446.

97. One should compare this explanation of the Vibhajyavadins with that of the Pudgalapaññātī, 16. The Antarāparinibbāyin realizes the path upapattam vā samanatara apattam vā vemaśīham āyupamāṇam: the Upahaccaparinibbāyin realizes the path atikkamitvā vemaśīham āyupamāṇam upabacca ... upabacca vād kalakriyam (According to the commentary, upabacca = upagantvā, thus "holds firm to the place of death"). Buddhaghosa, ad Kathāvatthu, iv.2 (If one can become an Arhat by birth) reproaches the Uttarapathakas for substituting upapajjaparinibbāyin for upabacca.

98. There is premature death (antarāmarana) in Arupyaḥdhaṭu; thus a being of Arupyaḥdhaṭu can enter into Nirvāṇa before having completed his thousands of kalpas of existences in Arupyaḥdhaṭu.

99. For an explanation of this śloka, see Cosmologie bouddhique, 141, 235, Anguttara, iv.422.

100. Hsian-tsang: After a long time (gloss: after 900 years) the sovereign master of the Law has entered into Nirvāṇa; the great generals of the Law (Gloss: Śāradvatipuṭra, etc.) have also entered into Nirvāṇa . . .

101. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 620c11; Majjhima, i.332, where we have Kakusandha and Vidhura (Vidura=mkhas mgu); Ṭheragāthā, 1187 (with the variants Vidhūra and Vidūra). Mrs Rhys Davids, "Dussi is a name for Mara in a previous life"; the Vyākhya: dūsi nāma māraḥ.

We may recall that a heretic of the Kathāvatthu, viii.2, thinks that existence in hell is not preceded by an intermediate existence.

102. Hsian-tsang: Or rather, who does not admit that antarābhava is "arising"? The word "infernal, hellish being" also designates antarābhava; when antarābhava is produced immediately following a death of existence, one can also speak of arising (upapatti), because it is the means of the arising. The Śūtra says that the criminal is immediately born as a "hellish being"; it does not say that at this moment there is an arising of existence.


Version of Hsian-tsang: "Desiring to go on the road to the east, you do not have any provisions;
desiring to stop, there is no stopping place in the interval."

Recension of Dhammapada 237: upanāsīvaya va dānī si/sampayāto si Yamassa santike/vāso pi ca te n'atthi antarā / pāṭheyyam pi ca te na vijāti.

104. On the action which projects the intermediate existence, etc., iv.53a. Same doctrine attributed to the heretics in the Kathavatthu, viii.1 (p. 106): "There is no particular action which produces intermediate existence..."

105. Suppose, says Hsüan-tsang that there are five embryos which give rise to five antarabhava, each one calling for a different realm of rebirth; thus one says that these five antarabhava, although formed in a single womb, do not touch one another nor burn one another.

106. The Vyākyā: "By reason of the transparence (acchatvā) of the body (ātmabhāva) of intermediate beings, there is no reciprocal adherence (anyonyam): thus no burning... It is for this reason that the womb is not burned."

107. This constitutes a Trisahasramahasahasra (iii.74), that is to say, a buddhakṣetra.

108. After the beginning of the "one hundred kalpas," iv.108.

109. The Vyākyā quotes, in full, a recension of the dreams of Krkin which may be compared with the recension of the Mahāsāstras, TD 22, number 1421, in Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, ii.343.

On the dreams of Krkin, Burnouf, Introduction, 565; Feer, Cat. des papiers de Burnouf, 65; Tokiwa, Studien zum Samādabhavavāda (Darmstadt, 1898); Minayev, Recherches, 89; Oldenbourg, Zapiski, 1888, JRAS, 1899, 509; notes in Cosmologie bouddhique, 237. Many points of contact with the dreams of Bimbisāra, for example I-tsing, Takakusu, 13; Chavannes, ii.137.

110. The same master is quoted iii.59a-c, where we have grouped some references.

111. Hsüan-tsang: "There is no reason to explain this text because it is not in the Three Pitakas, and because the authors of these stanzas go beyond the Truth (?)."

Paramārtha: "This is not in the Sūtra... this is merely an arrangement of words. Wise men desire to arrange the meaning in Śastras..."

Vasumitra says: The Mahāsāṅghikas think that the Bodhisattvas do not take up the nature of kalala, arūda, etc.; that they enter into the womb having become great elephants; that they are born by cutting open the womb. In the same way, Bhavya, for the Ekavyavahārikas (Wassilief, 236, Rockhill, 188).


113. The Bhikṣunī dkar mo, or hsien-pai 鮮白, according to Hsüan-tsang; shu-ko-lo 叔柯羅 in Paramārtha. Avadānatakā, ii.15 (73).

Translated according to Paramārtha who expands the original. Hsüan-tsang: "From world to world, she has autogenous clothing which never leaves her body and which transforms itself according to the seasons, until finally, at Nirvāṇa, the clothed body will be burned." (Compare the story of Śāṇavāsa, Hsüan-tsang, Julien, i.39, quoted in Przyluski, Funerailles, 111; and that of Nāgagāna, Demieville, Milinda, 80).

The Pāli sources (Therīgāthā, 54, Samyutta, i.512) have nothing similar.

114. These four bhava are enumerated in Mahāvyutpatti, 245, 1271, with maraññabhava placed first.

115. Vyākyā: suvīsuddham ity ekādaśādīvyacakra-apakṣā-sālayavarjītam. These eleven apakṣās are, according to the Sūtra, vicikīṣā, amanassikā, kāyadaśṭāvyā, sthānāsuddha, uddhatya, atyārabhujavirya, uddhyāya, chamittiṭkāva, nānāvavasajñā, abhijalpa, atidhyāyāvām jñeyesu.

116. Vibhūsī, TD 27, p. 364b8. Do intermediate beings see one another? Yes. Who sees whom? There are different opinions. According to certain masters, hellish intermediate beings see only
hellish intermediate beings... heavenly intermediate beings see only heavenly intermediate beings. According to other masters, animal intermediate beings see hellish and animal intermediate beings ... According to other masters, the five classes see the five classes.

117. According to the heretics of the Kathavatthu: satto dibbacakkuko viya adibbacakkuko iddhimā viya aniddhima...

118. His body is accha, viii.3c.

119. The Vibhaṣa discusses this point, TD 27, p. 360a9. According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, it is false that an intermediate being cannot change his Dhātu, his realm of rebirth, or the place of his new existence. All of the actions which comprise the five anantarayas can be “changed.”... An intermediate being who goes to be reborn into the Fourth Dhyāna can generate a false view; he is then destroyed and is immediately replaced by a hellish intermediate being ...

120. The Lotsava and Paramārtha omit the grammatical explanation which is partially translated by Hsüan-tsang. Dhātupāṭha, i.615, aruva hṁsāyāṁ. sakandhu, vi. 1.94.

121. Alpeṣākhyā, that is to say, anudāra bimavīrya. We have iṣṭa iṣṭab / alpa iṣṭo′peṣab / alpeṣa ākhyā yasya so′iṣṭeṣākhyab. Trenckner, Milinda, 422 (=appaparivāra). Hsüan-tsang: “of little merit,” Paramārtha: “of little merit-virtue.”

122. This is the fourth opinion expressed in the Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 361b14; the others are below under b, c, d. Vasubandhu prefers this fourth opinion according to the Chinese commentators.

123. We understand that an intermediate being can last a very long time since it is projected by the cause which projects the duration, frequently long, of the existence properly so-called. See above, note 104.

124. According to the principle sāmagrīm prāpya kālam ca phalanti khalu dehinām, Divyavadāna, 54, passim.

125. Third opinion of the Vibhaṣa.

126. Second opinion of the Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 361b8, that of Šamadatta (?). The heretics of the Kathavatthu: sattābarhi va atirekasattābarhi va tāṭbhati.

127. First opinion of the Vibhaṣa [From this passage can we conclude that, according to Vasubandhu, the Vaibhāṣikas admit the opinions indicated in first place in the Vibhaṣa? See note 153].

128. If an intermediate being must be reborn as a horse, then his actions will cause horses to mate out of season.

129. Ghoṣaka (Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 361a6): If the desired father is encountered, and if the desired mother is not encountered, then the father will mate with another woman.

130. Yet Sarṅghabhadra justifies the thesis that condemns Vasubandhu. The example of Kalmaṣapāḍa, etc., shows that some actions, whose retribution in a certain realm of rebirth (gati) is determined, can give forth a diversity of births (upapatti).

Vyākhyā: na niṣkāyabpadā ekākṣeṣaṃkhatvam bhūyate tattvamanāha ekajāyātavād gavyākṛtisamsthamāntara-pārapiṇāyāyagacca / gatimuyataḥām hi karmaṇām upapattivaicāryam dṛṣṭam kalmaṣapādādīvat iti nāyati esa dōsa ity acaryasaṃghabhadrab.

According to the Tibetan version of the Vyākhyā: upapattippayavacetāyam.

131. This theory, which cannot but remind one of the ancient Gandharvas who were nymphomaniac Genies, passed into Tantric literature, see Candamahārosanatantra, Chap. xvi, in Theorie des Douze Causes, 125.
Chapter Three

132. Males to the right, females to the left, *Avadānaśataka*, i.14; positions changed in the Chinese redactions of Chavannes, *Cinq cent contes*, i.380.

133. We must compare the (Buddhist) medical theories of Vāgbhaṭa and Caraka, Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, 48, and the *Prāśastapāda* (V. S. S., 1895), 33-34.

134. *Vyākhyā*: ekasminn eva kṣaṇe bṛjāṃ nirudhakraye anikāraṇa cīrtapadyate tūlādanādānānīgmnāvat.

135. Sanskrit redaction: *vaṃṣika* iti bhikṣo asya kāyasyaitad abhivacanam rūpiṇa audārikaryā cāturmabhābhitikā jasya odanakulmāṃśapuracitasya mātāpītrāśucikalalasambhiṣṭasya...Pāli redaction, Majjhima, i.144: *vamṃiko ti kho bhikkhu imass'etam cāturmabhābhitikassya kāyasya abhivacanam mātāpetikasambhavassya odanakummāśūpacayassā aniccucchādānaparimadannaddanabbedanaviddham-samādhammassa.


137. *Purvacāryā* yogācāryā āryasaṅga prābhṛttyaḥ (*Vyākhyā*). According to *P'u-kuang*, quoted by Saeki, some Sautrantikas or Sarvastivādins.

138. I think that this is the meaning; but I do not wish to superimpose the versions of the Lotsava, Paramārtha and Hsian-tsang onto the notes of the *Vyākhyā*.

139. *Samiyukta*, *TD* 2, p. 341b9; *Jātaka*, v.266: *ete patanti niraye uddhopapādā avamśirā / isinām ativattāro sānyatānam tapasvinam*. For *śūrdhapāpādā*, *avāktīras*, Rhys Davids-Stede sub voc. *avamśira*, Suttanipāta, 248, *Samiyutta*, i.48, etc. This is not most commonly "a position characteristic of beings in Purgatory" (as *Mabhāvastu*, iii.455.3), but the position of a being who falls into hell; the same for *Manu*, iii.249, viii.94.

According to the glosses of Saeki, the Rśis are the Buddhas, the ascetics (*sānyata*) are the Pratyekabuddhas, and the penitents are the Bodhisattvas. The explanations of the *Lokaprañāpti* (*Cosmologie*, p. 239) differ.

\[ \text{ativaktar} = \text{abhikṣetar} = \text{apavaditar} \]

140. According to the Sūtra quoted in note 142, we should read *gṛbhasāṃkrāṇtis*; but *gābbāvakkanti*, *gabbbe okkanti* (*Dīgha*, iii.103, 231, *Cūlanididesa*, 304) and *kārikā* 17 give *gābbāvākrānti*. The Lotsava has *jug-pa* throughout.


*Vibhāṣā*, p. 863a11: There are four types of *gṛbhasāṃkrāṇtis* (*ju t'ai* 入胎, *Paramārtha* *TD* 29, p. 204a1: *s'wo t'ai* 託胎, entry into the womb): to enter into the womb without full consciousness, and to remain there, and to leave it in the same condition; to enter in full consciousness, to remain there and to leave it without full consciousness; to enter and remain there in full consciousness, but to leave without full consciousness; and to enter, to remain there, and to leave in full consciousness. Why create this Sastra? In order to explain (*vibhaktum*) the meaning of the Sūtra. The Sūtra teaches four *gṛbhasāṃkrāṇtis*...but it does not explain them. The Sūtra is the support, the root of this Sūtra. Desiring to say what the Sūtra does not say, we make this Sūtra. What is to enter, to remain, and to leave without full consciousness? Two ways. 1. He whose merit is small, at the moment of entry, produces error of ideas and resolution (*samjñā, adhimokṣa*); he thinks, "The heavens rain down...". 2. He whose merit is great believes that he is entering into a palace...

*Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 865b8 and foll.: There are five opinions on the four *gṛbhasāṃkrāṇtis* examined in descending order: the fourth, full consciousness upon entry, remaining, and leaving; the third, full consciousness upon entry and remaining; the second, full consciousness at entry; and the first, complete absence of full consciousness. According to the extract which Saeki gives: 1. the fourth: Bodhisattvas, third: Pratyekabuddhas, second: Pāramitā-Śrāvakas, first: all others. 2. second: Srotaāpannas, Sakāḍgāminis. 3. Beings having pure knowledge and action, impure knowledge and action, no knowledge but pure action, neither pure knowledge nor pure action. The four *gṛbhasāṃkrāṇtis* correspond to this classification. When the first ones enter the womb, they are
pure and free from all troubling tangibles; when they remain therein...; when they leave it, the
gate of their birth is open, easy, without pressure or obstacle: from whence it results that these
beings do not lose their "mindfulness" for any moment (smrtimosa). (For beings of the following
categories, the conditions of leaving, remaining and entering become successively bad; from whence
"loss of mindfulness") In the order of Bodhisattvas, etc. 4. The three good garbhavakrdntis are those
which the Bodhisattvas take up in the course of the three asamkhyeyakalpas of their careers.

Buddaghosa ad Dîgha, iii.103 (Dialogues, iii. p. 98): fourth, omniscient Bodhisattvas; third, the
two great Srâvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas; second, the twenty-four great Theras; first,
persons in general.

142. According to Hsüan-tsang.
   According to Saṅghabhadrâ: andâj jato janisya te jâyate ceyt andajah, by virtue of Pâñjini, 3.2.75

143. In the case of full consciousness, how can one say that reincarnation or rebirth (pratisamâdhibandha) takes place by reason of a defiled mind (kliṣṭacitta) (iii.38)? Because the mind is defiled through affection for the mother, etc. (mâtrsnebdâi).

144. See Madhyamakavatâra, 149, Museon, 1910, 336.

145. Namely, the Sâmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika.

146. Kârikâs 18 and 19 are quoted in the Bodhicaryavatârapanjika, ix.15, 73.

147. (Samyutta, i.206 (Jñataka Commentary, iv.496, Kathavattu, xiv.2): Mahâniddeesa, 120, Mahâvyutpatti, 190. Windisch, Buddhas Geburt, 87, compare the Nirukta, the Garbha-upanisad, the Sâmkhya and medical sources.

   Note that Mûlinda, 40, and Visuddhimagga, 236, treat of premature death, but omits the pasâkba: "The embryo dies at the time of kalala...of ghana, at one month, at two months..." In the Mahâmîddesa: "...it dies at the time of pasâkba: it dies when scarcely born.

   The Sanskrit version (see Samyukta TD 2, p. 357c29) replaces the fourth line with: (râpïndriyâni jâyante) vyañjanâny anus petrol. The "material organs" are the subtle parts of the eye, ear, nose, and tongue [=the eye properly so-called, that which sees...]; the vyañjanas are the visible supports (adhiṣṭhâna) of the eye thus defined, etc., for it is by reason of its support that the organ properly so-called is manifested (abhivyajyate). (The organ of touch exists from the very beginning).

   On kalala, etc., p. 395–396, and n. 154. TD 14, no 523.

   According to the commentator of the Kathavattu, xiv.2, the organs of the eye, etc., appear after seventy-seven days.

   According to a Mahâyâna commentary, there are eight embryonic states: 1.-5. kalalavasthâ...pratikâhavasthâ... pratiâlomâvasthâ, 6. ketalomâvasthâ, 7. indriyâvasthâ, 8. vyañjanâvasthâ (the period when the supports of the indriyas are clearly manifested). In agreement with the Hinayâna commentaries, P'u-kuang and Fa-pao say that kela, roman, nakba, etc., up to the moment when the indriyas-vyañjanas are complete, all constitute the fifth state. But according to the Sârhmâlyas, hair, etc., are a sixth state.

148. We have tried, in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 30, to translate the Tibetan here word for word.

149. The description of Majjhima, i.266 is more moderate: "...When he is born, his mother nourishes him with her blood, for, according to the Vinaya, 'Oh Bhikṣus, maternal milk is of blood...'

150. Compare Majjhima, i.266: ...vuddhim anvâya paripâkam anvâya.

151. Note of Saeki: The author refutes the Mahiṣâsakas who admit that there is a beginning, one eternal cause, of effects without causes; see above note 19.

152. In kârikâs 20 to 24 Vasubandhu defines avasthika or "static" pratîyassamutpâda (see 25a), the series considered in twelve successive states (avasthâ, daśâ).
On the three parts or "sections" (kāṇḍa) and the three "paths" (vartman), a theory common to the two scholars, see Deux notes sur le Pratītyasamutpāda (Congres d'Alger, 1905); Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium, 259; Théorie des douze causes, Gand, 1913, p. 34-38; the Sanskrit source is the Jñānapratītyasāstra.

Sarighabhadra (Nyāyānusāra) establishes that the causal series is both internal and external,—the kalala, etc., on the one hand; the seed, etc., on the other: this is what is termed Pratītyasamutpāda (Comp. Sālistambasāstra, Théorie des douze causes, p. 73). Pratītyasamutpāda is thus not only the twelve āngas. How do we know this? By the Śāstra (Prakaraṇa, below, p. 405 line 2) which says, "What is pratītyasamutpāda? All the conditioned dharmas." Indications vary elsewhere in the same Śāstra. Sometimes twelve bhavāṅgas are enumerated, for example in the Paramārthasānyatāsāstra, etc.; sometimes eleven, for example in the Chib-sib ching 智事經 (Jñānavastu-sūtra = Sanīyutta, ii.56), etc.; sometimes ten, as in the Nagaropamādīsūtra (Divya, 340); sometimes nine, as in the Mābāṇidaṇḍaparyāśīsūtra; sometimes eight, as in the Śāstra which says, "The Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who do not truly know the nature of the dharmas..." Such are the differences. (Other variations, Senart, Mélanges Harlez, 281, Przyluski, JA, 1920, ii.326). Why does the doctrine of the Śūstras differ from that of the Treatises? The Treatises teach according to the nature of the dharmas; the Śūstras take into consideration the person to be converted...Or rather the Śūstras are of non-explicit sense (antātika), the Treatises are of explicit meaning. The Śūstras only consider living beings (sattvābhivyā); the Treatises consider living beings (sattva) and non-living beings... (Below, p. 405).

153. Viśhāṣa, TD 27, p. 120a29: Some say, "This Śūtra refers only to Kāmadhātu and the three types of arising with the exception of apparitional birth; and, as a result, it is without fault." We should say that this Śūtra refers to the Three Dhatu and the four types of birth. Although apparitional beings possess all the organs at the moment they are born, these organs are not sharp (tiṣṭha); then, little by little, with time, the organs become sharp. When they are not sharp, at the first moment, this is the āṅga of vijñāna; at the second moment and as long as they are not sharp, this is the āṅga of nāmarūpa; when they are sharp, this is the āṅga of saḍāyatana. In this way, the Śūtra does not present the fault of being incomplete. (This refers also to the apparitional beings who possess all their organs from the beginning, Kośa, ii.14, Kathāvatthu, xiv.2).

P'u-kuang says, "The Śūtra of Vasubandhu does not take the judgement of the Viśhāṣa (p'o-sha p'ing-chia 婆沙評家) as authority; it follows the sense of the first masters of the Viśhāṣa.

We must, it appears to me—without my having the Viśhāṣa in my hands—understand the p'ing-chia to be the group of scholars who drew up the Viśhāṣa and who formulated a critical judgement on the opinions of the different masters. Saeki notes that, on such and such a point, the Viśhāṣa confines itself to enumerating opinions: "There is no p'ing chia," it says. According to others, four p'ing-chia. See note 127.

Viśhāṣa, TD 27, p. 122c12: Twelve āṅgas exist in Kāmadhātu; eleven āṅgas in Rūpadhātu with the exception of nāmarūpa; ten āṅgas in Ārūpyadhātu with the exception of nāmarūpa and saḍāyatana. (But we see the difficulty of the propositions which result from this thesis, for: "The saḍāyatana exist by reason of the vijñāna, "sparśa by reason of the vijñāna"). Thus the Viśhāṣa (literally: the p'ing-chia say): "We must say that the twelve āṅgas exist in the Three Dhatu..."

154. For these definitions, Théorie des douze causes, 41; the San-tsang fa-tsu, trans. by Klaproth, Foe-houe-ki, 286, which very closely follows the doctrine presented by Vasubandhu, but requiring glosses; for example, sparśa is described: "From the leaving of the uterus until the age of three or four years, even though the six roots (śāntiāyus) corresponding through touch to the six dusts (visaya, alambana), one cannot yet reflect, nor comprehend the joys and the sufferings of life."

Viśhāṣa, TD 27, p. 119a2: What is avidyā? We cannot say that it is all the past kleśas, for this would destroy the characteristics proper to avidyā; we must say that it is pārvakleśasādaśa (or avasthā), the period of the past kleśa. What are the saṁskāras? The period of the past action. What is the vijñāna? It is pratisamādhicīta, "the mind at conception" with that which accompanies it. What is nāmarūpa? After pratisamādhicīta and before the four material organs are produced. (Kāyendriya, the organ of touch, is acquired all at once). In this interval, before the saḍāyatana are
complete, there are five periods (avasthā): kalala, arbuda, peśīn, ghana, and prāśākha, which together make up the period of nāmarūpa. What is the saḍāyatanasa? When the four material organs are produced, the six āyatanas are complete. In the period of prāśākha, the organs of the eye, etc., are not capable of giving any support to spāra.

155. Commentary of Kathāvatthu, xiv.2; Kośa, ii.14.

156. Vyākhyā: caksurādyatānottattikāle kāyamanāyatanayor vyavasthāpānāt. Hsüan-tsang: “But this refers to the moment when the six āyatanas are complete.”

157. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 117c3: Pratītyasamutpāda is of four types: kṣāniḥ, sāṁibandhika, āvasthika, and prākārsaḥ.

The Vyākhyā explains, in a different order: a. kṣāniḥ kṣāne bhavaḥ kṣaṇo ’yastatā kṣāniḥ b. prākārsena divyati carati vā prākārsaḥ / prākārsayukta ity arthaḥ. And further on: sa evāvasthiṃ kṣāniḥ prakārsayogatā prākārsaḥ / anekākṣāniḥkatvād anekākṣāniṃkatvāc c. sāṁibandhikaḥ / hetupbalasāṁbandhayukta ity arthaḥ.d. āvasthikaḥ / dvādasā paścaskāndhikā āvasthā ity arthaḥ.

158. Hsüan-tsang corrects: “the three skandhas.”

159. One can say that the organs are placed beside the nāman which is their support (āṣraya); one can say that their existence or activity (ārta) depends on nāmarūpa.

160. The ābbhinipāta of the eye is its activity (pravṛtti) with respect to visible things.

161. The paryavasthānas are the absence of shame, abrī, etc., v.47.

162. Here Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha omit this quotation from the Prakaraṇa. (According to the Vyākhyā, “the Prakaraṇa”). See below, p. 405, 410.

163. Saṅghabhadrā: The masters of the Abhidharma say that it is with respect to the “states” (avasthās) that the Buddha taught pratītyasamutpāda. The Sautrāntika (=Vasubandhu) does not believe this, and this is why he puts in his stanza the word kīla (which we have translated as “according to the School”).

164. Saeki mentions Madhyama, TD 1, p. 578b16. Pratītyasamutpāda of the Sūtra is ābhīprāyika; in the Abhidharma, lākṣāṇika. See above, note 152.

165. Saṃyutta, i.26; Majjhima, i.8, 111; Visuddhimagga, 599; Saṃyukta, TD 2, p. 84b26; Sālīstamba, p. 88 (Théorie des douze causes), quoted in Madhyamakavṛtti, 593. Variants, among which we shall take up those of the third paragraph.

Vyākhyā: kīm nā kṣāna ity ātmadṛṣṭvam anvesate / kathāṃ nā kṣāna iti kena prakāreṇa kayaḥ yukteti / ke sānta iti ke vayam idānāṃ vidyamanāḥ / ke bhavisyāna ity evam nāvadāḥaryati.

The Sālīstamba in the Madhyamakavṛtti: kīṃ nā idam / kathāṃ nā idam / ke sāntaḥ / ke bhavisyāmabḥ / ayam sattraḥ kuta āgataḥ / sa itāḥ cyutāḥ kutas gusmiṣyati.

Majjhima, i.8 and Visuddhimagga, 599 (Warren, 243): abām na kbo’smi / no nu kbo’smi / kīm nu kbo’smi / kathāna kbo’smi / ayam na kbo sutto kuto āgato / so kubimān bhavissati (The Visuddhimagga reads: abām na kbo’smī ...)

This text appears to bear some relationship to the Sūtra of the tṛṣṇapiccaras, Kośa, vii.13a.

166. Opinion rejected by Saṅghabhadrā.

167. These are the three vartman or vaṭṭa. Visuddhimagga, 581: tivaṭṭam (idām bhavacakam) anavaṭṭhitam bhamati.

In all the other sources, the third vartman is solely defined as retribution (vipāka) (or fruit, phala); see Théorie des douze causes, 34.

168. Hsüan-tsang: “The naya of the bhavāṅgas is solely that.” Saṅghabhadrā comments on the word “solely”, which, he says, indicates that the number of the bhavāṅgas is limited to twelve.

169. Madhyama, 34.3, Saṃyukta, TD 2, p. 92c22.
The commentators say: the word *kevala* indicates the absence of *ātman* (self) and of *ātmīya* (things pertaining to the self); the word "grand" indicates the absence of beginning and end; ... "mass of suffering", because it is accumulated by the impure *sāṅskāras*; *samudaya* because it is produced by a conjunction of conditions ...


On Manoratha, the teacher of Vasubandhu the elder, see Watters, i.211.

171. According to the *Vyākhya*, the *Sābetusapratyayasanīdhasūtra*.

avidyā bhikṣavā sabetukā sapratyayā sanidāna / kaś ca bhikṣavā ‘vidyāyā betuḥ kaḥ pratayāh

Same quotation in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 452, excerpt from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*.

Sānyūkta, 13.20 (note of Saeki).

*Théorie des douze causes*, p. 8; *Aṅguttara*, v.113 (on the nourishment of avidyā).

Nettippakarana, 79 (avijjā avijjāyā betu, ayonisomanasikāro paccayo).

172. See below, note 176.

173. “Here”, that is to say in the Sūtra that we are concerned with now, the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* (*Vyākhya*), the *Dvādaśāṅgasūtra* (Saeki).

For example, *Sānyūkta*, ii.25.

174. The Sautrāntika Śrīlābha.

175. See above, note 171.

176. Sānyūkta, TD 2, p. 74b-c. cakṣuḥ pratīyā rūpāni cottiḍaya āvilo manasikāro moheṇa. 

moheṇa = avidyāyā.

Madhyamakavṛtti, 452, according to the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*: āvilo moheṇa manasikāro bhikṣavā‘vidyāyā betuḥ.


178. Sānyūkta, ii.25: paṭiccasamuppādam vo bhikkhave desissāmi paṭiccasamuppāne ca dhamme.

179. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 715c4 triyadhvikd sarve saṁskṛtā dharmāḥ pratiṣṭḥyasamutpādaḥ / ta eva ca pratiṣṭhāyamuttānab.

Above p. 405.

180. By qualifying *cetanā* with the word *abbisasāṅskārikā*, the author indicates the unique or self-characteristic of all the *cetanās* (i.15a); for the *cetanā*, creating retribution (*vipākābhisāṅskaranār*) is its *abbisasāṅskārikā*. The future *dharman* are "willed" (*cetita*), that is to say are "the object of a vow or an intention" (*pranībhāta*), by this *cetanā*, "I will be a god, I will be a man." It is in this way that the future *dharman* are *saṁskṛtā*; they are not so called through "anticipatory designation" (*bhāvinyā saṁjñīyā*).

181. It is the object of a *kusaladharmanacchanda*, v.16, viii.20c.


183. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 118b25: The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: The *dharma* which is cause (*betu*) is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma*; the *dharma* which is caused (*sabetauka*) is *pratītyasamutpanna dharma*; the *dharma* which is arising is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma* ...; the *dharma* which is production (*utpāda*) ...; the *dharma* which is active (*karaka*) ... The Bhadanta says: The *pravartaka* (see Kośa, iv.10) is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma*; the *anuvartaka* is *pratītyasamutpanna dharma*.

184. According to the Tibetan, the Sthavira Bsam rdo rtsugs (which Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, 4, n.6, gives
as Sarībhūti); Hsüan-tsang: wang-man 希滿 "hope-fulfillment"; transcribed by Paramārtha.

This paragraph appears to be excerpted word for word from the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 118b15, which Saeki quotes fol. 16a.

185. According to the Vyākhyā.

186. Sarīvyutka, TD 2, p. 85a16. pūrvānte'jñānam aparānte'jñānam madhyānte'jñānam buddhe'jñānam dharme'jñānam sanghe'jñānam ... (See p. 421).


188. The Lotsava translates: "It happens that, in the Teaching not everything is only of clear meaning. The Bhagavat also gives definitions which bear on the essentials of the thing to be defined." Hsüan-tsang: "All the Sūtras are not spoken in a clear meaning; it happens that they are also spoken according to their essentials." Paramārtha: "All the Sūtras are not of clear meaning by the fact that they define ..."

189. Siksāsāmuccaya, 245; Majjhima, i.185 (katamā aśībhattikā paṭhadvidbhūțu / yam aśībhattam ... kakkhalam ... soyyathāpi kesa ... ), iii.240.

190. The Lotsava indicates the first words of this other Sūtra: santī asmin kāye, see Siksāsāmuccaya, 228, Madhyamakāvṛtti, 57, Majjhima, i.90, Digbo, iii.101.

191. The viśñāna that this refers to is the pratisamdhivijñāna, the viśñāna of "reincarnation": we should understand avipagatā = tām tām upapattīni gacchati.

192. According to the Vyākhyā, the Āryamahājaññikas; according to the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 116c57, the Vibhajyavādins; according to the Samayabheda, the Mahāsāṁghikas; according to the Yū-chien chi 瑜伽論記, the Mahāsāṁghikas and the Mahāsākas. Kathāvatthu, vi.2 (xi.7, xxi.7); Nirvāṇa, 1925, p. 185.

Sarīvyutka, TD 2, p. 84b16. Utpadādā vā tathāgatānām anupadādā vā tathāgatānām sthitaiyevān (dharmānānā) dharmatā; Samyutta, ii.25; Visuddhimagga, 518.

On this formula (which the Vyākhyā quotes according to the Śalistambasūtra, Cordier, 111, 361), see the note in Théorie des douze causes, 111-113.


194. Etymology of the word pratītyasamutpāda, Burnouf, Lotus, 530, Introduction, 623; Visuddhimagga, 518, 521 (Warren, 168); Aung and Rhys Davids, Compendium, 259; Madhyamakāvṛtti, 5; Théorie des douze causes, 48.

195. According to Pāṇini, 3.4.21: samānakartṛkayoh pūrvakāle.

196. The Sautrāntikas do not admit the pre-existence of this dharma.

197. Śābdikā = sabdavid = vaisyākarana.

198. Two opinions: the refutation which follows is Sautrāntika or Sarvāstivādin (P’u-kuang, TD 41, p. 170a29).

199. Anāgata = alabdhhātmaka.

200. Two simultaneous actions: pratītyakriyā and samutpādakriyā.

201. According to the version of Paramārtha, more explicit than Hsüan-tsang: "One should quote this Sūtra as an explanation of pratītyasamutpāda."

202. Vyākhyā: asam annaḥvālabdhātmaka utpadyate yathā pratetā api tathā / asan // atha
Yet the Sarhkyas affirm \textit{sata evotpādo nāsataḥ}. And we Buddhists admit the existence of the future against the Vaibhāṣikas; and against the Sautrantikas; we admit the existence of "generating seeds" (\textit{janakaḥadharmabija}): we say then \textit{san purāṇī vā: "or rather, it is pre-existent."}

But one can see in the fourth \textit{pāda: asan purāṇī vā = "In order to avoid infinite regression, you say that it arises non-existent: this is to return to the thesis refuted in the first line: asann utpadyate yadvat."}

203. \textit{Vyākhya: naḥ by asau pūrvaḥ mukhaṁ vyādādaśi vidārayati paścāc chete / kim tarbi mukhaṁ vyādādaśi chete sa mukhaṁ vyādāya ieta ity ucye / . . .}

204. This is the explanation of Bhadanta Śrīlābha (\textit{Vyākhya}).

\begin{quote}
pratir viśpārtbhau iti nānāvacinaṁ adbhikaṁśanāṁ sarvesāṁ kriyāgamābhyyam icchā viśpā / tām ayaṁ pratir dyotayati / itau gatau sādhavaḥ ityāḥ / tatra sādhur iti yatpratayāḥ / itau vinaśtau sādhavo-nāvasthāyina ity arthaḥ / samavappargāṁ samavāyāṁ dyotayati / ut pūrvaḥ pādiḥ prādurbhavāntaḥ dhāvartvāharināṁ / tām tāṁ sāmagrīṁ prati iṣṭāṁ vināśvarāntāṁ samavāyānopaṇāḥ pratīyaṁ samatpādaḥ. One dharma never arises alone, \textit{Kosa}, ii.22, etc.
\end{quote}

See the explanation of \textit{pratyāya}, vii. note 100.

205. \textit{Saṁyutta}, ii.72, iv. 33; \textit{Mālinda}, 56, etc.


i. First explanation, approved by Vasubandhu. The arguments two to four are (according to P'u-kuang who follows Saṁghabhadra), those of the Sthaviraśiṣya Bhadanta Rāma (\textit{fis-ya=ti-tzu 弟子}).

ii. Second explanation, that of the Sthavira Vasuvarman (\textit{Vyākhya}); according to Fa-pao, a divergent explanation of the Sautrāntikas (\textit{ching-pu i sibh 經部異釋}) (as is also the fifth explanation); according to P'u-kuang, the "dissident Saṁtrāntika master" (\textit{ching-pu i sibh 經部異師}), the Bhadanta Shih-ts'ao 世曹 (Vasuvarman); according to Saṁghabhadra, the "Sthvira-t'ū-t'ang 徒黨", (which gives Sthavirapāksīka, a follower of the Sthavira).

iii. Heterodox explanation.

iv. Explanation of the ancient masters (Sautraṭnikas).

v. Explanation of Śrīlābha (\textit{Vyākhya}) (whom Saṁghabhadra terms, generally, "the Sthavira"); Fa-pao: a divergent explanation of the Sautrāntikas; P'u-kuang, "Sthavira-t'ūng-bsib 同學"; Saṁghabhadra, "Sthavira-t'ūng-chien 同見".

207. The \textit{Vyākhya comments} on this paragraph with the words: \textit{etat sarvam ācāryamatam}.

208. According to the \textit{Vyākhya}, an explanation of the Sthavira Vasuvarman, which should be the Shih-ts'ao of P'u-kuang. A Vasuvarman is the author of \textit{TD} 32, no 1647, \textit{Treatise on the Four Truths}.

209. Namely, the ancient masters: ācāryā iti pūrvavācāryāḥ.

210. aprabhāajāpanārtham, utpattijāpanārtham.

211. According to the \textit{Vyākhya}, the opinion of Śrīlābha.

212. According to the \textit{Vyākhya: sa eṣa Bhadanta Śrīlābha}. Note of Saeki: the Sthavira.

213. The Sūtra says: \textit{jātiprtyayā jaraṭamaraṇaśokaṇaridevadāduḥkhadaurmanasopāyaśāḥ sarībhana-vanti} (with variants).

The terms \textit{soka} . . . \textit{upāyaśas} are included (\textit{sanāghaśa} in \textit{jarāmarāṇa} and are not separate items (\textit{nāṅgāntaram}). They come from diverse transformations (\textit{parīphāma}) of objects (\textit{vīṣaḥ}), living beings and non-living beings, and from the person (\textit{ārmaḥīva}.

They are defined: \textit{soka = daurmanasasaṃpratyakṣavatikāraḥ; parideva = sokaśasamuttihitapralāpa; duḥkha, as ii.7a; daurmanasya, as ii.8b; upāyaśa = vicchinnavega daurmanasya, or, according to others, sokaṇaridevapārvaka śrama (\textit{Vyākhya}).
See the definitions of the Śālistambasūtra (Théorie des douze causes, 80); Abhidhammaasanga, 36; sokādivacanam pan’ettha nissandhapalanidassanam; Visuddhimagga, 503 (grief is the cause of all vissana); for other references, see Théorie des douze causes, 31-32.

Soka, etc., are represented on the wheel of existence in Ajañta, J. Przyluski, JAs. 1920, ii.313, an article that should be read.

214. The Vyākhyā explains aprajāma with the words avenikām avidyāṁ darśayati: “the author indicates here avidyā pure and simple.” See p. 402, 419.

215. See iii.101b.

216. For us, the item vijñāna is the whole of the series of vijñānas from the existence at death (maranabbhava) until the existence at birth (upapattibhava): in other words, the mental series of the intermediate being since its initial mind (prasamābhibhāt) to its end (the existence at birth, the beginning of the realm of rebirth). This series includes mental consciousness (manovijñāna), plus the five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc. We are thus in agreement with the definition of the item vijñāna (vijñānānāgamirdeṣe): vijñānam katamat / sad vijñānāñākañāyaḥ.

This definition of the vijñāna is from the Madhyama, TD 1, p. 578b16, Majjhima, i.53. According to Paramārtha, confirmed by the Vyākhyā below (see note 217), we should read: “according to the Vijñānavibhanga of the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra.”

If the item vijñāna is the initial mind of the realm of rebirth, existence at arising (prasamābhibhāt, upapattibhava), the Sūtra would say: vijñānam katamat / manovijñānam. For “it is to the manovijñāna alone that the cutting off of the roots belongs . . .” (iii.42a).


On the definition of nāmarūpa and its variants, Théorie des douze causes.


219. On kukkuravrata, etc., Majjhima, i.387, Dīgha, iii.6.

The Pāṇḍarabhikṣus call to mind the Pāṇḍaraṅga-paṇḍitājakas who divided, along with the Brāhmīns and the brāhmaṇa-jāti-paṇḍitās, the favors of Binduśāra, Samantapāsādika, 44; Mrs Rhys Davids reconciles this with the Paṇḍaraṇa-sagotta of the Theragāthā, 949.

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 590a26: There are two Trthakas, Acēla Śreṇika (Acēla Seniya Kukkuravatika of the Majjhima, i.387, compare Nettippakarana, 99) and Pūraṇa Koḍika (Pūraṇa Koliyaputta Govatika). These two Trthakas, at the same time, went to ask questions of the people seated together, saying, “We two practice all the difficult practices of this world, we study them, and we accomplish them to perfection. Who can in truth prophesize the retribution that these practices will produce? . . .

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 284a13: Śilavratopādāna is twofold, internal and external. The inner persons (or Buddhists) are those who abuse themselves thinking that bathing makes for purity, that the practice of the twelve Dhutas suffices for purity.

220. Ātma-bhāva, ātmavrāda are the five upādānaskandhas, as results from the text: ye ke cīc cīc chramaṇa va brāhmaṇa va ātmeti samanupasyantah samanupasyanty sarve ta imān eva pāñcādānaskandhān.(Sānyutta, iii.46).

221. The “divergent” masters (i-stib 異師 ) of the Sautrāntika school (Saeki).


The bāla, who lacks “innate” (upapattibhākā) prajñā which comes from the influence of a previous religious practice (pārvābhāṣavasasaṇanirjātā); aṣṭuṭavā, who is lacking the prajñā which arises from Scripture (āgamaṇā); the prthāgjanā, who is lacking the prajñā arisen from adhiṣṭema, that is to say from satyābhisaṃaya (vi.27).

Prajñātān anupatisaḥ yathā samiṣyā yathā ca vyavahāras tathānugataḥ. The expression
appears to be lacking in Pāli.

223. "In the Sarvā", I understand to be the Sarvavarga, but we do not find anything parallel in the Sabbavagga of the Samyutta, iv.15. The Lotsava translates as thams cad las; Hsüan-tsang: chubchung 諸踪 "in all the various Scriptures"; Paramārtha: i-ch'ieh ch'i'一一切 "in all places".

224. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 58a4; Samyutta, iii.100: "Is upādāna the same thing as the upādānaskandhas? It is neither the same thing as the upādānaskandhas, nor different from the upādānaskandhas: chandarāga with respect to them is upādāna with respect to them (api ca yo tattha chandarāgo tam tattha upādānam)"); iii.167: rūpa is an upādānayuddha (that is the object of upādāna, giving rise to upādāna); chandarāga with respect to it is upādāna with respect to rūpa (the same for the other skandhas); iv.89, same text by replacing the skandhas with the six indriyas.

Vyākhyā: aprāptesu viśayesu prarthanā chandab; prāptesu rāgab.


Visuddhimagga, 575, less precise; Vibhaṅga, 137, Cullaniddesa, 471.


227. Compare Majjhima, i.49, Dīgha, ii.305, Vibhaṅga, 99, Dhammasaṅgani, 644.

The word khāliya, cavity, corresponds to khandicca which is explained as "the state of being broken (of teeth)" (Rhys Davids-Stede) according to the Aṅguttara, i.138 (khaṇḍadanta), Visuddhimagga, 449.

228. In the word avidyā, the prefix na(ā-) has the sense of viroḍa; it creates words which designate the vipakṣa (the pratidvandva); it does not indicate simple exclusion (paryuddhānta); and it does not indicate simple absence (abhava).

229. Other examples: ayukti, avyavahāra, amanusya. (On amanusya, iv.58c-d, 97b, and iv. note 348.)

230. See v.H


232. We have seen above (p. 417): that fools "do not understand (aprajñān) the conditioned character of the dhammas": we can draw a definition of avidyā from this passage. This avidyā is anterior to drṣṭi (ātmadyāsī = satkhyadṛṣṭi). Definition of avidyā, p. 411, 421.

On the other hand avidyā = moha, ii.26a, iv.9c, v.20a.

Speaking truthfully, if avidyā is not simply "ignorance," the simple absence of correct vidyā or prajñā, one is at a loss to see how it is not a defiled prajñā; if avidyā is anything other than ignorance of the conditioned character of the dhammas, ignorance of the true nature of former existence, etc., how is it not confused with this defiled prajñā which is the bad dṛṣṭis, "view of self", "view of the former existence of self," etc? All the more then one may admit a reasoned "view of the self," such as non-Buddhist scholars can formulate, a natural, innate (sahaja) "view of the self." Note that the three dṛṣṭis are defined as moha (mūḍhi), the root of evil (v.20a).

233. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 190b15.

On the deliverance of the defiled mind, vii.77a.

The Abhidhamma (for example the Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.21) recognizes the visuddhi of sīla, citta, and dīṭṭhi.

234. Vyākhyā: kalpanāmātram etad āgamaninapekṣam iti kathayati.Fa-pao and P’u-kuang do not agree whether Vasubandhu here takes the part of the Vaibhāṣikas against the Sautrāntikas. In other words, whether Vasubandhu says, as his personal opinion, "Who can stop a master in his imaginations?", or if he gives these words to the Vaibhāṣikas. The Vyākhyā accepts the first hypothesis. But Saṅghabhadra says, "The Sautrāntikas say that good prajñā can be mixed...", and we know that he always mentions and quotes Vasubandhu as "the Sautrāntika." The Chinese
commentators think that Vasubandhu rejects the theory of the mixing of good *prajñā* with defiled *prajñā*; nevertheless, he does not admit that *avidya* is a separate *dharma*.

235. Hsiian-tsang: "There is a separate thing, *avidya*, which differs from *prajñā*, as *rāga* differs from the mind. This master is correct."

236. Bhadanta Śrīlābha says, "*Avidya* is the general designation of all of the *klesas*; there is no *avidya* separate from craving and the other *klesas* (*avidyeyeti sarvakleśānāṁ iyoṁ sāmāyasyaśāṅjñā / na rāgādiśkeśayaśaṅkūṭāvīdyā nāmāśi). According to the Śūtra, "Oh Mahākāusūla, he does not rightly discern (na *prajñānti*), and as a consequence we say *avidya*" (Sarīrīputta, iii.172: Mahākṣottthito (or Mahākṣottthiko) ... *avocā / avijjā avijjātā avuso Sarīputta vucaṭṭi ...). In fact all the *klesas* are by their nature non-knowledge (*ajñānasvarūpa*), for they grasp things as they are not (*vāparāṇagrabhanātās*).

This is the thesis of Harivarman in *TD* 32, no 1646. According to Saeki, here Vasubandhu refers to Harivarman.

237. Above iii. p., *Samyukta*, *TD* 2, p. 85a16, p. 126c5: pūrvānte ‘jñānam aparānte ... madhyānte ... (budhbadharmasamgharatnaṁ svu ... dubhbasamudayanirbhāmāryeṁ ... kusālakusālayāketesv ... ādhyātmikas ... bābāye’jñānam / yat kincid tatra tatrājñānam tama āvaramā) ... See Kośa, ii.26a-c, where we have *avidya*, *ajñāna* and "non-clarity."

Vibhanga, 85: yam aṁhīkānān adassanam anabhissamayo ... (asampakkhāna is missing from the long list of synonyms).

One will find in Rhys Davids-Stede (*avijjā*) and in *Théorie des douze causes*, 6-9, a good number of references.

238. The *Vyākhyā* has *mayāna*, *mayānāṁ*, and in the *Dbhāpatā*, *mī gatau*: thus *sattva-mayānā*. Paramāntha has simply *lei* 類 (= *maya*).

Hsiian-tsang: *yu ch'ing shih* (to depend upon, to support) *wo lei hsing* 有情恃我類性 = *sattva-ātmāriśa-maya-tā*: *lei* gives *maya* and *hsing* = -tā 類性 .

*Pu-kuang* explains: *lei-hsing* (mayatā) = *abhirūmāna*.

Sarīghābradha explains *maya* in the sense of "to go (to the realms of rebirth)"); that which is the nature of *maya* is *mayatā*. (We would have *sattva mayatā* = "the quality of going of beings ... ".)


240. *Abнkāramamakāramānūdaya*, *Samyutta*, iii.80, etc.; *asmimāna*, *asmūti māna*, iii.155.

241. *Sitcbaya* corresponds to *nicchāta* of the Pāli sources. On this word, Rhys Davids and Stede. Often accompanying *nibbuta*, *sībhūta*, etc.: however see *Anguttara*, v.65.

242. Here it would be more fitting to explain the *samskāras* and *vījñāna*; see iii.36a.


244. It is by reason of a name that the non-material *skandhas* are active (*pravartante*) with respect to objects not immediately perceived (*apratyakṣasv arthasv*): "Such is the object (or the meaning), *artha*, of this noun." By reason of the organs, the non-material *skandhas* arise (utpadyante) with respect to the objects perceived. By reason of the object, the non-material *skandhas* are active with respect to names: "Such is the name of this object."


245. On this subject the *Vyākhyā* quotes a Śūtra which presents together, with the *Mahānāmasutta* of the *Samyutta*, v.369, some interesting variants: *ṃrtasya khulu kālagasūya jñātaya imam pūtikākāyam agnīna vā dhānti udake vā plavayanti bhūmau vā nibbananti vā dvāpāp bhūyaṃ vā pārisōjanā pariṣkāyam pariṣṭādānām gacchati / yat tu màn idam ucate cetān iti vā mana iti vā vījñānam iti vā sādapparibbāviṁsam sīlāyaṃṣrutapraṇāṇaṃ pariṣṭābāviṃsam tad ārthavāgāmi bhavati viṣeṣagāmy ayatāṃ svargopagām.
In **Samyutta**, mention only of the body cut to pieces and eaten by animals and birds, etc.; as **Dīgha**, ii.295. See Nariman, RHR, 1912, i.85.

246. On **sparśa**, see **Kośa**, ii.24, iii. note 160. Théorie des douze causes, 22, Mrs Rhys Davids, intro. to the trans. of the **Dhammasaṅgani**, 63, Compendium, 12, 14 (awareness of the objective presentation).

Majjhima, i.190; **Atthasālinī**, 109, 141-2; **Visuddhimagga**, 463, 595; **Madhyamakavṛtti**, 554 (important); **Vijñānakāśyā** (analyzed in Études Asiatiques, 1925, i.370).

Here the kārikā defines the position of the Sarvāstivādin: whereas, according to the Sautrāntikas, **sparśa** is the "coming together of the three", according to the Sarvāstivādins (and according to Buddhaghosa, **Atthasālinī**, 109), **sparśa** is not the "coming together of the three", but the effect of this coming together, a mental (caitasika) dharma. **Kośa**, ii.24.

The "three" are the eye, the object and the viññāna. The viññāna is produced by the eye and the object (plus an intellectual element, the samanvābara), **Majjhima**, i.190, **Madhyamakavṛtti**, i.554. The Sarvāstivādin thesis is that the viññāna (=citta), "the mind," knows "the thing only" (arthamāra), whereas the "mental states" (caitta, caitasika) (namely **sparśa**, vedanā, etc.) know the "particulars of the thing" (arthaviśeṣa). Th. Scherbanski (Central Conception, 15, 17, 55) defines viññāna as "the mind viewed as a receptive faculty, pure consciousness (which renders well the idea of manodhātu), pure sensation without any content," and **sparśa** as "sensation," "real sensation". To not depart from the definitions furnished by our texts (**Kośa**, ii.34, note 178), viññāna grasps the upalabhāyatūrāja: this is the most rudimentary of the "gnosis" (as psychologists say), the idea that one perceives something; but, on the other hand, cakṣurviññānaṁ nidāṁ viññāti, "the visual consciousness knows the blue" (One should explain that without doubt one should understand by cakṣurviññāna the viññāna with the caittas, **sparśa**, etc., which necessarily accompany it).

Maung Tin recounts the definition of **sparśa** of the **Atthasālinī**: sikasamānātisamkhātassā panā attano kāraṇassa vasena pavedhitattā samānātisupaccaṭhāhāno (phasso) = Contact has coinciding as its manifestation, because it is revealed through its own cause, known as the coinciding of the three (i.e., the basis [that is to say, the organ], the object and consciousness). The meaning of this appears to be: Contact appears, arises (paccumottari) by reason of the conjunction (literally: has for its immediate cause this conjunction: yasya samānātisah pratyupasthānam sa samānātisupaccaṭhāhāno iti), because it is sensed ("experienced") by reason of (and in conformity with) its cause, which is what is called the conjunction of the three." From another point of view phassa is vedanāsupaccaṭhāhāno (=yo vedanāyāḥ pratypasthānam sa vedanāpratypasthāhāno iti) because it causes the vedanā or agreeable impression to arise (paccapaccapadi = upaddeti). 247. Samīyukta, TD 2, p. 18a16: in the Pāli sources, we need not read tiṇṇam samgatiphasso, as does the Samīyukta Index, but like Samīyutta, iv.68, and **Majjhima**, i.111: yā ... imeyam tiṇṇam dharmamārāni samagati samāvayāya ayam uccati cakkhusampasso. Nettipakaraṇa, 28: cakkhusampaviniṇānasamaniyātalamkhāhano phasso. Théorie des douze causes, p. 20.


249. **Saṅgaha dharmaparāya**, **Majjhima**, iii.180 (Chachakkasutta) **Dīgha**, iii.243.

250. See iv.4a-b.

251. They read ya esam dharmamārāni samagatiḥ samāvayāt sa sparśah. And not: ... samagatiḥ samāvayāt sa sparśah ... 252. Classic example: yathā buddhānāṁ sukha upādāḥ (Dhammapada, 194), **Visuddhimagga**, in Warren, 194, **Madhyamakavṛtti**, 70.

253. This discussion is atibhuvāsitaraapakāraṇavīriṇā.

254. **Sparśa** = sanātsparśa (Vyākhyā).

255. **Pratīīhasamsparśa**, so called because its āsraya (the organ) is sapratīgha (first opinion of the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 760c13, which follows TD 28, no 1552 and Vasubandhu), because its āsraya and
its object (alambana) are sapratigha (second opinion of the Vibhāṣa, which follows TD 28, number 1550 and Saṅghabhadra).


257. Vyākhyā: adhyucyate' nenetv adhivacanam / vān nāmī pravartate nāmrtham dyotayaty adhivacanam nāma.

258. cakṣūrvijñāṇena nilam vijānati no tu nilam iti / manovijñāṇena nilam nilam iti ca vijānati (variant: cakṣūrvijñānasaṃsāri ... manovijñānasaṃsāri ...). On this text, which is without doubt excepted from the Abhidharma (Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasamākṣepa, Mdo 111, fol. 108b), see Kośa, i.14c, Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 74, note.

259. This is the opinion of Fa-sheng in the Abhidharmahrdaya (6.18), TD 28, number 1550. Fa-sheng has been reconstructed as Dharmakīrti, Dharmajina (Nanjio), or Dharmottara (Takakusu); Pērī, "Date de Vasubandhu," 25, mentions the transcription dha-ma-sli-i (=?).

260. Hsüan-tsang translates: with the vacana for its adhipati [pratyaya].

261. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 760b25. Two sparśas: sārava and anārava; three sparśas: kuśala, akusala, and avyākta; four sparśas: trādheṣa, abhiṣepa, and ādhiṣṭapana; etc. From the point of view of nivāraya and of its pratiṣṭhā (the hindrance and its opposition): sparśas of avidyā and vidyā; from the point of view of the same nature of the sparśa: sparśa of neither-vidyā-nor-avidyā; from the point of view of what is pleasing and what is displeasing: sparśas of sympathy and antipathy; from the point of view of association (samprayoga): agreeable sparśa, etc.; from the point of view of its support: sparśas of the eye, of the ear, etc.

262. Abhiṣekasamuddecarin = nityasamuddecarin (Vyākhyā).

263. How sparśa is vedanīya, iv.49.

Sukhavedya is explained: sukhasya vedah sukhabhedah / sukhabhedo sādhuḥ sukhabhedoḥ / sukham vā vedayam asmin iti sukhabhedoḥ.

264. Vedanā has been explained i.14, ii.24; here the author does not explain the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of vedanā, but its type (praṇāra). On adukkhāsukhā, Madhavīma, i.397.

265. The Sautraṇtika does not reply, because the problem of shade has already been discussed ii.50c.

266. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 698c10.

267. Saṇhiyukta, 8.4. Saeki quotes TD 24, number 1451 (the Vinayakṣudrakavastu, see S. Lêvi, Seize Arhats, p. 37) where the Bhagavat explains to Ānanda the four principles of Āṅguttara, ii.167.

268. The Vaibhāṣika theory of the mahābhūmikas is presented ii.23c and following; one should replace adhimukti with adhimokṣa, p. 189, 190.

269. The asamāskṛtas are unconnected with cause, since they refer to the caittas. 270. Paramārtha translates: "in the first three bhūmis"; Hsüan-tsang: "in the first bhūmis"; the Vyākhyā glosses: in the saviturkā-saviccāra bhūmi.

271. This is the thesis presented ii. trans. p. 192−3, 204. Here the Vyākhyā quotes several definitions of the Pañcaskandhaka (of Vasubandhu) (Mdo, 58) which we have reproduced ii. trans. p. 189−190. (There is a Pañcaskandhaka by Candrakirti, Mdo, 24).

272. The Prakaraṇapāda in effect arranges the "mental states" into four categories: mahābhūmikas, kuśalamabhūmikas, klesamabhūmikas, parittaklesabhūmikas (see ii. trans. p. 195−6 and note 109).
Chapter Three

273. The Sutta opposes akusala to ku/ala.

274. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 72c9, p. 87c26.
   We have Samyutta ii.72, iv.33 and passim: cakkhum ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-
   viññānam / tiññānam samgati phasso / phassapaccayā vedanā / vedanāpaccayā tanbhā / ayanā kbo
dakkhasa samadayo.

   Our Sutta, most probably, has: caksuḥ praṇyāṁ tṛṇāṁ cettavyat ca caksurviññānam /
   trayāṁsāmāṁ pātāḥ sāpāḥ / sabājātā vedanā samjñā cetānā.

   Vijñānakāya in Études Asiatiques (BEFEO, 1925), i.370.

275. The meaning of sabājāta is not specified; we can understand it as para/sparas-sabājātā, “arisen
   one from the other.”


277. Madhyama, TD, p. 791b1. yā vedanā yā ca samjñā [yā ca cetanā yac ca viññānam] samāṁṣaṁśa
   [ime dharmā na vitarīṣyāt]. Saeki quotes this Sutta which has for its protagonist Great-ko-thi-la
   (the same person to whom the Bhagavat teaches that āyus and uṣmaka are “mixed,” below note
   281): the Pāli edition, Majjhima, i.293 (Mahāvedallasuṭta, where the protagonists are Mahākoṭṭita
   and Sāriputta), omits the words yā ca cetanā.

   It is the doctrine of the Dharmasāṅgaṇīni, 1193, that the skandha of vedanā, saṁsāra and
saṁkhāra (=cetanā) are cittasamāsaṭṭha [that is, united to the mind from their origins to their end,
   Āṭṭhasālinī, 49].
   On samāṁṣaṁśa, vi.11d.

278. This means, according to the Vyākhyā, in the same Sutta where we read: “vedanā, samjñā,
cetanā . . .”

279. Majjhima, i.293 omits yam ceteti . . .
   Compare Samyuta, iv.68: phūṭho veḍeti phūṭho ceteti phūṭho samjñañāti.

280. According to the Vyākhyā, this is a reply of Vasubandhu: acārya abha.

281. The Sutta is quoted viii.3c, note 26. The formula is lacking in Majjhima, i.295. On āyus and
   uṣman (uṣmaka), ii. trans. p. 233.

282. The Pāli sources know of six somanassupavīcāras, domanassupavīcāras, and uppekkhāpavīcāras
   (Dīgha, iii.244, Majjhima, iii.218, Vibhaṅga, 381, etc.): cakkhumā rūpam divyā somanassatthabhiyām
   rūpam upavīcarati . . . manasā dhammanā viññāya somanassatthabhiyāmāh dhamman upavīcarati;
   but they ignore the word maṇa-upavīcāra, as does the Mahāvyutpatti.

283. This thing (dravya) which is the mental vedanā, of one single type by its being associated with
   the mental consciousness, is threefold by the triple variety of its nature, satisfaction, etc.; and each
   one of these three is sixfold by the variety of its object, visibles, etc. Thus we have 1 x 3 x 6 = 18.

284. The Bhāsyaam says simply: trayo dhammapavicārā ubhayathā, but we have translated the
   Vyākhyā here. The source is the Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 716c3. When the dharmamana-pavicāra has
   for its object seven types of dharmas—the six internal āyatana (eye . . . mana-āyatana) and the external
dhammāyatana—either together, or not together, its object is not mixed; when it has for its object
   these seven dharmas (either together, or not together) plus one, two . . . five of the external objects
   (visible things, etc.), its object is mixed. Same doctrine on the subject of the smṛtyupasthānas:
   kāyasmiṁtyupasthāna is of an unmixed object, bearing only on the body; dharmasmṛtyupasthāna can
   be of unmixed object, or mixed (samabhima, miśra), or universal (samasta) object, vi.15c.

285. The word kila indicates that Vasubandhu does not accept this etymology.
286. The prefix *upa* has the sense of repetition (*punah punah*).

287. Problem discussed in *Vibbāṣa*, TD 27, p. 716b6. The *upavicāra* are proper to mental sensation: there is thus *saumanasya-upavicāra*, not *sukha-upavicāra*.

288. Problem discussed in *Vibbāṣa*, TD 27, p. 715a3.

289. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 690c4. caṅkṣaṇa rūpāṇi dṛśtvā saumanasyasthāniyāṁ rūpāṇy upavicāratī.

290. According to the Lotsava: "The word *ga* signifies ‘taking for an object’, as in the expression: How does he go? He goes thus." This gloss is omitted by Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang.

291. Hsüan-tsang adds: "The same in the prefatory absorptions of the Second, Third, and Fourth Ārūpya."

292. According to the *Vyākhyā*, Vasubandhu; according to P’u-kuang, the Sautrāntikas (TD 41, p. 179c12).

293. Satatāmbava=sattā, vibhāra=yogaviveka.


295. When the Arhat thinks of the *dhammas* which constitute the Buddha, buddhasamāntānike *dhammas*, he experiences a good satisfaction. Such a satisfaction is not forbidden, nor is it to be fought.

296. Anantavarman does not accept this theory: This is not correct, for, in the Sūtra, the Bhagavat does not say that the satisfactions, etc., are *upavicāra* solely when they are defiled (*sāmklesika*). He says in fact, "Oh Bhiksus, take support on the six *upavicāras* of satisfaction, abandon the *upavicāras* of dissatisfaction; take support on the six *upavicāras* of equanimity, abandon the *upavicāras* of satisfaction. There are, Oh Bhiksus, two equanimities, the equanimity resting on unity (*ekatvasamānīśīra*), and equanimity resting on variety (*nānātvasamānīśīra*): take support on the first, but abandon the second" (ya ime sat saumanasyopavicāras tān āśīrya tān adhibhyāya ya ime sat dārmanasyopavicāras tān prajavīya...). Majjhima, i. 364, in another context: ya 'yam upekkhā nānattā nātāsita tām abhinivasavetvā ya 'yam upekkhā ekatta ekattāsitā... tām eva eva upekkhān bhāveti.

But, says Yasomitra, this Sūtra does not prove that the satisfactions, etc., can be *upavicāra* without being *sāmklesika*. One supports oneself on light (*laghu*) defilement in order to abandon heavy (*guru*) defilement; as he said, "Māna or pride, is to be abandoned by supporting oneself on māna." The text referred to in *Nettipakarana*, 87: "The māna, supported on which one abandons māna, is good (*kusala*)." According to this same work, thirst (=desire) can also be good, see below note 297. (We know the Tantric thesis of *rāga* expelled by *rāga*, Cittavi/uddhiprakarana, JASB., 1898, p. 175.

To be sure, māna is never purification (*uyāvatānika*). Nanda (who expelled desire for women by desire for goddesses) is an example. The Bhagavat also teaches that one abandons the *upavicāras* of equanimity by the *upavicāras* of equanimity.

297. *Vibbāṣa*, TD 27, p. 715bl: five explanations of the expression *sāstrpadā*; Vasubandhu adopts the first. (In taking into consideration the three time periods, 108 *upavicāras*.The *chatiriṇsa sattpadā* of Majjhima, iii.217.

According to the *Vyākhyā*: ta evaṣṭasadopavicārab... “These eighteen *upavicāras*, through the distinction of those which have for their principle craving and *naiśkramya*, make up the thirty-six points of the Master." Understood in this way, the argument goes to prove that some of the *upavicāras* are good, others bad.

Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang understand: “On the other hand, the satisfactions, etc. (tān eva saumanasyaśādina) ...”

*Naiśkramya* is explained as "leaving" (*niśkrama*) the *sāmklesas* or getting out of the suffering
of sarisāra.

On gredbārika, naiskrāmyāsrita, Kośa, ii. trans. p. 155, iv.77b-c; Mahāvyutpatti, 245.1145, Samyutta, iv.232, Viśhāṅga, 381, Miśrīṅga, gebanisita and nekkhammanisita (thirty-six vedanās); Nettipakaraṇa, 87, how good desire gets one out of dissatisfaction, nekkhammasita.Rhys Davids-Stede, nekkhamma, gebam, gedha (confused with the words kāma and grha).

Somanassā, domanassā, upekkhā are sevitabba, asavitabba, Diṭṭha, ii.278.

298. Same comparison, grain and husk, Vyāsa ad Yogasūtra, ii.13.

299. This thesis is demonstrated in Chapter IX (page 297 of the French translation).

300. The term klesa is to be understood as both the klesas and the upaklesas, v.46.

301. Cittacaittasamudācāryapāṭutvā. As we shall see, iii.42d, upekkhāyām cyutodbhavā.


303. It appears indeed that this is not exactly correct: the first moment of antarābhava is necessarily defiled.

304. See above p. 383 and note 85.


Madhyamakavṛtti, 40, quotes another Sūtra: eko dhammaṁ sattvasthitayya yad uta cātvāra abārah. Mahāvāstu, i.65.

The first section (Ekadharma) of the Sāṃgītisūtrāyāya begins: “All beings last through food.”

306. Sāṃyutta, TD 2, p. 102a13, Viśhāṅga, TD 27, p. 674b28, Lokaprajñāpti (analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique); Mahāvyutpatti, 118; Beal, Catena, (interesting).

Diṭṭha, iii.228 (kabalmkāra abāro olārika vā sukhumo vā . . .) Majjhima, i.48, 261, Sāṃyutta, ii.98; Dharmasamgani, 71, 646, Atthasālīmi, 153, Visuddhimagga, 341, Nettipakaraṇa, 114.

See the Udayisūtra, Kośa, ii.44d, viii.3c.

307. Mātrapuṣṭa absent from among the Four Kings.

308. On the constituent elements of the molecule, ii.22; the smallest part of the visible termed chāyā includes odor, taste, tangible.

Paramārtha is not very clear: “How are the (odors) chāyā-ātapa-jvāla-prabhā, etc. food?”; Hsūan-tsang: “How are chāyā-ātapa-flame-cold food?”

Hsūan-tsang translates the phrase yāmy api tu nābhayavaḥriyante “which however are not swallowed,” by a simple yu (={punah}).

309. According to the Vyākhyā, Vasubandhu now presents his own opinion (svabhīpṛya).


311. Vijñā, as one says prajñā; the meaning is vijñāna.

Food by the mouthfuls, being, by its nature, the three āyatanaṁ of odor, taste, and tangible, is evidently sāsvāna, impure; but sparśa, manāsasamceṭana and the vijñāna are sometimes impure, sometimes pure. It is only when they are impure that they are food.

312. The Lotsava does not explain the term vijñāna. Paramārtha explains it through manovijñāna, Hsūian-tsang through vijñānasukhādha.

313. Vyākhyā: catvāra abārah bhūtānaṁ sattvānaṁ sthitaye samabhavasijñānam cānugrabāya / katame catvārah / kavādikārabāra audārikaḥ sūkṣmaś cābārah prabhamaḥ / sparso dvitīyaḥ / mana-
hamsacetana / vijñanaṃ abharaṇaḥ catutrtah (Comp. viii.3c).

Ekottara, TD 2, p. 719a15: bhūtānāṃ sthitaye yāpanāya samībhavaśīṣīnāṃ cānugrabhāya;
Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 676b15; Samyutta, ii.11, Majjhima, i.261: cattāro 'me bhikkhave abhāra bhūtānāṃ sthitaya samībhavasmiṁ va anuggabhaya ... kabaīākāro abhāro olārīko vā sukkhuno vā ...

On the expression kāyassa sthitaye yāpanāya, Visuddhimagga, 32 and other sources in Rhys Davids-Stede (yāpana).

Sstitaye=avasthpandya, anugrabhāya=punarbhavabhāya samībhavāya (Vyākhyā).

314. See p. 442 line 27.

315. Manomaya, see Kūsa, ii.44d, viii.3c.

316. Above p. 393.

317. Hsia-tsan: Abhinirvṛtti (ch'i 起, upāda), because, turned towards future birth, it is produced in a short period of time.

318. ... a painful body ... The Lotsava translates las = kāya, ātmabhāva; the Chinese translators have svabhāva. The Vyākhyā gives the words savyabhādam (sadoṣhabhāvā) abhinirvṛtya.

319. This is a Sūtra of four points (cātuṣkoṭika): asti pudgalo yasyaḥ abhinirvṛttisanyojanam prabhinām nopapattisanyojanam / asti yasyaḥ abhinirvṛttisanyojanam prabhinām nabhavinirvṛttisanyojanam / asti yasyaḥ abhinirvṛttisanyojanam prabhinām upapattisanyojanam ca / asti yasyaḥ nabhavinirvṛttisanyojanam prabhinām nopapattisanyojanam.

The distinction between abhinirvṛtti and upapatti is elucidated in Kūsa, vi.3.

Rhys Davids and Stede have grouped many references under the words abhinibbatta, abhinabatteti, abbinibbatteti. One of the most interesting is Samyutta, iii.152 (which slightly calls to mind the “embroiderer” of the Upanishad).

Let us add that, in Aṅguttara, ii.134, we have (in addition to orambhāgiya samīyojana which brings about rebirth in Kāmadhātu): upapattipatilābhika samīyojana (correct upapatti) and bhavapatilābhika samīyojana: this second category is the abbinirvṛttisanyojana of the Abhidharma bhāva=antarabhāva the Antarāparinibbāyaḥ has broken the bond which produces upapatti, but not the bond which produces bhāva.

320. The words “when he is an Anāgāmin” are necessary, for one can detach oneself from the two lower Dhatus through a worldly path, thus in a manner which is not definitive.

321. Anugraba. Here, by samībhavasīṁ, one should understand, conforming to the second explanation (above line 28), not the intermediate beings, but all beings not liberated from thirst (sātartha).

322. Four opinions in Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 674c25; Vasubandhu follows the orthodox opinion (p'ing-chia says: ...)

323. We see in fact that three of the four foods—manahsāncetana, which is action; the vijiñāna considered as vijiñānabija, “the seed which is the vijiñāna,” action which develops or perfumes (karmaparibhāvajita); and sparśa, which is associated with action—have for their result anugrāha or re-existence (anugrabhāya bhavati). But how can food by the mouthfuls have this result?

324. Samyutta, TD 2, p. 103a5: rogasya ganḍasya sāhasya catvāra abhāra mūlaṇa jārāmaranapratayyaḥ (?). According to the Vyākhyā, the word jārāmaranapratayya belongs to another re-redaction of this same Sūtra (Ekottara, TD 2, p. 656c10). Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 677a17. Samyutta, iii.189: rūpam rogo ti ganḍo ti sallam ti ... 325. The question also concerns sparśa and vijiñāna, which are associated with manahsāncetana.

326. This brings to mind the “popular maxim” (Jacob, ii.11) of the āśāmodakas, “cakes of hope,” or manomodakas, “cakes made by the manas” of the Nyāyakanda, 130 and Nyāyavrāttika, 43 (quotations trans. from the Sarvadarśana, Muséeon, 1902, ad 16, 22).
In the Shidō-in 四度印圖, (Musée Guimet, Bibl. Études, viii.1899), 126, the mudrā of drinking and of eating, the four foods, and the sensation of acidity which produces the thought of a result.

327. The Abhidharma treatise by this name. TD 26, number 1536, chap. 8, fol. 8 (Saeki); Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 676b16.

328. A remark of the Sautrāntikas according to certain commentators.

329. The Vibhāṣā explains four opinions:
1. vijñāna, spārśa, and kavādikāra nourish present existence; cetanā nourishes future existence.
2. spārśa and kavādikāra nourish present existence; vijñāna and cetanā nourish future existence.
3. kavādikāra nourishes present existence; spārśa, vijñāna, and cetanā nourish future existence.
4. P'ing-chia: all four foods have the two functions.


331. Paramārtha: The bhava thus projected arises from the vijñāna-seed informed-perfumed by action.

Hsiian-tsang: Punarbhava or new existence means future "birth" (sheng 生). This future birth is projected by the manahsaṁcetana. Being projected by the food which is the manahsaṁcetana, punarbhava is produced by the force of the vijñāna-seed perfumed by action.

According to Pu-kuang, this explanation is that of the Sautrāntika school; the Sarvāstivādins do not use the expression "vijñānabija."

332. Sarīṇīśāparvāya, TD 26, p. 368a28, yaḥ kṣicāt kavādikāraḥ sarvāḥ sa abhāraḥ / syāt kavādikāro nabhāraḥ / syād abhāro na kavādikāraḥ / syād ubhāyam / syān nobhāyam iti cātuṣkoṭikam.

333. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 674a3.

On upacayika "matter" arising from samādhi, i. trans, p. 103.


335. See for example the Pañcasikāsūtra, Feer, Fragments du Kandjour, 241.

336. Vyākhyā: That which has for its effect augmentation is food par excellence (mukhya).


On the value of the gift according to the field, Kośa, iv.117.

338. The Bhagavat said: yaḥ kṣic cēj jambuṣyadāt sarvanvayā sarvāḥ tathā samudräpanāṁḥ samudrāpravānaḥ samudrāprābhbāḥ.

(Compare Anguttara, v.22, Samyutta, v.39).


We recall that Jambudvīpaṇarmaṇa = Buddha (Kośa, vii.30a-c).

Kuksimantaḥ, "possessing a womb" = who possesses the capacity to eat; since the beginning of embryonic life.


341. Spiritual states which immediately precede the abandoning of the quality of Prthagjana = entry into the Path = the acquisition of the quality of candidate for the first fruit, vi.17.
342. We have, in viii.27c, Vyākhyā, another redaction: bodhisattvo hi kārmaṇaṁ apratyavesaṁśa [kārmaṇaṁ-labored field] nīśkarṇo jambumūle prabhāsnam dhūyam uṣṇāsīdavān. Divya, 391: asūmin pradeśe jambucchāyāyam nīśayā. Majjhima, i.246: ... pitu sakkassa kammante sūṭaya jambucchāyāya nīśino vivecc'eva kāmehi ... prabhāsnam ṇāham upasampajjā ...; Lalita, Lefman, 128 (Chapter xi): avalokita ca kṛṣṇakārmaṇām ... Mahāvastu ii.45, 26.

343. The cutting off of the roots of good results from "false view" (mithyādṛṣṭi), which, being of reflection (saṁsārika), is mental (mānasī); the recovery of these roots results from "correct, right view" and from doubt (saṁyagdṛṣṭi, vicikitsa), which are mental (iv.79-80).

It is only in the manovijñāna that detachment takes place: for detachment can be obtained only by an absorbed (saṁādhi) mind; the losing of this detachment is caused by incorrect judgment (ayontananaṁ saṁyaksikāra), which is vikalpa, and thus purely mental.

Death is produced in a viññāna propitious to the cutting off of the series: thus among a person wherein the activity of the five organs of sense consciousness is "reopened" (cittatikṣaptasaṁcakkhyāyapraccāraya pravāhaḥcakṣusāke vijañānā bhavati). Arising (upapatti) happens only to the manovijñāna since it takes place with "a troubled mind" (viparītastamaṁ, iii.15).

344. That is to say pratisamāndhisāmānyād anuśto'py akṣatakalpa iti no cayate.

345. Kathāvatthu, xv.9; Koša, viii.16.

346. The Bhagavat leaves the Fourth Dhyāna in order to die, Divya, ii.156; below note 350.

347. We can understand: "the mind, being made present, falls (=dies)"); or rather "the mind of this [pudgala] being made present =having entered into activity=saṁvijñānayā, this pudgala falls"; or again saṁmukhibhāva = saṁmukhibhāva [with the falling of ni, as we say: "There is a wind which causes leaves to be shoved up, there is a wind which causes leaves to dry up" = asti pariṇarūbo vaiśā/o'parāḥ; variant from the commentary of Udādi, 2.22], with the meaning: "... having made the mind present, the pudgala dies."

How a mind, interrupted by absorption, is reborn, ii. trans, p. 230.

348. Hsiian-tsang reads, hetvabhāvāt = "because the cause of arising is lacking," and not cittaścchedahetvabhāvāt (which causes difficulties).

We have seen, iii.38, that arising takes place through all of the kleśas or defilements, proper to the sphere where they take place (sarvakleśair hi tadbhumikasr upapattih pratisamāndhibandho bhavati).

349. The mind at death can be good, bad, or neutral. There are four types of neutral mind: vipakaja, aiśyāpattika, saṁjñapaṭṭhika, and naṁmaṇika (ii.71d, trans, p. 315). There is good reason to specify to which category the mind of a dying Arhat belongs, [the mind by which he enters into Nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa].

In Visuddhimagga, 292, some Arhats die sitting down, some while lying down, and some while walking. [Thus with aiśyāpattika minds?]

350. There are two "cuttings off of the mind" (cittaśccheda): apratisamāndhisaka cutting off, or definitive cutting off, in which the mind at death is not followed by the mind of an intermediate existence; and sapratissamāndhisaka cutting off, so that the mind at death continues into the mind of the intermediate being [a cutting off of the series of minds which lasts one life, the cutting off of the bhavanga in the Pāli sources]. In this last case, the mind can be also good or bad.

On the nature of the mind of a dying Arhat and, in general, of all dying persons, Kathāvatthu, xxii.3. [Death takes place in pakaticitta, a mind of Kāmadhātu for a being of Kāmadhātu]. On the death of the two types of Arhat, see Compendium, Introduction, p. 75.

351. On the two types of death, death all at once, and gradual death, see ii.15, trans. p. 176, Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 952c11.

When death is gradual, the organs of sight, hearing, smell and taste, the sexual organ, and the "organs" of agreeable and disagreeable sensation disappear first; the organ of touch (kāyāndriya),
the vital organ (ujjvitarāja), the mānas and the sensation of indifference (upeksendriya) remain: these four indriyas perish together.

352. Beal, Catena, 41, according to a gāthā which should be Mahāyāna, gives different indications.

For the Saint, the head; for a future god, the eyes; for a future human, the heart; for a future Preta, the groin . . . We can divine the future destiny of a dead person by examining which part remains warm the longest.

Vāngiṣa, before her conversion, listened to a skull with a stethoscope with success, and knew if the dead person would be reborn as a man, god, or in hell. But listening to the skull of an Arhat, he remained nonplused (Theragāthā, Commentary, Brethren, 395).

We see, Avadānātātaka, i.5, that the rays re-enter into a certain part of the body of the Buddha according to the realm of rebirth that he has predicted. [Into the feet, when it refers to beings in hell . . .].

353. The viśñāna, being non-material (arūpiṇī), does not reside in a place (adesattva); but it has for its support a body endowed with organs.

354. On the vital parts, the four hundred and four illnesses, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 953a7, and following, Saddhārmasūryapustakā, TD 17, p. 41b20. Bodhicaryāvatāra, ii.41 (marmacchedaśīvedana).


356. I-tsing (Takakusu, 131) quotes a Sūtra which enumerates four dosas: "The chū-lu, i.e. making the body slothful and heavy, owing to an increase of the element earth," plus ślesman (kapha) pitta and vāta. Takakusu translates chū-lu as gusma: "the phonetic probability is rather in favour of guru or its derivation (gaurava)." [But the fourth classical dosa is the blood, Jolly, Grundriss, 41]. On the three dosas, Rhys Davids-Stede mention Mūinda, 43, 172 and Sumangalavilāsini, i.133; Takakusu, Commentary on the Cullavagga, v.14.1, Mābabavagga, vi.14.1.

357. On the signs of death among the gods, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 365a21, and Ekottara, TD 2, p. 693c11.

Beal, Catena, 97, quotes a source which combines the two lists with some omissions, for a total of five. Chavannes, i.425 (TD 4, number 206), has a list of seven signs: 1. the brightness of the nape of the neck becomes extinguished; 2. flowers wilt; 3. color becomes altered; 4. dust accumulates on clothing; 5. a sour smell from the armpits; 6. the body becomes thin; 7. "he has left his throne."

Elsewhere we find only the second list: Divya, 193: cyavanadharmo devaputrasya pāśca pūrvanīmatāni prādurbhavanti [which corresponds word for word to the text which the Lotsava translates as the preamble to our first list] akiśāni vāsāmini kšīyanti / amlanāni mālyāni mālyanti / dasargandhyam kāyena (?) niśkrāmati /ubbābhyām kaṇsābhāyaṁ svedab prādurbhavati / cyavanadharmā devaputraḥ sva āsane dhrīśin na labhate [which is our second list]. Same list in the Friendly Letter of Nāgarjuna, JPTS, 1886, 100 (where we have as the third sign the colour of the body becoming ugly: compare Itivuttaka, Para. 83).

We know that five signs distinguish the gods from mortals: no bad smell, no dust, no winking of the eyes, no shadow, and no touching of the ground (see the references of Bloomfield, Pārśvanātha, Baltimore, 1919, p. 51).

In Divya, 222, Māndhātār differs from Śakra only by the winking of his eyes.

358. Hsüan-tsang adds: "which are in intermediate existence."

359. Kosa, iv.80d.

Ekottara, TD 2, p. 614b23, Dīrgha, 13.20, Mahāvyutpatti, 95.11.

Dīrgha, iii.217, tayo rāsi, miccbattaniyato rāsi, tammataniyato rāsi, aniyato rāsi; Puggala-panthatti, 13, recognizes only puggala niyata (paścika puggala ānantarikā ye ca micchādiṭṭhibhikā niyata, see Kosa, v.7, iv.96) and the aniyata; but Dhammasaṅgani, 1028, recognizes the three categories [The explanation as we see by the note of the translator and Atīthasālimi, 45, differs from the explanation of the Abhidharma]. On the aniyata, see Nettipākaraṇa, 96, 99 and commentary.
360. **Samyaktva** defined vi.26a (note 162).

361. A traditional etymology.

362. The oldest sources are the Śūtras of the Dīrgha and Madhyamāgama, notably Dīrgha, 30; among the most recent Śūtras, TD 1, number 25 (the Hi-shai of Beal); among the Sāstras, TD 32, number 1644, the Lokaprajñāpī and the Kāraṇaprajñāpī (analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique), the Viṅgás. It appears that Vasubandhu here reviews all this literature. The Saddharmasūryapustakāna (Lévi, *Pour l'histoire du Rāmāyaṇa*, Jas. 1918, i.), Divya, xvii. (the conquests of Māndhātār, xxxii. = TD 14, number 551 and foll.), belong also to the Hinayāna. For the Pāli sources, Lotus, 842, Sp. Hardy, Legends and theories, 1886. Chinese sources (of the two Vehicles), Beal, Catena, 1871, and Four Lectures. The schema of the universe in Geometry, Alphabetum Tibetanum, 1772, Gogerly, Ceylon Buddhism, 1908; vol ii, Sp. Hardy, Legends, 104. Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, art. Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist), iv. 129-138, B. C. Law, Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective, 1925; I have not seen the Buddhist Cosmology of MacGovern (London, 1923?).

363. **Uṣanti** = icaḥanti. This can refer to either "The Vaibhāṣikas" (P'u-kuang), or to "All the schools" (Fa-pao).

According to one opinion (notably Mahāyāna) the sphere of gold is placed immediately on the circle of wind; above is the circle of water.

**Sammvega** is interpreted by Hsiian-tsang in the sense of disposition: "Such is the disposition of the receptacle world: below . . ."; and this interpretation is preferable since the circle of wind forms part of the receptacle world. Paramārtha understands, I believe, "foundation"; the Lotsava has gnas, "place".

364. Burnouf has translated, *Introduction*, 448, the Śūtra which the Vyākhyā quotes ad i.5: prthivi bho gautama kutra pratisphitā prthivi brāhmaṇa abmaṇḍale pratisphitā / abmaṇḍalam bho gautama kutra pratisphitā / vāyau pratisphitā / vāyau bho gautama kutra pratisphitāh / ākāśe pratisphitāh / ākāśam bho gautama kutra pratisphitā / atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa / ākāśam brāhmaṇa apratisphitam anālambanam īśī vitarāh.

Compare Dīgha, ii.107 (on the earthquakes); Windisch, Māra et Bouddha, 61. ayam ānanda mahatāpaḥvi udake pratisphitā / udakam vāte patiṣṭhitam / vāto ākāṣaḥbho hoti. Thesis which Nāgasena (with the reading vāto ākāse patiṣṭhitā) explains in Mūlinda, 68.

On the origin of the circle of wind, iii.90c, 100a-b (Hsūian-tsang fol. 16a to the end). We will see iii.95c, note 504, that, when the universe is destroyed, it stays in the rūpa there where it was. This rūpa should be the ākāśadātāna, i.28.

365. Hsūian-tsang and Paramārtha transcribe; the Lotsava has tshan po che chen po, the meaning of which, according to Sarad Chandra, 1024, is also not clear; see Mahāvṛtyputti, 253; Kośa, viii.31, note 178; Viṅgāsa, TD 27, p. 155a11.

366. We have, according to the Lotsava, iṣādhaṇārāmārā vāryadvāra [See Cosmologie, p. 317, note, different Tibetan editions, Lokaprajñāpī, etc.] iṣā signifies "pole"; Paramārtha translates "great post", but Hsūian-tsang: "the axel of a carriage." We know elsewhere that iṣā is a measure (Subbāśūtra, in Monier-Williams).

On the primordial rain, below iii.90c, Samyuktā, TD 2, p. 243a15, 23, quoted above p. 370 (the rain of the cloud Iṣādhāra); Sīkṣāsamuccaya, 247: clouds forming thirty-two couches (pāṭala) covering the world. The deva Iṣādhāra rains during five small kalpas, like the devas Gajaprameha, Achinnadhara and Sthulabinduka. [According to the Pāṇḍitrasamāgamā = Rānakūṭā, xvi, Lévi, Jas. 1925, i.37]. [Bendall mentions the Nāgarāja with the name of Iṣādhāra, Mahāvṛtyputti, 168.24].

367. According to Hsūian-tsang. We have seen, iii.47, that the circle of water has a diameter of 1,203,450 yojanas. It thus forms a drum almost as high as it is large: how is it held up? According to the Viṅgāsa, TD 27, p. 691b23, the source of this presentation, some other masters think that the circle of water is incalculable in width, like the circle of wind.
368. Pakvakṣīnasaribhūvayogena. Grammatical explanation in the Vyākhyā. See the comparison of the Dīgha, ii.85: seyyathāpi nāma payaso tattasya nībhāyamānasya upari santānakan hoti...

369. Śīksāsamuccaya, 148, quotes the Āgama of the Sarvāstivādins: On the circle of gold there rests Jambudvīpa, some 84,000 yojanas of earth. [The circle of gold is named kāṭiścana-vajramāṇḍala, Bodhicaryā, vi.1]. The Kośa prefers 80,000, see iii.50b.

370. The circumference is triple that of the diameter: sarvasyaparīmāṇḍaśyaiyam sthitākyastvat, tripāksaa samantapārīkṣiptasya prāmāṇam (Vyakhyā).

371. The “ancient” metrical sources of the Atthasarini (p. 207 and foll.) have the same number for the diameter of the “circles”, and contain details on the mountains and the continents which are near to those Vasubandhu furnishes. However comparisons with other documents multiply the numerous variants.


Nemijātaka, v.145 and foll. (Jātaka, vi.125); Atthasarini, 297; Spence Hardy, Legends, 81.

Remusat, J. des Savants, 1831, p.600, Beal, Catena, 45; Dīvyāvadān, 217, same order of the mountains as in the Kośa.

Mahāvyutpatti, 194, Dharmasarāgraha, 125, Mahāvastu, ii.300, Śīksāsamuccaya, 246, Atthasarini, 298 and Jātaka, vi.125 differ.

372. These are the seven paribbhaṇḍaparvata of the Jātaka. Ra-ba signifies wall.

373. Lévi, Rāmāyaṇa, 45.

374. Nāṇavidhājagarbha, that is to say, according to the Vyākhyā, nāṇāprakārasāmarthayuktā.

375. ii.36c-d, iii.100a, iv.4, v.26, vii.13a.

376. That is to say, na by avasthitasya rūparatādyātmakasya kṣīraniyṛttau daddhunma: We can only admit that—color, taste, etc., remaining the same—there would be, at the destruction of milk, the appearance of small milk.

377. You admit that the successive moments (milk... small milk) are “other” (anyathā), you admit that there is a modification (anyathābhedva): thus there is no transformation (parināma); there is no passage, from one state to another state, of one and the same thing; for which it is otherwise (anyathābhedva) is other (anyatva) such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta.

378. In the Saddharmasṛṣṭiyupastāna (Lévi, Rāmāyaṇa, 46) as in Atthasarini (208), Meru emerges to a height of 84,000.

379. Vasubandhu does not speak of the Mahācakravāda, Mahāvyutpatti, 194.12, Lotus, 842, Dharmasarāgraha, 124 and notes p. 65, Dict. of St Petersburg. The Cakravāda of Beal, 45, is of a height of 300 yojanas; in Atthasarini (299), the Cakravāda is immerged 82,000, and emerges some 82,000.

380. Hsüan-tsang corrects this redaction which is sufficiently embarrassing: “Between the mountains [that is to say, between Meru, Yugandhara... Cakravāda] there are eight oceans. The first seven are the inner [ocean]. The first is 80,000 long; and is triple to its external limit. The six others, diminishing by a half. The eighth is the outer [ocean], of 321,000 yojanas.

381. We read Sūta in the kārikāś. We do not find the translation “cold” anywhere. The Lotsava has rol mtho, rol pa'i mts'o bdun: “the seven lakes of which the waters move in gentle waves as if they were dancing to the music of the wind” (Ṣarad Chandra Das).

The heroes of Jātaka 541 see the seven mountains that encircle Meru, satta paribbhaṇḍapabbatte, which is found Sūdaṃtare, that is to say Sūdāmahābāsakuddassā antare, in the middle of the great sea Sūda. This sea is so called because its water is so subtle (sukhumā) that it cannot even bear a peacock feather: it sinks (siddhi) (Jātaka, vi.125). Compare iii.57.
382. The Vyākhyā quotes this śloka.

Divya, 127.19. The eight qualities of the waters of the lakes of Sukhāvati, in Beal, Catena, 379; of Karanḍahara (Beal, Hsüan-tsang, ii.165; see ibid. i.10).

383. The masters are not in agreement. We have seen that the diameter of the circle of water and of the circle of the sphere of gold is 1,203,450 yojanas. On the other hand the Cakravāda is so called because it encircles the universe with its four continents. Now if one adds up the numbers given above (half of Meru 40,000; first Sīta 80,000; Yugasena 40,000; second Sīta 20,000...), we see that Cakravāda is not placed at the edge of the sphere of gold. Thus, certain masters think that the outer ocean, between Nimindhara and Cakravāda, should be 323,287.50 yojanas. Beal, p. 46, gives 322,312 yojanas. But the difference can be resolved in two ways: either by admitting that Cakravāda is not located at the edge—that it encircles, not the circle of water but the upper part of the sphere of gold; or by admitting that the descriptions of the mountains, “same height and width” (iii. 51b), should not be taken literally: the edges of the mountains are not strictly perpendicular (atyantacchinnata).

384. The form of a carriage, see Dīgha, ii.235.

385. Vajrāśana, iv.112b, trans. note 506. Saeki quotes the Si-yu-ki (=Hsi-yü-chi), Watters, ii.114; Śārad Candra Das, 751, Poucher, iconographie, ii.15-21, Beal, Catena, 21.

386. We are assured that, in this continent, the eye hears sounds, the ear sees colors, etc.

387. On Uttarakurus, “Hyperboreans”, iii.78, 85, 90, 99c, iv.43, 82, 97, Beal, Catena, 37, Hastings, ii.687.

388. The Vyākhyā has an interesting remark: bhūmiivaśat sattvānāṁ vaicitryāṁ himavadvindhyavāṁśāṁ kiratāvalariṇiṁ gaurāyāyāṁ: Beings differ by reason of their habituation; the inhabitants of the Himalaya, namely the Kiratas, are yellow; the inhabitants of the Vindhayas, namely the Śabaras, are black. On the face of the men on the 3,000 islands, Saeki mentions the Śūrṣṭamānasūtra, 2ßß; see also Saddharmasūrti in Lévi, Rāmāyana, 47.


Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 868a6. There are five small islands around the intermediate continents, inhabited by men, or by amanuyas, or deserted... In the beginning men spoke ārya; later, after they had eaten and drunk, men differed and, through the increase of treachery (śāthya), there were many languages; there are also men who do not know how to speak...

Beal, Catena, 35, gives numerous details on the four great and the eight small continents, according to the Dīgha, Sarṇghaḥhadra (Nyāyānasūtra), etc. According to Sarṇghaḥhadra, Deha, Videha, Kuru and Kaurava will be deserted.


391. For the Gandhamadāna mountains, etc., see Hopkins, Epic Mythology, 9.

392. The Lōtsava, Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate kūḍrī = 黑山|| “black mountain.” Paramārtha adds a gloss: “They are called ‘ant-mountains’ because they are low” (T. 29, p.215b10); the Vyākhyā glosses kūḍracāvakāyāḥ by kūḍrācārināṁ parvatānāṁ navakātāḥ.

393. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 22a2. The Jñānaprasthāna says that there are five great rivers in Jambudvīpa: Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Sarayu (Sarabhū), Aciravati, Mahi [this is the list of the Pāli Canon]. When the Bhadanta Kātyāyani putra established this Śāstra, he was in the East; this is why he quotes, as an example, the rivers that Easterners know and see. But, in fact, there are in Jambudvīpa four great rivers which each gives forth four secondary rivers. [The rest of this text, on the four great and the sixteen small rivers, is translated and commented on by S. Lévi, Pour l’histoire du Rāmāyana, p. 150-152].

On the rivers of the Pāli Canon and of Milinda, Rhys Davids, Milinda, i. p. xlv, and above all Demiéville, Milinda, 230 (BEPEO, 1924).
On the Vaksu or Vahksu, and Caksus and Sucaksus of the Buddhist and Brahmanical sources, see Levi, loc. cit., Mahāvyutpatti, 167.80, Eitel, 194, Hopkins, Sacred Rivers of India, 214, Watters, i.293; JAs. 1914, ii.409; V. Smith, 262. We owe the identification of Vaksu = Oxus to Rémusat.

On the Sīta, Levi, ibid p. 139 (= Tarim); Minayev, Grammairae palie, p. ix, quotes Ctesias in Pliny, xxxi.2 on the Side:... stagnum in Indiâ in quo nihil innatet omnia mergantur. (The river of Yarkand or the Sirikol).

"To the north of the Sīta, Scripture is written in the language of the land of Campaka, in the languages of the land of the monkeys, in the language of the land called Gold." (Mel. As. ii.177).

394. Paramārtha here adds two lines. According to Paramārtha: "On the south bank of this lake, a mountain 25 yojanas in height; on the north bank, a mountain 15 yojanas in height; both are of various minerals. To the north of Gandhamadana mountain, at its summit, there is a cave called Nanda, decorated with the seven jewels, 50 yojanas in length and width, the abode of the king of the elephants. Beyond, there are six kingdoms, seven forests, and seven rivers. Beyond the seventh river, there are two forests in the shape of a half-moon. To the north of these forests, there is the Jambu tree to a height of 100 yojanas ..."

395. Let us mention the Bibliography of Kern, Manual, 58; L. Feer, "Enfer Indien," JAs. 1892 and 1893; B. C. Law, Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective, Calcutta, 1925 (Paññ sources); Gogerly, Ceylon Buddhism, 1908, vol. 2; Kāraṇḍavyūha, edited by S. B. Samasrami, Calcutta, 1873; the Friendly Letter, Wenzel, JPTS, 1886; Saddharmasūtrāpasthāna, fragments in the Śīkṣāsūmuccaya and S. Leśi, Rāmāyaṇa. We owe a very interesting essay to J. Przyluski, and the first, on the story of Buddhist hell, in Légende d'Aṣoka, 1924.

396. See note 369: there are 84,000 yojanas between the sphere of gold and the surface of Jambudvīpa.

Avīci and avici, Bodhicaryāvatāra, vi.120, vii.107, Rāṣṭrapālapariprcchā, 30.

Geography of Avici, Saddharmasūtrī, in Śīkṣāsūmuccaya, 70.

397. The expression avici maṁśe in the description of an overcrowded country, Anguttara, i.159, Diśha, iii.75. Terrible Avīci with its four doors, Itiivuttaka, 86 and Cullavagga, vii.4,8. As the lower limit of Kāmadhātu, Dhammasamāṇīgani, 1281. Avīci is not named in Suttanipata p. 121, Samīyutta, i.154 (Notes of Rhys Davids, Dialogues, iii. p. 73).

Avīcīsanantaṭisāhibatam, in an uninterrupted series (explanation of saṭā), Mahāniddesa, 18, 347. Avīci a synonym of jara in Visuddhimagga 449 (Rhys Davids-Stede).

398. This second explanation has passed to Mahēśvara in the Amaṭakośa: na vidyate viciḥ sukham yatra. We have two Tibetan equivalents mthsams-med = "without interval" [Eitel understands that the damned die there and are reborn there incessantly] and mnar-med = "without tortures", as a euphemism, says Wenzel, JPTS, 1886, 23; but mnar-med = "without pleasure."

399. ity eke aṣṭau nirayā ākhyatā duratikramāḥ / ākhyatā maṅgalakāraṇaḥ pratyekam śodātosadāḥ // catuḥskandhabhāti catuḥprakāraḥ ityarthah / catuḥsaṁnivesāḥ ity aparā //

Dīrga, TD 1, p. 127a4, Ekottara, TD 2, p. 747c12, Samīyukta, TD 2, p. 341a25. I have quoted in extenso in Cosmologie bouddhique the parallel passages: 1. Anguttara, i.141, Majjhima, iii.182, Petavatthu, 21.65, Kathāvatthu, xx.3; 2. Jātaka, v.266; 3. Mahāvastu, i.9 and iii.454; 4. Lokaprajñāpti (Mdo, 89b and 104b, Śutra and glosses).

a. Reading given in the Vyākhyā: catuḥskandhāti catuḥprakāraḥ ity arthaḥ / catuḥsaṁnivesāḥ ity aṣṭau.

Elsewhere catubkarpāḥ (Mahāvastu), catukkapāṇā (Jātaka).

Elsewhere catubbhāgāḥ according to the version cha bzbi (Lokaprajñāpti), with the commentary: four parts, east, south, etc. This is the version of Senart: "They are in four parts; they have four doors ..."; this is the interpretation of the Chinese translators: "four faces and four
doors”.
Version of the Bhdsya rtsig pa = wall, masonry.
b. Reading of all the sources. Senart: “They are isolated and limited, each having a definite
place.” I translate the commentary of the Lokaprajñāpti.
c. Ayahprākārāparikṣiptā ity arthāḥ (Vyākhyā).
d. Ayasoparistac chāditāḥ / ayasā pūthanadvāra ity apare (Vyākhyā).Senart: “having a canopy of
fire.”
e. Sphuṭā iti vyāptāḥ (Vyākhyā).
Dpaṅ thṣad bṛgya bṛgṛau mar yau / me lce rmans ni mrkbd par gnas (Lokaprajñāpti); dpag
thṣad bṛgṛa bṛgṛau mar ni / me lce dag gis khyab par gnas (Version of the Bhāṣya).
According to the commentary on the Lokaprajñāpti, this refers to Avīci, which gives the
reading: ... tisthaṃ sphuṭaḥ.
In the Pāli editions, this refers to the ground: samantā yojanasaratā phṛtā (var. pharitvā)
tisthaṃ sabbadda.
J. Przyluski discovered in Divya, p. 375, a fragment of the Bālapanditasūtra, where there is
described “the ground formed of burning fire, having a hot smell, forming only a single flame”
(Burnouf, Introduction, 366) which is the floor of our hells.
400. On the development of hellish cosmology, see Przyluski, Légende d’Aṣoka, 130; see also Feer,
Fragments du Kandjour, 518, Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, iv. 113 (Bibliography).
In the Devadūtasūtra (Anguttara, i.138, Majjhima, iii. 178) the great hell (mabāniraya) has four
gates which lead into four secondary hells, Gūthaniraya, Kukkulāniraya, Simbalivana, Asipat-
travana; all this is surrounded by the river Khārodaka which is, at least once, identified with the
Vaitaraṇī (Jātaka, vi.250, quoted in Przyluski, Aṣoka, 132).
In the thirtieth Sutra of the Dirgha, there are sixteen uṣīdaḥs, which are placed between the two
Cakravādās; the same in the Kanālasūtra (Przyluski, Aṣoka, 135, 136).
According to Vasubandhu, there are sixteen uṣīdaḥs, counting the River (Vaitaraṇī) as an,uṣīdaḥ,
and by making one uṣīdaḥ out of the forests, etc.
In Jātaka, i.174: attha pana mabāniraye sodasa uṣīdaniraye; ibid. ii.3, there is a village
pākara-parikṣhita catudvāra nagaḥ which is an uṣīdaniraya, a place where many of the damned
suffer.
401. The kukula is the kukkula of the Mahāvastu, i.44 = iii.455; Paramārtha: “Burning ashes.”
Compare Śīksāsamuccaya: pādaḥ praviliyate / uṭkṣiptah punaḥ saṁbhavati. TD 32, number 1644
describes a journey to Kukulā.
402. Kuṇapa (Mahāvastu, ibid.) corresponds to the gūthaniraya of the Devadūtasūtra which is
related to the gūthakāpa of Sahitya, ii.259, Petavatthu, 64. The animals with sharp mouths
(nyaṅkuṭa nāma pṛṇati, Mahāvyutpatti, 215.20 or nyaṅkuṭa, “torso”) are the sūcimukha pāṇa;
compare Sahitya, ii.258; Saddharmasmṛti in Śīksāsamuccaya, 69-76.
403. The kṣuramārga is absent in the Mahāvastu; it is described in Kāraṇḍavyūha, 38.
404. In Devadūta, the asipattravana follows simbalivana. Compare Mahāvyutpatti, 215.
405. The simbalivana of the Devadūta; its thorns have eight fingers in the Dvāvimśatavādāna (ed.
R. Turner).
406. On the Vaitaraṇī (= khārodaka nadi), Lévi, Rāmāyaṇa, 152, Hopkins, Sacred Rivers, 222. The
rab-med “Without a ford” of the friendly letter, JPTS., 1886, 21.
407. Paramārtha, yuān _Def. = additions, excrescences.
Senart, Mahāvastu, i.372; Sp. Hardy, Manual, 27 (osupat);
Śīksāsamuccaya, 56.6, 248.5.
Vyākhyā: adhikayānaṁstabhāvatvād uṣīdāḥ / narakesu . . . / narākavarodhād uṛdbvam esu
kukulādise sidamty ats ta uṣīdāḥ ity aparāḥ.
Ut signifies adhika or uṛdbvā.
Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 866b4 explains why the annexes to hell are called uṣīdā; three reasons
according to P’u-kuang (p. 187a3), two according to Fa-pao (p. 616a15): because its suffering is very
strong, quite varied, supplementary. Sojourn in the utsadas lasts 10,000 years; it is indefinite or infinite in the hells properly so-called (Majjhima, i.335).

In Petavatthu, p. 46, there is a sattussada niraya (mentioned by Rhys Davids-Stede) which is explained, in Diţba, i.87, as “full of beings.”

408. Beal, Catena, 65, says that the damned pass from Avici to the cold hells, and from there to the dark hells, etc.

409. Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 866b12. This is the controversy of Kathavatthi, xx.3. The Andhakas deny the existence of beings called nirayapāla basing themselves on a text (not identified): “This is not Vessabhu, nor the king of the Petas . . . it is their own actions which torment the damned.” Vasubandhu, in the Vijñaptimāramvinīśaka, stanza 4 (translated in Musdon, 1912, 53-90; the Tibetan, edited and translated by S. Lévi, 1926), demonstrates the non-existence of the guardians of the hells, of the dogs, of the crows, of the walls of steel, etc. Sæki quotes a commentary of the Viṁśāsaka: “Or rather it is believed that the guardians of the hells are real beings: an opinion of the Mahāsāṅghikas and of the Śārmīttiyas; or rather it is believed that they are not real beings, but certain kinds of bhūta and bhautika created through action: opinion of the Sarvāstivādins etc; or rather it is believed that, even though they are not beings, yet, being produced by the viśanā (the trace of actions and thoughts), they are not simple modifications of the mind: opinion of the Sautrāntikas.”

Compare the women created by action, Śīkasamuccaya, 69-76.

410. Vivartanāyuvat. In this same way, at creation, the winds move (ceṣṭante) in order to create the receptacle world. The self-styled “guardians of the hells” are only bhūta and bhautika, asattvākhyā, “non-living beings,” i.10b.

411. Dhmārasubhūti has been quoted above, iii.13a. We have here a śloka which ends: [jāyante] yamaraṅkṣasāḥ. Perhaps an excerpt from the Dāṭakūlakaṃpatthanamāndita (Lévi, JAS., 1925, i.37). Hsüan-tsang translates: fa-shan-bsien 法善現 Paramartha transcribes bhuv pu部 or bow 呃. On this master, and the masters with analogous names (Subhūtigboṣa), F. W. Thomas, Album Kern, 407, and S. Lévi, Notes Indiennes, JAS., 1925, i.36 (Dbārmika Subhūti, one of the names of Áśvaghosa according to Tāranātha).

412. . . . kṛtāvadhitvat / bhūtaviveśanirựṭter vā. Paramārtha adds: “They do not differ from the other beings who arise in hell; how can they be guardians?”

Nāgasena, p. 67, explains why the damned in general are not destroyed by the fire.

413. J. Przyluski, Āpoka, 135, observes that there are ten cold hells in the 30th Sūtra of the Diţga (placed between the Cakravāḍas), in Samyutta, i.152 (Feer, JAS, 1892, ii.213), Āṅguttara, v.172, Suttanipāta (Kokāliyasutta): abbuda nirabbuda, ababa, āṭaṭa, ababa (or ababa, āṭaṭa), kamuda, sogandhiṣa, uppa (or uppalaka), puṇḍarika, paduma. With the eight great hot hells, eighteen hells, as in the Kunālasūtra (Przyluski, 136). [Feer, JAS, 1892, ii.220: “The names of the cold hells designate simply the number of years of punishment”: see below p. 473]. Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, ii.341: There are hundreds and thousands of Arbudas; the Nirayas are thirty-six in number. Mahāvyutpatti, 215.1-8; Divya, 67, trans. Burnouf, Introduction, 201 [Burnouf mentions the identity of Mahāpadma with the Pen-to-û= Puṇḍarika of the note to the Foe-koue-ki (=Fu-kuei-chi), p. 298-99].

Or rather we distinguish the eight cold hells and the ten hot hells which are placed between the Cakravāḍas or Universes; these, with the numerous small hells, are the lokāntarika hells, Eitel, p. 106-107; Sæki, about this, mentions the Li-shib lun 立世論, TD 32, the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, TD 17, p. 103b19 and the Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 866b3.


414. Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 866a15. Here a difficult person objects: “It is said that Jambudvipa is narrower at the top, and larger at the bottom; and that the other continents present the opposite
appearance: is this reasonable?"

415. *Vibhaṅga*, ibidem. Below Jambudvīpa, the great hells; at the surface of Jambudvīpa, the "border" (pien 邊) hells (Compare Beal, *Catena*, 65) and the *prādeśika* (ku 孤) hells: in valleys, mountains, etc. In the other *dvīpas* the great hells are lacking because there the great crimes are not committed. According to some, all the hells are lacking in Uttarakuṇa. The damned are of human form; they first speak in Aryan languages; then, crushed by their sufferings, they no longer pronounce one single intelligible word.


Another name for this is *pratyekanaraka*, *paccekaniraya* (Comm. on the *Suttanipāta* and *Petavatthu*); such as the hells which Sarīgharaksita visits, *Divyā*, 335, 336, *Introduction*, 320 ("some hells which are renewed each day" says Burnouf according to the Tibetan *ni-thse*, and according to the description itself). Burnouf quotes Des Hautesravas: "hells dispersed over the surface of the earth, on the rivers and in isolated places" (which corresponds to the *Vibhaṅga* trans. by Beal, 57, on the "solitary hells").

We recall that one of the names of the *mahāniraya* of *Majjhima*, i.337, is *paccattavedaniya*.

The *pratyekanaraka* of the *Sīkṣāsamuccaya*, 136, is an imitation of a monastery; the damned-pretas of *Sāriyutta*, ii.254 are the "individual" damned; the same for the heroes of the *Maitrakanya*.

The Bodhisattva who should go to Avīci goes into a *pratyekanaraka* (*Mahāvastu*, i.103): "a urinal hell" says Barth, *J. des Savants*, quoted in part, p. 23; but, ii.350, there is fire in this type of hell).

416. *Vibhaṅga*, *TD* 27, p. 690c15, mentions the opinion that the animals which live among humans are not beings, *sattvas*: they resemble animals, give milk, etc. We see that the "disappearance of the animals" at the end of the world is accomplished in two steps, the animals which live with humans disappearing after the others and at the same time as humans (iii.90a).

417. The city of Yama is 86,000 *yojanas*, Hopkins, *JAOS*, xxxiii.149.


Details on the Pretas, *Kośa*, iii.9d, 83c.

418. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang differ. The sun is set into motion by five winds, Beal, *Catena*, p. 68.

419. In *Visuddhimagga*, 417-418 (Warren, 324; Spence Hardy, *Legends*, 233), the moon is 49 and the sun 50 *yojanas* in width.

420. Absent in the Tibetan version.

421. It appears difficult to otherwise understand the Lotsava: *ni me hi gshal med khaṇ 'og gi phyi rol ni me sel kyi dkyil 'khor ... miön par 'grub bo*. Paramārtha: sun disk lower face outer limit 日輪下面外邊 ... The houses, *vimāna*, are distinct from the disk; on the dimensions of the houses, mansions, Beal, *Catena*, 68.

422. *Taijasa cakra* is explained *sūryakāntātmaḥ* "made of the sūryakānta gem."

423. Hsüan-tsang adds: "By how much is the augmentation? By a *lava.*" The *lava* is the thirtieth of a *mahārta* which is a thirtieth part of the day, or four minutes, *Vibhaṅga*, *TD* 27, p. 701c9. The *Māsaparikṣā* Chapter of the *Śāradākāraṇa* is omitted in the Cowell-Neil edition (see *Divya*
Appendix).

The Lokaprajñāpti indicates the maximum of a day and a night; in agreement with the Sārdalakarṇa, Divya, 642: bhamantānāṁ dvitīye māse robhinyāṁ anāmyāṁ dvādaśamuhārto divaso...; common figures, as we see in Thibaut, p. 26, Barnett, Antiquités of India, 196: the duration of the day is a maximum of 15 hours, a minimum of 9 hours.

This contradicts the dates of the equinox in 61c-62.

424. Vyākhyā: aparaparāśve chāyapatantī vikalamantālam darśayati / tadyathā stambhe pradib-

pachāyapatantī yathā yathā stamba ahana bhavati tathā tathā stambhaḥ svacchāyayā chāyate /
dāre hi vartamāne praśpe pariśrastambho dṛṣṭyate / kīṁ cād āsanne kīṁ cāt kṣyate / yāvad atyāsanne stambho naśṭarūpo vartate / tadvad etat.

Paramārtha: Consequently, the shade of the sun covers the other parts of the moon.

Hsüan-tsang: The other sides (west and east) produce a shade which covers the disk of the moon (east and west).


Paramārtha: Such is the manner of the progress of the sun and of the moon that sometimes one sees them complete, sometimes by half. Hsüan-tsang: The progress of the sun and the moon are not similar; one sees them as complete or partial.

The phases of the moon are explained in TD 1, number 24, Beal, 69: 1. on account of its revolution, by which the hind parts are exhibited; 2. the blue-clad devas, perpetually intervening between the earth and the moon, cause the disc of the latter to be obscured; 3. because the bright rays of the sun (sixty bright rays) obscure the disc of the moon... the moon is so near the sun that its brightness is obscured... 4.

Beal also quotes TD 32, number 1644: “The subject of the 19th Chapter is the motion of the sun and moon” (Nanjio 1297).

426. Cāturmabārājakāyika is explained: cāturmārājānāṁ kāyāḥ / tatra bhavāḥ cāturmabārā-

jakāyikāḥ = which forms part of the company of the Four Great Kings.

427. According to the Lokaprajñāpti (Cosmologie, Appendix, p. 301), there, between the city of the Asuras and that of the Suras (or Thirty-three), there are “five gardens of the Thirty-three, the Udašakṣīrita Nāgas, the Karotapaśīs, etc.” Divya, 218, Jātaka, i.204.

Parīṣāṇḍā, Tib. ban-rim, Paramārtha: stage (ts'eng[層]) , Hsüan-tsang: stage-series (ts'eng-

chi[層級]) . Divya, 212.8 (the Sumeruparikbhaṇḍa, incorrect reading); 217.17, 344.12 (Sumeru-

parīṣāṇḍā, which differs from the dwellings of the Karotapaśīs, etc, and is not one of our parīṣāṇḍās). Mahāvyuttāpti, 194.21, sumeruparīṣāṇḍa, 245.358, parīṣāṇḍa.

28. We do not see how the parīṣāṇḍās “depart” (ṣirgata, ‘phags, chu 出), from out of the side of Meru.

If we admit that the parīṣāṇḍās are recessed terraces, placed all around the circumference of Meru, one can then understand the theory that attributes to the summit of the mountain sides of 20,000 yojanas in height, not of 80,000 yojanas.[Above the first terrace the side is 80,000 less 32,000: diminishing then 16, 8, 4, there then remains a prism of 20,000 yojanas on a side.] Great variety in the designs which represent Meru, Alphabetum tibetanum, 473; Beal, Catena, 75; Eitel, Handbook, 164, etc.

428. See Burnouf, 600, Divya, 218, Mahāvastu, i.30 and 394; Morris, JPTS, 1893, 21 (karoti).

430. Sadamatta is the name of one of the “particular paradises” of Maitrakanyaka.

431. Dhṛtarāṣṭra in the East, Virūḍhaka in the South, Virūḍpāśa in the West, and Vaiśrāvaṇa in the North.

432. The gods which are the company of the Thirty-three Gods, Sakra, etc Vibbhaṅga, TD 27, p. 691c20, which Vasubandhu follows faithfully. Divya, 219; Mahāvastu, i.31; Lokaprajñāpti, fol.
28a-48b, Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 301-306; Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna in Lévi, Rāmāyāṇa, 44-47 (the Chinese names of the parks do not agree with our versions of the Kṣā).

433. In the Vibbhaṇa, the first opinion is that the sides are 20,000 yojanas in height; the second, that they are 24,000. Vākhyā: How does one reconcile the theory of sides of 20,000 with the thesis that the mountains are as high as they are wide? These masters think that this thesis refers to the central section of the mountain (mahābhāgām evābhisamikṣya evam uktam). See above note 428.

434. On Sudarśana, Divya, 220; Commentary on the Dhammapada, 30 (p. 319 of Burlingame’s Buddhist Legends.)

435. Hsiian-tsang: Its walls of gold are one yojana and a half in height.

436. On the four parks, see Mahāvyutpatti, 196.1-4; Divya, 194-195 (regrets of a dying god), Mahāvastu, i.32. The four parks of the Jainas, SBE, 45, p. 288.

437. Caturūṣāṁ is explained: caturasro diśotyeti caturūṣāṁ kriyāviśeṣaṇam. According to Bhaguri, we have the two forms diś and diṭa (Vākhyā).

438. The subbhūmi of the stanza is explained: sōbhānā bhūmaya eṣāṁ iti subhūmāni kriyāsthānāni.

439. Pārijātaka (Divya, 219, etc.) is the Pāricchattaka of the Jātaka, i.202, Atthasālinī, 298, Visuddhimagga, 206 (opinion of the Poranās).

440. Paramārtha and Hsiian-tsang, five yojanas.


443. On the Sudharmā, see Divya, 220, Anūttara, i.226; Vibbhaṇa, TD 27, p. 692a20: The gods come together on the eighth, the fourteenth and the fifteenth day of each fortnight; they examine the gods and men, govern the Asuras, etc . . . The same, TD 1, number 24. Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.26. J. Przyluski, JAs. ii.157, on Dīgha, ii.207, Mahāvastu, iii.198.

444. The vimāṇas are either immense plate-shaped, or individual, mansions, p., iii.101c.

445. The bhaumas and āntarikṣavāsins (?) of Mahāvyutpatti, 156, etc. Vasubandhu is not speaking here of the Asuras (see iii.4) which the Lokaprajñāpti discusses (trans. in Cosmologie bouddhique); he also ignores Māra (on which Beal, Catena, 93; Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.125 = the King of the Paranjitavāsavartins; Huber, Sātrālanikāra, 110) and Mahēśvara (Beal, 94).

446. Pāli: khīddāpadosika.

447. Lokaprajñāpti, Chap. VI (Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 300): “As, in Jambu, there is abrahmacarya, maithunadharma, dvandvasamāpatti, so too in the other continents and among the gods up to the Thirty-three Gods; among the Yāmas, appeasement of desire (paridāha, gduṇ ba) for embracing . . .”

Lokaprajñāpti, ibid.: “As, in Jambu, the women have their month, are pregnant, give birth, so too in the other continents. Among the Caturmahārajājāyikas, the infant appears on the bosom or the shoulder of the god or the goddess . . .”

448. Vākhyā: “As long as there lasts mating, embracing, contact of the hands, smiling, looking, so long will there last mating for the gods inhabiting this earth” (Four Kings and the Thirty-three), the Yāmas, etc.

Vibbhāṇa, TD 27, p. 585b12 . . . Some say that as the higher gods approach detachment from desire (vairāgya), the fire of desire becomes weaker; but, in any union (maithuna), one must mate (dvandvasamāpatti) in order to appease the fire of desire.
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449. See above p. 391.

450. That is to say, adds Hsüan-tsang, they speak as they do in Central India, "middle in-tu" 中印。 Beal, Catena, 91.

451. Samgitiaparâya, TD 26, p. 386 a 27; Vibhâša, TD 27, p. 870 a 28; Dīgha, iii. 218; Itivuttaka, 94.

452. Rhys Davids-Steede translate: "having power under the control of another".

In Dīgha, i.216, there is a god Sarântusita, King of the Tusitas, a Sunimitra, King of the Nimmânaratis, and a Vasavatti, King of the Paranirmitavasavattis; above, Mahâbrahma, King of the Brahmâyâlikas.

Sumangalavilâsini, i.121, Mândhâtar possesses the human kâmâgûnas, the Parinirmitas possess divine kâmâgûnas.

453. See ii. 45, p. 237.

On the sukha of the dhyânas, viii. 9.

Dīgha, iii. 218, differs, at any rate, in the redaction.

454. Sukha is absent there, for the sensation of dhyânamârtha is the sensation of indifference, equanimity, viii. 23; thus this is not "an arising of pleasure." This dhyâna is the retribution of a good action, it resembles sukha (sukkalpa), thus it is "an arising of pleasure." But then the Fourth Dhyâna will also be "an arising of pleasure?" No, because sukha is absent there. Consequently this point is to be examined (vicāyam, sampradāyam).

455. Other methods of calculation in Beal, Catena 82. [Excerpt from the Vibhâśa, with numbers very different from those that we have here: ten thousand yojanas between the residences; same doctrine in the In-pen Sûtra; in the Abhidharma; "one year for the falling of a rock of one hundred cubits thrown from the world of Brahmâ; 65,535 years for the falling of a mountain thrown from Akañña"; in the Jñânaprabhâsana; "18,383 years for the falling of a rock of ten cubits thrown from the first stage of Rûpadhâtu."]

The same, Miûnda, 82, a rock takes four months to fall from Brahmaloka falling at a rate of 84,000 yojanas a day.

Sûtrâlamkâra, Huber, 127, the heaven of Trayastrîniyâs is 3,000,336 lîs.


457. The Mahâvyutpatti, 161.5-6., mentions two forms, the Akiññâs gods and Aghanîsthas gods. It appears that Aghanîstha is the reading of the MSS of the Bodhisattvabhûmi, see Wogihara. On agha, Koça, i.28a, trans. p. 89; and the references of Rhys Davids and Steede.

Rhys Davids and Steede, s. voc. kâniṣṭha, mention "aâkiññâ in aâkiññabhûbavana, Jâtaka, iii.487, Commentary on the Dhammapada, passim, aâkiññâbagâmin, Samyutta, v.237, etc." We could quote Vibhanga, 425 (aâkiññâdeva); Dhammasaṅgani, 1283 (limit of Rûpadhâtu), Dīgha, ii.52, iii. 237, etc.

458. But the Cûrûmahârâjakâyâikas are of the same bhûmi as the Trayastrîniyâs; they can thus, without difficulty, go to them.

459. The Four Kings and the Thirty-three Gods are of the same bhûmi (for both inhabit Meru); the four other classes of higher gods of Kâmâdhûtû, Yâmas, etc., occupy distinct bhûmis; Rûpadhâtu embraces Four Dhyânas which are also bhûmis.

A god arisen in the First Dhyâna does not see a god arisen in the Second Dhyâna.

460. This is simply an example; we can also read: "As sound is not understood ..."

461. The Mahâsârîghikas whom Sarânghabhadra refutes.

462. See iii.101c.

463. Âṅguttara, i.227, Culleniddesa, 235.2b (sabassî cûlanikâ lokadhâtu); Dīgha, TD 1, p. 114b20, c7, quoted by Beal, Catena, 102, who quotes many Sûtras. The term "chiliocosm" was invented by
Rémusat.

Mahāvyutpatti, 153 and 15.15. In the Mahāvyutpatti, it appears that sāhasracūḍika forms only one word; by this fact, a lokadhātu, a universe, is called sāhasra because it is composed of one thousand four-continent universes, (cāturdvipa lokadhātu), and cūḍika because it is the cūḍā (cūḍābhūtatvāt) of a great universe. [Without doubt we have here ksūla, ksudra = cūla, cūla].

464. This point will be elucidated iii93a-b (Vyākhyā). Rather: "Creation and destruction [of the universes of one group] take place at the same time."

Vivarta is explained as vividhavartana or rather vividhd vartante'smēṁ itī. Samvarta = samvartana, or rather samvartante'smīṁ itī: this is the period when beings "come together" (samvartante = samgacchanti) in the higher dhāyas; see below, note 493.

465. There is an Anysparuyantasūtra, Csoma-Feer, p. 278, Mdo, 26, 217.

466. Vibhaṅga, 422: manussānam kītakam āyuppamānam / vassasatam appam vā bhīyyo vā. According to the canonical formula: yo ciram jīvati so vassasatam...

467. This is based on a Sūtra very close to Āṅguttara, iv.256-7 (eulogy of the Upasatīha), Vibhaṅga, 422. Lokaprajñāpātī in Cosmologie, 301.

468. The year of 360 days and the year of the "middlere Periode" (=the middle period) of Thibaut, Astronomie, 1899, p. 28. Below iii.90.

469. Very close to the source of Vasubandhu, Divya, 279: kathāṁ rātrir jñāyate divaso vā / devavasāpānāṁ samikocavikāsāṁ maṁmāṁ āvulanāvulanāc chakunānām ca kujānākujānāt.

470. Doctrine of the Kośa in Beal, Catena, 83.

Āṅguttara, i.267: life of 20,000, 40,000, 60,000 kappas for the gods of the first three Ārūpyas; the Fourth Ārūpya is ignored.

Vibhaṅga, 424; Brahmapārisajyajasa, life of 1/3 of a καττα (or ¼); Brahmapuruhita, ½; Mahābrahmas, 1; Parittābhas, 2; Appamāṇābhas, 4 . . . We have 64 kappas for the Subhakinhas, higher gods of the Third Dhyāna. For the Fourth Dhyāna, six divisions, namely the Asānāhāsattas with the Vehappalas, 500 kappas, and the five types of Śuddhavāsikas, 1,000, 2,000, 4,000, 8,000 and 16,000 kappas (Akanitthas). The Ārūyas, as in the Kośa.

Buddhaghosa interprets the formula: "The duration of the life of the Brahmakāyikas is a καττα," in the sense of "part of a καττα", Kathavatthu, commentary to xi.5.

471. The Pāli sources (Itivuttaka, p. 11, Āṅguttara, etc.) are quoted iv.99c, note 449.

472. The Vyākhyā quotes the Sūtra.

This list is quoted in the Lokaprajñāpāti (with Tejasvin in place of Manasvin) iii.1, Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 298. M. W. De Visser has assured us that it does not figure in the Dirgha (16 Nagas who escape from Garuḍa), in Saddharmapundarīka (eight: Nanda, Upananda, Sāgara .. Manasvin . . .).

The Sūtra quoted by Beal, Catena, 419; Mahāvyutpatti, 167.14, 51, 66, 58, 44. Mucilinda, Mahāvagga, i.3. There is no Pāli reference to the Nāgas who, like Śeṣa, hold up the earth. Above, p. 382 .

473. Suttanipāta, p. 126, Samyutta, i.152, Āṅguttara, v.173: seyyathāpi bhīkku viśatikābāriko kosalako tilavāho / tato puriso vassasatassā vassasatassā accayena. . . Suttanipāta, 677, says that the "learned" have calculated the vābas of sesame for Paduma hell, and that they have a figure of 512,000,000,000 (Fausboll).

474. According to the Lottava; in Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, as in the Pāli sources, viṁsatikābārika.

Tibetan, rdzas = vāba; khal = khāri; on the dimensions of vāba, Burnett, Antiquities, 208, Ganitasarasamgraha (Madras, 1912), 5. On the other hand, tilavāha = tilasakāta, thus "cart-load" (Rhys Davids and Stede).
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475. Full all the way to the top = cūḍikābaddha (āvabaddha, Mahāvyutpatti, 244.92).


477. Persons in Uttarakuru are free from premature death because they do not say, “This is mine” (Lokaprajñāpti).


479. Jmoddāṭa, jmādāta, see ii. trans. p. 236 and notes.

480. Beings who have entered into the absorptions of nirodha, of unconsciousness, of maitri, etc., do not die before they have left these absorptions.

481. The paramāṇu as distinct from the anu, “atom”, see ii.22. On name, nāma, ii.47. On time, kāla, adbhuta, iv.27a.

482. Bhojarāja ad Yogasūtra, iii.52: kṣaṇa is the smallest division of time, which cannot be further reduced in quantity. Saddārśana, p. 28.

483. These two definitions belong to the Sautrāntikas. We have seen ii.46a, trans. p. 245, a Vaibhāṣīka definition: kāryaparīsamāṃti kālaksana eṣa naḥ kṣaṇab. We should note the remark of the Atthāvatūlī, p. 60 at the bottom, that sixteen thoughts arise and perish during the time that a rūpa

The second definition recalls that which the Jains [Tattvārthādbhigam, iv.15 (see S. C. Vidyābhūṣan, Jfs. 1910, i.161) trans. of Jacobi, Journal of the Germany Oriental Society, vol 40, 1906] give of samaya (which is their kṣaṇa): paramasūryakṣamakriyasya sarvajagāmyatiparīṇatasāya paramānābh svāvagābānaksatrayatikramakālab samaya iti. According to Jacobi, “die Zeit, die ein Atom in langsamer Bewegung bebraucht, um sich um seine eigene Körperlänge weiterzubewegen.” One needs an “incalculable” (asamkhyeya) number of samayas in order to make one āvalī; a “calculable” (samkhyeya) number of these in order to make one prāṇa (7 prāṇas = 1 stoka, 7 stokas = 1 lava; 38½ lavas = nālikā [=ghați], 2 nālikās = 1 mukhānta).

Compare Ganitasārasaṅgraha, i.32 (a mathematical treatise of Mahāvīrācārya, published and translated by M. Rangacarya, Madras, 1912).

484. Quoted in Madhyamakavṛtti, 547: balavatpuruṣaḥ attamārṣṭena pañcaśaṣṭiḥ kṣaṇā atikramanti śaḥ pāñhat. Mahāvyutpatti, 253.10, acchaṭāsamghātamāra; Divya, 142; Pali, accahārā.

The Viṣṇu, TD 27, p. 701b2, has five opinions on the kṣaṇa. (The first four assign it a duration more and more reduced: Vasubandhu quotes here the second (Note of Saeki). The fifth is the best (but Saeki does not reproduce it): the first four solely indicate the duration of the kṣaṇa in a general manner; the Bhagavat did not tell the true duration of a kṣaṇa . . . because no one is capable of understanding it.) The Samyuktahrdaya (?), TD 28, p. 886c11, is interesting.

485. This is the series in Mahāvyutpatti, 251 (with vātāyanacchidrarajas and yūka = likṣodbhava). Dhāranis = danda; hasta - the purusāhasta of the Abhidharma according to which the stature of the inhabitants of the Dvīpas is calculated.

The series of Sārdālakarna (Divya, 645, where the text is altered) differs in certain details.

In Lalita, 149 (rgha chera rol pa, 142), truti is placed between anus and vātāyanarajas; yūka is replaced by sarṣaṇa. Other Buddhist sources, Lokaprajñāpti, fol. 12a (Cosmology, p. 262); Watters, i.141 (Viṣṇu, TD 27, p. 701b2); Saddharmasūryī, Lévi, Rāmāyaṇa, 153; Kalpadruma (Calcutta, 1908), 9. Ganitasārasaṅgraha, 3; Varāhamihira (in Alberuni, i.162); Fleet, JRAS, 1912, 229, 1913, 153; Hopkins, JAOS. 33.150; Barnett, Antiquities, 208.

Likkā in the Pali commentaries = 36 rattarenus, 1/7 āvakāśa.
486. Same omission in the Hsi-yü-chi, ii.

487. Eitel (p. 98) observes that a cemetery ascetic should not approach a village closer than the limit of a krofa.

488. According to Lokaprajñāpīti, fol. 55b, Cosmologie, 309; figures reproduced in the Hsi-yü-chi, ii. (Watters, i.143, Julien, i.61, Beal, i.71; vāsāṇa, error for tatksāṇa, in numerical Dictionary quoted by Chavannes, Religious Eminents, 152). Source of the Mabhyutpatti, 253, differs.

In Divya, 643-644, the order ksāṇa and tatksāṇa is reversed.

On ksāṇa above p. 474.

Tatksāṇa defined in Divya: tadyathā sṛtwā nātiśṛṅghamātubravvakartinyāḥ vātrādyāma evamārthvas tatksāṇaḥ; Saeki quotes the Prajñāpīti: "When a women of medium age is about to spin, the stroke, the movement of a thread neither long nor short, its duration is the tatksāṇa." That is to say: the normal time that it takes the thread to touch the finger is the tatksāṇa. [According to a note of P. Louis van Hée].

489. In Scripture (pravacana), there are three seasons (ṛtu) and not six as in the world. Śīra is cold and is thus hemanta; vasanta is hot and is thus grīṣma, sarad is rainy and is thus varṣās (Vyākhyā). [Three seasons in the Kāhyāvār, Alberuni, i. 357]. For all the Buddhās, hemanta is the first season (Vyākhyā). (Burnouf, Introduction, 569). On the Buddhist seasons, I-tsun, Takakusu, 101, 219, 220, Hsi-yü-chi, chap. ii, Watters, i.144. Thibaut, Astronomie . . ., p. 11.

490. The "learned" are the Buddhists who, in the fourteenth and fifteenth fortnight of each of the three seasons omit a day which is called ānārātra or ksαyā (Thibaut, Astronomie, 1899, 26, Barnett, Antiquities, 195) and, in this way, hold posaḍha after fourteen days and not after fifteen: cāturaśtaṅkāraḥ bhikṣubhibhiḥ posaḍbah kriyate.

"Worldly" (laukika) computation has months of 30 days. The lunar month has 29 days, 12 hours, and 44 minutes. The ceremony of posaḍha is regulated according to the moon. One must thus omit a day (ānārātra) from the worldly computation every two months. Thus each ecclesiastical season of eight half-months will be 15 days + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 14.

In order to pass from the ecclesiastical (cāndra) year to the worldly year, one adds six days; in order to catch up to the solar year (of 366 days) one adds an intercalary month (adbimbāsa) after two years and seven months (Alberuni, ii.21).

We should study the Mārahgasūtra, TD 21, number 1300, analyzed in Divya 657, part of the Śārdālakarṇa (māṣaparikṣā) omitted by Cowell-Neil.

491. A good study by Fleet, JRAS. 1911, 479, on the kalpas and the yugas. Fleet recalls the formulas of Aśoka: āva kapām, āva samvartakaṇṭā. According to Buddhaghosa, Makkhali admits 62 antarakalpaś instead of 64, Sumanāgala, i.162 (Dīgha, i.54). The kalpas of the Jains, for example, SBE. 22.

The four periods, disappearance, etc., described in 90-93, are "the four asaṅkhṛetya of the [mab]kalpa", Anguttara, ii.142.

492. We customarily translate antarakalpa, antabkalpa, as "intermediate Kalpa", and others, by "der Kalpa der Zwischenzeit" or "Zwischen-Kalpa." (Schmidt, Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen, 304). But Rémusat has correctly seen that "these expressions do not make sense" (Mélanges posthumes, 103, note). The antarakalpas or antabkalpas are, rather, kalpas which are within, inside of greater periods. The translation of Rémusat "petit kalpa" ("small kalpa") is, if not literal, at least useful.

493. We translate saṁvarta, saṁvartanti as "disappearance." Such is indeed the meaning of the word when one speaks of bhājanasamsaṁvartanti, "disappearance of the receptacles," yadā bhājanaṁ saṁvartante vināśyanty arthah = "when the receptacles disappear, that is to say, perish." But in the expressions gatisaṁvartaṁ, etc., saṁvart signifies "to go together, to be found together with." There is saṁvartanti of the realms of rebirth (gātis) when hellish beings, animals, etc., are found to be together (saṁvartante, ekasthābhavante) in one part of the heavenly realm of rebirth; saṁvartanti of beings (sattvā), when beings are found together in a single Dhyāna heaven (Ṛūpadhānā).
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494. Ekottara, TD, p. 736c17; Beal, Catena, 113. Sp. Hardy, Manual, 472, says that, at the end of the kalpa, beings guilty of the five ānantaryas (iv.96) get out of hell, but that "the doubter, the skeptic" (the man in Dīgha, i.55, Samyutta, iii.207) is transported to the hell of another universe (see iv.99c).

495. A being whose actions should be punished by an animal rebirth will be reborn into another universe. Hsüan-tsang: "The animals who live with humans and with the gods disappear at the same time as do these."

On the animals in heaven, Kathāvatthu, xx.4.

Manuṣyasaṅkaraniṇava iti manuṣyasabacaramañśilā gomahīsādayāḥ.

496. He obtains the first dhyāna dharmatāpratilambhi. By dharmatā one should understand "the particular transformation which the good dharmas then undergo" (kusalaṁ dharmanānām tadāniṁ parināma viśeṣaḥ). This point is elucidated viii.38.

497. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 429a19; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 736c20; Mahāparinirvāṇa, TD 12, p. 753c14: Seven suns come out at the same time from behind the mountain Yugandhara; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 690a15: Four opinions, 1. that the suns are hidden behind Yugandhara (?); 2. that one sun divides into seven; 3. that one sun takes on a seven times greater force; 4. that seven suns, at first hidden, then manifest by reason of the actions of beings.


Mesopotamian origin of this theory (?), Carpenter, Studies in the History of Religion, 79.

498. See above p. 376.

499. Below 100c. When the receptacle world is empty, water (abdhūtu) is produced which dissolves, like salt, the receptacle world. This water, which is of Kāmadhatu, "binds" (saṁbadhnāti) a water of the First Dhyāna and the Second Dhyāna. This water, which is thus of three spheres (Kāmadhatu and two Dhyānas) disappears with the receptacle to which it corresponds.

Disappearance through wind: the wind disperses (vikirati, vidhvamsayati) the receptacles of the first three Dhyānas like a pile of dust (pāṁśurāṣṭi).

On that which remains, note 504.

500. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 691b8, quoted by Saeki ad iii.45.

501. According to the rule enunciated below: yat paścat śānvartate tat pāṇvarivivartate.

502. According to other sources, 84,000.

503. According to the Mahāyāna, the 20 kalpas are of augmentation and diminution.

504. It has been explained, i.7, that the skandhas are time.

What does a kalpa consist of? Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 700b23: Some say that it is by its nature rūpāyatana, etc.; the days-and-nights, etc., are totally the arising and the destruction of the skandhas; as a kalpa is made up of days-and-nights, etc., it is of the same nature. But a kalpa is the time of the Three Dhātus: thus it is five or four skandhas. Hui-hui: "kalpa, with respect to Kāmadhātu (and Rūpadhātu), is five skandhas; with respect to Ārūpyadhātu, it is four skandhas. The 'empty' kalpa ('the period when the world stays destroyed') is two skandhas [namely, says the gloss, saṁskāraskandha and rūpaskandha (for 'ākāśa is rūpa)], since the days-and-nights, etc., do not exist separate from the skandhas." A commentary on the Kośa observes that, according to the Mahāyāna, time (kāla) is a vipravayukta saṁskāra.[The 90th saṁskāra of the list of the 100 dharmas, Viyānapīthā, Muséon, 1906, 178-194, R. Kimura, Original and developed doctrines, 1920, p. 55].

505. i. Asāṅkhyeya kalpas, "numberless kalpas" are the time an asāṅkhyeya number (10 to the 59th power) of mahākalpas last.
Footnotes

506. A muktaka Sutra, that is to say a Sutra which does not form part of the Agamas: na caturdhamāntarmedam ity artham. Elsewhere a muktaka Sutra is a non-authentic Sutra.


507. Our list is that of the Mahāvyutpatti, 249 (which, according to Wogihara, is excerpted from the Kośa). The numbers 14 and 15, in the MSS of the Mahāvyutpatti, are prasuta, mahāprasuta, but the Chinese versions give prayuta, mahāprayuta: the Tibetan (rab bkram) gives praya or prayta. For 36, 37, Wogihara corrects samāptam, mahāsamāptam to samāptam, mahāsamāptam.

Our list, as Vasubandhu remarks below p. 480, has 52 terms: “Eight members, in the middle, have been forgotten”: asamkhyeyam asamkhyeyam... see below, note 508.


The Mahāvyutpatti presents four types of calculation 246-249, excerpted from the Buddhāvatamsaka and the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, Skandhavyūha, Lalita, Abhidharma; then “worldly” calculation (from 1 to 100).

The Buddhāvatamsaka, quoted by Rémusat, teaches that “in the higher system, the numbers are multiplied by themselves”: there are ten numbers thus calculated beginning with asamkhyeya: asamkhyeya, asamkhyeya², asamkhyeya⁴... [I think that the Tibetan version (Kandjour, 36, fol. 36) invites us to apply this progression from koṣī (=10,000,000): koṣī, koṣī², koṣī⁴ and thus following up to anabhildpya-anabhildpya-parivartanīdesa which should be the 122nd term of this series].

“Nothing is certainly more unreasonable that all this numerical apparel... and yet one is obliged to admit that the Buddhists have sometimes made use of it, either in order to sustain their imagination in the contemplation of the infinity of time and space, or in order to make this idea nearer to those rude spirits incapable of conceiving of this”. (Rémusat).

The Brahmanical numbers are also very large. The lives of Brahmā, Narayana, Rudra, Iśvara, Sadasiva, Śakti keep increasing. Śakti lives 10,782,449,978,758,523,781,120 plus 27 zeros of kalpas. This life is only one trāyū or second of a day in the life of Śiva, which is represented in kalpas by 37,264,147,126,589,458,187,550,720 plus 30 zeros. Concerning this, Alberuni (i.363) says: “If those dreamers had more assiduously studied arithmetic, they would not have invented such outrageous numbers. God takes care that their trees do not grow into heaven.”
508. Vyākhyā: aṣṭau sīhanāṁ kuśāpi pradeśe pramūṣitavān na pāśhitāni / tenātra dvāpaṅcāsata
sīhanāṁ bhavantī / saṣṭyā ca saṁkhyaśtānair bhavitavām / tānty aṣṭakāṁ svayāṁ kāṁ cin
nāmāṁ kṛtvā pāśhitavyāṁ yena pāṭiḥ saṁkhyaśtānāṁ pariśārṇāṁ bhaveyuh. Same doctrine in
Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 891b10.

For Yaśomitra the number asamkhyā is the sixteenth of the series 1, 10, 100, 1000 . . . We should
place in this list, in an undetermined place, the eight numbers which are lacking, by giving them
some name.

The editor of Mahāvyutpatti, 249, does not understand it thus; he adds, 53-60, apramāṇam,
apameyaṁ . . . anabhisāyam.

Śarad Chandra Das gives our list as coming from the Kośa, 1-52: “Up to this number there are
sanscrit equivalents; from 53 to 60, there are no sanscrit equivalents, the Tibetan having introduced
new names to replace the lost originals.” These new names (which one can translate as maitra,
mahāmaitra, karunā, mahākarunā . . . ) do not have, in fact, any resemblance to 53-60 of the
Mahāvyutpatti.

509. According to Paramārtha. The Lotusav, certainly less clear: de liar na gnas gzhān drug cur
phyin pa de dag tu phyn pa’i bskal pa ni bskal pa grants med pa ces bya’o.

518a18 (Saeki). Altruism of the Bodhisattva, Kośa, iv.lila. That persons of little virtue cannot
believe in the Bodhisattva, vii.34. How the Bodhisattva considers others as his “self,”
Bodhicaryāvātāra, viii.

511. We can thus understand: the excellent desire, for others, of temporal happiness (ābhīyyudayika)
and bliss (sattvavyāsa) (= nirvāṇa, cessation of suffering), and, for himself the cessation of
suffering, that is to say, the quality of Buddha, because he is useful to others.

According to Saeki, the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, 29.18, quotes some stanzas of the Sānyukta
presenting the same doctrine.

Compare the four categories of Dīgha, ii.233, Anguttara, ii.95.

512. Different theory in the Pāli sources, for example Sarasāṅgraha.

Sources are not in agreement on the date of the appearance of the last Buddhas; Vibhāṣā, TD 27,
p. 700c29, Dīrghāgama, etc. (Rémuṣat, Mélanges posthumes, 116; Notes of the Foe kowe ki, 189).

The Dīgha places, in the course of the ninth antarākalpa of our great kalpa, four Buddhas:
Krakucchanda (period when life is 40,000 years long), Kanakamuni (life of 30,000 years), Kāśyapa
(life of 20,000 years), Śākyamuni (life of 100 years) [same figures in Dīgha, ii.3, Aśokavādāna,
Avasānaśataka, etc.]; elsewhere we have 60,000, 40,000, 20,000 and 100.

Others say: No Buddhas during the first five antarākalpas; Krakucchanda in the sixth,
Kanakamuni in the seventh, Kāśyapa in the eighth, Śākyamuni in the ninth, Maitreyā in the tenth.
The other Buddhas of the present Bhadrakalpa in the other antarākalpas.

According to the Mahāyāna, we are in the first antarākalpa of our great kalpa: four Buddhas in
the period of diminution; one Buddha (Maitreyā) in the period of augmentation. In fact, in the
comment of TD 14, number 452 (“The Birth Above of Maitreyā”): “Why does Śākyamuni appear
in a period of diminution, Maitreyā in a period of augmentation? By reason of their vows. . .”

Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, TD 25, p. 89c12, p. 93a13. It is said that the Buddhas appear when
human life is of 84,000, 70,000, 60,000, 50,000, 40,000, 30,000, 20,000, 100 years . . . But the
compassion of the Buddhas is constant. Their Dharma, like a good remedy, is ākāśa.
The gods live more than 1000 x 1000 years and enjoy great pleasures [Yet they can be converted]. So much the
more mankind. Thus the Buddhas should appear when life is more than 80,000 years.

513. The order of the kāṣayas (sīṅg ma) differ according to the sources, Mahāvyutpatti, 124 and the
numerical Dict. (Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.17, interesting): āyus dṛṣṭi kleśa sattva kalpa (dus
kyi sīṅgs); Dharmaśāṅgraha, 91, kleśa dṛṣṭi sattva āyus kalpa; Bodhisattvabhūmi, i.47, āyus sattva
kleśa dṛṣṭi kalpa; Karunāpunḍarika, iii, āyus, kalpa, sattva dṛṣṭi kleśa; Lotus of the Good Law, 43,
kalpa sattva kleśa dṛṣṭi āyus.[The Buddhas who appear then preach the Three Vehicles].
Three kasāyas, Kośa, iv.59.
On kalpakaśāya, iii.99, note 555.

514. When life is of one hundred years, the five kasāyas are utsada, but not abhyutsada as when life was formerly reduced.

515. The upakaranas are the dhānāyupapapbalausadbhādmi, the fruits of the sphere. Their deterioration or vipatti, is that their rasa, vīrya, viśāla and prabhāva become small; or rather again the fruits of the sphere are completely absent. See Kośa, iv.85a.


517. The Pratyekabuddhas take this name because, before obtaining the result, they did not receive instruction, and because, having obtained the result, they do not give instruction.

518. Wassiliev, 276: "To the types of Āryans recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas, the Saurāṇītikas add two types of Pratyekas."

Vargacārins, in Mahāvyutpatti, 45; in the Commentary of Nāmasaṅgī, vi.10. (The text only speaks of khaḍga pratyekamāyaka.)

Khaḍgaṃgvanakalpa: Suttanipata, third Sutta; Visuddhimagga, 234 (mabesi), etc.; Mahāvastu, i.357 (his Nirvāṇa), Śīkṣāsmuccaya, 194 (khaḍgasama), Divya, 294, 582.

Śrāvakapārāvin as pretapārvin, etc., Avadānastakā, i.259.

The Vargacārins have obtained the fruits of Srotaāpanna or of Sakṛdāgamin in a period when the Good Law exists; later, in a period when the Good Law has disappeared, they realize by themselves the quality of Arhat. Since they experienced the terror (saṃvega) of existence under a former Buddha, they do not have to be terrorized (saṃvejantya) again: thus the Vargacārins appear even in a period when life continues to be augmented.

519. We shall see vi.23c at which moment the ascetic can pass from one Vehicle to another.

520. Pūrvakathā, a conjectural translation of sion gyi gtam; Hsüan-tsang has pen-shih 本事; Paramārtha, pen-hsing ching 本书 经 p. 222a (pūrvacaryāśūtra).

Saeki refers to the Viśāsā, TD 27, p. 241b2, to Balapandita ("Weisse und Thor"), Chap. xiii, and to Asokarājasūtra. This story is recounted in fact in Divya, 349, an excerpt from the Sūtra of Asoka as we have seen in Przyluski, Légende d’Asoka, 310 (JAs. 1914, 2, 520).

521. Aṇuṣaya = bodhibesu; thus "the Rhinoceros has one hundred kalpas as the cause of Bodhi."

Vyākhyā: yathā khaḍgaṃgvanā ādityā bhavanti evam te gṛhasthāpravrajātān anyai ca pratyekabuddhān asanmiṣṭṭhāvibhārbhīḥ ut dṛṣṭyante.

Viśāsā, TD 27, p. 156b26, not two Pratyekas at the same time.

522. Rādher āviṣkaraṇāt, for example, Mahāvastu, iii.27.

523. Why would some lokottaravārāgas be impossible? See Introduction, Chapter v.

524. Sarṅghabhadra, TD 29, p. 524b8, indicates at first some other reasons which are, in his opinion, the good ones, notably: "The Rhinoceros does not possess vaśāradya. To persons attached to personalism (ātmavādā), he desires to teach non-personality (nairātmya); but his mind is timid."

525. See below note 539.

526. Hsüan-tsang: These kings, by means of the movement of the wheel, govern all, thus they are called Cakravartins. Etymology in Sumangala, i.249.

527. Po-koue-ki (=Po kuo chi), 134. The Dīgha only speaks of the king of the wheel of fire; the Chh-še lu'n (=Kośa) distinguishes: 1. wheel of fire, Jambudvīpa, life being 20,000 years; 2. wheel of copper, Jambu and Videha, 40,000 years; 3. wheel of silver, Jambu, Videha, Godānīya, 60,000 years; 4. wheel of gold, four Dwipas, 80,000 years.
On the period when the Cakravartins appear, *Dīgha, TD* 1, p. 21c22, *Samyutta, TD* 2, p. 194a6; *TD* 3, number 155.

Suvarṇacakravartin, see *Vie de Hiouen-tsang (=Life of Hsiian-tsang),* 70; caturbhaḍagaca-
kavrätin, Divya, 369 at the bottom (the Chinese versions understand: king of a continent, Przyhusski, *Aśoka*); caturdvīpāsvarta, Śikṣāsamuccaya, 175. Pāli, late, cakkavālacakkavattin, cāturanta, dipa, padesacakkavattin (Rhys Davids and Stede).

Notes on the Cakravartins, *Koša* ii. p., iv.77b-c, vii. 53c; Bodhisattvabhyāmi, fol. 125b-126a (caturdvipaka, jambudvīpavarta); Maitreyasamiti, 86, 237, 246, where Leumann supposes a Dvidvipa (king of two continents) = Didipa or Dudipa, which would give Brahmanical Dilipa, and Dujipa, *Jātaka,* 543.129.

528. It is the teaching (nirdesa) of the Prajñāpti that there are four types of Cakravartins. See *Kāraṇaprajñāpti,* Chap. ii (analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique,* 329) [Takakusu, *Abhidharma Literature,* 117].

529. Hsiian-tsang and Paramārtha: “as if made by some good craftsman.” Nothing which corresponds to *lha rdzas. (But *Foe-koue-ki,* 133: a work of heavenly artisans) [Leumann, *Maitreyasamiti,* 86].

530. *Dīgha, TD* 1, p. 119b27; *Samyutta, TD* 2, p. 194a6; *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 731b15; *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 310c8. This is the text of which we have the Pāli recension, *Dīgha,* ii.172: *yassa raṁkākettiyassa . . . Quoted in Kāraṇaprajñāpti,* Chap. ii, analyzed in *Cosmologie,* 328.


The Pāli recension has: *ekissā lokadhātu yāve arahanto . . . apubbam acarimam uppajjeyum . . .*

532. Hsiian-tsang differs: What is the meaning of the expression, “Is there only one?” Does it refer to a great Trisāhasra universe . . .

533. Note of Saeki. The Sarvāstivādins say that only one Buddha appears in a universe of the ten cardinal directions. The Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna say that, in the universe of the ten directions, many Buddhas appear. See *Kathavatthu,* xxi,6, the treatises of Vasumitra, etc. (Mahāsarāṇghikas, Lokottaravādins).

534. Equal to the Buddhas who are equal for all beings.


536. *Thsangs-pa'i mdo = Brhamasūtra; Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, Fan-wang ching = Brhamarājasūtra (=Madhyama, *TD* 1, p. 547a). This formula can easily find a place in the Brhamanimitanātika, *Majjhima,* i.329.

537. See *Koša,* vii.55a. *Vibhāṣā,* TD 27, p. 767b2. In the same way the memory of the Bhagavat bears “naturally” on 91 kalpas (iv.109). The explanations of the *Visuddhimagga,* 414, on the triple khotta of the Bhagavat: jātikkhotta, 10,000 cakkavālas which tremble at his birth; ānākkhotta, a koṭi and 100,000 cakkavālas where his parītta, magic formulas of protection, reign; visayakkhotta, the field which is the object of his knowledge, infinite.

538. Paramārtha here stops the exposition of the “pluralist” thesis.

539. Sarāṅghabhadrā refutes this argument. The comparison with the Cakravartins proves nothing: their power is limited to the four continents; the power of conversion of the Buddhas is infinite, since their “knowledge” (*jñāna*) attains to all the universes.
Footnotes

540. All this argument in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, fol. 39.

541. Mahāvīryutpatti, 181, svayamityam, pratuydityam, kalabajitah, sastrajitah (read pratuydityāṇa, svayamityāṇa, kalabājī) [var. astrajitah].


543. Tadhā sphita subhikṣadākṣarabṛhatmanusya (Mahāvīryutpatti, 245.10,11,13,14). Vyākhya: jandha prakrtamanusya / manusya tu matimantaḥ; J As. 1913, i.602.

544. Dīgha, ii.173, Śīkṣāsūcayya, 175.


546. The marks (iv. 108,110a) are enumerated in Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 888a6-889a9; Pārśva examines why there are thirty-two, no more no less.

547. Deśasthārā is translated by Paramārtha as "most correct" (ob'eng), and comments: "not inclined" (pu p'ien 不偏). The Vyākhya is illegible: deśasthārāṇī / astraṭhārāṇī (?), translated as gnas ma 'grus pa.

548. Tibetan: Because some [persons] were endowed with grasping, after having made provision through attachment to taste and through laziness, a protector of the fields was rewarded.
Paramārtha: Little by little, beings through attachment to taste, and through idleness, made provision, and by means of riches looked to (var. hired) a protector of the fields. Hsüan-tsang: By reason of the appearance of stocking up provisions and of robbery, in order to put an end (to robbery), they hired (ku 崁) a guardian of the fields.

549. Summary bibliography of the “Buddhist Genesis.”

a. Aggaññasutta, Dīgha, iii.84 and i.17 (Dialogues i.105, iii. 9 and 25, meaning of the word aggaina according to Buddhaghosa; O. Franke, 273). Visuddhimagga, 417 (Warren, 324, Sp. Hardy, Manual, 65).

b. Kandjour, Vinaya, iii.421-430, v.115-166, trans. by Schiefner, 6 June 1851, Mélanges Asiatiques, i.395 (mentioned by Georgi, Alphabetum Tibetanum, 188; Pallas, Sammlungen über die Mongolische Völkerschaft, ii.28; Kovalewski, Buddhistischen Kosmologie, Mem. de l'univ. de Kasan, 1837, i.122 and the Ssanang Ssetsen of Schmid and by Rockhill, Life, 1).

Lokaprajñāpīti, xi (analyzed in Cosmologie, 318) which quotes the Vāsīṣṭhābārādvaśā vyākaranā (comp. Dīgha, iii.80).


b. Mahāvastu, i.338 and notes 615.

c. Mahāvastu, i.616

d. Beal, Catena, 109, Four Lectures, 151 (according to Dīgha, Madhyama, etc.)

550. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 147c28 (Compare Dīgha, i.17, 34).


Karmaddhi is defined vī.53c, where it is called karmaja dādhi.

551. Priṭibhivatpapatāka, Mahāvyutpatti, 223.212; Hsüan-tsang: “earth-skin-cake” 地皮餅， Paramārtha: “earth-skin-dried” 地皮乾， Notes of Senart, Mahāvastu, i.616 (MSS. paryamapaka, par-pantaka); Lex. paryapāta.

552. Asthasalini, 392.

553. Lists of Cakravartins descended from Mahāsamarānata. The Lokaprajñāpīti contains a list based on the Abhidharma, another on the Vinaya (Cosmologie, 320, 322): Mahāvyutpatti, 180; Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.324, 330; Mahāvastu, l.348; Jātaka iii.454; Sumanaga, l.258; JRAS. 1914, 414; Geiger, concerning the translation of the Mahāvamsa.

554. Hui-hui says: “This Śāstra does not totally explain how many years life diminishes or augments by a year. The traditional opinion is that, every century, life diminishes or augments by one year (This is the system presented by Rémusat, Mélanges posthumes, 103, with a computation which appears to me to be erroneous: read 16,798,000 in place of 16,800,000). The Mahāyāna admits this theory for diminution, but it thinks that, during the period of augmentation, the life of the child is double that of the life of his father.” In the Cakkavattisīhanāda (Dīgha, iii.68), persons of 80,000 years have children of 40,000; these, children of 20,000; then 10,000, 5,000, 2,500 or 2,000, 1,000, 500, 250 or 200, 100 years. Cosmologie, 314.

555. Vasubandhu follows Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 693a7.

According to the explanations that Chavannes concludes from the numerical Dictionary and his commentary (Cinq cents contes, i.16) famine appears when life is thirty years long; sickness, when it is twenty years; killing, when it is ten. This is kalpakāṣāya.

Vyākhyā: There are three ends (nirvāṇa) of the kalpa: fire, illness, and hunger. Should we think that these three scourgences are produced successively at the end of each and every kalpa when life is ten years long (dastavāraṇaḥkalpa)? Or rather that these three scourgences are produced in turn at the
end of three successive *kalpas*? Scholars are divided; but we are followers of the second opinion (which is that of TD 32, number 1644, quoted by Saeki).

556. *Anguttara*, i.159. "I have heard the ancient Brāhmīns say . . . that the world was once over-populated, such as Avīci (?). How did it come to be that now mankind was destroyed, diminished, and that the villages became non-villages . . . ? Now, Oh Brāhmīn, men are adhammarāgaravatta, visamalobbābhībhattā, micchādhammapareta. They take up sharp arms and kill one another . . . It no longer rains, there is hunger . . . ( . . . micchādhammaparetanam [manussānam] yakhī vā amanuse osajjantī . . . vā is unlikely; we have a variant vāle)." This passes into the eschatological plan of *Dīgha*, iii.70, the *Cakkavattisīhanāda*. (Famine and illness are absent, there is only sattbantarakaṭṭa).

557. Pāli sources. *Anguttara*, i.160, dubbhikkhāḥ hoti dussassam setaṭṭhīkam salākavuttam tena babū manussā kalām karontī. *Samyutta*, iv.323: The Bhagavat passes through the country with a great following of Bhikkhus when famine was reigning, dubbhikkhe dvībhīke setaṭṭhike salākavutte.In the *Suttaviṭṭhāna* (*Vinaya*, ed. Oldenberg, iii.6.15, 87): in such a country dubbhikkhā hoti dvībhikkhī setaṭṭhīkā salākavuttā na sukarā uṭcchena paggabena yāpetum; commentary in Samantapāsādikā, i.175 (where Buddhaghosa gives many explanations; some are in agreement with those of Vasubandhu). Buddhaghosa gives the variant setaṭṭhikā, a sickness of rice, that we find in *Anguttara*, iv.269: women will have a similar sickness, as maṇīṭṭhikā (from maṇīṭṭhā, madder-root) is the sickness of sugar-cane, as setaṭṭhikā a type of wheat blight, is the sickness of rice. Rhys Davids-Stede discuss the expression dvībhīkadhūṭikā (*Samyutta*, iv.195).

558. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate samudga(ka) by chū-chi 凑集, to accumulate, bring together; 'du-ba has the same meaning. The version of Hsüan-tsang is very free; Paramārtha appears more literal: Now chū-chi, at that period was called chan-che 㪨{d}. Further liên-che (perfume box, etc, Couvreur, 1904, p. 197) is called chan-che.


559. This second explanation is slightly closer to that of the *Dīya*.


561. *Dīgga*, TD 1, p. 137b12; *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 690a14, examines whence come the suns (created at the origin of the world? created at the end of the *kalpa* by the actions of beings?), the water, the wind; examine that which becomes things; is there parināma (iii.40d)? is there transformation in fire, in water? Above, note 497.

562. [In the same way that, at the end of the world, the flame of Kāmadhātu provokes the arising of the flame of Rūpadhātu, above p. 477].

563. Saeki mentions here *Dīgga*, TD 1, p. 147c2, on the five types of seeds; the same the *Vyākhya*: paśca bijajātiṁ mālabhajam phalabhajam bijabhajam agrabhajam skandabhajam.

564. For nimiṭṭakāraṇa, samavāyikāraṇa, see Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, 136, 139, 141, 146.

565. Guna [dharma] and dravya [dharma] are defined *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, i.15-16, see Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 122.
566. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, ii.1.1: "The earth has smell, taste, smell, touch".

567. The Pailukas maintain that things (*avayavidravya*), wool, etc. are not consumed, or burned up; the old attributes disappear; new attributes, arisen from the cooking, arise; but the things, which are the support (*āśraya*) of the attributes, remain as they are (*tadavastha*) (*Vyākhyā*).

We have in *Nyāyabindu*, Calcutta, 1889, p. 86, a Pailuka, a disciple of Kaṇḍa; in the *Nyāyavārttikatātpārya*, 355 (ad 3.1.4) a Pailukanṭha.

568. According to *Madhyama*, 58.

569. We shall see in viii.11 that there are eight *apaksālas* and that the first three Dhyānas are *sa-ināja*. (See also iv.46).

*Aṅguttara*, v.135: the thorn (*kaṇṭaka*) of the First Dhyāna is *sadda*; of the Second, *vitakkavicaras*; of the Third, *pūśi*; and of the Fourth, *assāsapassāsas*. *Kaṇṭaka* is that which destroys the Dhyāna, that which is incompatible with the Dhyāna (*Kathāvatthu*, ii.5), as the mind of women is the *kaṇṭaka* of the chaste life; *apaksāla*, on the contrary, is a certain vice, an imperfection or lack, essential to a Dhyāna.

Tibetan: *skyon*; Chinese versions: *tsai* = calamity; *vipatti*, *tsai-wo* 災禍 calamity-obstacle, and also *kuo* 過 fault, defect, in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 245, 664 (see the notes to Sasaki’s edition: *apaksāla*, *apaksāla*, *apaksana*, *apācara*), *Siksasamuccaya*, 145 and *Bodhisattvabhumi* in Wogihara.

570. See iv. p. 107, vi.24a, viii.101b.

571. Paramārtha adds: They obtain Nirvāṇa in this sphere.


CHAPTER FOUR

Karma

Om. Homage to the Buddha

Who created the variety of the world of living beings and the receptacle-world which we have described in the preceding chapter? It was not a god (ii.64d) who intelligently created it.

la. The variety of the world arises from action.

The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings. But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,—saffron, sandalwood, etc.—on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?

The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (vyāmisrakārī, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objects of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.

But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objects of enjoyment are equally pleasing.

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What is action?

Ib. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.

The sūtra says that there are two types of action, volition (cetanā) and the action after having been willed. 1 Action after having been
willed (cetayitvā) is what the kārikā designates by the words “that which is produced through volition.”

These two actions form three actions: bodily action, vocal action, and mental action.

How do you establish this division, according to the support of its action, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?

To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support, there is nothing but an action, for all actions are supported on a physical support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal action, for, of these three, —body, speech and manas,—only the voice is ultimately action by its nature. 2 If one were to regard its original cause, we have only mental action, for all actions have their origin in the mind. The Vaibhāṣikas say that the three types of action are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.

ιc-d. Volition is mental action: it gives rise to two actions, bodily and vocal action.

Volition is called mental action; that which arises from volition, namely action which has been willed, is made up of the two other actions, bodily and vocal action.

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2a. These two actions are informative and non-informative.

Bodily action and vocal action are informative (vijñapti) and non-informative (avijñapti, i. 11, iv.4); we then have bodily informative action, vocal informative action, bodily non-informative action, and vocal non-informative action.

What action is “bodily informative action?”

2b-3b. Bodily vijñapti is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destructive.

Bodily vijñapti is such and such a shape (sanisthāna, i.10a) of the
body by reason of a volition

According to others, (the Vatsiputriyas,) bodily vijnapti is displacement, for it takes place when there is movement, and not when there is no movement.

The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.

What is understood by "momentary" (ksanika)?

Ksana means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; ksanika is a dharma that has kṣaṇa, as a dandika is one who has a staff (danda).

A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily vijnapti is not movement.

The Vatsiputriyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.

It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily perish;" for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.

1. That which depends on a cause is an effect, something "done," "created." Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or "created?" Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.

2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes.

3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that, consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii.46a, p. 245).

4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, consequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.

In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this
relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.

The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.

You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.

Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.

5. The Vatsiputriyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?

We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.

If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction depending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc., is spontaneous.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.

But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,—doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,—do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak dharmas destroy strong dharmas of the same type—as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?

6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu]\(^{12}\) think that a flame perishes through the absence of a cause of duration. But an absence cannot be a
According to the Vaišeṣikas, a flame perishes by reason of dharma and adharma, merit and demerit.

This explanation is inadmissible. Dharma and adharma would both be causes of arising and of destruction: dharma would cause the flame to arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or unfavorable; adharma, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable. Now we cannot admit that dharma and adharma enter into activity and cease being active from moment to moment.\(^\text{13}\)

Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its relationship with the flame.\(^\text{14}\)

7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc., has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.

Cooking (paka), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (pakaja), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least—if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary—the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare Tarka-saṅgraha, xxiii).

Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,—long, short, large and small,—our conclusion does not become indispensable? Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow, caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn different "products of cooking." But you do not attribute the characteristic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.

8. Some\(^\text{15}\) ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?

By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element—which is present in water (ii.22, p. 186)—increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.\(^\text{16}\)
itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.\textsuperscript{16}

9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood. The idea of movement is a false conception.

Hence bodily \textit{vijñapti} is not displacement, movement; rather bodily \textit{vijñapti} is shape.

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The Sautrāntikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhāṣikas, \textit{rupayatana}, visible physical matter is both \textit{varnarūpa} or color: blue, etc., and \textit{samstbānarūpa} or shape: long, etc. (i.10a). For the Sautrāntikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation.]

When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long." When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short." When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square." When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular." The other figures,—high, low, etc.,—are explained in the same manner; when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc. Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a \textit{rupa}.

1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself,

3c. It would be perceived by two organs.

In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc.; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, \textit{rupayatana}, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.

The Vaibhāṣikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length
forming part of the tangible.

This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc.) arranged in a certain manner "long."

The Vaibhāsikas: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.

In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the dharmas as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc.) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the rememberance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the rememberance of its shape.

2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many rūpas, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.

3. Third argument. All "real" rūpa, susceptible of being struck (sapratigha, i.29b),—blue, etc.,—is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color rūpa (blue, etc.) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans. p. 185). Now

3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.

There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a rūpa "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,—atoms of color,—arranged in a
certain manner.

If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc.—this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been proved, how could they be united and arranged? 17

[4. Objection of the Sarvāstivādins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.

Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long?" Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.

[5. Objection of the Sarvāstivādins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,—a column, a person, etc.,—without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.

In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms—through the mental consciousness—the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some elephants, etc.: "This army is arranged in a circle." 18 Or rather it happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows,—through the mental consciousness—a mass.

[6. The Sarvāstivādins criticize the Sautrāntikas,] You Sautrāntikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily viññāpti?"

We say that bodily viññāpti is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsiputriyas-Sārinmitiyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvāstivādins.]

[The Sarvāstivādins:] If you maintain that bodily viññāpti is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the
real dharma that constitutes bodily action?

Bodily action is the action which has for its object the body: that is to say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily action. Other actions should be defined according to their natures: [i.e., vocal action is the action which has the voice for its object; mental action is the action of the manas or action associated with the manas (see iv.78c-d).]

[The Sarvastivādins:] A scripture says that “action is volition and willed action.” If bodily action and vocal action are volition, what difference is there between the two types of action defined in this scripture?

There are two types of volition. First, the initial or preparatory stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, “I must do such and such an action”: this is what the Scripture calls cetanākarmaṇa, action which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of action, the volition of doing an action in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls cetayitvā karmāṇa, action after having been willed, or willed action.

[The Sarvastivādins:] If this is the case, then informative (vijñapti) action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only volition; there is no place for the vijñapti which is matter (rupa) by its nature. And if vijñapti does not exist, then avijñapti, “non-information” of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, does not exist. From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i.e., sanvarāsanvarābhāva, etc., see below 4a-b).

These difficulties can be refuted. Avijñapti is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily actions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal vijñaptis. These two types of volitions—which bear the names of bodily action and vocal action—are capable of producing a volition sui generis which is the avijñapti. Where is the difficulty in this?

[The Sarvastivādins:] This sui generis volition is subordinate to the mind (cittānaparivartin, ii. 31), like the avijñapti which in our system arises from dhyāna, for the avijñapti of Kāmadhātu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)
No, for this *sui generis* volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure *cetanā*), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the *vijñapti*, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the *avijñapti*, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.

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The *Vaibhāṣikas* say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily *vijñapti* is shape.

3d. Vocal *vijñapti* is vocal sound.

Sound which is discourse by nature—that is, articulated sound (ii. 47)—is vocal *vijñapti*.

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*Avijñapti* has already been defined (i. 11; above n. 5).

The *Sautrāntikas* say that the *avijñapti* does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i.11) as *avijñapti*; now past *dharmas* no longer exist (v.25); and (3) because *avijñapti* does not have the nature of *rūpa*: the nature of *rūpa* is *rūpyate* and since the *avijñapti* is not “susceptible of destruction” (*apratīgha*), it cannot be *rūpa* (i. 13).

[The *Vaibhāṣikas* prove the existence of *avijñapti*:]

4a-b. Scripture says that *rūpa* is of three types and that there is a pure *rūpa*; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of action for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.

[By the word *et cetera*, the *Kārikā* refers to reasons 5 to 8 below.]

1. A scripture says that there are three types of *rūpa*: “*Rūpa* is embraced within a threefold *rūpa*: there is visible *rūpa* susceptible of destruction (visible physical matter); there is an invisible *rūpa* susceptible of destruction (the eye, etc.); and there is an invisible *rūpa*, free from destruction,” and this latter can only be the *avijñapti*.21
2. The Blessed One said in a scripture that there is pure rūpa: "What are the pure dharmas? All rūpa of the past, the future and the present... all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure dharmas." (see Ekottarāgama, TD 2, p. 13b-c).

Now, apart from avijñāpā, there exists no rūpa which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no rūpa which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, mārgasatyasamāpanna.]

3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit, "... There are seven material meritorious works, (aupadbhika punyakriyāvastu, iv. 113) ... when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed, walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity, without ceasing; merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven material works? ... In this same way there are seven non-material meritorious works..."²²

By reason of what dharma, other than the avijñāpā, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?

4. If avijñāpā does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannot constitute a course of action, killing etc.; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.

Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?

But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.

5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the dharmas, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven āyatanas, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91c19). He did not say that the dharmāyatana is non-rūpa.

If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the avijñāpā, which is rūpa and so included in the dharmāyatana [and not in rūpāyatana], then what is the rūpa that is included in the dharmāyatana?

6. If avijñāpā does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, samyaggvāc, samyakkarmānta, and samyagājīva (correct
speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (samādhi). (If the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature avijñāpti vi. 67, 68).

But, one would answer, a scripture says, “When he knows thus, when he sees thus, samyagdrṣṭi, samyaksaṅkalpa, samyagvyāyāma, samyaksmṛti, and samyaksamādhi are cultivated and achieved; samyagvāc, samyakkarmānta and samyagājīva have been previously purified.” Thus the last three are considered as vijñāpti and as previous to absorption.

This text, the Vaihāṣikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc., from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of avijñāpti.

7. If the avijñāpti does not exist, the Prātimokṣa discipline (sāṇvara, iv.14a) would disappear.23 For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhikṣu or Bhiksunic when his mind is bad or neutral.

8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which arrests immorality.24 An “absence” cannot be a dike: virati is thus a real dharma (the avijñāpti), and not the mere fact of no longer accomplishing an action which one has renounced, as the Sautrāntikas maintain (p. 560, 562).

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[The Sautrāntikas answer:] These arguments are numerous and diverse, but are not conclusive. Let us examine them one by one.

1. The Sūtra teaches that rūpa is of three types. The Yogācārins25 say that in the Dhyānas, through the force of absorption, a rūpa arises which is the object of the absorption, that is, which is perceived by the person in the absorption, [for example a skeleton in the asubhaṁbhāvanā, (vi.9).] This rūpa is not seen by the eye; it is thus invisible. It does not “cover,” it does not occupy a place: it is thus “free from destruction.” If you ask how this object of absorption can be rūpa [since it does not possess the usual characteristics of rūpa,] you forget that the existence of avijñāpti would give rise to the same question.
2. The scripture says that there is a pure rūpa. The Yogācārins maintain that the rūpa that arises through the force of the absorption is pure, since the absorption is pure.

But other masters, [the Dārśṭāntikas,] maintain that the rūpa of the Arhats (organ of sight, etc.) and external rūpa, [namely the five objects of the senses (i.9a), are pure (anāśrava)] because they are not a support of the vices.

To this one can object that the scripture expresses itself [without making a distinction,] “What are the impure dharmas? All that which is organ of sight, all that which is visible . . .”

[The Dārśṭāntikas answer that all the dharmas referred to in this scripture are qualified as] impure because they are not opposed to the vices: [in fact, only the mind and its mental states can oppose the vices and destroy them.]

To this one could object that the same dharmas would be impure, because they are not opposed to the vices, and at the same time pure, because they are not a support of the vices, with the unpleasant consequence that the characteristic of pure and impure would be confused.

No, answer the Dārśṭāntikas, for these dharmas are not pure from the same point of view in which they are impure. Further, if the visible and the other āyatana are exclusively impure, why would the scripture specify, “The impure and upādāna-provoking rūpas, . . . the impure and upādāna-provoking dharmas are the cause of the hardening of the mind and of hypocrisy.” (v. 47)

3. The scripture says that merit increases.

The ancient masters say: It is in the nature of things that merit increases when persons who have received a gift utilize this gift: by reason of the qualities of these persons (dhyāna, absorption of benevolence, etc.), by reason of the benevolence that they get out of the gift for themselves and for all creatures, the mental series of the givers, be they of bad or of neutral minds, is found to be perfumed by the volition of giving which has for its object the person who receives: their series undergo a subtle ascending transformation and arrives at the state where they are finally capable of bringing forth many results. It is in this sense that the text says, “Merit increases in an intense and un-interrupted manner, merit adds to itself.”
But how does one explain the increase of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work?

[The mental series transforms itself] by reason of the repetition of volitions having for their object [the Tathāgata or the Śrāvakas]. Even during dreams these volitions are linked together.

On the contrary, we do not see how the [Vaibhāṣikas,] partisans of an avijñāpti, can explain the growth of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work. [This does not consist of bodily or vocal action, vijñāpti, but merely the joy experienced with regard to the Tathāgata or the Śrāvakas; it does not consist of an absorption. Now according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the avijñāpti can only give rise to the vijñāpti or to an absorption. Hence it is impossible here.]

But according to other masters, [certain Sautrāntikas,] in the case also of material meritorious works, merit proceeds from the repetition of a volition having for its object [the person who receives.]

But this opinion is inadmissible in light of the scripture which says, "When an energetic Bhikṣu, endowed with morality, possessor of good dharmas, eats the alms of a donor, he then enters into and dwells in the absorption called 'infinites' (good-will, etc.), and by reason of this fact there is certainly produced for the donor an out-flowing of merit, and out-flowing of good and prosperity." Now does the donor whose merit thus continues to increase, have a special volition whose object is the person who receives? [We should thus prefer the opinion of the first masters:] in the case of material meritorious works, the merit proceeds from a transformation of the series [of the donor by reason of the qualities of the person who receives.]

4. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, if the avijñāpti does not exist, he who has an action accomplished by another will not be endowed with the course of action ("path-of-action," karmapatha). When an emissary charged with murder accomplishes the murder, it is in the nature of things that the mental series of the author of the instigation will submit to a certain subtle transformation by virtue of which his series will bear a result later. This holds likewise when one acts for oneself; when the course of action (murder, etc.) is achieved, at this moment the series undergoes a transformation. This transformation is called "course of action," and consequently the person whose series is transformed is endowed with the course of action—for the effect (transformation of
the series) receives the name which belongs more properly to the cause (course of action),—and this transformation is called bodily or vocal accordingly as it results from an action of the body or the voice. It is by virtue of these same principles that the partisans of *avijñāpti* consider the *avijñāpti* as a bodily or vocal course of action.

The Bhadanta\(^{31}\) (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 617a18) proves in a different manner the nonexistence of *avijñāpti*: "A person is touched by the sin of murder by reason of a tritemporal volition with regard to the *skandhas* which constitute a living being (iv.73), that is, when he thinks, 'I shall kill; I kill; he is killed.' "[The course of action is complete when there is preparatory action, principal action, and consecutive action, consisting solely of *cetanā*, iv. 68c.]

But this triple volition does not necessarily bring about the achievement of the course of action, for, according to the theory of the Bhadanta, there would be a mortal sin (iv.97) for the child who says, "my mother has been murdered," if she has not in fact been killed by the emissary charged with the murder.

Nevertheless all this exercise of volition, "I shall kill, I kill, he is killed" applies only to the person who kills: the intention of the Bhadanta is to refer to this type of murder.\(^{32}\)

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But, [ask the Sarvāstivādins,] why do you, in your antipathy, deny the existence of the *avijñāpti* and yet admit a transformation of the mental series (ii.36c-d)?

[In truth, *avijñāpti*, a doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, and the transformation of the mental series, a thesis of the Sautrāntikas, are both equally difficult to understand;] I thus have no antipathy [for these doctrines.] But, to say that there arises at the moment of the achieving of the course of action by a bodily operation dependent on a mind, a certain *dharma*, called *avijñāpti*, [in him who has ordered the course of action,] either from the mind of him who has ordered, or separate from the body of him who has accomplished the murder, is a hypothesis that cannot satisfy us; but to say that there is produced at the moment of the achievement of the course of action by an operation ordered by a certain person, a transformation of the mental series of this person, is a
hypothesis that satisfies us. And it also satisfies us that the result arises from a transformation of the series and not from an *avijñāpti*.

[Take into account also the arguments enumerated above:] "if the *vijñāpti* does not exist, [how could there be *avijñāpti*?], "The *avijñāpti* consists solely in no longer doing a certain action," "the *avijñāpti* cannot depend on past primary elements."

5. The *dharmāyatana* is not defined as nonmaterial. The response to this objection is as has been given above: there is an invisible *rupa* free from destruction, forming part of the *dharmāyatana*: this is not the *avijñāpti*; this is a *rupa* which is the object of the absorption and which arises from the force of the absorption.

6. The Way, say the Vaibhāṣikas, would not have eight parts.

How does the saint, when he has attained the Way, [when he sees or meditates on the Truths,] possess correct speech, action, and livelihood? Does he pronounce correct speech, act in a correct manner, and correctly ask for the robes of a monk?

[Such is not our thought, answer the Sarvāstivādins.] In the Path, the saint takes possession of certain pure *avijñāptis*, so that, when he leaves the contemplation, it is by the force of these pure *avijñāptis* that he produces correct speech, actions, and livelihood, and does not produce incorrect speech, actions, and livelihood. A cause takes the name of its result: thus speech, action and livelihood are designated as *avijñāpti*.

If this is so, why not accept my theory? There is no *avijñāpti*; but the saint, when he finds himself in the Path, takes possession of a certain intention (*āśaya*) and of a certain personality (*āśraya*) so that, when he comes out of this contemplation, by reason of the force of these two factors he henceforth produces correct speech, actions and livelihood. One gives to the cause (*āśaya* and *āśraya*) the name of their result; and we can thus affirm that the Path possesses eight parts.

According to another opinion, the parts of the Path solely consist of non-commission. What is non-commission? The person who is in absorption acquires, through the force of the Path, definite absolute abstention (*akaraṇanīyama*, vi.33a-b). This abstention, which is acquired having the pure Path as its support, is pure. This is a part of the Path.

Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc.) is not a "thing"
(dravya), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distinct things which constitute the dharmas; there are for example, the eight worldly dharmas: possession and non-possession; glory and non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc., is not a thing. (Anguttara, iv. 157, Digha, iii.260)

7. If the avijñāpti does not exist, say the Vaibhāṣikas, the Prātimokṣa discipline would disappear.

One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (vidhi) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Prātimokṣa discipline should be understood in this manner.

The Vaibhāṣikas object that, if the Prātimokṣa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.

This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.

8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (hṛi, ii.32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.

In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an avijñāpti independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the avijñāpti is always there.

Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhāṣikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (dravya), sui generis, which is avijñāptirūpa.

We have seen (i.11b) that the avijñāpti arises dependent (upādāya) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the vijñāpti, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed vijñāpti (iv. p. 3, 33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other
primary elements.\textsuperscript{35}

The \textit{avijnapti} derives from primary elements different from those which serve as the support for the \textit{vijnapti}: for it is impossible that one and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a subtle, derived \textit{rupa},—the \textit{avijnapti}—, and at the same time a gross, derived \textit{rupa}, the \textit{vijnapti}.\textsuperscript{36}

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The \textit{vijnapti} is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the \textit{avijnapti}?

The general rule is that all derived \textit{rupa} is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived \textit{rupa},—of the present and the future,—derive from past primary elements:

4c-d. From the first moment, the \textit{avijnapti} of Kāmadhātu arises derived from past primary elements.

The moment the \textit{avijnapti} arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, \textit{avijnapti} of the sphere of Kāmadhātu—in opposition to the \textit{avijnapti} arisen from the \textit{dhyāna}, and pure \textit{avijnapti} (p. 32)—arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (upādāya) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the \textit{avijnapti}, for they are the cause of its \textit{pravṛtti}, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the \textit{avijnapti}, for they are the cause of its \textit{anuvṛtti}, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that the supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the \textit{pravṛtti} and the \textit{anuvṛtti} of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).

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To which sphere,—Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas—do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal actions of the different spheres derive?
5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.

Bodily and vocal actions of Kāmadhātu derive from the primary elements of Kāmadhātu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyāna which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyāna.

5c. When they are pure, they are from the primary elements of the sphere to which the person who has produced them belongs.

When they are pure, bodily and vocal action derives from the primary elements of the sphere where the person who produces arises: for the pure dharmas are transcendent to the sphere of existence (Kāmadhātu, etc.); for there does not exist any pure primary elements from whence one could derive a pure action; for the pure bodily or vocal action arises by reason of the primary elements, and not only through the mind, since it is derived rūpa (upādāyarūpa) (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 723b29-c6)

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What are the characteristics of these two actions, vijnapti and avijnapti? What are the characteristics of the primary elements from whence they derive?

5d. The avijnapti is not integral to the organism; it is also an outflowing; it belongs solely to living beings. Not of absorption, it derives from the primary elements which are an outflowing, which are integral to the organism, which are differentiated.

1. The avijnapti is a derived rūpa exempt from mass (amūrta), nonextended (apratigha); thus it cannot be a support of the mind and of mental states; thus it is anupātta, not integral to the sense organism (i. 34c). The avijnapti is never morally neutral (iv. 7a): hence it is not arisen from retribution (i. 37); it is not of increase (i. 36); it remains then that it is an outflowing (i. 36), that is, produced by sabhāgaheṭu (ii.52). [The text says, “also of outflowing,” because the avijnapti can be also kṣanika (i. 38b): the first pure avijnapti is not an outflowing.]
Chapter Four

2. Not absorbed or, in other words belonging to Kāmadrītātu, it derives from primary elements which are an outflowing,\(^{38}\) and which are integral to the organism. These primary elements are differentiated, because each of the seven avijñaptis, the renouncing of killing, etc., which form the Prātimokṣa discipline, derive from a distinct group of the four primary elements.

6. Arisen from absorption, it derives from non-differentiated primary elements, not integral to the organism, and increase.

3. Avijñapti which arises from samādhi, is divided into two types, that is, (avijñapti arisen from) absorption, and (avijñapti arisen from) pure discipline. These two both arise from samādhi, are of increase, and not integral to the sense organism. They are both arisen from undifferentiated (i.e., identical) primary elements.

In the same way that the mind which engenders these renouncings is a unity, the primary elements upon which the renouncings are based constitute a unity.

[II. Concerning the vijñapti.]

The vijñapti is an outflowing; being bodily, it is integral to the organism.\(^{39}\)

Does bodily vijñapti, by arising, destroy or not destroy the preexistent bodily figure which is retribution (vipāka)? The two hypotheses create difficulties. That it destroys it, is impossible; for it is contrary to the principles of the Vaibhāṣikas that a rūpa, retribution by nature, continues again, after having been interrupted (i.37, trans. p. 103). If on the contrary, bodily vijñapti does not destroy the previous figure, two figures,—the first of retribution, the second of outflowing,—would be found to coexist in one and the same spot.

We must admit that bodily vijñapti arises deriving from new primary elements, outflowing in its nature, and that it does not destroy the previous figure.

If this is the case, the part by means of which a bodily vijñapti is produced would be greater than has existed previously, being penetrated by new primary elements from whence this vijñapti derives. If the part has not been penetrated by these new elements, one could not say that the avijñapti is created by the whole part.

We could answer that the body—retribution in nature—presents
some voids: thus place is found for the new primary elements, outflowing by nature, from whence the \textit{vijñāpāti} derives.

We have said that action is of two types, \textit{cetanā} and \textit{cetanākṛta}, volition and action created by the volition; of three types, mental, bodily, vocal; of five types, \textit{cetanā}, bodily \textit{vijñāpāti}, bodily \textit{avijñāpāti}, vocal \textit{vijñāpāti}, and vocal \textit{avijñāpāti}.

[What are these action, good, bad, or neutral? To which realm of existence (\textit{dhātu}), to which sphere (\textit{bhūmi}) do they belong?]

7a. The \textit{avijñāpāti} is never neutral.

It is either good or bad.
In fact, neutral volition is weak; it is not capable of engendering a powerful action as is the \textit{avijñāpāti}, which continues reproducing itself after its initial cause has disappeared.

7b. Other action are of three types.

Other actions, namely volition and the \textit{vijñāpāti}, can be good, bad, or neutral.

7b-c. Bad action exists in Kāmadhātu.

Not in the other spheres, for, in the other spheres the three roots of evil (iv.8c-d and v.19), and non-shame and imprudence (ii.26c-d), are missing.

The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhātus.

7c. \textit{Avijñāpāti} also exists in Rūpadhātu.

"Also" that is to say: in Kāmadhātu as well as in Rūpadhātu; not in Ārūpyadhātu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the \textit{avijñāpāti} is derived (iv.6b).] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the \textit{avijñāpāti} which] is the discipline of the body and voice.

Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure \textit{avijñāpāti}.Pure \textit{avijñāpāti} derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure \textit{avijñāpāti}.In the same way, when a person arisen in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu enters into an ārūpya absorption, he produces an \textit{avijñāpāti} of
Ārūpyadhātu deriving from the primary elements of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

The case is not the same, for the pure *avijnapti* transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an *avijnapti* of Ārūpyadhātu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

Further, turning away from all *rupa*—since any idea of *rupa* is absent in it—an *ārupya* absorption is not capable of producing an *avijnapti*, which is *rupa*.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu; morality, consisting of *avijnapti*, of the realm of Rūpadhātu is opposed to it. But the *ārupyas* are removed from Kāmadhātu by the four estrangements of āśraya, prakara, āālambana, pratipakṣa (ii.67; Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 495c23).

7d. *Vijnapti* exists in the two spheres where there is *vicāra*.

There is *vijnapti*, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, where there is *vicāra* (i.32c, viii 7).

8a. The *vijnapti* termed *nivrta* is also missing in Kāmadhātu.

*[Nivrta signifies *nivrta-avyākṛta* (ii.66), defiled but neutral. “Also,” in the spheres where there is no *vicāra*, and “also” in Kāmadhātu.]

Such *vijnapti* does not exist in Kāmadhātu, [where all defiled *vijnapti* is bad, not neutral.]

This means that *vijnapti* of the *anivṛtāvyākṛta* class exists only in the world of Brahmā. It is reported that Mahābrahmā produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahābrahmā boasted falsely, in order to avoid the inquires of the venerable Āśvajīt. 42

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But if vocal *avijnapti* is absent above the First Dhyāna, how can sound (*śabdāyatana*) exist in the Second Dhyāna and above?
It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements: sound caused by the wind, etc. (i.10b). 43

Other masters say: Vijnapti exists in the Second Dhyāna and in the following Dhyānas; it is there in the anivṛtāvyākṛta class, undefiled-neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in these Dhyānas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere, by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled vijnapti. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and the defiled mind has been abandoned. 44

But [the Vaibhāṣikas] defend the first opinion. 45

Why is the vijnapti, whatever it may be, absent above the world of BrahmA? Why is the vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kāmadhātu?

8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.

i. It is the mind associated with vitarka and vicāra which gives rise to the vijnapti: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyāna and above. (iv.7d).

ii. The nivṛtāvyākṛta mind gives rise to a vijnapti of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class “to be abandoned through Mediation.” (See p. 575 and foll.)

[In Kāmadhātu, only the nivṛtāvyākṛta mind is the mind associated with satkāyadrṣṭi and with antagrāhadrṣṭi.] Thus, it does not give rise to vijnapti (ii.67, v.12).

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Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (samutthapaka) to them—good or bad nature—that the dharmas are good or bad?

The dharmas are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (paramartha), in and of themselves (svabhavatas), through association (samprayogatatas), and through their original cause (samuttathanatas). 46

8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good.

Nirvāṇa, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-and-happy; 47 hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of
sickness (*Majjhima*, i.510).

8c-d. The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of themselves.\(^{48}\)

The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.

9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc.,] is good through association.

The dharma, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.

9b. Actions, etc. are good by reason of their original cause.

Having their origin in dharma good in and of themselves or good through association, bodily action, vocal action, [the laksanas,] praptis, nirodhasamapatti, asaminisamapatti (ii.35 and foll.),\(^{49}\) are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.

How can praptis be good when they have their origin in a mind which is not good? \(^{50}\)

9c. Evil is the contrary.

The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:

1. Sam\(\text{s}\)\(\text{\text{s}}\)\(\text{\text{\text{s}}}\)\(\text{\text{a}}\)ra—or existence—has for its nature the process of all suffering: it is thus perfectly unhappy, and so absolute evil.

2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d) are bad in themselves.

3. The dharma associated with these principles are bad in themselves.

4. Having their origin in the roots, etc., and in the dharma associated with these roots, etc., bodily action, vocal action, their characteristics (arising, etc.) and the praptis of the bad dharma, are bad by reason of their original cause.
Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.

But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to \textit{samsāra}: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?

From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure \textit{dharma} which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii.54), and the impure \textit{dharma} which produces an agreeable retribution, is called good.

What is absolutely neutral?

9d. Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.\textsuperscript{51}

The two unconditioned things (\textit{asaműskṛta}, i.5), namely space and \textit{apratisamkhyānirodha}, are, without ambiguity, neutral.

A difficulty. The Vaibhāṣikas teach that action, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition.] The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal action (iv.2b, 3d).

No, answer the Vaibhāṣikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the action, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain action, not any primary elements.]

But, we should say, how will the \textit{avijñapti} produced by absorption (iv.6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the \textit{avijñapti} and so does not think, "Let us create an \textit{avijñapti}!" We cannot admit that the \textit{avijñapti} produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the \textit{avijñapti} produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii.72a, trans. p. 315, vii.45).

There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhāṣikas should resolve.

It has been said above (iv.8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not give rise to \textit{vijñapti}. Yet the Blessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad action, bad livelihood." Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v.4).

This Sūtra does not contradict this theory. In fact
10a-b. That which gives rise (samutthāna) is of two types, which are known as hetusamutthāna and tatksanasamutthāna.52

Samutthāna is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (hetu) and samutthāna is hetusamutthāna. What is samutthāna at the very moment of the action is tatksanasamutthāna.

10c-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.

The hetusamutthāna projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The tatksanasamutthāna is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).

But what is [with regard to the action (vijñāpti)] the efficacy done by the tatksanasamutthāna which makes it the second mover?

If the tatksanasamutthāna is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies.]

[But if the vijñāpti does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there vijñāpti for a person free from a mind which undertakes the discipline?53 (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 586a8).

[One will then have recourse to another explanation.] The vijñāpti is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the vijñāpti, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.

lla-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.

The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the vijñāpti, because it is the cause of the mental process (vitarka and vicāra) which gives rise to the vijñāpti. It is not the second mover 1.) because it no longer exists at the moment when the vijñāpti takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2.) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the rūpa (that is, the vijñāpti) created by it would also be abandoned by
this Seeing; [in the same way that the \textit{vijñāpti} created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation.] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i.40c-d).

In fact, \textit{rūpa} (=\textit{vijñāpti}) is not contradicted either by \textit{vidyā} (correct knowledge), or by \textit{avidyā} (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.\textsuperscript{54}

[The Sautrāntikas would answer that this affirmation, "\textit{Rūpa} is not contradicted by \textit{vidyā},"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of \textit{rūpa} through Seeing would not admit that \textit{rūpa} is not contradicted by \textit{vidyā}.

[The Vaibhāṣikas say: If the \textit{rūpa} (=\textit{vijñāpti}) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (\textit{āśraya}) to this \textit{rūpa}, to this \textit{vijñāpti}, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral \textit{dharma}s, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (\textit{kliṣṭa}, ii.40c-d).]

We deny this consequence. In fact, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the \textit{vijñāpti} (iv.9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.

[The Vaibhāṣikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled \textit{dharma} is not contradicted either by \textit{vidyā} or by \textit{avidyā}.

[In fact, the undefiled \textit{dharma}, either of the \textit{anivṛtāvyākṛta}, undefiled-neutral class, or of the \textit{kusalaśāsrava}, good-impure class, is not contradicted by \textit{vidyā}, that is to say through the pure (\textit{anāsrava}) Path, as is the case for the defiled \textit{dharma} which perishes by the fact that its \textit{prāpti} is cut off by this said Path ...]

Hence the Sūtra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not give rise to \textit{vijñāpti}," for this Sūtra refers to false views
considered as agent. *(Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 610c22)*

llb-c. The *manas* susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is twofold.

The mental consciousness of the *bhāvanāheya* category is at one and the same time both agent and mover.\(^{55}\)

lld. The five are solely mover.

The five *vijñānakāyas*, [visual consciousness, etc.,] are solely mover, [being free from reflexion (*vikalpa*, i.33)]\(^{56}\) *(Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 610a6)*

There are thus four cases:

i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is exclusively agent.

ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.

iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is both promoter and mover.

iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.\(^{57}\)

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Is the “mover” of the same [nature—good, bad, neutral—] as the agent?

There is no rule on this subject:

12a-b. From a good agent, etc., a mover of three types.

A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.

12c. With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.\(^{58}\)

With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.

12c. Or good.

Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminution.\(^{59}\)
According to other Schools, the mind of the Buddhas is never neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sūtra says, "The Nāga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated."

The Vaibhāṣikas say: The Sūtra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks.] But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral dharmas: dharmas of retribution (vipākaja), dharmas related to attitudes (īryāpatha), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nir-māṇacitta) (ii.66).

We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral.

12d. That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.

The mind that has arisen from retribution (vipākaja, i. 36, ii.60, iv.85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover.]

Is the vijñāpti good, bad, or neutral, 1.) according to the characteristics of the agent, or 2.) according to the characteristic of its mover?

To what does this question lead?

i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,—personalism, and past-and-future-of-the-personality—are the agent (iv.lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the vijñāpti to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kāmadhātu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv.8b).] If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv.lla-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas satkāyadṛṣṭi and the antāgrāhadrṛṣṭi are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.

Second hypothesis. The vijñāpti through which a person undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind.

ii. The Vaibhāṣikas answer. The vijñāpti is of the same nature as its
agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (vijñāpti), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by vicāra and by vitarka, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad. From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (vijñāpti) of the same nature.

iii. But if the action (vijñāpti) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv.10a-b) of the Sūtra does not hold. You have said in effect that the Sūtra considers a "wrong view" (drṣṭi) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of vijñāpti, the Sūtra contradicts neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender vijñāpti, nor its corollary that, in Kāmadhātu, there is no vijñāpti of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sūtra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (vijñāpti), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.

This is enough on this point which has been defined above (i.11, iv.3d).

13a-b. Avijñāpti is threefold, discipline (saṁvara), un-discipline (asaṁvara), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.

It is of three types, 1.) saṁvara, discipline, so called because it constrains the flux of immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2.) asaṁvara, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv.24c-d), and 3.) naivasaṁvaranaasaṁvara, [an avijñāpti which has neither the characteristic of saṁvara nor asaṁvara.]

13c-d. Prātimokṣa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from dhyāna.

There are three types of discipline: 1.) the discipline called
Prātimokṣa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, the morality of beings of this world; 2.) the discipline produced through dhyāna is morality of the sphere of Rūpadhātu; and 3.) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.

[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines?]

14a. The Prātimokṣa is of eight types.

It includes the discipline of the Bhikṣu, the Bhikṣuṇī, the Śīkṣamāṇa,62 the Śrāmāṇera (novice), the Śrāmaṇerikā, the Upāsaka (pious layman, iv.30), the Upāsikā, and the Upavāsastha ("faster," iv.28). These eight disciplines are the Prātimokṣa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Prātimokṣa is of eight types.

14b. In substance however, the Prātimokṣa is of four types.

Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhikṣu, the Śrāmaṇera, the Upāsaka and the Upavāsastha.

In fact, the discipline of the Bhikṣuṇī does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhikṣu; the discipline of the Śīkṣamāṇa and the Śrāmaṇerikā do not differ from the discipline of the Śrāmaṇera; and the discipline of the Upāsikā does not differ from that of the Upāsaka.

14c. The name changes with the gender.

Unga is vyañjana, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhikṣu, Bhikṣuṇī, etc., differ.

When their gender is modified, the Bhikṣu becomes a Bhikṣuṇī; the Bhikṣuṇī, a Bhikṣu; the Śrāmaṇera, a Śrāmaṇerikā; the Śrāmaṇerikā, like the Śīkṣamāṇa, becomes a Śrāmaṇera; the Upāsaka, an Upāsikā; and the Upāsikā, an Upāsaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new one; the change of gender cannot have this influence.63 Thus the four female disciplines are indetical with the three male disciplines.

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When the disciplines are undertaken successively,—i.e., the discipline of the Upāsaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Śramaṇera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhikṣu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,—do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (virati, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?

14d. [The disciplines exist] separately.

They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all—Upāsakas, Śramaṇeras and Bhikṣus all renounce (virati) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors—the three disciplines have some distinct characteristics.

Their differences lie in the difference of the occasions (nidāna) of transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of occasions of intoxication-pride (mada, ii.33c-d) and of non-diligence (pramādasthāna, ii.26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of occasions of transgression, killing, etc. Consequently the three series of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upāsaka and Śramaṇera were integral to the discipline of a Bhikṣu, then the Bhikṣu who renounces the discipline of a Bhikṣu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.

14d. But they do not contradict one another.

They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does not abandon the preceding ones. Thus the fact that a Bhikṣu who renounces his quality of Bhikṣu remains in possession of the discipline of Upāsaka and Śramaṇera is explained.

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How does one become an Upāsaka, an Upavāsastha, a Śramaṇera, or a Bhikṣu?
15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of the eight, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the quality of Upāsaka, Upavāsastha, Śrāmaṇera, and Bhikṣu.\(^{67}\)

1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upāsaka.

2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2. stealing, 3. unchastity, 4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents, garlands, and unguents; dances, songs, music;\(^{68}\) 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8. meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavāsastha.

3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Śrāmaṇera. These make ten items, for one counts “scents, garlands, and unguents” separately from “dances, songs, and music.”

4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhikṣu.

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The Pratimokṣa discipline is

16a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.

1. It is morality (sīla),\(^{69}\) because it redresses that which is “unjust,” for transgressors conduct themselves in an unjust manner with regard to beings. Etymologically, because it cools (Śī), as it says in the stanza, “Happy is the undertaking of morality, because morality does not burn.”

2. Good conduct, because it is praised by the wise.

3. Action (karma), because it is action (kriya) by nature.

Objection. Does not the Sūtra say that avijñāpti is “not doing” (akarana) (see above p. 560, 562)? How can avijñāpti be action?

Without doubt, the avijñāpti makes the disciple, endowed with shame, to abstain from transgression; it is thus “not doing.” But it is action, according to the etymology kriyata iti kriya: it is doing (kriyate) either by a bodily-vocal action (vijñāpti), or by the mind (citta).\(^{70}\)

According to others, avijñāpti is action because it is the cause and the
effect of an action.  

4. Discipline (*samvara*), because it disciplines or constrains the body and the voice.

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The expression "Prātimokṣa discipline" designates all Prātimokṣa discipline since its origin.

16c-d. The Prātimokṣa is the first *vijñapti* and the first *avijñapti*; these are courses of action (*karmapatha*).

1. The expression "Prātimokṣa" designates the first *vijñapti* and the first *avijñapti* of the undertaking of the discipline.

The Prātimokṣa is called *prātimokṣa*, for through it there takes place *pratimokṣana*, that is, the abandoning of transgression: such is the efficacy of the first moment (*vijñapti* and *avijñapti*) of the undertaking of discipline.

2. This *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* are also "Prātimokṣa discipline" because they discipline the body and the voice.

3. They are courses of action, that is "courses of action properly so called" (*maula*, iv.66).

There is no longer any Prātimokṣa in the moment which follows the first moment and in the moments which follow, for the transgression is not rejected (*pratimokṣyate*) by the second moment, having been rejected (*pratimokṣita*) by the first; there is *pratimokṣasamvara*, that is, discipline "of the Prātimokṣa type" or discipline "arisen from Prātimokṣa;" there are no longer courses of action properly so-called, but solely "consecutive action" (iv. 68).

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Who possesses each of the three disciplines?

17a. Eight persons possess the Prātimokṣa.

Eight persons, the Bhikṣu, Bhikṣunī... the Upavāsātha, possess the Prātimokṣa discipline.

Does this mean that non-Buddhists cannot possess a morality that they have undertaken?
They can possess a morality, but they cannot possess the Prātimokṣa discipline. In fact, the morality that they undertake ("I shall abstain from killing," etc.), rests on an idea of existence; even when they have in view, not a heavenly existence, but that which they call "deliverance" (mokṣa), they conceive of deliverance as a certain type of existence. Hence transgression is not absolutely "rejected" by them, nor can they be "released" through the discipline they have undertaken.

17b. He who possesses dhyāna possesses the discipline which arises from dhyāna.

"Which arises from dhyāna" (dhyānaja), that is, which arises from dhyāna (ablative) or by means of dhyāna (instrumental).

Dhyāna, means not only the Four Principal (maula) Dhyānas, but also the absorptions which are close to them (sāmantaka, viii. 22a). In the same way, when one says, "There is a field of rice or a field of wheat in this village," one means the village and its environs.

17c. The Āryans possess pure discipline.75

The Āryans,—the Śaikṣas and Aśaikṣas,—possess pure discipline (iv. 26b-c).

17d. The last two disciplines are concomitants of the mind.

The discipline that arises from dhyāna and the pure discipline are concomitants of the mind; not of the Prātimokṣa discipline, for this latter continues to exist in a person whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (anyacittācittaka, i. 11).

18a-b. Arising in the ānantaryamārgas, in anāgamya, they are called "abandoning." 76
In the nine ānantaryamārgas of anāgamyā these two disciplines, the
discipline of dhyāna and pure discipline, are “abandoning disciplines”
(prahānasamvarā=abandoning and discipline), for through them one
abandons immorality and the defilements which produce them
(iv.122a).

There are thus disciplines arisen from dhyāna which are not
abandoning-discipline. Four cases:

i. Discipline arising from dhyāna, impure, with the exception of
what arises from the ānantaryamārgas of anāgamyā: discipline arisen
from dhyāna which is not abandoning;

ii. Pure discipline obtained in the ānantaryamārgas of anāgamyā:
abandoning, but not discipline arisen from dhyāna;

iii. Impure discipline in the ānantaryamārgas of anāgamyā: dis­
cipline arisen from dhyāna which is abandoning;

iv. Pure discipline arisen outside of the ānantaryamārgas of
anāgamyā: discipline not arisen from dhyāna which is not abandoning.

According to the same principles, one would establish four cases
relative to pure discipline which is not abandoning, to abandoning
which is not pure discipline, etc. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 231a13)

***

The Blessed One said, “Good is discipline of the body, discipline of
the voice, discipline of the mind, discipline in all things;”77 and again,
“He lives disciplined through the discipline of the organ of sight.”78
What is the nature of these two disciplines, discipline of the mind, and
discipline of the organs?

Neither are, by their nature avijñapti of śīla. But on the contrary,

18c-d. Discipline of the mind and discipline of the organs are,
each of them, two things: attentive consciousness and
mindfulness.79

In order that the reader should not come to believe that the first
discipline is consciousness (samprajāna) and the second mindfulness
(smṛti), the author says that each of them is two things.80

***
Let us examine who possesses \textit{vijn\=apti} and \textit{avijn\=apti}, and to what period these belong in each case (iv.19-22, 23-24b).\textsuperscript{81}

19a-c. He who is in Pr\=atimok\=sa always possesses \textit{avijn\=apti} of the present moment, as long as the does not reject the \textit{avijn\=apti}.

As we have said previously the person who dwells in the Pr\=atimok\=sa discipline (iv.14a), always possesses present \textit{avijn\=apti} as long as he does not reject the \textit{avijn\=apti} which constitutes this discipline (iv.38).

19c-d. After the first moment, he also possesses \textit{avijn\=apti}.

After the first moment, which is designated by the expression Pr\=atimok\=sa (iv.16c-d), he also possesses earlier, past \textit{avijn\=apti}: this of course, as long as he does not reject the discipline.\textsuperscript{82}

As he who dwells in the Pr\=atimok\=sa discipline,

20a. So too is he who dwells in undiscipline.

He who dwells in undiscipline (\textit{asam\=varastha}, iv.24c-d), always possesses \textit{avijn\=apti} of the present moment as long as he does not reject it; [he also possesses \textit{avijn\=apti} of the past, and from the second moment on, of undiscipline.]

20b-c. He who possesses discipline arisen from \textit{dhy\=ana} always possesses past and future \textit{avijn\=apti}.

He who possesses the discipline arisen from \textit{dhy\=ana} always possesses \textit{avijn\=apti} of the past, and \textit{avijn\=apti} of the future as long as he does not lose it, [for the \textit{avijn\=apti} in question—namely the discipline arisen from \textit{dhy\=ana}—accompanies the mind (iv.17d).]

From the first moment when he acquires the discipline of \textit{dhy\=ana}, he takes possession of the discipline of former \textit{dhy\=anas}, either of this existence, or of a previous existence, that he had lost.

20c-d. The \={A}ryan, at the first moment, does not posses past \textit{avijn\=apti}.

The \={A}ryan possesses pure \textit{avijn\=apti}, which constitutes his pure discipline, in the manner in which he who possesses the discipline arisen from \textit{dhy\=ana} possesses the \textit{avijn\=apti} arisen from \textit{dhy\=ana}: he
possesses his past and future \textit{avijnapti}; but with the difference that, when in the first moment of the Way he takes possession of pure \textit{avijnapti} for the first time, he cannot, evidently, possess pure \textit{avijnapti} of the past.

21a-b. The person who is in a state of absorption, the person who is placed in the Way, possesses \textit{avijnapti} of the present moment.\textsuperscript{83}

The person who is absorbed (\textit{samābīta}), the person who is cultivating the Way (\textit{āryamārgam samāpannaḥ}), possesses, at present, the \textit{avijnapti} which is proper to him, arisen from dhyāna, and pure. But when he leaves the absorption, he does not [possess this present \textit{avijnapti}, for this \textit{avijnapti} only accompanies an absorbed mind.]

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As for the intermediary (\textit{madhyastha}) [the person presently in neither-discipline-nor-undiscipline, who does not posses discipline like the Bhikṣu, nor undiscipline like the transgressor:]

21b-c. The intermediary, at the first moment, possesses, medially, \textit{avijnapti}, when the \textit{avijnapti} is produced.

Medially (\textit{madhya}) means the present, situated between the past and the future.

Action (\textit{avijnapti}) does not necessarily produce \textit{avijnapti}. The intermediary does not necessarily possess \textit{avijnapti}: if there is \textit{avijnapti}—either \textit{avijnapti} created by an act of immorality (killing, etc.), or \textit{avijnapti} created by an act of morality (abstention from killing), or \textit{avijnapti} is created by some other good or bad acts, the worship of a Stūpa, hitting and wounding—he possesses this \textit{avijnapti}, of the present, at the moment when it arises.

21d. Afterwards, [he possesses \textit{avijnapti}] of the present and the past.

[until the moment he rejects it.]
Can a disciplined person possess bad *avijnāpti*? Can an undisciplined person possess good *avijnāpti*? And how long does the *avijnāpti* last in these two cases?

22. As long as he is endowed with faith or with very active defilements, the undisciplined person possesses good *avijnāpti*, and the disciplined person possesses bad *avijnāpti*.

As long as there continues, in an undisciplined person, the strength of faith by which, accomplishing actions such as the worship of a Stūpa, he has created good *avijnāpti*; as long as there continues, in a disciplined person, the power of the defilements by which, accomplishing actions such as killing, hitting, binding, he has created bad *avijnāpti*, good or bad *avijnāpti* continues.

At the moment of the action in question, the agent possesses *avijnāpti* of the present; then he possesses *avijnāpti* of the present and of the past.

23a-b. Those who have created one *vijnāpti* possess it always, in the present.

All those who accomplish a bodily or vocal action (*vijnāpti*) whether they are disciplined, undisciplined, or intermediaries, so long as they are accomplishing this action, possess it in the present.

23c-d. From the second moment onward, they possess *vijnāpti* of the past, until the moment when they give it up.

From the second moment onward, that is, after the first moment. 84

23d. One cannot possess future *vijnāpti*.

No one possesses future *vijnāpti*, because such *vijnāpti* does not now accompany the mind.

24a-b. One does not possess past *vijnāpti* of the *nivṛtta* and *anivṛtta* classes.

[That is to say the defiled-neutral and undefiled-neutral actions (see ii.66 and foll.).]

One does not possess these actions, once they are past, because the possession (*prāpti*) of a weak *dharma*, being weak itself, is not
prolonged.

Why is this dharma, a neutral action, weak?
By reason of the weakness of the mind which gives rise to it.
But then the possession (prāpti) of this mind too will not be prolonged.

No: the case is not the same. The vijñāpti, in effect, is stupid, for it
does not know an object; furthermore it is dependent, for it depends
upon the mind. Such is not the case with the mind itself. Thus the
vijñāpti produced by a neutral mind is weaker than this mind itself; the
possession (prāpti) of the vijñāpti is not prolonged, whereas the
possession of the mind is prolonged.

***

We have spoken of an undisciplined person, one who is in
undiscipline. What is undiscipline (asamśvara)?

24c-d. Undiscipline, bad conduct, immorality, action, course of
action.

1. It is undiscipline, because there is no constraining of the body and
voice.
2. It is bad conduct, because it is blamed by wise men, and because it
produces painful results.
3. It is immorality, because it opposes morality (iv.122).
4. It is an action, as it is created by the body and the voice.
5. It is a course of action, as it is included in the principal action
(maula-samgrha-tatvāt, iv.68). 85

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He who possesses vijñāpti can also possess avijñāpti. Four cases
present themselves.

25a-b. The intermediary, acting with a weak volition, possesses
a single vijñāpti.

He who is in neither-discipline-nor-nondiscipline and who, with a
weak volition, does good or bad action (vijñāpti), possesses solely this
act (vijñāpī), and does not possess any avijñāpī. All the more reason that there is no possession of avijñāpī by an agent when his action is neutral (avyākṛta).

Nevertheless, even accomplished with a weak volition, 1.) material meritorious works (aupadbikapunyakriyāvastu, iv.112) and 2.) a course of action (iv.68) always create avijñāpī.

25c-d. The Āryan possesses a single avijñāpī when he has not produced, or has abandoned, the vijñāpī.

When an Āryan has changed his existence or when he has not created vijñāpī (for example when he is in an embryonic state or when he is reborn in Ārupyadhātu), or when he has lost the vijñāpī (the vijñāpī created with a neutral volition), he possesses only avijñāpī (pure avijñāpī acquired in the previous existence), and not vijñāpī.

The two other cases, the possession of vijñāpī and avijñāpī, and the non-possession of either, are set up according to the same principles.

***

How does one acquire the disciplines?

26a-b. The discipline that arises from dhyāna is acquired by one thought of the sphere of the dhyāna.

It is through one thought of the sphere of the dhyāna, that is, of the mauladhyāna (the Four Dhyānas) and the sāmantakas (the four absorptions which proceed the Four Dhyānas), and with an impure mind, that is, with a mind not forming part of the Way, that the discipline of dhyāna is acquired: this is a discipline concomitant with this type of mind.

26b-c. Pure discipline, by the same mind, when it is Āryan.

"Āryan" means pure, forming part of the Way (iv.17c).

We will explain below (viii.22) that the Āryan mind exists in six spheres of dhyāna, namely the Four Dhyānas, the dhyānāntaras and the anāgamya (the first sāmantaka).
26c-d. That which is called Prātimokṣa, through paravijñāpana, etc.

"Paravijñāpana" is informative action to or from another: the candidate makes known something to another, and another makes something known to him. “Another” is the Saṅgha, through the acquisition of the disciplines of Bhikṣu, Bhikṣuṇī, or Śikṣamāṇa; or a person (puḍgala), the acquisition of the five other prātimokṣa disciplines.

According to Vinaya scholars of the Vaibhāṣika School, there are six types of ordination. In order to include them all within his definition, the author says, "... from the information of another et cetera."

1. Ordination by oneself, in the case of the Buddha and the Pratyekabuddhas.
2. Through entry into the Path (niyāmāvakrānti, vi.26a), in the case of the Five, that is to say of Ājñataκauṇḍinya and his companions.
3. Through the summons, “Come, Oh Bhikṣu!,” in the case of Ājñata.
4. By recognizing the Blessed One as master, as in the case of Mahākāśyapa.
5. By satisfying the Blessed One through one’s answers, as in the case of Sodāyin.
6. By accepting the special obligation of monks and nuns, as in the case of Mahāprajāpati.
7. By a messenger, as in the case of Dharmadinnā.
8. By an official action as the fifth, that is, ordination before a Saṅgha of five Bhikṣus, as in frontier lands.
9. By ten Bhikṣus, as in Madhyadeśa.
10. By repeating three times the formula of Refuge, as in the case of the sixty Bhadravargas, ordained in a group.

One sees that, according to these scholars, the Prātimokṣa discipline is not necessarily acquired by means of a viñāpti, for example the ordination of the Buddha, etc.

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When one undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline, for how long a time does one undertakes it?
27a-b. One undertakes the discipline for a lifetime or for a day and a night.  

The first seven categories of the Prātimokṣa discipline are undertaken for a lifetime; the fasting discipline (upavāsastha) is undertaken for a day and a night. Such is the rule.

Why?

Because there are two limits of time, the period of a lifetime, and the period of a day and a night. As for the fortnight and the other durations of time, they consist in additions of day and night periods.

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What is the dharma that we term "time" (kāla)?

This is not an eternal substance (padārtha), as some believe. The word "time" is an expression by which the samskāras are designated as past, present, or future (17, v. 25).

When it is light in the four continents, it is daytime; when it is dark it is night (iii.80c).

Discussion: We admit, say the Sautrāntikas, that the Prātimokṣa discipline is solely produced for the duration of a lifetime. In fact, even if one were to undertake to observe these rules in a future life, one would not now produce this discipline for this other life: 1. the person (āśraya) that one would become, would be different (see nikāyasabhāga, ii.41); 2. this new person would not be able to apply himself to the rules undertaken; and 3. he would not remember undertaking them. But if a person assumes the duties of a faster for more than a day and a night,—for five days, or for ten days,—what obstacle would this be to his producing in himself many disciplines of the fast?

It needs be that there would be an obstacle since the Blessed One, in a Sūtra, says that one undertakes the fast for a day and a night.

Why did the Blessed One express himself in this manner: did he think that the discipline of fasting could not be produced for a longer duration?

He thought that persons in whom the senses are difficult to subdue would be well capable of undertaking the fast for a day and a night. But, in truth, nothing is wrong with producing the discipline of the fast for more than one day.
As the Blessed One does not speak of the fast as lasting any longer, the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit this manner of viewing the matter.

***

What is the duration of undiscipline (asamvara).

27c. There is undiscipline for a day and a night.

Undiscipline never last longer than a day and a night, like the discipline of the fast, for it is produced by the acceptance of transgression for one's entire life.

How is this?

27d. For, says the School, one does not undertake it thus. 101

No one undertakes undiscipline in the manner in which one undertakes the fast, by saying, "I wish to remain a day and a night in undiscipline." Rather, he carries out, in effect, shameful actions.

Objection: No one undertakes undiscipline by saying, "I wish to remain for my life undisciplined." Thus one does not undertake undiscipline for an entire lifetime.

Answer: It is not in this manner, in fact, that one undertakes undiscipline. One does not undertake undiscipline by means of a ritual. One acquires undiscipline by acting with the intention of always acting badly; one does not acquire undiscipline by the intention of acting badly for a time. In the case of the fast, the intention is not "for always;" nevertheless one obtains the discipline through the force of the action which consists of saying, "I wish to remain a day and a night in the discipline of the fast," and one accomplishes this action because one desires to acquire this discipline. If someone desires undiscipline, he could without doubt give himself over to undiscipline for this period of time. But the case does not present itself; hence we do not recognize undiscipline "for a time."

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According to the Sautrāntikas, undiscipline does not exist in and of itself (dravyatās) apart from volition. Undiscipline is the intention to
commit evil, that is, a certain volition with the traces which allow this volition. And, as long as this volition with its traces has not been destroyed by a contrary volition, the person, even when he has a good thought, remains filled with undiscipline, a person undisciplined.

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How should one undertake the discipline of a day and a night, or the discipline of the fast? 102

28. One should undertake the fast (upavāsa) in a humble attitude, speaking after, with ornaments removed, until the morrow, complete, the morning, from another. 103

1. In a humble attitude, squatting or kneeling; with the hands joined in kapotaka (by placing the four fingers of one hand between the thumb and the index finder of the other) or in the position of aṇjali; except in the case of sickness. Without a respectful attitude, discipline is not produced.

2. The candidate does not speak before the ordainer or the giver, the person who “gives” the fast; nor at the same time. In this way, it is from another that one undertakes the fast; otherwise, there would be neither receiving nor a thing received. 104

3. The candidate does not wear any ornaments; he wears his normal dress, because he does not draw forth vanity from it. 105

4. One undertakes it until the morrow, until the rising of the sun.

5. One undertakes the complete fast, with its eight rules, and not with any rules missing (Takakuku, I-ťıng, p. 188; Chavannes, Cinq centes contes, p. 136).

6. The morrow, at the rising of the sun, since this is a discipline lasting a day and a night (Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 647b29).

He who, previously, has formed the undertaking, “I will always practice the fast, the eighth day of the fortnight, etc.,” undertakes the fast, even though he eats. 106

7. From another, nor from oneself. If one encounters a cause of transgression, through honesty with regard to the giver, he will not violate the obligations undertaken.

When these rules are not observed, one has nevertheless done a
good action (sucarita), but one does not obtain the discipline of the fast. When the rules are observed, the fast is even more useful for the person who commits transgressions by day and by night (hunting, murder, stealing, adultery).

i. The fast is termed upavāsa, because, embracing a way of life conforming to that of the Arhats, he places himself near (upa) the Arhats. According to another opinion, it is because he places himself near the "lifelong discipline" (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 648c29).

ii. It has for its end procuring an increase of the roots of good of persons who have only small roots of good. As it procures (dbhā) an increase (poṣa) of good, the Blessed One said, "It is called poṣadha."  

***

Why is the discipline of the fast undertaken with eight parts?

29a-c. Part of morality (śīla), part of vigilence (apramāda), parts of ascetic vows (vrata), have respectively four, one, three parts.

Four parts,—the renouncing of killing, stealing, adultery and lying,—constitute the parts of morality (śīlāṅga) by which what is transgression by nature is abandoned.

One part, the renouncing of intoxicating drinks, constitutes the rule of vigilence by which non-vigilence is arrested. For even if a person who has undertaken morality drinks intoxicating liquor, he will be non-vigilent. (ii.25-26, iv.34c-d).

Three parts,—the renouncing of high beds, music, etc., and meals at forbidden times,—constitute the rule of asceticism, for they are favorable and conform to disgust.

***

What necessity is there for undertaking the rules of vigilence and of asceticism?

29d. In order to avoid weakness of mindfulness and arrogance.

When one drinks intoxicating liquor, one loses one's mindfulness of what one should and should not do. When one uses high and wide beds, when one attends dances, singing and music, the mind becomes
arrogant. In both cases, one is not far from violating morality.

When one observes the rule of eating at the proper times, and when one avoids eating outside of this time, one retains a mindfulness of the obligations of the fast, and disgust is produced. In the absence of the eighth rule, mindfulness and disgust would be absent.

***

i. According to certain masters, the fast or upavāsa consists of the fast proper, and the renouncing of food at forbidden times; whereas the other renouncings are the rules or parts of the fast (upavāsāṅga). The abstention from food is not a part; thus, with an end to the obtaining the number of eight parts, one should distinguish two parts in the seventh rule; first, the renouncing of dancing, singing, and music; and the second, the renouncing of perfumes, garlands, and unguents.

This interpretation is not in accord with the Sūtra, [say the Sautrāntikas]; for, according to the Sūtra, immediately after the renouncing of meals at forbidden times, the faster should say, “By these eight rules, I imitate the rule, I conform myself to the rule of the Āryans, the Arhats.”

ii. Then what would the fast be, distinct from its rules, and yet embracing eight parts?

According to the Sautrāntikas, it is the very collection of parts which one says possesses parts; it is to this very collection that one attributes parts. The expression, “a fast having eight parts” should be understood in the same way as the expressions, “a part of a carriage,” “a four-part army” (caturāṅgabala), or “a powder made up of five parts” (pañcāṅgapīṭa).

iii. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the abstaining from food at forbidden times is at one and the same time the fast and a part of the fast. In the same way that Right Views (samyagdrṣṭi) are at one and the same time the Path and a part of the Path (mārgāṅga); in the same way that Investigation into the Dharmas (dbharmapravicaya) is at one and the same time Bodhi and a part of Bodhi (vi.68); and in the same way that Samādhi is at one and the same time dhyāna and a part of dhyāna (viii.7-8).

iv. But we would say [with the Sautrāntikas] that it is impossible for
Right Views, Investigation into the Dharmas, and Samādhi to be parts of themselves. Would you say that earlier Right Views, etc., are parts of later Right Views, etc.? This would be to admit that the first moment of the Path does not have eight parts. This would be to admit that the last moment of the parts of Bodhi is itself not a part.  

***

Is the possession of the discipline of the fast kept only by Upāsakas?  

30a-b. Others can possess the fast, but not without taking the Refuges.

When a person who is not a Upāsaka, takes, in the same day and night, the Three Refuges before he undertakes the rules of the fast, then the discipline of the fast is produced within him. But not without taking the Refuges; on the condition that there has been no error, etc. (iv.31d).

The Mahānāma-sūtra says, “Oh Mahānāma, the layman with white clothes, male and possessing the male organ, who, after having taken refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Saṅgha, pronounces these words, 'Consider me as an Upāsaka:' only through this does he become an Upāsaka.” Does this mean that one becomes an Upāsaka by only taking the Three Refuges?

The Aparāntakas answer yes. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 645c19).

The Kaśmīreans affirm that one cannot be an Upāsaka when one does not possess the Upāsaka discipline.

But does this not contradict the Sūtra?

No. Because

30c-d. The discipline is produced through the fact that he accepts the qualities of an Upāsaka.

The discipline of the Upāsaka is produced in him by the mere acceptance of the quality of the Upāsaka, when he says, “Consider me, from today onwards, for the rest of my life, as a prānāpeta Upāsaka.”

[What is the meaning of the expression prānāpeta?]

One should understand, prānātītipātāpeta through ellipsis, as free from killing, having renounced killing (see below, note 127).
Thus, by accepting the quality of an Upāsaka, one undertakes the discipline [since one shows himself as having renounced killing]. Yet, in order that he understands the points of the rule (śīksāpada),

30d. One explains them to him, as is also the case for a Bhikṣu.

Through an ecclesiastical action the Bhikṣu has acquired the discipline of the Bhikṣu: yet he is made to undertake the most important rules: “You are to abstain from this, from that. Your co-religionists will tell you the rest.” The same holds for the Śrāmaṇera. The same holds for the Upāsaka: he obtains the discipline by undertaking once, twice, three time the Three Refuges; he is then made to undertake the rules, “Abandoning killing, I renounce killing.” Thus one is not an Upāsaka without possessing the discipline of the Upāsaka.

31a-b. If all Upāsakas possess the discipline of the Upāsaka, how can an Upāsaka be an ekadeśakārin, etc.? If all Upāsakas place themselves within the discipline of the Upāsaka, why did the Blessed One describe four types of Upāsakas, the Upāsaka of one rule (ekadeśakārin), of two rules (pradeśakārin), of three or four rules (yadbhūyaskārin), and of five rules (paripūrṇa-kārin)?

31c. These terms, say the School, refer to the fact of observing the rules.

The Upāsaka who in fact observes one of the rules [of all which he has accepted] is said to practice (kar) this rule. [It should not be understood that the ekadeśakārin is an Upāsaka who undertakes to practice only a single rule]. Yet all the Upāsakas are equally placed within this discipline.

The Sautrāntikas object: Your doctrine contradicts the Sūtra. In what way does it contradict the Sūtra? i. You say that one acquires the discipline by the mere fact of accepting the quality of a prāṇāpeta Upāsaka, “Consider me ... as a prāṇāpeta Upāsaka.” But, such is not the text of the Sūtra. In fact, the Sūtra that interests us is the Mahānāma-sūtra which gives the definition of an Upāsaka, and not another Sūtra. And the Mahānāma-sūtra does not have the expression “prāṇāpeta.”
You hold that you are authorized by another Sūtra,\textsuperscript{125} which has, "From today, for the rest of my life, [consider me as an Upāsaka], risking my life (prānopeta),\textsuperscript{126} having taken refuge, believing perfectly (abhīprasanna)." Now this text refers to persons who have seen the Truths, who have acquired the faith of intelligence (avetyaprāśāda, vi. 73), and who, as a consequence, adhere to the Good Law even at the price of their lives: "We are incapable of abandoning the Dharma, even in order to save our lives." This text does not give a definition of the Upāsaka discipline.

Further, the expression prānopeta, upon which you establish your theory, is nowhere to be found, either in the Mahānāma-sūtra, nor the Drśtasatya-sūtra. Who could admit a similar expression the sense of which is lacking in precision?\textsuperscript{127} Who, based on faith in this expression, would admit that the Upāsaka has undertaken the five renouncings before he has undertaken them ritually?

ii. If the expression ekadeśakārīn designates a person who violates the discipline, the question raised in the Sūtra (note 122) is not justified, nor its answer. In fact, who is it that, being acquainted with the discipline of an Upāsaka and knowing that it is made up of five rules, would be incapable of explaining, "He who does not violate a rule observes a rule" and so on.

On the contrary, someone who does not know the extent of the discipline of an Upāsaka, seeing the persons capable of observing one, or two, or three, or all the rules, would he be able to pose the question, "What does one do to become an Upāsaka of all the rules?"

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: If one were an Upāsaka without possessing the discipline of an Upāsaka, one could also as well be a Bhikṣu or a Śrāmaṇera with an incomplete discipline.

Answer: How can we know the extent, the number of the rules of the disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Śrāmaṇera, or the Bhikṣu? Evidently through the teaching of the Master. Now the Master speaks of the Upāsaka not possessing the discipline in its entirety; but he does not speak of an incomplete discipline of the Bhikṣus or of the Śrāmaṇeras.\textsuperscript{128}

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr do not admit this opinion.

31d. All the disciplines are weak, etc., according to the mind.
The weakness, the mediocrity, and the force of the eight rules depend on the weakness, on the mediocrity, or on the force of the mind through which one has undertaken them.

But if such is the case, the Prātimokṣa discipline of an Arhat could be weak, and that of a Pṛthajāna could be strong.

Is one an Upāsaka if one solely undertakes the discipline (saṁvara) without undertaking the Refuges?

No; except in the case of ignorance by the person who gives and by the person who receives.

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When a person takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and in the Saṅgha, what does he take refuge in?

32. He who takes the Refuges takes refuge in the asaikṣa dharmaṇa which form the Buddha, in the two types of dharmaṇa which form the Saṅgha, and in Nirvāṇa.

i. He who takes Refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the dharmaṇa of the Arhat which form a Buddha, the dharmaṇa which are the causes of the designation “Buddha,” that is, the dharmaṇa by reason of which, as principle cause, a certain person is called a Buddha; or rather the dharmaṇa by the acquisition of which a certain person, understanding all things, is called a Buddha. These dharmaṇa are the Knowledge of Extinction (kṣayajñāna), the Knowledge of Nonarising (anutpāda- jñāna) and Right Views (samyagdṛṣṭi) (vi.50, 67) with the dharmaṇa which accompany these jñānas, that is, with the five pure skandhas.

As for the material body (rupakāya) of the Buddha, that is not subject to modification through the acquisition of the quality of Buddha. Thus one does not take refuge in the material body of the Buddha which is, in fact, the material body of the Bodhisattva.

Does one take refuge in all the Buddhas or in one Buddha?

According to the nature of things, and in the absence of an explicit declaration, in all the Buddhas. For the Buddhas have always followed the same path, a worldly path and a transworldly path (vii.34).

ii. He who takes Refuge in the Saṅgha takes refuge in both the saikṣa and the asaikṣa dharmaṇa, of the non-Arhat and of the Arhat,
which form the Saṅgha, that is, the dharmas through the acquisition of which the Eight Saints become a Saṅgha; becoming unanimous they cannot be divided with regard to that which concerns the Path.

Does one take refuge in all the Saṅghas or in one Saṅgha?

According to the nature of things, in all: for the Path followed by the Saints is always the same. Without doubt, the Buddha said to the two merchants, "Also take refuge in the Saṅgha which shall exist in the future," but the Master expressed himself in this manner in order to exhaust the qualities of the Jewel of the Saṅgha which would soon be visible to the merchants.

iii. He who takes Refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in Nirvāṇa, that is to say, in pratisamkhyānirodha (i.5, ii.55d). He takes refuge in all Nirvāṇa, for Nirvāṇa has for its unique characteristic the cessation of the defilements and suffering of oneself and others (see vi. 73c, the meaning of the word dharma in dharma avetyāprasāda).

iv. Discussion.

If the Buddha is none other than the asaikṣa dharmas, the dharmas pertaining to an Arhat, how could the fact of wounding the Buddha with a bad thought constitute a mortal transgression (iv. 96)?

The Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 177b8) answer: "When one wounds the material elements which are the support of these dharmas, these dharmas themselves suffer injury."

But the Śāstra (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 177a27) does not say that the Buddha is solely asaikṣa dharmas. It says that the Buddha is the dharmas that form a Buddha, that is to say, either the worldly or transworldly dharmas which are the object of the designation "Buddha," are the Buddha. Thus the Śāstra does not deny that the āsraya—the organism, the support made up of the five worldly skandhas—forms part of the quality of Buddha. Hence the objection taken from wounding the Buddha is without value.

If it were otherwise, if the Buddha was only asaikṣa dharmas, and if the Saṅgha (that is, the Saints, Saiksas and Arhats) were only saikṣa and asaikṣa dharmas, a person whose mind is presently "worldly" would not be able to be either a Buddha or a Saṅgha. And by virtue of these same principles, one would have to say that a Bhikṣu is only morality, the discipline of a Bhikṣu.

But, say the Vaibhāṣikas, if the body is, itself, among the dharmas
which form the Buddha, why does the Śāstra say, "He who takes refuge in the Buddha, takes refuge in the *asaikṣa dharmas* which form the Buddha?"

We would answer: In the same way that one who honors Bhiksus, honors the morality which makes up the Bhiksus.

According to another opinion, one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the eighteen *āvenikadharmas* (vii.28) of the Buddha.

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What is the nature of the undertakings of the Refuges?
They are vocal *vijñāpti* (iv. 3d).^135^

What is the meaning of "Refuge" (*sarana*)?

The Three Refuges are so named because, by going to them for refuge one obtains definitive deliverance from all suffering.

The Blessed One said in fact, ^136^ "Tormented by fear, persons most frequently ^137^ take refuge in mountains, in forests, in woods, and in sacred trees. This is not a good ^138^ refuge, the supreme refuge; it is not by taking refuge in these that one is delivered from all suffering. But one who takes Refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, when one sees through wisdom the Four Noble Truths,—Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Holy Eightfold Path which leads to Nirvāṇa,—this is the good refuge, this is the supreme refuge; by taking refuge in this, one is delivered from all suffering."

This is why the undertaking of the Refuges is the enterance to the undertaking of all the rules of discipline.

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The other rules of discipline contain the renouncing of all sexual activity (*abrahmacaryavirati*); but the discipline of the Upāsaka only contains the renouncing of sexual misconduct (*kāmamithyācāra*, iv. 74). Why is this?

33a-b. Sexual misconduct, because it is much censured, because one easily abstains from it, because the Āryans have obtained abstention from it.
1. Sexual misconduct is much censured in the world because it is the corruption of another's wife, and because it leads to retribution in a painful realm of rebirth.

2. It is easy for householders to abstain from it, but it is difficult for them to abstain from all sexual activity: householders do not leave the world because they are not capable of difficult things. (Divya, 303).

3. The Āryans possess akaraṇasaṁvarava with regard to sexual misconduct, that is, they have obtained definite abstention from it; in fact, in their future existence, they will be incapable of violating this precept. Such is not the case concerning all sexual activity. As a consequence, the rules of discipline of the Upāsaka contain only the renunciation of sexual misconduct: it is inadmissible in fact that the Āryans, in a subsequent existence, would be capable of violating the discipline of an Upāsaka which could happen if this contained the renunciation of all sexual activity. Akaraṇasaṁvarava means akriyāniyama, (that is akriyāyam ekāntatā, the certain abstention from one action).139

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Has the man who marries after having undertaken the Upāsaka discipline, undertaken renouncing with regard to the woman whom he marries?

Yes, answer the Vaibhāṣikas; for, in the contrary hypothesis, this man would have undertaken a restraining discipline (prādesika, iv.36a-b).

But then this man violates the discipline when he gets married!

No:

33c-d. They have acquired it as they have accepted the discipline; they have not accepted it with regard to some persons.

They have acquired it as they have undertaken the discipline. They undertake it by saying, "I renounce sexual misconduct," that is, "I renounce all sexual activity with all prohibited females;" they do not undertake it by saying, "I shall refrain from all sexual activity with such persons."140 Consequently, they do not violate the discipline by getting married.
Among the transgression of speech, why does the renouncing of lying constitute one of the rules of the Upāsaka, whereas the renouncing of other transgressions of speech are omitted?

For the same reasons: because lying is much censured in the world, because householders abstain from it easily, and because the Āryans are not capable of lying; and also for a fourth reason:

34a-b. Because, having violated any other rule he would lie. ¹⁴¹

[If lying were not forbidden], he would lie when he violates any other rule, saying, "I have not done it." Consequently the Upāsaka should renounce lying, thinking, "I shall confess what I transgressed."

Why are not the transgressions of disobedience included in the discipline of the Upāsaka?

The question is not justified:

34c-d. One renounces strong liquor, which is a transgression of disobedience,

Why should the Upāsaka renounce a single transgression of disobedience and not others?

34d. In order that the other rules may be kept.

One who drinks strong liquor will not keep the other rules.

i. The Ābhidhārmikas maintain that strong liquor does not have the characteristic of being a transgression by its nature. A transgression by its nature is committed only by a person whose mind is defiled: now it happens that, as a remedy, one can drink strong liquor in a quantity where it is not inebriating. But the mind of one who drinks knowing that such a quantity is inebriating is defiled; the mind is not defiled when one drinks knowing that such a quantity is not inebriating.

ii. Such is not the opinion of the Vinayadharas. [According to them, strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.]
Chapter Four

1. To Upāli, who asked him, “How should one attend to illnesses?” the Blessed One answered, “Except, Upāli, by transgression of nature.” And, the Blessed One did not permit strong liquors to sick Śākyans: “Those who recognize me as their master should not drink any strong liquor, even a drop on the point of a blade of grass.” Since the Blessed One forbad only transgression by nature in the case of illness (as in the Upālīsūtra) and yet does not permit strong liquor, it is clear that strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.

2. The Āryans, even in a following existence, do not drink strong liquor, not any more than they would commit the other transgressions of nature, killing, etc.

3. Scripture,—the Nandikasūtra and elsewhere,—places strong liquor among the misdeeds of the body.

iii. The Ābhīdhārmikas answer:

1. In general, the transgression of disobedience is permitted to the ill, as the answer to Upāli proves. But strong liquor is an exception: though solely a transgression of disobedience, it is forbidden to the ill, and this with a view to preventing the unpleasant consequence of strong liquor, because its inebriating quantity is undetermined.

2. If the Āryans certainly abstain from strong liquor, it is not because it is a transgression by its very nature, but because they are filled with the force of modesty; [if they do not drink in secret], this is because strong liquor makes mindfulness fail; even if they do not drink a drop, this is because the inebriating quantity is not determined, as for poison.

3. Scripture considers strong liquor as a bodily misdeed, because strong liquor is a “cause of non-vigilance.” In fact, the rule of training relative to strong liquor includes the expression, “Abandoning the pramādasthāna which is strong liquor, surā and maireya, I renounce pramādasthāna . . .” This is not the case for the other transgressions: one does not say “I renounce the pramādasthāna which is killing,” and that is because the other transgressions are transgressions by their very nature.

The Scripture says that one is reborn in hell through the practice of strong liquor. As a consequence of strong liquor, there is continual activity of a series of bad thoughts; from whence, there is either projection of a new action retributable in hell, or else the entry into activity, at the moment of death, of an old action.
What is the meaning of the expression *surāmaireya madya-pramādasthāna*?\textsuperscript{153}

*Surā* is a fermented drink of rice; *maireya* is a fermented drink of various ingredients (sugar cane juice, etc.).

At a certain moment, the liquor is no longer inebriating; at a certain moment, it is no longer that: this is why the word *madya* (inebriating) has been added. Even the areca-nut, the paspale (*kodrava*, etc.) are termed *surā* and *maireya* when they inebriate.\textsuperscript{154}

Strong liquor is only a transgression of disobedience. The formula thus contains the words *pramādasthāna* in order to have one understand that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.

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Do the three discipline have the same object?

35a-b. One acquires the discipline of Kāmadhātu relative to all actions, relative to the two types of beings and to the two types of actions, relative to things of the present.

The discipline of Kāmadhātu is the Prātimokṣa discipline.

This discipline is relative to all actions, preparatory actions, actions themselves, and consecutive action (iv.68).\textsuperscript{155}

This discipline is relative to living beings and to non-living beings, for example persons and trees.

This discipline is relative to the transgressions by nature and to the transgression of disobedience, both of which are capable of relating to living beings (killing; touching the hand of a women when one is a monk) or to non-living beings (cutting the leaves of a tree; accepting gold when one is a monk).

This discipline is relative to things—*skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*—of the present, for the things of the past and of the future are neither living beings, nor non-living beings.\textsuperscript{156}

35c-d. One acquires the discipline of *dhyāna* and the pure
discipline relative to actions themselves and to things of the three time periods.

One acquires these two disciplines relative to actions themselves, not relative to preparatory actions or to consecutive action, and not relative to the transgression of disobedience; and relative to the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus of the past, present and future.

There are thus some skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus relative to which one acquires the Prātimokṣa discipline and not the two others. Four cases: 1. Preparatory and consecutive actions, transgressions of disobedience, of the present—alluded to by the Prātimokṣa. 2. Courses of action of the past and future—alluded to by the last two disciplines. 3. Courses of actions of the present—alluded to by the three disciplines. 4. Preparatory and consecutive actions of the past and the future, with regard to which one cannot undertake any of the three disciplines.

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Objection: It is not correct to say that one undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action of the present time: for, when one undertakes the discipline, no bad course of action is present relative to which one could undertake the discipline. One should say, "One undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action whose object is present." I can abstain from a future action relative to a person or to a thing existing at the present time, but I cannot abstain from a past or future action.

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Does one acquire discipline or undiscipline with regard to all beings, relative to all of their parts, and by reason of all causes?

36a-b. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings; one must distinguish regarding the parts and the causes.

1. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings, not with regard to only some of them.

The discipline of the Bhikṣu is acquired relative to all parts:
abstention from the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are acquired relative to four parts: abstention from killing, from stealing, from forbidden sexuality, from lying, for, by parts of the discipline, one should understand abstention from the courses of action.

If, by cause of the acquisition of discipline, one understands the three roots of good (non-desire, non-hatred, non-delusion), then the discipline is acquired by reason of all these causes. If one understands by cause—the cause of the origin, samutthāpaka (iv.9b)—the mind by which one acquires the discipline, then this cause is considered as threefold: strong mind, mediocre mind, weak mind. The discipline is acquired by reason of one of these three minds.

From this last point of view, four alternatives can be distinguished (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 608a20).

1. There is a person abiding in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, but not disciplined relative to all the parts, nor disciplined by reason of all causes: he who, through a strong, or mediocre, or weak mind, has acquired the discipline of the Upāsaka, the Upavāsastha or the Śramaṇera. 2. There is a person abiding in the discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings and relative to all the parts, but not disciplined by reason of all causes: he who has acquired the discipline of the Bhikṣu through a strong, mediocre, or weak mind. 3. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, relative to all the parts, by reason of all the causes: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Śramaṇera and the Bhikṣu through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong. 4. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, disciplined by reason of all the causes, but not disciplined relative to all the parts: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Upavāsastha and the Śramaṇera through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong.

No one abides in discipline who is not disciplined with regard to all beings: he acquires the discipline through a good mind having for its object all beings. The person who makes a restriction is not completely rid of the intention of transgression.

The Prātimokṣa discipline includes the absence of the fivefold restriction: 1. with regard to beings, "I renounce transgressions with regard to certain beings;" 2. with regard to parts of the discipline, "I
renounce certain actions;" 3. with regard to place, "I renounce committing transgressions in a certain place;" 4. with regard to time, "I renounce transgressions for a month;" 5. with regard to circumstances, "I renounce transgressions except in the case of a quarrel." He who undertakes such undertakings does not acquire the discipline; rather, he does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline. 157

ii. How can one acquire the discipline with regard to all beings? How can one acquire the discipline with regard to beings who are out of range, or with regard to beings whom one cannot kill?

Because, we believe, one acquires the discipline through the intention of not killing any being.

The Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 623b19, second masters) give a different explanation. If the discipline was acquired only with regard to beings who are within range, the discipline would be liable to augmentation and to diminution: for some humans, who are now within range, will be reborn as gods, which are out of range; and vice versa. The discipline would thus be acquired with regard to gods who become human, and lost with regard to humans who become gods, without there being any cause either of the acquisition, or of the loss of the discipline.

This argument does not move us: the transmigration of beings within range and out of range does not entail the augmentation or the diminution of the discipline. For the discipline that one undertakes with regard to grass neither increases nor diminishes when new grass arises, nor when old grass dries up.

The Vaibhāṣikas deny the value of this comparison. Grass exists after having been nonexistent, and no longer exists after having existed. Living beings, on the contrary, continue to exist, sometimes as humans, and sometimes as gods. Humans, becoming gods, only pass out of range, whereas grass is annihilated.

But when living beings enter into Nirvāṇa, they no longer exist, exactly like grass, so the discipline acquired with regard to living beings is subject to diminution. Thus the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas is invalid.

If one objects, "In the case where the Pratimokṣa discipline would be acquired with regard to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas would be reduced in comparison with that of former Buddhas, for it
would not be relative to beings who have already entered into Nirvāṇa, to former Buddhas and their disciples"; we would reply: all the Buddhas discipline all beings; and if former Buddhas were to exist again, later Buddhas would be disciplined by them.

36c-d. Undiscipline, with regard to all, relative to all parts, and not by reason of all causes.

One acquires undiscipline with regard to all beings and relative to all courses of action. No one is undisciplined with an incomplete undiscipline. One is not undisciplined by reason of all causes, undiscipline being undertaken by a weak, mediocre, or strong mind. Let us suppose that an undisciplined person has undertaken his undiscipline with a weak mind and commits a murder with a strong mind: his undiscipline remains weak, but he is adorned with a strong vijnapti, with a strong murder.

The term "undisciplined" is explained etymologically as one "who resides in undiscipline (asarnvara), one who possesses undiscipline."

The butchers of sheep, bird-catchers, the butchers of pigs, fisherman, hunters, bandits, executioners, jailers, elephant hunters, the slaughterers of dogs, and the vāgurikas are all undisciplined. It also holds that kings, office holders, judges, etc., are undisciplined.

A butcher of sheep (aurabhrika) is the person whose profession is to kill sheep (urabbra). The same etymology holds for the names of the other professions.

ii. We understand that discipline, undertaken with the intention of universal benevolence, would be acquired with regard to all beings. But the butchers of sheep do not have the intention of maltreating their parents, their children, or their servants; they would not want to kill them, even at the price of their lifes. How, [ask the Sautrāntikas], can one say that they are undisciplined with regard to all beings? (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 608b20).

The Vaibhāṣikas: Because they have the intention of killing with regard to their parents who have become sheep through transmigration.

But they do not kill their parents who have become sheep knowing that they are their parents! Furthermore, if their parents obtain the quality of an Āryan, these parents will not be reborn as sheep or as
animals: hence the butcher is not undisciplined with regard to them. Finally, the argument turns against you: if the butcher is undisciplined with regard to his present parents because he will kill his parents who have become sheep, one would say as well that he is not undisciplined with regard to some other sheep since he is not disposed to kill the sheep which are reborn as humans, as his own children.

The Vaibhāṣikas: He who has the intention to kill his parents who have become sheep is certainly undisciplined with regard to them.

But, [the Sautrāntikas say,] he who does not have the intention of killing the sheep who have become his children is certainly not undisciplined in their regard. Another point: how can the butcher who does not steal, who is not an adulterer, and who is mute, be undisciplined relative to all these transgressions?

The Vaibhāṣikas: Because his intention is perverted. A mute can express himself through gestures.

But what is there to say of a man who has accepted two or three parts of morality?

For the Vaibhāṣikas, nondiscipline is never incomplete, that is, relative only to certain parts; nor is it partial, that is, including restrictions (time, place, etc.) in the practice of a certain transgression.

For the Sautrāntikas, discipline and undiscipline with the exception of the Pratimokṣa discipline can be incomplete and partial. This depends on the manner in which one undertakes discipline or undiscipline: one "binds" oneself to a part of immorality, or to a certain part of morality.

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How does one acquire undiscipline? How does one acquire the avijñāpatis which are neither discipline, nor undiscipline?

37a-b. One acquires undiscipline through action or through accepting it.\(^\text{161}\)

Persons born in a family of undisciplined persons acquire undiscipline when they accomplish the actions preparatory to killing (iv. 68c). Persons born in other families acquire undiscipline when they adopt such a style of life, thinking "We too shall live in this manner."
37c-d. One acquires the other *avijñāpti* by reason of the field, of undertaking, of an action seriously undertaken.\footnote{162}

1. Certain persons are a field of such a nature that by offering them a garden, etc., one reduces *avijñāpti*. [See below, iv.112, the doctrine of good material works.]

2. One produces *avijñāpti* by undertaking vows, for example, "I shall not eat unless I have paid homage to the Buddha," "I shall give alms food on the fast day, for a fortnight, for a month, for a year," etc.\footnote{163}

3. Action undertaken seriously, with a burning faith, with a burning passion (iv.22d), produces *avijñāpti*.

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How does one lose discipline?

38. The Pratimokṣa discipline is lost through abjuration, through death, through hermaphroditism, through the cutting off of the roots, and by the night coming to an end.

The stanza calls the Pratimokṣa discipline *dama* because it subdues (*dāmyati*) the six organs.

Excluding the discipline of the fast, the Pratimokṣa discipline is lost:
1. through abjuration, intentionally renouncing the rule\footnote{164} in the presence of a person capable of understanding it; 2. through the death or abandonment of the *nikāyasabhāga* (ii.41); 3. through the appearance of the male or the female organ according to the case; and 4. through the cutting off of the roots of good (iv.79).

The discipline of fast is lost through these four causes and, further, when night come to an end.

Abjuration constitutes a *vijñāpti* in contradiction to the undertaking; death and hermaphroditism constitute the abandoning and the overturning of the personality who undertook the Pratimokṣa (see iv.27a); the cutting off of the roots is the cutting off of the foundation of the discipline itself. Finally the discipline of the fast has been created, or projected, for a day and a night: it comes to its end when the night is finished.

39a. Some say through a *pataniya*. 
According to the Sautrāntikas, the discipline of the Bhikṣu and the novice is also lost through any one of the four patanīyas, or transgressions involving a falling away.\textsuperscript{165}

39b. Through the disappearance of the Good Law, say some other masters.

According to the Dharmaguptakas, the Pratimokṣa discipline is lost when the Good Law disappears: there are no longer any rules, any boundaries, nor any ecclesiastic actions.

39c-d. The Kaśmīreans believe that the transgressor possesses morality and immorality, in the manner that a person can have riches and debts.

i. The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir say: A monk guilty of a grave transgression, that is, of a patanīya, does not lose his Bhikṣu discipline. It is not admissible that one loses the entire discipline by destroying only a part of the discipline.\textsuperscript{166} He who commits a transgression other than a patanīya is not immoral. He who commits a patanīya is at one and the same time moral and immoral: as a person who has both riches and debts; but when this transgressor has confessed his transgression, he is no longer immoral, but solely moral: as a person who has paid his debts.

ii. But the Blessed One has said, "He is not a Bhikṣu, he is not a monk; he no longer belongs to the sons of Śākya; he falls from the quality of Bhikṣu; his quality of monkhood is cut off, fallen, erased, tumbled down, annihilated."\textsuperscript{167}

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this text "Bhikṣu" signifies a "true Bhikṣu:" the transgressor, being incapable of seeing the Truths, is not a true Bhikṣu.

An inadmissible explanation: you avoid the question that the Blessed One made "in a clear sense:" furthermore, you lead defiled persons to the practice of immorality.

The Vaibhāṣikas: How can you prove that this quotation is of clear sense and should be taken literally?

The Blessed One has explained this himself. "There are four Bhikṣus: a samājñābhikṣu, a Bhikṣu in name only, is a person who is called Bhikṣu without his having been ordained; a pratijñābhikṣu, a self-styled Bhikṣu, is one who is immoral, unchaste, etc.; a person called Bhikṣu because he begs,\textsuperscript{168} is a begger only; and the person who is called
Bhikṣu because he has cut off the defilements, that is to say, the Arhat.”¹⁶⁹ In the text which concerns us¹⁷⁰ (“He is not a Bhikṣu, he is not a monk . . .”), this refers to a fifth Bhikṣu, namely a person who has been properly ordained but who, through patanīya, loses this quality and this discipline; it is certainly not a question of his being a true Bhikṣu, an Arhat, for one capable of a patanīya is not a true Bhikṣu, an Arhat, but is susceptible of losing the quality of being a true Bhikṣu.

iii. The argument that one does not lose the entire discipline through the losing of one part of it, is refuted by the Master himself who in fact compares a transgressor monk to a palm tree whose head is cut off, henceforth incapable of becoming green, of growing, of developing, or of growing larger:¹⁷¹ this means that, when one part of the discipline, the part which is the root of the discipline, is cut off, the rest of the discipline is incapable of growing. The patanīya or the mauli āpatti is in contradiction to the state required of being a Bhikṣu; he embraces an extreme absence of fear of transgression (anapatrāpya, ii.32a-b); he breaks off the root of discipline: all his discipline is lost.

The Master excludes persons guilty of patanīya from all commerce¹⁷² with the Bhikṣus, he prohibits them from participating with them for even one mouthful of food, he forbids them from even setting one foot into the monastery. He says, “He who is not a Bhikṣu but who has the aspect of a Bhikṣu—destroy this tare, uproot this rotten tree, drive out this plant without seed!”¹⁷³ What indeed can be the Bhikṣu quality of this criminal?

iv. The Kaśmīreans answer: He possesses the quality which consists of his quality of Bhikṣu. For the Blessed One said, “Cunda, there are four monks and not a fifth: the mārgajina, who triumphs through the Path; the mārgadaiśika, who teaches the Path; the mārgajīvin, who lives in the Path; and the mārgadūśin, who soils the Path, the immoral monk.”¹⁷⁴

We believe that the Blessed One gives the name of “monk” to an immoral monk because his external form is that of a monk. Does one not speak of burning wood, of a dried up pond, of a parrot-nose (a motif of architectural decoration), of rotten seed, of a circle of fire, or of a dead being?

v. Answer of the Kaśmīreans: One does not lose the quality of monkhood through patanīya, since the Blessed One admits a monk
guilty of unchastity as a penitent. 175

We do not say that any Bhikṣu guilty of unchastity is a pārājika, a fallen or destroyed Bhikṣu. But whoever is a pārājika is no longer a Bhikṣu. It is the idea of hiding the crime which is decisive here: if, thanks to the excellence of his moral dispositions, thanks to the excellence of his "series," the guilty one does not have the thought of concealing his fault for an instant, then the King of the Law admits him as a penitant.

The Kāśmīreans: If a pārājika is no longer a Bhikṣu, why is he not again admitted to ordination?

Because he is susceptible to discipline: his mental dispositions are ruined and overturned by the excess of imprudence (anapataṛpya, ii.32a-b). Also, even if he had renounced the rules (nikṣiptaśikṣa, iv.38) [after his transgression], he cannot be ordained again. To what good does this discussion lead? If a similar Bhikṣu is a Bhikṣu, we pay homage to this quality of Bhikṣu. 176

vi. When the Good Law disappears, all ecclesiastical acts become impossible, and as a consequence also all acquisition of the discipline. But he who possesses the discipline will not lose it (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 608cll).

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How does one lose the discipline of dhyāna (iv.17b) and the pure discipline?

40a-b. The "good" of the sphere of dhyāna is lost through a change of state and through falling. 177

All of the good of the sphere of dhyāna, that is, material and non-material good, is lost through two causes: 1. through arising in a superior or inferior stage: this refers to the "good" which appears to persons arisen in the heavens of Rūpadhātu; 2. through falling away: when the ascetic falls away from this absorption.

One should add a third cause, [according to vi.21:] the Pṛthagjana loses certain good dharmas through death even when he is reborn in the same heavenly stage from whence he died.

40c. The same for the good of Ārūpyadhātu.
It is lost through the changing of the stage or through falling away. Note that discipline does not exist in this sphere.

40c-d. Pure good is lost through the obtaining of a result, through perfection of the faculties, or through falling away.

1. By obtaining a result, the Āryan abandones the good dharmas of the path of the candidate (pratipannakamārga, which is threefold, prayoga, ānantarya, vimukti, vi.65b); 2. when he perfects his faculties (indriyasamācāra, vi.29), he abandons the path of weak faculties; and 3. when he falls, he abandons the result or the path of a superior result (vi.32).

41 a-b. Undiscipline is lost through the acquisition of discipline, through death, or through hermaphroditism.

i. Acquisition of the discipline: either he ritually undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline; or, through the efficacy of an internal cause (hetu=sabhāgābetu, ii.52) or an external cause (the teaching of another), one obtains the absorption which constitutes the discipline of dhyāna. The discipline of dhyāna cuts off undiscipline, being a threefold change hostile to undiscipline.

Death and hermaphroditism are, respectively, the abandoning and the overturning of the person through which undiscipline had been undertaken.

ii. An undisciplined person who rejects the tools of his work, dagger and net, even with the intention of no longer committing murder, does not by this cut off his undiscipline if he does not undertake the discipline. Illness does not improve without medicine, even though one may avoid the causes of illness.

iii. Does an undisciplined person who undertakes the discipline of the fast remain undisciplined when he departs from the fast, or rather, does he find himself in the intermediary state, neither-disciplined-nor-undisciplined?

Opinions differ. For some, he is found to be undisciplined, for the person who undertakes the fast does not have the intention of definitively renouncing transgressions: a mass of iron turned red returns to its original state.
For others,\textsuperscript{180} once an undisciplined person has departed from the fast, he is no longer undisciplined, for the acquisition of indiscipline supposes a physical or vocal action (\textit{vijñāpita}).

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How does one lose \textit{avijñāpita} which is neither discipline nor undiscipline (iv.131-b)?

41c-d. Intermediate \textit{avijñāpita} is lost through the cutting off of the force, the undertaking, the action, the object, the life, and the roots.

We have seen (iv.37c-d) how one acquires \textit{avijñāpita} which differs from discipline and from indiscipline.

This \textit{avijñāpita} is lost by reason of six causes: (1) when the intense force of faith, or the defilements which have projected the \textit{avijñāpita}, come to an end. Example: the movement of the arrow and the potter’s wheel; (2) when one renounces the undertaking, “From this moment onward, I shall no longer do that which I was engaged in doing;”\textsuperscript{181} (3) when one cuts off the action, that is to say, when one does not do that which one was engaged in doing, [for example: venerating the Buddha, making a \textit{maṇḍalaka} before eating (see note 163)];\textsuperscript{182} (4) when the object is cut off: the \textit{caitya}, the garden, the monastery, the bed, the seat, which one was in engaged in venerating or in giving; the instrument, the net, etc.;\textsuperscript{183} (5) when life is cut off; and (6) when one begins to cut off the roots of good.\textsuperscript{184}

42a-b. Good non-material action, of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, is lost through the cutting off of the roots, and through arising in a superior sphere.

We have explained how material action, namely bodily action, vocal action, and the \textit{avijñāpati}, is cut off. Good non-material action of Kāmadhātu is lost thorough the cutting off of the roots of good, and through birth in Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu.\textsuperscript{185}

42c-d. That which is defiled and non-material is lost through the arising of its opposite.
All that which is defiled, of whatever sphere, is lost through the arising of the Path which opposes this defilement. This refers to a path of abandoning (prahāṇamārga, distinct from vimuktimārga, vi.65b) which can be Seeing or Meditation, and which can be worldly or transworldly. This Path causes the abandonment of a certain category of upaklesa\textsuperscript{186} and, with it, all its attendant prāptis, etc.

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What beings are susceptible to discipline and to undiscipline?

43a-d. Humans—with the exception of the two categories of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, and the Kurus—are susceptible of undiscipline; the same for the discipline which pertains also to the gods.

Undiscipline exists only among humans. One must furthermore except sandhas and pandakas, hermaphrodites\textsuperscript{187} and beings in Uttarakuru.

Discipline exists among humans, with the above-mentioned exception, and among the gods:\textsuperscript{188} thus, it exists in two realms of rebirth.

1. Eunuchs are not susceptible of discipline: this results from the Sūtra, “Oh Mahānāma, white clothed laymen, male and possessing the male organ…” (iv.30a-b), and from the Vinaya, “One must expel such a person.”

   Why is this?

   Because they possess, to an extreme degree, the defilements of the two sexes; because they are incapable of the reflection necessary to combat these defilements; and because the vigor of respect and fear (bhī, apatrāpya, ii.32a-b) is absent in them.

   Why are they not susceptible to undiscipline?

   Because the intention of committing transgressions is not strong among them; because undiscipline is opposed to discipline; and only one who is susceptible to discipline is susceptible to undiscipline.

2. The Uttarakurus are lacking the undertaking of any discipline, from whence there is an absence of the Prātimokṣa discipline; and they lack absorption,\textsuperscript{189} from whence there is an absence of the other two
disciplines. On the other hand, the intention of committing transgressions is absent in them.

3. In the painful realms of rebirth there is no vigor of respect and fear: now a vigorous respect and fear are necessary for discipline; in order for there to be indiscipline, it is necessary to destroy respect and fear (iv.97b).

Neither discipline nor undiscipline can arise in the bodies, or in the persons, of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, and beings in the realms of painful rebirth, for these bodies are similar to soil saturated with salt wherein there can neither grow wheat, nor bad herbs.

Objection: The Sūtra says, "Oh Bhikṣu, there is a Nāga born from an egg (iii.9a) which, each eighth day of the fortnight, leaves its dwelling, and comes to undertake the eightfold fast." (Samayutta, iii.241; Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 648c19; compare with Visuddhimagga, 300).

This refers, for the Nāgas, not to discipline, but to good actions.

Discipline exists thus solely among humans and among the gods.

43d. The three disciplines exist among humans.

These three are the Prātimokṣa discipline, discipline arisen from dhyāna, and pure discipline.

44a-b. Discipline of dhyāna exists among the gods of Kāmadosha and Rūpadhātu.¹⁹⁰

Not in higher spheres.

44b-d. So too the pure discipline, with the exception of the gods of the intermediate dhyāna and the Asaṁjñīsattvas; and also in Ārūpyadhātu.¹⁹¹

It exists in Rūpadhātu with the exception of the dhyānanāantarikas of beings arisen in intermediate dhyāna, and the Asaṁjñīsattvas; and in Ārūpyadhātu. The gods of Ārūpyadhātu never in fact manifest this discipline, since discipline is matter, rūpa; but they can "possess" it (see iv.82).¹⁹²

Following the examination of action, the author now defines the diverse categories of action which are taught in different Sūtras.

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There are three actions, good, bad, and neutral (*Vibhaṣa*, TD 27, p. 263a6).

45a-b. Good action is salutary, bad action is pernicious, and action differing from good and bad is different from the salutary and the pernicious.

Such is the definition of good action, etc.

Good action is salutary, because it is of agreeable retribution and as a consequence it protects one from suffering for a time (: this is good, but impure action); or rather, because it brings about the attainment of Nirvāṇa and, as a consequence, definitively protects one from suffering (: this is good, pure action).

Bad action is pernicious: this is action of disagreeable retribution.

Action concerning which the Blessed One does not say whether it is good or bad, that is, morally neutral action, is neither salutary nor pernicious.

45c-d. There are meritorious actions, demeritorious actions, and non-agitated actions; and three actions of which the action of agreeable feeling is the first.

There are three actions: meritorious action, demeritorious action, and non-agitated action. There are three actions: action of agreeable feeling, action of disagreeable feeling, and action of neither disagreeable nor agreeable feeling.

46a-b. Meritorious action is a good action in Kāmadhātu; non-agitated action is a good action above there.\(^{193}\)

Good action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is called "meritorious" action, because it purifies, and because it produces an agreeable retribution.\(^{194}\)

"Good action above there," that is to say, of the two higher spheres, is called "non-agitated."\(^{195}\)

But did not the Blessed One say that the first three Dhyānas are agitated? Did he not say that "the Āryans say that the *vitarkita* and the *vicāritā* of the First Dhyāna are agitation?"\(^{196}\)

The Blessed One said in fact that the first three Dhyānas are agitated, but he is saying this from the point of view of the corrupted
characteristics of these dhyanas (iii.101c, vi.24a, and the full explanation viii.11); their vices are what agitate them. But in the Iśījaṣūtra, the Blessed One declared that these dhyanas are non-agitated because he considered them a pathway favorable to non-agitation.

But why term that which is agitated non-agitated?

46c-d. Because, with regard to that which concerns its retribution, action of the domain of the higher stages does not vary.

Action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is agitated in its retribution. The place of retribution is not fixed: one action which produces, naturally, a certain realm of rebirth, can be retributed in another one; an action which produces a heavenly realm of rebirth can be retributed in another heavenly realm of rebirth. In fact it happens that actions which produce power, a good figure, beauty, or objects of enjoyment, instead of being retributed in a heavenly realm of rebirth, are retributed in a human, animal, or Preta realm of rebirth through the efficacy of certain causes. But no cause can make an action of the sphere of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu be retributed in any but the sphere which is proper to it.

Bad action is demeritorious. This is well known in the world and there is no good reason to insist on what is well known in the world.

As for actions of agreeable feeling, etc.:

47a-b. Good action, up to the Third Dhyāna, is of agreeable feeling.

Agreeable sensation does not exist above the Third Dhyānas: it thus has Kāmadhātu and the first three Dhyānas for its domain. Hence the retribution of good action is of agreeable feeling up to the Third Dhyāna. Action having such a retribution is called "of agreeable sensation" (see iv.49).

47b-c. Above, it is of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation.

Agreeable and disagreeable sensation do not exist above the Third Dhyāna. There only remains the sensation of indifference, which is the only retribution of good action retributed above the Third Dhyāna.

47c-d. Bad action, here below, is of disagreeable sensation.
Bad action is of disagreeable sensation. The *kārikā* says "here below" in order to indicate that this action exists only in Kamadhatu.

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Is the result of all these actions only sensation?
No; they also have the apparatus of sensation as their (retributive) result.  

48a. According to some, intermediary action also exists below.  

According to others, intermediary action—that is, action which has for its retribution neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation—also exists below the Fourth Dhyāna, (contrary to the doctrine iv.47a-c; see Vibhāṣā, *TD* 27, p. 596b13; two arguments, 48b and 48c-d.)

48b. Since there is no retribution with regard to *dhyānāntara.*

If intermediary action is absent below the Fourth Dhyāna, there would not be any retribution of *dhyānāntara* action, or rather, there would not be any retribution of any action whatsoever in *dhyānāntara,* for there are no agreeable and disagreeable sensations therein.

[Responding to this argument,] some say that the retribution of *dhyānāntara* action is the sensation of pleasure (*sukhendriya,* ii.7; viii.9b) of the *dhyāna* itself; some others say that the retribution of this action is not sensation, (but *rupa,* etc.).

These two opinions are in contradiction to the Śāstra (*Jñānaprasthāna, TD* 26, p. 973a20), "Does it happen that an action is solely mental sensation? Yes, the retribution of a good action which was free from *vitarka.*"

48c-d. Because it is admitted that the retribution of the three types of action takes place at the one and same time.

This is the second reason why one should admit that intermediary action exists below the Fourth Dhyāna.

The Śāstra says in the same place, "Does it happen that there is at one and the same time retribution of the three types of action? Yes.
There can take place at the same time: (1) the retribution of an action of agreeable sensation, namely of material *dharmas*, [the organ of seeing, etc.]; (2) the retribution of an action of disagreeable sensation, namely the mind and the mental states [excluding dissatisfaction, ii.10b-c]; (3) the retribution of an action of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation, namely the *dharmas* dissociated from the mind, [vital organ, etc., ii.35].”

Now, the three types of action cannot be retributed simultaneously outside of Kāmadhātu, for the retribution of action of disagreeable sensation takes place only in Kāmadhātu (*Vibhaṣa, TD* 27, p. 615c4).

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Is the action of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation [when it belongs to a stage lower than the Fourth Dhyāna] good or bad?

It is good, but of weak force.

But didn’t you say that “good action, up to the Third Dhyāna, is of agreeable sensation (iv.47a)?”

This definition refers to cases in general.

***

But how can one say that action is of agreeable sensation? Action, by its nature, is not sensation.$^{213}$

One expresses oneself in this way because action is favorable to agreeable sensation; or rather, because its retribution is agreeably sensed. In the same way that one calls bathing clothes, *snāṇyaksāya*, “the clothes with which one bathes,” in that same way one terms “to be sensed” (*vedanīya*) action through which one senses a retribution.

Further,

49. There are five ways of being *vedanīya*, “sensed,” “experienced:” of itself, through sensation, as an object, by being retributed, and by the fact of its presence.$^{214}$

1. Sensation, by its nature, is feeling. Agreeable sensation is agreeable experience, etc. (i.14c; ii.24).

2. Contact is feeling because it is associated with sensation: contact
of agreeable sensation, etc. \textit{(Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88a4 et passim, Samyutta, v.211; Kosa, ii. trans. p. 169 and 180).}

3. The six objects (\textit{visaya}) of the six organs are feeling in the role of object (\textit{\ddot{a}lambana}), "Seeing color with the eye, he experiences, he feels the color, but he does not feel the color with affection."\textsuperscript{215} Color is thus the object of sensation.

4. Action is feeling in its role of being retributed, "an action experienced in the present existence" \textit{(Madhyama, TD 1, p. 433all).}

5. Sensation is feeling through the fact of its appearance. "When he feels, when he experiences agreeable sensation, two sensations, the disagreeable and the neutral, are then found to be obstructed by it:"\textsuperscript{216} hence when agreeable sensation is functioning, there is no other sensation through which one would feel it. Thus if one says that this sensation is "to be felt" (\textit{vedaniya}), this is because it is present.

50a. This action is determinate or indeterminate.\textsuperscript{217}

The action (agreeable sensation, etc.) that we have just described is either determinate, that is, "which will necessarily be felt," or indeterminate, "which will not be necessarily felt."

50b-c. Determinate action is of three types, to be experienced in the present life, etc.\textsuperscript{218}

Determinate action is: (1) to be experienced in the present life; (2) to be experienced after having been reborn, in other words in the next immediate life; and (3) to be experienced later.

By adding indeterminate action, this makes, from the point of view of the modality of retribution, four types.

50c-d. According to one opinion, action is of five types.\textsuperscript{219}

By dividing indeterminate action into two categories: that which is indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution, but whose retribution is in any case certain; and that which is indeterminate with regard to its retribution, which can be not retributed.

***

Action experienced in the present life is action which ripens or is
retributed in the same existence in which it was accomplished. Action experienced after being reborn is action which is retributed in the existence which follows that in which it was accomplished. Action experienced later is action which is retributed in a later existence, from the third existence on.

But, some other masters, [the Sautrāntikas], cannot admit that a very strong action has a weak retribution. Consequently, the retribution of an action experienced in the present life can continue into other existences; yet, as this retribution begins in the present life, this action is said “to be experienced in the present life.”

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this way of looking at it. There is, they say, some actions whose results are near, and some actions whose results are distant. In the same way flax bears its fruit after two and a half months, but wheat and godhūma after six months.220

51a. Others distinguish four alternatives.221

The Dārśāntikas222 distinguish four cases: 1. Action determined with regard to the period of its retribution, but indeterminate with regard to its retribution. If this action is retributed, it will certainly be retributed at such a moment, but it is not necessarily retributed: this is niyatavedanīya, but aniyatavipāka action. 2. Action determined with regard to its retribution, but indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution. This action will be retributed, but the period of its retribution remains undetermined: niyatavipāka, but aniyatavedanīya. 3. Action determinate from two points of view: niyatavipāka and niyatavedanīya. 4. Action indeterminate from two points of view: aniyatavipāka and aniyatavedanīya.

According to this system there are eight types of actions: 1. action experienced in the present existence and of certain retribution, 2. action experienced in the present existence and of possible retribution... 7. action which can be experienced in any existence, but of certain retribution; and 8. action which can be experienced in any existence and of only possible retribution (aniyatavipāka).

But actions defined in Scripture as “to be experienced in this life,” etc., are always of certain retribution; action defined as “indeterminate” may not be retributed (iv.50a-c).223

***
Does it happen that a person produces or projects all four types of actions at one and the same time?

Yes. Suppose that a man has murder, stealing, and lying committed by another person; he himself commits adultery; and that these four actions, which belong respectively to the four types, are committed at the same instant (iv.67).

51b. Three types of actions project existence.

Action experienced in the present existence does not project the present existence (nikāyasabhāga, ii.41a); this has been projected by a former action.

***

How many types of action can be produced in the different spheres of existence and in the different realms of rebirth?

51c. Fourfold production throughout.

In the three spheres of existence and in all of the realms of rebirth the four types of good or bad action can be produced. But this general rule has some restrictions. On the one hand, there is no bad action above Kāmadhātu; on the other hand (51d - 53):

51d. Good action, in the hells, is solely of three types.

In the hells, one can produce good action to be experienced in the next existence, good action to be experienced in a later existence, and good action which is indeterminate; but no good action to be experienced in the present existence, for there is no agreeable retribution in the hells.

52a-b. When he is firm, the fool does not produce any action to be experienced, at the stage from whence he is detached, in his next existence.

"When he is firm," that is, when he is not subject to falling away (aparībānadharmān, vi.56; see Puggalapaññatti, p. 12)

"The fool" refers to a Pṛthagjana.

"When he is detached from a certain stage," that is, when he is
delivered from attachment with regard to a certain plane of existence (Kāmadhātu, the First Dhyāna . . . ), in this stage he never produces action to be experienced in his next rebirth.

52c. The Āryan no longer produces any action to be experienced in a later existence.

When he is firm, the Saint does not produce, in the stage from whence he is detached, any action to be experienced either in the next existence or in a later existence.

In fact, the Pṛthagjana incapable of falling away is not reborn, in the next existence, in the stage from whence he is detached; and a Saint incapable of falling away is never reborn at this stage.

Both produce, relative to the stage wherein they are born, actions to be experienced in the present existence, and indeterminate action.

52d. The Āryan, not firm, when he is detached from Kāmadhātu or from Bhavāgra, the same.

An Āryan detached from Kāmadhātu is an Anāgāmin (vi.36).
An Āryan detached from Bhavāgra or naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana, the last stage of Ārūpyadhātu, is an Arhat (vi.45).

Even when they are subject to falling away, that is to say, susceptible of losing the results obtained, these Saints do not produce action to be experienced in the next existence, nor in a subsequent existence, either in Kāmadhātu or in Bhavāgra.

We shall explain (vi.60) how the Saint, subject to falling away, always reacquires the results before dying.

***

Does the intermediate being (antarābhava, iii.12c) produce any actions?

53a-b. The intermediate being, in Kāmadhātu, produces twenty-two types of actions. 224

The embryo passes through five states, kalala, arbuda, pēsin, ghana, and prasākhā. A human being passes through five states, as an infant, an adolescent, a grown person, a mature person, and an old person. 225
The intermediate creature produces determinate actions to be experienced as an intermediate being, as kalala, as arbuda... as an infant, as an adolescent... there are eleven types of determinate actions. In this same way he produces eleven indeterminate actions.

53c. These actions bear their results in the present existence. The eleven determinate actions of the intermediate being belong to the category “to be experienced in the present existence.”

Why?

53d. For all these states form, together with the intermediate existence, only a single existence.226

The intermediate existence and the ten states which follow it are projected by a single action (iii.13). Thus one does not distinguish an action “to be experienced in the intermediate existence;” this is projected, in fact, by the action itself which is to be experienced in the life which follows the intermediate existence.227

***

By virtue of what characteristics is an action determinate, that is to say, necessarily retributed?

54. Action accomplished through intense defilement or through intense faith, with regard to the field of qualities, continually, and the murdering of a father and a mother, are determinate.

Action accomplished through intense defilement, action accomplished through intense faith, action accomplished with regard to a field of qualities, and action continually accomplished, are determinate.

“Field of qualities” signifies either the Three Jewels, or certain persons, namely the possessors of the results, or Saints (Srotāpanna, etc.), and the possessors of certain absorptions (nirodhasamāpatti, ii.44d; arañā, vii.35c; maitrī, vili.29). Action accomplished with regard to these fields, even in the absence of an intense thought of defilement or of faith, or of continuity, is determinate, whether it is good or bad.

The same for the murder of one’s father or mother, with whatever intention it was committed.228
All other action—which is done with a weak defilement, etc.—is indeterminate.

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By virtue of what characteristic is an action experienced in the present existence?

55a-b. Action bears result in the present existence by reason of certain characteristics of the field and the intention.229

By reason of the excellence of the field, even though the intention may be weak: for example, the Bhikṣu who becomes a woman through having insulted the Saṅgha, "You are nothing but women!"

By reason of the excellence of the intention: for example the eunuch who delivered bulls from the danger of being castrated, and so regained his own sexuality.230

Or still further:

55c. And also, when one is definitively detached with regard to the stage in which the action appears.

When a person is definitively detached from a certain stage (iv.52), he cannot anymore be reborn in this stage: as a consequence, action retributable in this stage, but in another existence, whether it is good or bad, changes its nature and becomes retributable in the present existence.

55d. Action "determinate with regard to retribution."231

This refers to action having a necessary retribution, but indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution: this action will be retributed in the present life.

As for action determinate with regard to the period of its retribution, it will be retributed in the period for which it is determinate: the person for whom actions should be retributed, in this first rebirth, in a certain stage, cannot be definitively detached from this stage.

As for action non-determinate with regard to the retribution itself, it will not be retributed if one detaches himself from the stage where it could have been retributed.
Which field confers on an action which is in a relationship with it, the quality of being necessarily retributed in the present existence? In general, it is the Saṅgha of Bhikṣus having at its head the Buddha; to enumerate its persons, there are five types of persons:

56. Persons who have left either nirodha, or maitri, or arañ̐̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑̆̑ł

The person who leaves the absorption of extinction (nirodha-samāpatti, ii.41c, viii.33): in this absorption he has obtained an extreme tranquility of thought, for this absorption is similar to Nirvāṇa. When he leaves it, it is as if he had gone to Nirvāṇa and has returned from it.

The person who leaves the absorption which arrests the defilements of another (aranāsamāpatti, viii.35c): in this absorption, his mental series is endowed with the intention of placing an infinite number of beings into the absence of defilement; when he leaves it, his series is penetrated with an intense and measureless merit.

The person who leaves the absorption of compassion (maitrīsamāpatti, viii.29): in this absorption, his series is endowed with the intention of increasing the well-being of an infinite number of beings; when he leaves it, his series is penetrated with an intense and measureless merit.

The person who leaves the Path of Seeing the Truths: in this Path, he has abandoned all the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing the Truths. When he leaves it, his series is thus pure, since his personality has just been renewed.

The person who leaves the result of Arhat, that is to say, who has just acquired the result of Arhat: he has just achieved the abandoning of all the defilements which are abandoned through Meditation on the Truths. His series is pure, since his personality has just been renewed. This is why good or bad actions, well or badly done, with regard to these five persons, bear a result in the present existence (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 782c27).

The Paths of Meditation through which one obtains the results of Sakṛdāgāmin and of Anāgāmin, are incomplete in themselves and in
their result. Persons who leave the conquest of these two results are not fields of merit comparable to an Arhat. Their series is not pure; their personalities have not been recently renewed.

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The essential element of retribution is sensation.

Can the retribution of a certain action be exclusively mental sensation, and not bodily sensation (kāyikī, ii.7)? And can the retribution of a certain action be bodily sensation, and not mental sensation?

57a-c. Sensation, the result of good action free from vitarka, is exclusively mental.

Actions of the the sphere of dhyanāntara, the interval between the First and Second Dhyānas (iv.48b), and the actions of the higher stages are free from vitarka (ii.31, viii.23c). Like bodily sensation, that is to say, associated with the five sense consciousnesses, which always embraces vitarka and vicāra (i.32), it cannot be the result of a retribution of an action free from vitarka.234

57d. Sensation, which is the result of a bad action, is exclusively physical.

A sensation, the result of retribution of a bad action, is painful; painful mental sensation is what is termed a sensation of dissatisfaction. We have established that dissatisfaction is never the result of retribution (ii.10b-c).235

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But if dissatisfaction, or painful mental sensation, is not retribution, in which consciousness—visual consciousness, etc., mental consciousness—is mental trouble or trouble-of-the-mind, which is painful sensation, produced? [Apparently it is the retribution of a bad action].

58a. Mental-trouble is produced in the mental consciousness.236

The expression that the Kārikā uses, manascītta, "mental thought,"
is equivalent to the expression *manovijnāna*, "mental consciousness, consciousness of the *manas*.

The five sense consciousnesses cannot be troubled because they are free from imagining, inquiry and memory, and mental trouble is the imagining of that which does not exist (*asadvikalpa*, i.33).

58b. It arises from the retribution of action.

Mental trouble arises from the retribution of action.

The person who troubles and deranges the mind of another through curses and formulas; the person who causes another to drink poison or alcohol when he does not want to drink it; the person who frightens game, either in the hunt, or by setting the jungle on fire, or by the hollowing out of traps; and the person who, by whatever means, troubles the memory and the presence of mind of another, will have his own mind troubled, deprived of the aid of his memory through the effect of the retribution of these actions.237

58c-d. Through fear, the attack of demons, irritation of the elements, and fear.238

1. Demon beings,239 with horrible features, will approach such a person: seeing them, the person is frightened and his mind is troubled. 2. Furious at the evil conduct of humans, demon beings will hit them in their vital parts. 3. The primary elements of the body will lose their equilibrium: the wind, heat and liquid will be irritated. 4. Fear also troubles the mind, for example in the case of Vāsiṣṭhī, etc.240

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But, one would say, if mental trouble, or trouble of the mental consciousness, arises from the retribution of action, how can one say that this mental sensation is not retribution?

We do not say that trouble of the mind—a troubled mind—is retribution of action, but that it arises from the retribution of action. The primary elements in a state of disequilibrium are retribution: the troubled mind proceeds from it; it thus arises from retribution. One says that the mind is troubled when,—by reason of the disequilibrium or the irritation of the humors, which results from action,—the mind is
deranged, anarchic, devoid of mindfulness.

Four alternatives: 1. The mind troubled without being disturbed: the mind undefiled but troubled; 2. the mind disordered without being troubled: the mind defiled, but tranquil; 3. the mind troubled and disordered; [and 4. the mind neither troubled nor disordered].

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Among whom is trouble of the mind produced?

58d. Among beings in Kāmadhātu, with the exception of the Kurus.

Among the gods of Kāmadhātu, there are two madnesses; all the more so is there madness among humans, Pretas, and animals.

Beings in hell always have troubled minds: their vital parts are incessantly hurt by thousands of different torments; they are crushed down by suffering; they do not recognize themselves, so they do not distinguish that which they should do and that which they should avoid. We give as an example a being in hell who laments by saying, “Ah! The mind!”

With the exception of the Buddha, the Āryans are not free from trouble of the mind: their thoughts can be troubled following the disequilibrium of the elements. But their disequilibrium of the elements is never retribution: for “determinate” actions where retribution could produce trouble of the mind are retributed before they have obtained the Path, and “indeterminate” actions will not bear their results due to the fact that the Path is obtained. Neither terror, nor the attack of demon beings, nor fear can trouble the mind of the Āryans, for they are above the five fears,241 they do no disobedient actions which excite the fury of demon beings, for they completely know the nature of things.242

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The Sūtra teaches that there are three crookednesses, crookedness of the body, speech, and mind; and thus three corruptions and three stains.
59a-b. What is termed crookedness, corruption, stains, is action arisen from hypocrisy, hatred, and attachment.

Action of the body, speech, and mind which arises from hypocrisy, proceeds from crookedness, and is called crookedness (kautilya, vi.50b); action which arises from hatred, proceeds from hatred, and is called corruption; and action which arises from attachment, proceeds from stain, and is termed stain.

59c-d. Action is of four types, white, black, etc.

The Sutra teaches that action is of four types: black, of black retribution; white, of white retribution; black-white, of black-white retribution; neither black nor white, without black or white retribution; and that which destroys the other actions.

60. Bad actions, good action of Rūpa, good actions of Kāma, are, respectively, black, white, black-white; action which destroys the other actions is pure action.

1. Bad action, being defiled, is absolutely black; retribution, being painful, is black.

2. Good action of the sphere of Rūpadhātu, not mixed with the bad, is absolutely white; its retribution, being agreeable, is white (see above p. 621, āniñjya action).

Objection: Why not say the same for good action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu?

Because the qualification “white” applies only to action which has two retributions (i.e., in intermediate existence and in an existence proper), and which is threefold, bodily, vocal and mental. Now action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu does not present these characteristics.

But the Sutra describes action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu as white and of white retribution.

3. Good action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, being mixed with the bad, is black-white; its retribution is mixed, so it is thus black-white.

This definition is to be understood as applying, not to the nature of the action itself, but to the "series" or the person; in one and the same mental series, good action is mixed with bad action. There is no action which is black-white, nor any retribution which is black-white, which would be a contradiction.
Objection: But bad action is also mixed with white action, hence bad action should be defined as black-white.

Bad action is not necessarily mixed with good action; whereas, in Kāmadvātu, good action is necessarily mixed with bad, because, in this sphere, the bad is stronger than the good.  

4. Pure action destroys the other three types of action. Not being defiled, it is not black; not being retribution, it is not white. It is "non-white" (asukla).

This expression of the Sūtra, asukla, is "intentional:" the Blessed One wishes to oppose pure action to white action; but, speaking in the Mahāśūnyatāsūtra of the dharmas proper to the Arhat, he expresses himself thus, "The dharmas of the Arhat, Oh Ānanda, are absolutely white, absolutely good, absolutely irreproachable." And one reads in the Treatise, "What are the white dharmas? The good dharmas and the neutral dharmas?"

Pure action does not have any retribution, for it is not of the domain of the spheres of existence; in fact, it arrests the process of existence.

Does any pure action destroy all the actions of the first three categories, black, white, or black-white?

No.

61. A volition may be of twelve types, namely the volition of the dharmaksāntis and of the first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadvātu: such is the action which destroys black action.

Four volitions correspond to the four dharmaksāntis of the Path of Seeing the Truths; eight volitions correspond to the first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadvātu: in all twelve volitions, all pure actions which destroy bad actions.

62a-b. The volition of the ninth is the action which destroys black-white action.

The volition which corresponds to the ninth path of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadvātu is the pure action which causes the abandoning of black-white action and black action, for at this moment one abandons, in its entirety, good action of Kāmadvātu (which is black-white) and the ninth and last category of bad action.
62c-d. Volition which arises in the last paths of abandoning of the detachment of the dhyānas destroys good action.

The volition of the ninth and last path of abandoning which produces detachment of Kāmadhātu with regard to each dhyāna is fourfold volition which destroys white action.

Objection: The first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadhātu destroy black action. But you attribute the power to destroy white-black and white action (good and impure actions: kusalaśāsrava) solely to the ninth path of abandoning. Why is this?

There is not, properly speaking, abandonment of any good dharma, for even if they are abandoned, the good dharma can reappear; but when the defilement which has this dharma for its object is destroyed this dharma is said to be abandoned. Therefore as long as the last category of defilement which can grasp it as its object is not destroyed, this good dharma is not considered abandoned. [Now it is the ninth path of abandoning which breaks the prāpti of the ninth category of defilement relative to each sphere (Kāmadhātu, dhyānas) and, as a consequence, allows one to obtain disconnection (ii.57d) from this defilement). 257

63a-b. According to others, the first two actions are retributed in hell and retributed moreover in Kāmadhātu.

According to other masters (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 590al) action which should be experienced in hell is black action; action which should be experienced elsewhere in Kāmadhātu, in addition to hell, is black-white action. Infernal retribution is produced exclusively through bad action: as a consequence, action which should be experienced in hell is black action. Retribution in Kāmadhātu, with the exception of hell, is exclusively produced by good-bad action (that is, by good action mixed with bad action).

63c-d. According to others, arisen in Kāma, actions are black when they can be abandoned through Seeing the Truths; they are black-white in the contrary case. 258

According to other masters (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 590c5) action which is abandoned through Seeing the Truths, not being mixed with the
good, \(^{259}\) is black. All other actions of Kāmadhātu, namely action which is abandoned through Meditation, is black-white, that is, good mixed with bad.

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The Sūtra says, “There are three silences, silence of the body, voice, and of the mind.” \(^{260}\)

64a-c. Asaikṣa, that is, an Arhat’s, actions of the body, voice and mind, are, in this order, the three silences. \(^{261}\)

Silence of the body and silence of the voice is bodily and vocal action which belongs to the Arhat. \(^{262}\) Silence of the mind is the mind or thought which belongs to an Arhat: this is not mental action.

Why is this?

Because the mind is the true Silent One, the true Muni.

The Vahāṣikas say that one knows through inference—by reason of the actions of the body and voice—that the mind is asaikṣa.

But an Arhat’s bodily and vocal action, is, in its nature, “abstention,” whereas the action of the mind is not, by nature, “abstention,” because three is no avijñapti of the mind. \(^{263}\)

But “silence” is abstention, thus the mind itself “which abstains” receives the name of silence.

Why does only the mind of the Arhat receive this name?

Because the Arhat is the true Silent One through the cessation of all murmuring of his defilements.

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The Sūtra says, “There are three purifications, purification of the body, purification of the voice, and purification of the mind.” \(^{264}\)

64c-d. The threefold good practice in its entirety is the threefold purification.

All the good practices of the body, pure or impure, are a purification of the body, because, either for a time or in a definitive manner, they efface the impurity of the defilements and bad practices.
The same holds for the voice and mind. This teaching has for its goal the instruction of persons who take a false silence for silence, and a false purification of purification. 265

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The Sūtra 266 says that there are three bad practices.

65a-b. The bad actions of the body, speech and mind are regarded as being the three bad practices.

Bad actions of the body are the bad practices of the body and so on. 267

65c-d. Even though greed, wickedness, anger and false views are not actions, they constitute a threefold bad practice of the mind.

Further, there are three bad practices of the mind which, by their nature, are not mental action: 268 greed, wickedness or harm, and false views.

The Dārṣṭāntikas 269 say that greed, wickedness and false views are, in fact, mental actions, for the Samcetaniyasūtra considers them as actions. 270

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this hypothesis, defilements and actions would be the same thing.

The Dārṣṭāntikas: What harm do you see in that?

The Vaibhāṣikas: To admit that defilement is action is to contradict the Sūtra and the definition that it gives of action (iv.lb). As for the Samcetaniyasūtra to which you allude, it is volition itself that it designates when it says “greed,” because volition comes into play under the influence of greed.

Because these produce a painful retribution, and because they are condemned by good persons, these practices of the body, speech and mind are bad; they are thus termed bad practices.

66a. Good practice is the opposite. 271

The opposite of bad practice is good practice: good actions of the body, speech, and mind; further, non-greed, non-wickedness and right views.
How can false views or right views be regarded as bad, or good? In fact, the first does not contain an intention to do evil, and the second does not contain an intention to do good to another.

This is true, but they are the root of this twofold intention.

66b-d. By taking, among these practices, the most evident, one defines the ten courses of action, good and bad respectively.

The Sūtra defines ten courses of action: good courses of action, by taking the most important,—which are the easiest to see—from among the good practices; and bad courses of action, by taking the gravest from among the bad practices.

What practices, bad or good, are not included in the courses of action?

A part of the bad practices of the body, namely (1) preparatory and consecutive actions of bodily courses of action (*prayoga, pṛṣṭhabhūta*, iv.68c); and (2) certain defiled actions of the body, for example, drinking alcohol, hitting, binding, etc. (*Majjhima*, iii.34), are not included among the courses of action, because these practices are not extremely grave. Among the bad practices of the body are courses of action which deprive another of his life, of his goods, or of his wife: one must absolutely abstain from them.

That which is very grave among bad practices of speech, is, for this same reason, declared to be a course of action, not preparatory, consecutive, or minor action.

One part of the bad practice of the mind, volition, is also excluded from the bad courses of action.

The good courses of action do not include 1. either a part of the good practice of the body: preparatory or consecutive; abstention from inebriating drinks, etc.; alms, worship, etc.; 2. or one part of the good practice of speech, affectionate words, etc.; 3. or one part of the good practice of the mind, good volition.
Among the courses of action,

67a. Six bad courses of action can be exclusively avijñapti.\textsuperscript{277}

When one has six courses of action—murder, stealing, lying, malicious speech, harmful speech, or inconsiderate speech—performed by another, then these six courses of action are only avijñapti. He who had these actions carried out is lacking the principle vijnapti, that is, the act of killing itself, etc.\textsuperscript{278}

67b. One bad course of action is always of two types.

Adultery is always vijnapti and avijñapti, for it must be perpetrated in person. When one has it committed by another, he does not procure the same pleasure.

67b. Six, when one carries them out himself, are of two types also.\textsuperscript{279}

When one executes them himself, the six courses of action specified above (67a) are at one and the same time vijnapti and avijñapti if death takes place\textsuperscript{280} at the same moment as the vijnapti (that is, at the moment of the stroke by which one intends to kill): if death takes place later, there is only avijñapti.

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Among the good courses of action,

67c. Seven good courses of action are of two types.

Seven courses of material actions, that is, of the body and the voice, are of two types, vijnapti and avijñapti. In fact the morality that one undertakes depends on one vijnapti.

67d. They are only avijñapti when they have arisen from absorption.

The courses of action which are included in dharmaśīla, that is, in the discipline of dhyāna and in the pure discipline, are qualified as
“arisen from absorption.” These two disciplines depend on a single thought: the courses of action are thus not vijnapti. 281

Is this also the case for preparatory and consecutive actions as for the principle action or the course of action proper?

68a. The sāmantakas are vijnapti.

The sāmantakas or preliminary actions are actions which prepare for the courses of action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. They are always vijnapti (iv.2b, 3d).

68b. They may or may not be avijnapti.

When they are accomplished with a great violence of passion (paryavasthāna, v.47, abhikya, ii.32, etc.), or with an extreme strength of faith (prasādabhanarasena, iv.22), they are avijnapti. If not, then no.

68c. The opposite concerning consecutive action. 282

Consecutive actions are, on the contrary, necessarily avijnapti. They are vijnapti when, having accomplished a course of action, one continues to commit actions analogous to the course of action.

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What is it that constitutes preparatory action, the course of action proper, and consecutive action? 283

A man, desiring to kill an animal, rises from his bed, takes some silver, goes to the market, feels the animal, buys the animal, leads it, pulls it, makes it enter, mistreats it, takes a sword, strikes the head once or twice: as long as he does not kill it, the action preparatory to killing lasts.

At the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life—that is, at the moment when the animal dies—the vijnapti of this moment and the avijnapti which is simultaneous to this vijnapti, are the course of action proper. For it is by reason of two causes that one is touched by the transgression of murder: by reason of the preparatory action and by reason of the achievement of the result [of the preparatory action]. 284

The moments that follow, the moments of avijnapti created by the killing, are the consecutive action; the series of the moments of vijnapti
are also consecutive action: moments that constitute pulling the hide off the animal, washing it, weighing it, selling it, cooking it, eating it, and congratulating oneself on it.

In the same way one can explain, with the necessary changes, the other six courses of bodily and vocal action.\textsuperscript{285}

There is no reason to distinguish preparatory and consecutive action for greed, wickedness and false views: at the moment when they manifest themselves, by the sole fact of their presence, they are courses of action proper.

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Objection: A question is raised. Is the course of action made up of \textit{vijñāpti} and \textit{avijñāpti} at the moment when the animal is in \textit{marana-bhava},\textsuperscript{286} that is, at the moment when the animal dies? Or is the \textit{vijñāpti} and the \textit{avijñāpti} of the moment when the animal is in \textit{mṛtabhava}, that is, when it is dead?

If you accept the first hypothesis, a person would be guilty of the transgression of killing when he kills at the very moment when the killed animal dies: but your system (\textit{śiddhānta}, iv.72a-b) does not admit this. And in the second hypothesis, you have rightly said that, “at the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life, the \textit{vijñāpti} of this moment and the \textit{avijñāpti} simultaneous to this \textit{vijñāpti}, are the course of action proper.” [You should have said, \textit{mṛte prāṇini yā vijñāptiḥ ... “The \textit{vijñāpti} which took place when the animal dies ...”}]

Further, if you accept the second hypothesis, you contradict the explanation that the Vaibhāṣikas give to the phrase, “while the \textit{prayoga} has not yet disappeared,” that one reads in the \textit{Mūlasāstra} (\textit{Jñāna-prasthāna, TD} 26, p. 975a8). This Śastra says, “Can it be the case that a living being has already been killed but that murder has not yet occurred?\textsuperscript{287} Yes, when the living being has already been deprived of life, but when the \textit{prayoga} [of the murder] has not yet disappeared.”\textsuperscript{288} The Vaibhāṣikas (\textit{Vibhāṣā, TD} 27, p. 617a3) explain this text by saying that the word \textit{prayoga} (“conjoined with”)—which normally signifies preparation—here has the meaning of consecutive action. Now you contradict this explanation since, placing the course of principle action at the moment when the animal dies, it is indeed the course of principal
action which, according to you, has not disappeared at the moment when the animal dies. You interpret the word prayoga of the Śāstra in the sense of the principal action.

The Vaibhāṣikas: One must explain the Śāstra in such a manner that it does not lend itself to criticism. And how is that? In the text in question, prayoga signifies principal course of action: [at least when one envisions the moment which immediately follows the death of the animal; when one envisions the moments which follow this moment, prayoga signifies, as the Vibhāṣā says, the consecutive action.]

But how could the vijnāpti of the moment when the animal is already dead be the principal course of action?

The Vaibhāṣikas: Why would it not be?

Because it is ineffective. [The animal is dead: one does not cause it to die again.]

The Vaibhāṣikas: But how is avijnāpti, which is always ineffective, a course of action? It is not their efficacy which makes a vijnāpti and an avijnāpti courses of action; it is the fact that they are produced at the moment of the achievement of the result of the preparatory action. 289

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Can it be the case that one course of action is either a preparatory action or a consecutive action of another course of action?

Yes. For example the ten courses of action can be a preparatory action for murder. A man desires to kill his enemy; in order to assure the success of this enterprise, he takes the goods of another and offers an animal in sacrifice; as a means to this same end, he committs adultery with the wife of his enemy in order to make her an accomplice; through lying, malicious, injurious, and frivolous words, he causes a falling out between his enemy and his friends who would be able to defend him; he covets the goods of his enemy; he wishes to do evil to his enemy; he nourishes false views with regard to the murder that he wants to commit.

In this same way the ten courses of action can be the consecutive action of murder. And the same for the other courses of action, stealing, etc. 290

But, greed, wickedness and false views are never preparatory
actions, for they are not the beginning of an action; nor are they preparatory actions, for they are solely a production of the mind.\textsuperscript{291}

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The Sūtra says, “There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of killing: killing arisen from desire, killing arisen from hatred, and killing arisen from ignorance,” and thus following to, “There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of false views.” What are these different killings, etc.?

All the courses of action are not indifferently achieved by desire, hatred, or ignorance; but

68d. Preparatory action arises from three roots.\textsuperscript{292}

The preparatory action of all of the courses of action can indifferently arise from the three roots. The Blessed One, by expressing himself as we have seen, refers to the first cause, the cause which gives rise (\textit{samutthāpaka}, iv.10a-b) to the course of action.

1. Killing (iv.73) arisen from desire:\textsuperscript{293} killing in order to seize a certain part of an animal; killing in order to seize some goods; killing for pleasure; killing in order to defend oneself, or one’s friends.

Killing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.

Killing arisen through ignorance. To consider the sacrifice as a pious action and so to kill;\textsuperscript{294} when a king, according to the authority of the legalists kills through duty, “The first of the meritorious actions of the king is to punish evil-doers”; when the Persians say, “One should kill one’s aged and sick parents”;\textsuperscript{295} when one says, “One should kill serpents, scorpions, and \textit{tryambuka} flies (\textit{Mahāvyutpatti}, 213, 91), etc., because these creatures are poisonous;\textsuperscript{296} one must kill game, cattle, birds, and buffalos in order to nourish oneself.”\textsuperscript{297}

And finally killing which is provoked by false views: murder committed by a person who denys a future life and whom nothing can stop.

2. Stealing (iv.73c-d) arisen from desire. Either one steals the object desired, or one steals in order to then gain possession of another object, to acquire honor and respect,\textsuperscript{298} or in order to defend oneself and one’s friends.

Stealing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
Stealing arisen from ignorance. A king, upon the authority of the legalists, seizes the goods of evil-doers. The Brāhmīns say, "All things have been given to the Brāhmīns by Brahmā; and it is through the weakness of the Brāhmīns that the Vṛṣalas enjoy it. Consequently, when a Brāhmīn steals, he takes that which belongs to him; he eats what is his, wears what is his, and gives what is his." And yet, when Brāhmīns take, they indeed have the notion of the goods of another.

Stealing provoked through false views is also stealing from ignorance.

3. Illicit sexuality (iv.74a-b) arisen from desire. Sexual intercourse with the wife of another, either through love, or in order to obtain honor and respect, or in order to defend oneself and one’s friends.

Illicit sexuality arisen through hatred, in order to satiate hostility.

Illicit sexuality arisen from ignorance. The Persians, etc., have intercourse with their mothers and other forbidden women. In the gosava sacrifice, a Brāhmīn drinks water in the manner of an animal, grazes through the grass, has intercourse with his mother, his sister, or a woman of his gotra; he must copulate with them wherever he finds them: in this manner this bull will triumph over the world. And such too are those that say, "Women are like rice mortars, flowers, fruits, cooked food, ladders, roads, and ferryboats: they are there to be used.”

4-7. Lying (iv.74c-d) and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance and from hatred, as above.

Lying arisen from ignorance. "Oh King, playful lying, lying to women, in marriage, or in danger of death, does not hurt: one says that these five lies are not transgressions.” This is lying provoked by false views.

Malicious words and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance. These are provoked through false views. Further, the false discourses of the Vedas, etc., are frivolous words arisen from ignorance.

8-10. How do greed, wickedness and false views (iv.77-78) arise out of desire, etc.? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:

69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.

When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;
the same for the other two roots.

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We have explained the bad courses of action in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of action,

69c-d. Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive actions, arise from non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.

Good courses of action, with their preparatory and consecutive actions, have a good mind for their originating (pravartaka, iv.10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.

The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of action is a preparation of a good course of action; the renouncing of the action proper which constitutes a bad course of action is itself a good course of action; the renouncing of a consecutive action of a bad course of action is a consecutive action of a good course of action.

Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the moment when the novice enters into the nānāvasa, salutes the Saṅgha, addresses his request to the Upādhyāya, until the first or second karmavācana, this is the preparatory action. At the achievement of the third karmavācana there takes place a viññāpti, and an avijñāpti simultaneous to this viññāpti, which constitute the course of action itself. After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the niśrayas, when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series of the avijñāpti created by the principal action continues—that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Prātimokṣa discipline (iv.38)—this is the consecutive action.

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We have seen that bad courses of action were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.

70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.
Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder, or one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.

70b-d. Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire.

"Adultery" is illicit sexuality.

71a. False views, through ignorance.

Through an extreme ignorance.

71b. The others, by the three.

The other courses of action,—lying, malicious words, and inconsiderate words,—are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.

The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their

71c-d. Object: living beings, objects of enjoyment, nāmarūpa, and nāman.308

Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious speech; the objects of enjoyment are the objects of adultery, greed and stealing; nāmarūpa, that is, the five skandhas, are the object of false views; nāman, that is, the nāmakāya (ii.47) is the object of lying and the other two transgressions of the voice.309

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When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same moment as the victim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?

72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal course of action.310

This is why the Vibhāṣā says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the
transgression of killing? Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies before or at the same time [as the victim].” The reason is clear: as long as the victim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the victim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.

72b. Because a new body has come into existence.

The body—the personality—by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another nikāyasabha (ii.41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not prayoktar and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.

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When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?

72c-d. As soldiers, etc., concur in the realization of the same effect, all are as guilty as the one who kills.

Having a common goal, all are guilty exactly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very fact that they are united together in order to kill.

But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?

Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, “Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being.”

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What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of action? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.

73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.
When a person kills by thinking, “I am killing such a one,” and kills this same person, and not another through error, then there is murder.\textsuperscript{312}

But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?

This person possesses the certitude, “This is certainly him”; he hits him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of \textit{parityāga}.\textsuperscript{313}

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How can there be murder, or destruction of the \textit{prāna} (\textit{prānātipāta}), since the \textit{skandhas} are momentary?\textsuperscript{314}

\textit{Prāna}, the “vital breath”, is a wind whose existence depends on the body and the mind.\textsuperscript{315} This \textit{prāna} is annihilated by a murderer in the same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself.

Or rather,\textsuperscript{316} \textit{prāna} is the vital organ (\textit{jīvetendriya}, ii.45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.

But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is dead when life is absent?\textsuperscript{317}

The true value of the pronoun “to whom” or “of whom” will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter IX).\textsuperscript{318} Let us observe that the Blessed One said, “When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood, deprived of feeling.”\textsuperscript{319} One says that the body lives when it is endowed with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.

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According to the Nirgranthas,\textsuperscript{320} a transgression (\textit{adharma}) results for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning.

But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the Nirgranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which
provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living beings perish. If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that but one example—the example of the fire—and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.

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73c-d. Stealing—taking what is not given—is to appropriate to oneself the goods of another through force or in secret. The reservation above holds: "with the condition that there has been no error." To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.

The plunder of a Stūpa is to take a thing that has not been given by the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvāṇa, the Blessed One accepted, appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stūpas. According to others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians of the Stūpa. To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.

To take the goods, the robes, etc., of an deceased monk, is to take what is not given by the Saṅgha of the parish, in the case when an ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.

74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman with whom one should not have intercourse.

1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,
one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;\(^{329}\)

2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way;\(^{330}\)

3. In an unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a *caitya*, an *aranya*;\(^{331}\)

4. At an unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing,\(^{332}\) or when she has taken a vow.\(^{333}\) Some say: when she has taken a vow only with the consent of her husband.

The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course of action when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one thought that he was with his own wife.\(^{334}\)

Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory action is not the object of the enjoyment.\(^ {335}\)

With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhikṣunis illicit sexuality?

With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.

Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 585a20)

74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a person who understands the meaning.\(^ {336}\)

1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous words.

2. Discourse (ii.47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables. Which will be the course of action? Which will be lies?

The last syllable, which is *vijñapti* and which is accompanied by *avijñapti*. Or rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceding syllables are a preparation for the lie.
3. How should one interpret the expression arthabhijña, “a person who understands the meaning?” Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely avijnapti: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the vijnapti, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any vijnapti at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is “capable of understanding the meaning?”

The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is “capable of understanding the meaning.”

One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.

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The Sūtra teaches that there are sixteen “vocal actions,” eight of which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen . . .

What is the meaning of the words seen (drṣṭa), heard (śruta), cognized (vijnāta), and known (mata)?

75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.

What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen, . . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,
taste, and touch, receives the name of known.

How do you justify this last interpretation?

The Vaibhāṣikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being morally neutral, are as dead (*mrtakalpa*); this is why they are called *mata*.

The Sautrāntikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression *mata* refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?

The Vaibhāṣikas: According to the Sūtra, and by virtue of reasoning.

The Sūtra says, "What do you think, Oh Mālakīmātār, the visible objects that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think 'Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection, attachment, appetite, or searching out? No, Lord. Oh Mālakīmātār, with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (*matamātrām bhavisyati*)."

The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the *dharmas*: hence the word *mata* refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be referred to in this teaching of the Blessed One.

The Sautrāntikas: This Sūtra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and is does not confirm your interpretation of the word *mata*. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having *mata*. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc.,—each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible things and *dharmas*,—you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc., without attributing (*adhyāropa*) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable."

Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, *mata* (known) and cognized?

According to the Sautrāntikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, *drṣṭa*; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, *sruta*; what is admitted
by reason of correct reasoning, is *mata*, known; and what is perceived by
the mental organ is cognized, *vijnata*. Thus five categories of
objects—visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things—are
seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category—*dharmas*—is not
seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sutra refers to. It is thus
false that, in the hypothesis where *mata* does not designate odors, tastes,
and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be
omitted in the Sutra: thus the argument of the Vaibhāṣikas does not
hold.

According to former masters, "seen" is what is perceived by the
organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceived by the organ of hearing and
what one learns from another; "known" is what is personally accepted
or experienced; and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself
(i.e., agreeable sensation, etc., or an intuition that one has in an
absorption).

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Does he who, by means of his body and not by means of speech,
causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?

Yes. The Śāstra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the
transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily?
Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally. Question: Can one be touched by
the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one
acts bodily. Question: Can one be touched by the transgression of
murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal
action? Answer: Yes, for example the Rṣis, guilty of murder through
their anger, and a Bhikṣu, guilty of lying through his silence in the
confession ceremony." (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 617c25).

But, we would say, how could one admit that Rṣis and a Bhikṣu
accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time *vijnapti*
and *avijnapti*? Neither the Rṣis nor a Bhikṣu have bodily or vocal action:
 hence there is no *vijnapti*; and *avijnapti* of the sphere of Kāmadhātu
cannot exist where *vijnapti* is absent (iv.2a). This is a difficulty that
must be resolved.

76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a
person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.\(^{349}\)

The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.

The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.

76c. Injurious words are abusive discourse.

Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to address, is injurious speech.\(^{350}\)

76c-d. All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.\(^{351}\)

The Kārikā has "all defiled . . ."; but it refers here to discourse.

All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is thus an "inconsiderate speaker"; but the Kārikā has bhinnapralāpita in place of samabhinnapralāpa.

77a. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.

Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.

77b-c. For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.

For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms, etc.;\(^{352}\) through frivolity\(^{353}\) some others sing; in the course of plays or dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and loquaciousness,\(^{354}\) carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.

But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are songs that do not have inconsiderate words?

In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by sensuality.\(^{355}\) Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,
inconsiderate words, since one speaks of āvāha, of vivāha, etc.; but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.

77c-d. Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illegitimate means, the goods of another.

To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly—"Would that the goods of another were mine!" is the course of action called greed, abhidhyā.

According to another opinion, abhidhyā means all desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, for the Sūtra of the Five Nīvarṇas, on the subject of kāmacchanda, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned abhidhyā . . ."

But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyā action, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu.

Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is abhidhyā: but all abhidhyā is not a course of action. Only the most notable among the bad practices are included among the courses of action (iv.66b).

78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.

It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the person of another.

78b-c. False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor bad.

As it is said in the Sūtra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good action, no bad action . . . there are no Arhats in the world." False view, as this Sūtra shows, consists of negating action, its results, and the existence of Āryans. The Kārikā only indicates the beginning.

Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of action.

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What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of action" (karmapatha)?
Three are courses of action; seven are also action.\textsuperscript{362}

Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action—courses of action that one terms volition (\textit{cetanā}, iv.1b). In fact, volition which is associated with them is moved by their movement, in that, by their force, it acts in conformity with them: it moves by their out-going.

Murder and the other six transgressions are action, for they are, by their nature, actions of body and voice; and they are also courses of this action that is called volition, for the volition that gives rise to them (\textit{tatsamutthānacetanāyāḥ}, iv.10) has in these transgressions its end and reason for existence.

The expression "course of action" thus simply means course of action when one applies it to greed, etc.; it signifies action and course of action when it is applied to killing, etc. A similar composition is justified by the rule of \textit{asarupānām apy ekāśeṣāḥ}: "A single meaning is maintained even when the terms of a compound are different" (\textit{Pāṇini}, i.2.64).

In the same way one should understand the good courses of action, the renouncing of killing, etc., non-greed, etc.

Why are not preparatory and consecutive actions considered as courses of action (iv.66b-d)?

Because preparatory action is accomplished with a view to the action proper; and because consecutive action has for its roots the action itself.\textsuperscript{363} Furthermore, the most notable among good and bad practices alone are courses of action. And finally, courses of action are actions the augmentation and diminution of which have for their result the augmentation or the diminution of things and living beings (iv.85, iii.89).

The Sautrāntikas do not recognize volition as a mental action; for them, there is no mental action outside of greed, etc. (iv.65c-d).

How then do they explain the fact that the Sūtra gives the name of
course of action to greed etc.? This is a question they must answer.

The response is not difficult. Greed, wickedness (anger) and false view are mental actions and they are pathways leading to bad realms of rebirth; or rather they are both courses of action, for greed sets into motion wickedness (anger) and false view, and vice versa.

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The ten bad courses of action are in complete contradiction with the good dharmas.

79a. The view of negation cuts off the roots of good. 364

The cutting off of the roots of good takes place through the false view of the ninth degree, strong-strong (iv.79d).

Objection: You affirm that only false view cuts off the roots of good, but the Treatise 365 says, "What are the strong roots of evil? They are the roots of evil which cut off the roots of good, the roots of evil which are initially abandoned when one acquires detachment from Kāmadhātu." This text proves that greed and the other roots of evil cut off the roots of good.

Answer: Only false view cuts off the roots of good; but false view is brought about by the roots of evil: hence the Treatise attributes to these last the operation which more properly belongs to false views. In the same way that one says that bandits burn a village because it is they who light the fire that burns the village.

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What roots of good are cut off?

79b. The innate roots of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. 366

The roots of good of the sphere of Kāmadhātu are cut off when one cuts off the roots of good; for one who cuts off the roots of good of Kāmadhātu is not endowed with the roots of good of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu.

If this is so, how should one understand this text of the Prajñāpti, "What cuts off this person’s roots of good of the three spheres?"
This text means that, at this moment, the acquisition of the roots of good of the superior spheres become distant, because this person, who was formerly fit for these acquisitions, ceases to exist through the cutting off of the roots of good of Kāmadhātu.

It refers to the innate roots of good: for one who cuts off the roots of good has already fallen from the acquired roots of good (prayogika, ii.71b, trans. p. 314, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 183b5).

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What is the object of the false view which cuts off the roots of good?

79c. The false view which negates cause and result.

Negation of cause is to think, "There is neither good nor bad action." Negation of result is to think, "There is no retribution, no result of good or bad action" (iv.78b-c, v.7).

According to another opinion, these two false views,—that which negates cause, and that which negates result,—contribute to the cutting off of the roots of good in the same way as ānantaryamārga and vimuktimārga contribute to the cutting off of the defilements (vi.28, 65b).

Some say that the negation which cuts off the roots of good has for its object (that is, denies) sāsrava, the impure, or the first two Truths, and not anāsrava, the pure, or the last two Truths; rather it has for its object the sphere where one is to be found, and not Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. In fact, the negation which bears on the "pure" or the higher spheres is weak, because it is in relation with these objects only by association (v.17-18). 367

But the Vaibhāṣikas say: 368

79d. Completely.

The roots of good are cut off completely by false view, whether this refers to cause or result, pure or impure, Kāmadhātu or the higher spheres.

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Some say that the nine categories of the roots of good, weak-weak roots of good, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, etc., are cut off all at once through one moment of false view, in the same way that the defilements which are abandoned by Seeing into one Truth are, in all their categories, abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth (vi.lc-d).

But the Vaibhāṣikas say:

79d. Gradually.

The roots of good are cut off in the manner in which the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation on the Truths (satyabhāvanā, vi.33) are abandoned: this means that the strong-strong root of good is cut off by a weak-weak false view, and thus following to the weak-weak root of good which is cut off by a strong-strong false view.

This theory is not in agreement with the text, "What are the 'small and concomitant' roots of good? They are those which are abandoned lastly to the cutting off of the roots of good; those through the absence of which a person is termed one-who-has-the-roots-of-good-cut-off."

Objection: If the cutting off is gradual, how should one understand the text, "What are the strong-strong roots of evil? The roots of evil through which one cuts off the roots of good?"

This text refers to the achievement of the cutting off of the roots of good, for it is through the strong-strong roots of evil that the roots of good totally disappear. As long as the last category of the roots of good, the weak-weak, is not cut off, it can determine the reappearance of the others.

According to certain masters, the cutting off of the nine categories takes place at one time, without interruption, like the abandoning of the defilements through the Path of Seeing into the Truths. But the Vaibhāṣikas say that it takes place either without interruption, or at several times.

According to certain masters, the abandoning of discipline (samvaraprahāṇa, iv.38) preceeds the cutting off of the roots. But the Vaibhāṣikas say that the discipline is lost when one loses the mind of which this discipline is the result (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 183c8).373
What beings are capable of cutting off the roots of good?

79d. The cutting off takes place among humans.

Only humans cut them off; not the creatures in the painful realms of rebirth; for their discernment (prajñā), whether defiled or not, is not firm; not the gods, for the result of action is manifest to them. And only humans of the three continents cut them off, not those of Uttarakuru, for they do not possess bad āsayas.

According to another opinion, only humans in Jambudvīpa cut off the roots of good. But this is in contradiction with the text, "The inhabitants of Jambudvīpa possess a minimum of eight organs; the same for the inhabitants of Pūrvavidena and of Avaragodānīya."

80a. Men and women cut off the roots.

According to another opinion, women do not cut off the roots because their will and their application are weak. But this is in contradiction with the text, "Whoever possesses the female organ necessarily possesses eight organs" (ii.18d).

The sensualist does not cut off the roots of good because his āsaya is in movement; the only one who cuts them off is

80a-b. The rationalist.

Because his āsaya is bad, firm, and hidden.

By virtue of these same principles, eunuchs, etc., do not cut off the roots of good, because they are counted among the sensualists, and because their discernment, like that of the creatures of painful realms of rebirth, is not firm.

What is the nature of the cutting off of the roots of good?

80b. The cutting off is non-possession.

When the possession of the roots of good is obstructed in rearising, in continuing, then ten non-possessions (aprāpti), or non-endowedments (asamanvāgama, ii.37) arise.

When aprāpti has arisen, there is a cutting off of the roots of good.
When the roots of good have been cut off, how do they rearise?

80c. Rearising through doubt, through insight into the existence of cause, etc.

It can happen that a person whose roots of good have been cut off produces, relative to cause and result, either doubt or insight into their existence, which is Right View. When Right View has arisen, then one says that the roots of good have arisen, because the possession of these roots is henceforth present. The roots arise in their nine categories; but they will only gradually manifest themselves, in the same way that one initially regains one's health and then, gradually, one's strength.

80d. Not here, for one guilty of ānāntarya.

Other persons who have cut off the roots of good can take them up again in this life, but not one guilty of an ānāntarya transgression (iv.97) who has thus cut off the roots of good. It is with regard to this transgressor that it is said, "This person is unfit to again take up the roots of good in this life; but he certainly will take them up either by dying in hell, or by being born." "By being born" means to be found in an intermediate state [which preceeds existence in hell]. "By dying" means disposed to die [in hell]. The roots of good are taken up by being born since they have been cut off by the force of the cause; and by dying, since they have been cut off by the force of a condition. Same difference when they have been cut off by one's own force, or by the force of another.

The person who is āsāyavipanna—that is to say, lost (vipanna) by the fact of his false view—can take up again the roots of good in the present existence. The person who is both āsāyavipanna and prayogāvipanna—that is, one who is furthermore lost through the fact of his ānāntarya transgression—takes up the roots again only after the destruction of his body. [This is a variant of what has just been said, "One who has cut off the roots by his own force, or by the force of another . . . "] Same difference for one who is drṣṭivipanna (lost through false view) and one who is at the same time both drṣṭivipanna
and silavipanna (lost further by an ānantarya transgression). \[388\] [This is a variant on the immediately preceding passage].

One can cut off the roots of good and not be destined to hell (mithyatvaniyata, iii.44c-d). Four cases: 1. Pūraṇa and the other five masters; \[389\] 2. Ajātaśatru; 3. Devadatta; and 4. persons who have not cut off the roots and who have committed an ānantarya transgression.

A person with a false view, who has cut off the roots of good, is punished in Avīci Hell; a person guilty of an ānantarya transgression is punished in Avīci, or elsewhere. \[390\]

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Volition is the principal action. We shall explain with how many courses of action volition can coexist.

81a-c. With regard to the painful realms of rebirth, volition can coexist at most with eight courses.

Volition can coexist with one course of action, as when either greed, anger, or a false view manifests itself, without any "material" (rupin) course of action having taken place; or rather the person who has prepared one of the material courses of action finds himself to have a non-defiled, that is, a good or neutral mind, at the moment when, on his instigation, this course of action is perpetuated. \[391\]

Volition can coexist with two courses of action, as when a person with an angry mind kills; or when a person who is prey to greed steals, or commits adultery, or speaks in an inconsiderate manner. \[392\]

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when a person with an angry mind kills and steals at the same time. \[393\]

But haven't we seen that stealing is only achieved by desire alone (iv.70)? This restriction refers to the achievement of stealing committed by a person who only thinks of stealing. \[394\]

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when greed is present at the moment when two material courses of action are completed that one has committed by another.

Volition can coexist with four courses of action, as when one lies or when one injures with the intention of dividing: there is one mental course of action and three vocal courses of action. \[395\] Or rather, when the
mind is in the prey of greed, etc., at the moment when three material courses are completed.

Volition can coexist with five, six, or seven courses of action, as when the mind is in the prey of greed, etc., at the moment when four, five, or six material courses of action are completed.

Volition can coexist with eight courses of action, as when a person has made the preparatory action of six courses of action, murder, etc.; at the moment when these six courses of action are completed, he is in the prey of greed and commits adultery.

Volition cannot coexist with nine courses of action, or with ten courses, because greed, anger, false view are not simultaneous.

81c-d. Concerning good courses of action, volition can coexist with ten.

The ten good courses of action can be simultaneous to volition.

81d. Volition does not coexist with one, eight, or five courses of action.396

Volition can coexist with two courses of actions, as when a person in the absorption of Ārūpyadhātu, in possession of ksayajñāna or anutpādañāna (vi.45, 50): his five consciousnesses are good. There are thus two courses of action: non-greed and non-anger.397

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when the mental consciousness is associated with Right View and when the seven good material courses of action are absent.

Volition can coexist with four courses of action. When, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of an Upāsaka or a Śrāmaṇera which embraces four material good courses of action, non-killing, etc.

Volition can coexist with six courses of action, as when, the five consciousnesses being good, one undertakes the same disciplines: four good material courses of action, non-greed and non-anger.

Volition can coexist with seven courses of action. When, with a good mental consciousness, one undertakes the same discipline, add Right View. Or rather, when, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of Bhikṣu: only seven material courses of action.

Volition can coexist with nine courses of action. [Three cases:] One
undertakes the discipline of a Bhikṣu, the five consciousnesses (visual consciousness, etc.) being good: Right View is absent; one undertakes this same discipline at a moment when, in an absorption of Ārūpya-dhātu, one possesses ksaya-jñāna or anutpāda-jñāna. [This is the case, examined above, of the two courses of action: one must add the seven courses of action of discipline, which is here not avijñapti]; in the course of an absorption of a dhyāna, one possesses ksaya-jñāna or anutpāda-jñāna [Right View is absent; the seven material courses of action exist as part of the discipline of dhyāna (avijñapti)].

Volition can coexist with ten good courses of action. In the different cases: when one undertakes the discipline of a Bhikṣu with a good mental consciousness, except in the case of ksaya-jñāna and anutpāda-jñāna; and all volition concomitant with the discipline of dhyāna and pure discipline when this volition is not associated with ksaya-jñāna or anutpāda-jñāna.

We have shown under what conditions volition coexists with the good courses of action included in the disciplines. If one looks at the good courses of action independent of the disciplines, volition can also be found with one course of action, five courses of action, and eight courses of action:

1. When one renounces a transgression and when one has a mind different from that which provokes this renouncing, that is, a defiled or neutral mind; 2. when one renounces two transgressions and when one has a good mental consciousness: this good mental consciousness includes the three mental actions to which is added two renouncings, two material actions; and 3. when, under the same conditions, when one renounces five transgressions.

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What are the courses of action which exist, either in fact or as potentiality, in the different realms of rebirth?

82a-b. Inconsiderate words, injurious words, anger, of two types, exist in hell.

Inconsiderate words exist in hell, for beings in hell lament: injurious words, for beings in hell mutually reproach one another; and anger,
because they hate one another for the duration of their lives.

82c-d. Greed and false views, as potentiality.

Beings in hell possess greed and false views, but these do not actually exist in hell: because of the absence of any object to which one could become attached,\(^{403}\) and because the result of action is manifested.

In hell killing is absent, for beings in hell die through the exhaustion of their actions (\textit{karmakṣaya}, ii. trans. p. 235-6); stealing and adultry are absent, for beings in hell do not have property or objects of property, or women; lying is absent, for it is useless; and malicious words are useless, for beings in hell are at a distance and are always separate from one another.

82d. Three exist in Uttarakuru.

Greed, anger and false views exist in Uttarakuru in the sense that the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are in possession of a potentiality for greed, anger and false views. But, in fact, greed is absent there, for no one has anything of his own; in the same way anger is absent, because they are soft, and because there is no cause for displeasure; so too false views are absent, because there is no bad āsaya (\textit{apāpāsayatvāt}, iv.80d).

83a. The seventh course exists there in fact also.

Inconsiderate words exist there in fact; for, sometimes, the inhabitants of Uttarakuru sing with a defiled mind.

Because bad āsaya is absent there; because the duration of one's life is determined there (iii.78c; ii. trans. p. 236); and because no one possesses any property or object of property, or women, and also through its lack of usefulness, killing and the other courses of action are absent in Uttarakuru.

If the men of Uttarakuru do not have wives, how can they have unchaste behavior? They take the women with whom they desire to enjoy pleasure by the hand and go to a tree. If sex with this woman is allowable, the tree covers up the couple with its branches; in the contrary case, the tree does not cover up the couple.\(^{404}\)

83b. The ten bad courses of action exist elsewhere in Kāma-dhātu.
The ten bad courses of action exist in fact in Kāmadhātu with the exception of hell and Uttarakuru.

Concerning animals, Pretas and gods, the bad courses of action are not necessarily connected with undiscipline (asamvaranirmukta, see iv.24c); with regard to humans, the bad courses of action are either necessarily connected, or not necessarily connected to undiscipline.

Does killing exist among the gods? The gods do not, amongst themselves, kill one another, but they kill beings belonging to other realms of rebirth, Pretas, etc. According to another opinion, the gods also kill by cutting the head or the body. 405

83c-d. Three good courses of action exist everywhere, as potentiality and in fact.

Everywhere, in the three spheres of existence and in the five realms of rebirth, non-greed, non-anger and Right Views exist both as potentiality and in fact.

84a-b. In the Ārūpyas, among the Unconscious Ones, seven courses of action exist as potentiality.

Among the beings of Ārūpyadhātu and the Asāmjñāsattvas (ii.41d), the seven good material courses of action, bodily and vocal, exist solely as potentiality.

In fact, Āryans who are born in Ārūpyadhātu possess the past and future discipline of pure morality, and the Unconscious Ones possess the discipline of dhyāna (iv.13c) under the same conditions.

The past pure discipline that the Āryan who is in Ārūpyadhātu possesses, has for its base of support the stage or stages (Four Dhyānas) which he has produced and destroyed; the future pure discipline that he will possess, has on the contrary the five stages (Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas) for its base of support. 406

84b-d. For the rest, good courses of action also exist in fact, with the exception of beings in hell and the Uttarakurus.

The rest, that is, in the other spheres of existence, and in the other realms of rebirth.

Beings in hell and the Uttarakurus do not undertake any morality. Elsewhere the seven good material courses of action exist in fact.
One must make a distinction. Among the animals and Pretas, the
good courses of action are never necessarily connected with discipline;
in Rūpadhātu, they are always necessarily connected with discipline;
elsewhere they can be of one or the other category.

85a-b. All the other courses of action have retributive results,
outflowing result, and predominating results. 407

Good or bad, the ten courses of action have a threefold result.
1. Through each bad course of action practiced (āsevita), cultivated
(bhāvita), developed (babulikṣta), 408 a transgressor is reborn in hell. 409
Such is the retributive result. 410

2. If a transgressor is reborn in a human existence, through murder
he will be of brief lifespan; through stealing he will be poor; through
illicit sexuality, he will have an unfaithful spouse; through lying, he will
be slandered; through malicious speech, his friends will become
enemies; through injurious speech, he will only understand disagreeable
speech; through inconsiderate speech, his words will not come to be
believed; through greed, he will have great desires (mahecca, vi.6);
through anger, he will have great hate; and through false views, he will
have great ignorance, for ignorance is great in false views. Such is the
outflowing result.

But, one would say, a human existence, even if it is short, is the
retribution of a good action. How can one regard it as an outflowing
result of murder?

We do not say that this existence is the result of murder; we say
rather, that a murderer will have a short life by reason of the murder;
murder is the cause which rends a human existence short, an existence
otherwise caused by a good action.

3. By reason of the intense practice of killing, external things411—
plants, the sun, etc.,—are of little vitality; by reason of stealing, they are
crushed by rains of stones, dust and acid; 412 by reason of illicit sexuality,
they are covered by dust or acid; by reason of lying, they are of bad odor;
by reason of malicious speech, they are in a hole or on a hill; by reason of
injurious speech, the land and the sun are impregnated with salt and are
sterile, and the plants are detestable and pernicious; by reason of
inconsiderate speech, the seasons are reversed; by reason of greed, fruits
are small; by reason of anger, fruits are sour; and by reason of false
views, fruits are very few, or are totally absent. Such is the pre-
dominating result.

***

Is it by reason of killing that a murderer is reborn in hell and then
only enjoys a short human life?

According to some, it is by reason of killing. Existence in hell is a
retributive result, whereas shortness of life is an outflowing result of the
killing. [In fact, retribution is always sensation, *vedanā*].

According to others, existence in hell comes from the preparatory
action of killing; the fact of having a short life comes from the action
itself. It is true that the Sūtra speaks of killing as the cause of existence in
hell, but it understands by killing, not only killing, but killing with all the
actions that accompany it. What is called outflowing result does not here
exist separately from the retributive result and the predominating
result. It is called outflowing by reason of the resemblance between the
cause and its effect (to kill—to have a short life; to steal—to be poor,
etc.).

***

Why is the result of the courses of action threefold? One who
commits murder causes the victim to suffer, causes him to die, and
destroys his vigor:

85c-d. The result is threefold, because one makes him suffer,
because one makes him die, and because one destroys his
vigor. 413

Because one causes suffering, there is a retributive result, that is,
suffering in hell; because one makes him die, there is an outflowing
result, that is, his life is short; and because one destroys his vigor, 414
there is a predominating result, that is, external things are of little vigor.

The same for the other courses of action.

***
The same for the three results of the good courses of action: through having practiced, cultivated, and developed the renouncing of killing, one is reborn among the gods; if one is reborn down here in human condition, one will have a long life. The results of all good actions oppose bad actions (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 589a18-21).

***

The Blessed One distinguishes wrong speech (mithyāvāc), wrong action (mithyākarmānta), and wrong manner of livelihood (mithyā-jīva).415 Is this to say that wrong livelihood is separate from wrong speech and wrong action?

It does not exist separately:

86a-c. Bodily and vocal actions which arise from attachment are "wrong manner of livelihood"; it constitutes a separate category, because it is difficult to purify.416

Bodily action and vocal action arising from hate and ignorance are, respectively, wrong action and wrong speech. Arisen from attachment, both constitute wrong manner of livelihood, distinguished in this way because the manner of livelihood is difficult to purify.

Attachment is by its nature, a bandit: one watches with difficulty the mind of the actions which provoke attachment. Consequently, since the manner of livelihood is, as long as one lives, difficult to purify, the Blessed One, with an end that one should apply himself to purifying it, made a separate category of wrong livelihood. There is a stanza,417 "The layman purifies his views with difficulty, for he is always in the prey of multiple views; the monk purifies his manner of livelihood with difficulty, for his subsistence depends on others."

86c-d. If one says that it is solely action issued from attachment to the resources necessary for life, no; for this is in contradiction with the Sūtra.

If someone thinks that to dance, to sing, etc., for one's own pleasure is not a wrong manner of livelihood,—because wrong manner of livelihood is only bodily and vocal actions inspired by attachment to the means of subsistence,—we would answer: no. In fact, the Blessed
One, in the Śilaskandhikā, taught that looking at elephant fights, etc., is a wrong manner of livelihood. And why? Because this is to enjoy bad objects.

***

We have seen (ii.56) that there are five results, predominating results, results of virile activity, outflowing results, retributive results, and disconnection or liberation. How many results are included in the different types of action?

87a-b. Impure, in the path of abandoning, action embraces the five results.

The path of abandoning is so called because it has abandoning for its goal, or because the defilements are abandoned due to it. This is the ānantaryā path which will be defined later (vi.28, 49) and which is of two types, pure and impure.

Action which forms part of the impure path of abandoning, includes the five results: 1. retributive result: an agreeable retribution which belongs to the same stage as the action; 2. an outflowing result: dharmas arisen from the absorption, similar to the action, and later than it; 3. a disconnective result: disconnection from the defilements, the abandoning of the defilements; 4. a result of virile activity: the dharmas that this action gives rise to, namely (a) the path of deliverance (vimuktimārga, vi.28), (b) the coexisting dharmas, (c) the future dharmas of which this action causes one to obtain possession, and (d) the abandoning itself; and 5. a predominating result: all the conditioned dharmas with the exception of the action in question, and with the exception of the dharmas already arisen (ii.59).

87c. Pure, it includes four results.

The preceding ones, with the exception of the retributive result.

88a-b. The rest of pure action and neutral action, three results.

The rest of pure action—that is, pure action not included in the path of abandoning, but forming part of the prayoga-vimukti-viśeṣa-mārgas (vi.65b)—embrace neither disconnective result, since it is not the cause
of abandoning, nor retributive result, since it is pure.

The same two results are absent also in neutral action, whether it is defiled nor not.

***

What is the nature,—good, bad, or neutral,—of the results of different actions?

88c-d. The good, bad, neutral dharmas, constitute four, two, and three results of good action.

Outflowing results, disconnective results, virile activity, and predominating results of good action are good dharmas. Retributive results are neutral by nature (ii.57).

Virile activity and predominating results of good action are bad dharmas.

Outflowing results of a good action are necessarily good; disconnective results are good by their nature.

Retributive results, virile activity, and predominating results of good action are neutral dharmas.

89a-b. Good, bad, neutral dharmas, constitute, respectively two, three, and four results of bad action.

The expression anukraman ("respectively") signifies yathākraman.

Two results,—virile activity and predominating results of bad action,—are good dharmas.

Three results—by omitting retributive results and disconnective results—are bad dharmas.

Four results—by omitting disconnective results—are neutral dharmas.

It is admitted then that an outflowing result of bad dharmas can be made up of neutral dharmas. How is this? 423

Two neutral dharmas,—the belief in personality (satkāyadrśti) and the belief in the past and in the future of a soul (antaragrāḥadrśti) (v.6b)—are an outflowing result of bad dharmas: namely of the universal defilements (ii.54, v.12) which one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering and Arising, and of the defilements of the rāga class,
etc., which one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering.

89c-d. The same dharmas—good, bad, neutral dharmas—make up two, three, and three results of neutral action.

Two results,—virile activity and predominating results,—are good dharmas.

Three results—by omitting retributive results and disconnective results—are bad dharmas. In fact some bad dharmas of the five categories (ii.52b), to be abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc., are an outflowing result of two neutral dharmas, namely of satkāyadrṣṭi and antagrāhadrṣṭi.

Three results—the same as above—are neutral.

***

With regard to the time period, and the stage, etc.,

90a. Some dharmas of all types constitute four results of past action.

All the dharmas or some dharmas of all types, that is, past, present and future, can constitute four of the results of past action. One must exclude the disconnective result which is outside of time.

90b. Some future dharmas constitute four results of median action.

Median action, that is, present action, has four results—by excluding disconnection—which are future dharmas.

90c. There are two which are median dharmas.

Some present dharmas are predominating results and virile activity of median action.

90c-d. For action not yet arisen, there are three results made up of future dharmas.

That is, retributive results, predominating results, and virile activity. Future action does not have outflowing results (ii.57c).
91a-b. Some dharmas of the same stage constitute four results, whereas some dharmas of another stage constitute three or two results.

An action of a certain stage produces four results—by excluding disconnection—which are dharmas of its own stage.

Some pure dharmas belong to a stage different from that of the action which constitutes three results of this action: virile activity, predominating result and also outflowing result, after the rule given in ii.53.

Some impure dharmas belong to a stage different from that of the action which constitutes virile activity and the predominating result of this action.

91c. Some Śaikṣa dharmas, etc. constitute three results of Śaikṣa action.\(^{425}\)

Some dharmas “characteristic of the Saint who is not an Arhat” (Śaikṣa) constitute outflowing results, virile activity, and predominating results of Śaikṣa action.

The same for dharmas “characteristic of the Arhat” (Aśaikṣa).

Neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa dharmas constitute virile activity, predominating results and disconnetive results of Śaikṣa action.

91d-92b. Śaikṣa dharmas, etc., constitute one result, three results, and two results of Aśaikṣa action, etc.

Śaikṣa dharmas are a predominating result of this action.
Aśaikṣa dharmas are a predominating result, an outflowing result, and virile activity of this action.

Neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa dharmas are predominating results and virile activity of this action.

92c-d. Some Śaikṣa dharmas, etc., constitute two results, two results, and five results of action differing from the two preceeding.

This refers to neither-Śaikṣa-neither-Aśaikṣa action.

Some Śaikṣa dharmas and some Aśaikṣa dharmas are virile activity and predominating results of this action.
Some neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Āśaikṣa dharmas are five results of this action.

93a-b. Dharmas susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truths (darśanabeya), susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation (bhāvanābeya), and not susceptible of being abandoned (aprābeya), constitute three results, two results, one result of action susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truths.

Some darśanabeya dharmas are predominating results, virile activity and outflowing results of darśanabeya action.

Some bhāvanābeya dharmas are four results of this action: excluding disconnection.

Some aprābeya dharmas are predominating results of this action.

93c-d. The same dharmas constitute two, four, and three results of action susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.

Darśanabeya dharmas are virile activity and predominating results of bhāvanābeya action.

Bhāvanābeya dharmas are four results of this action: excluding disconnection.

Aprābeya dharmas are virile activity, predominating results, and disconnection of this action.

94a-b. The same dharmas constitute, respectively, one result, two results, and four results of action not susceptible of being abandoned.

Darśanabeya dharmas are predominating results of aprābeya action.

Some bhāvanābeya dharmas are predominating results and virile activity results of this action.426

Some aprābeya dharmas are four results of this action: omitting the retributive result.

The text has yathākraman, “respectively,” the same as the above passage (iv.89b) has anukraman in the sense of yathākraman. It repeats here “respectively”: one concludes from this that this word should be supplied in each definition. Such is, in effect, the process of abbreviation.
In the teaching of the doctrine of action the following question is again posed: the Treatise (the Jñānapraśthāna) speaks of proper action (yogavihita), improper action (ayogavihita), and neither-proper-nor-improper action. What is the meaning of these three actions?

94c-d. Improper action is defiled action; according to some, irregular action also.427

Some say that improper action is defiled action, because this proceeds from a wrong judgment.428 According to others, irregular action is also irregular action: when a person walks, stands still, eats, or dresses himself in a manner other than that which he should, this action—which is undefiled-neutral—is improper, for this person acts contrary to received usage (ayoga).

There is the same divergence of view with regard to proper action: this is either good action, or good and regular action.

Action which differs from proper action and improper action is neither-proper-nor-improper action.

***

Does one action project one birth or many births? Do many actions project one birth or many births?

According to the system of the School:

95a. One action projects one arising.429

By arising, janman, one should understand, not merely birth (jāti), but an existence (nikāyasabbhāga, ii.41a). He who comes into an existence is said to be born.

1. One action projects one arising and no more.

The Sautrāntikas: This thesis is in contradiction with what the Sthavira Aniruddha says, “Through the retribution of this single alm (pindapāta), after having been born up to seven times among the Thirty-three Gods, I am finally born in the family of the rich Śākyans.”430

Answer: Aniruddha, through this alm, obtained a great prosperity;
he obtained a memory of his past lives; and he accomplished many new meritorious works. By expressing himself as he did, he intends to indicate his point of departure. It is thus that a person who had acquired a sum of one thousand by means of a single penny, could say, "It is through one penny that I have acquired this fortune."

One answers again: 431 By reason of his alm, Aniruddha produced many streams of volition: one result appeared to each volition.

2. Many actions do not together project one arising: for if this were the case, the projection of existence would take place in parts. But admitting that one existence is projected by a single action,

95b. Many actions complete an existence.

The same way that a painter with one stroke delineates the outline of an image, and then fills in this image: 432 so too, even though their quality of being a human is the same, certain humans have perfect organs, major and minor members; certain humans are beautiful through the excellence of their hue, figure, shape and power, whereas, in certain humans this or that is lacking. 433

It is not solely action which projects one existence: all retributive dharmas, namely sensation, etc., also project it. 434

However

95c-d. Neither the two absorptions of unconsciousness nor the prāptis project (an existence).

Even though they are retribution, the two absorptions of unconsciousness (ii.42) do not project an existence, because they do not coexist with action. The prāptis (ii.36) do not project an existence, because they do not have the same result as does the action with which they coexist. 435

***

The Blessed One said that there are three āvaranas or obstacles: the obstacle of action (karmāvarana), the obstacle of the defilements (kleśāvarana), and the obstacle of retribution (vipākāvarana). 436

What are the three obstacles?
96. *Anantarya* actions; chronic defilements; and bad realms of rebirth, and Asamjñisattvas and Kurus, are the threefold obstacle.\(^{437}\)

The obstacle which consists of action are the five mortal (*anantarya*) transgressions: matricide, patricide, the killing of an Arhat, schism, and wounding the Tathāgata with thoughts of hatred.\(^{438}\)

The obstacle which consists of the defilements is chronic defilement. Defilement is of two types, chronic and violent: chronic defilement is continual defilement, and violent defilement is strong defilement. Chronic defilement constitutes an obstacle, as is the case, for example, among eunuchs. Defilements which surge up from time to time, even if their impulse is strong, can be overcome, but not continual defilement, even though it is at rest. The person in whom this is found does not find the time to make an effort to overcome it. From being small, they become medium sized; and from medium sized, they become strong: thus they form an obstacle.

The obstacle which consists of retribution is the three painful realms of rebirth—existence in hell, animal existence, and Preta existence—and one part of the good realms of rebirth—human existence in Uttarakuru, and heavenly existence among the Unconscious Ones.

What does “obstacle” mean?

That which causes an obstacle to the Way and to the roots of good preparatory to the Way, *usmagatas*, etc. (vi.17).

Objection: One should mention as actions forming obstacles other categories of actions besides mortal transgressions. Actions which necessarily produce painful realms of rebirth, etc.,\(^{439}\) which produce birth in eggs, birth in sweat, birth as a woman, or an eighth birth, form obstacles.

Answer: Only actions easily discernible by others and by the agent himself,—and that from five points of view—are mentioned here. Actions which are mortal transgressions are murder, lying, and preparation for murder; its result are painful; the rebirth realm which it produces is hell; the period of its retribution is the next existence; the murderer himself receives the name of patricide ...: from five points of view, action which is mortal transgression is easy to discern.\(^{440}\)
Among the obstacles, the gravest is the obstacle of defilement, followed by the obstacle of action. For these two obstacles rend one incapable of health, not only in the present existence, but also in the next existence.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 601a2-7), the obstacle of defilement is the gravest because it produces the obstacle of action; the obstacle of action is heavier than the obstacle of retribution because it produces this obstacle.

***

What is the meaning of the word ānantarya?2441

The five moral transgressions are called ānantarya because they cannot be "traversed" (antarita), that is to say, prevented in their retribution through actions which should be retributed in the next existence.442 Or rather a person guilty of a mortal transgression is reborn, after this life, immediately (anantaram) in hell; the guilty person is thus antara, "one without intermediate (existence)"; thus the dharma the possession of which makes the guilty one an anantara is called ānantarya, like one terms śrāmanya the dharma which makes someone a Śrāmaṇa (vi.51).

***

In what sphere of existence are the obstacles found?

97a. Mortal transgressions exist in the three continents.443

The inhabitants of Uttarakuru and living beings which are not humans are not capable of mortal transgressions. And all the more reason mortal transgression is absent in the higher spheres. And, among humans, only men and women can commit mortal transgressions:

97b-c. It is not admitted that eunuchs, etc., are capable of this transgression, because of the mediocrity of their kindness and respect.

For the same reasons that rend eunuchs, etc., incapable of
indiscipline (iv.43c); and, further, because their parents, having given to the eunuch only an incomplete body and having only a mediocre affection for their son, are mediocre benefactors; \(^{444}\) because, on the other hand, the eunuch does not experience a strong respect (lajjītva = brīvypatrāpya, ii.32) for his parents the destruction of which would render him guilty of a mortal transgression.

For the same reasons then, Pretas and animals, if they were to kill their parents, are not guilty of mortal transgressions. Nevertheless, the Bhadanta said that animals in whom intelligence is lively, for example, the ājāneya horse, are capable of mortal transgressions (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 619c4-7).\(^ {445}\)

For the same reasons, a human born of demon (or non-human) parents does not commit a mortal transgression in killing them.

97d. The other two obstacles exist in the five realms of rebirth.

Birth in Uttarakuru is an obstacle of retribution for humans; birth among the Asamjñisattvas is such for the gods.

***

What are, by their natures, the different actions of mortal transgression?

Four are bodily action; one is vocal action; three are killing; one is lying; and one is the preparation for murder,\(^ {446}\) for the Tathāgatas cannot be killed by the attack of another.\(^ {447}\)

***

We say that schism (saṅghabhedā) is lying, and that this lying is the fourth mortal transgression. How is this?

If we make schism a mortal transgression, this is because we give the name of schism to lying which is the cause of schism; or rather the word "schism" should be explained as "that which the divides Saṅgha." In fact,

98a-c. Schism is, by its nature, disharmony; this is an undefiled-neutral dharma disassociated from the mind.\(^ {448}\)
Schism, that is, disharmony, is a *saṃskāra* not associated with the mind (ii.35, trans. note 180), and is undefiled-neutral: how could it hence be a mortal transgression? As much as it is a person who divides the Saṅgha, the schismatic is not in possession of the schism. On the contrary

98d. It is the Saṅgha which possesses the schism.

It is that which is divided, and not the schismatic, which “possesses” the *saṃskāra* called “division of the Saṅgha.”

But what does the schismatic possess?

99a-b. The transgression of schism is lying; it belongs to the schismatic.

The schismatic possesses the transgression of schism, which is lying. This lying arises at the same time as the schism itself; it consists of vocal *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti*.

Possessed of this lying,

99c. The schismatic falls into Avīci for a *kalpa*.

He falls into the great Avīci hell for an intermediary period (*antarākalpa*, iii.83). 449 Those guilty of other mortal transgressions are not necessarily in Avīci.

Yet all mortal transgressions are retributed in the next existence: what would happen if a person is guilty of many mortal transgressions?

99d. Suffering grows by reason of supplementary transgression.

A person guilty of many moral transgressions possesses in Avīci a large body and very tender flesh by which he feels twofold, threefold, fourfold, or fivefold, and his torments are extremely numerous and insupportable.

***

Who is capable of dividing the Saṅgha?

100a-b. A Bhikṣu who is an intellectual, who is virtuous, divides. 450
It is a Bhikṣu who divides, not a layman, not a nun, etc. This Bhikṣu should be an intellectual, not a sensualist; he should be virtuous, not immoral: for the words of an immoral Bhikṣu lack authority.

***

Where does schism take place?

100b. Elsewhere.

Not where the Tathāgata is found. Schism is impossible where the Master is to be found, for the Tathāgata cannot be conquered and his word is full of authority.

***

Who does the schismatic divide?

100b. Fools.

Only fools and not Āryans, for Āryans see the Dharma with direct insight. According to another opinion, the schismatic can no longer divide possessors of kṣānti.

***

What does the Saṅgha do that it is divided?

100c-d. When it admits another Master, or another Path, it is divided.

Once it is divided, how long does it remain divided?

100d. It does not exceed a day.

A night of the same day. When the Saṅgha is divided, infallibly, the Saṅgha will again be in concord at sunrise. The schism that we have just described, and which is a “mortal transgression,”
101a. Is what we understand by breaking the Wheel.

The Wheel of the Law of the Blessed One is then broken, because the progress of the Path is hindered. As a consequence there is, at the same time, both breaking of the Wheel and a division of the Saṅgha.\(^{456}\)

Where is breaking of the Wheel produced?

101b. In Jambudvīpa.

Not in the other continents where the Buddhas do not appear.

By how many Bhikṣus?

101b. By nine or more.\(^{457}\)

The maximum number is not fixed. The Saṅgha susceptible of being divided counts at a minimum eight Bhikṣus; the ninth monk necessary is the schismatic. In order for there to be schism, it is necessary that a Saṅgha be divided into two parts—the first is for the Buddha, the second is for the schismatic—forming thus two Saṅghas of four Bhikṣus each, which is the minimum number required in order to constitute a Saṅgha (\textit{Vibhāṣa}, \textit{TD} 27, p. 602c5-13).

***

Another type of schism, different from the breaking of the Wheel and which is not a mortal transgression results from a division in ecclesiastical actions: when, in one parish (\textit{sīmā}), the monks divide themselves in order to perform ecclesiastical actions, \textit{posadha}, etc.

101c. Ritual schism in three continents.\(^{458}\)

Only there where the Religion exists.

101d. This schism supposes eight Bhikṣus or more.

It is necessary to form two groups of four Bhikṣus; but, here, there is not one schismatic who declares himself a Master.

***

At six periods, the schism of the breaking of Wheel cannot take place.
102. The breaking of the Wheel is impossible at the beginning; at the end; before the abscess; before a pair; when the Sage is extinguished; or when a parish has not been delimited.459

At the beginning, that is, when a little time has passed since the setting into motion the Wheel of the Law; and at the end, that is, at the period of the Parinirvāṇa of the Blessed One: in these two periods the Saṅgha is penetrated by a single sentiment.460 In the interval, breaking is impossible before the appearance of an abscess: 461 as long as the abscess of precepts and the abscess of views does not appear in the dispensation (sāsana). It is also impossible before the apparition of a pair: as long as a pair of excellent disciples has not appeared, because the Saṅgha should not pass a night in a state of division, and because this pair of disciples has for its task the reestablishment of harmony. Breaking is impossible when the Sage is extinguished, for, once the Master has entered into Parinirvāṇa, a schismatic would have no opponent. Finally, when a parish has not been delimited, 462 for one says that the Saṅgha is divided when there two parties in one parish.

All Buddhas do not have their Wheels broken as does Śākyamuni: this depends on their former actions.463

***

Why are the transgressions enumerated above, matricide, etc., mortal transgressions to the exclusion of other transgressions?

103a-b. Because they destroy or hurt a field of benefaction, or a field of qualities.464

Matricide and patricide are mortal transgressions because they destroy a benefactor. One’s mother and father are benefactors because they have given birth.

How does the murderer destroy them?
By killing them.465

The murder of an Arhat and the last two mortal transgressions are mortal transgressions because an Arhat, the Saṅgha and the Buddha are fields of qualities.466 One does not destroy the Saṅgha and the Buddha, but one can hurt them.

***
But if the gender of the mother and father changes, does the quality of mother and father no longer exist within the mother and father?

103c. Even if their gender changes, there is mortal transgression in killing him who was the mother, and in killing her who was the father.

It is said in fact (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 619c19-23), “Can a person be guilty of a mortal transgression killing a man who is not his father, or who is not an Arhat? Yes, if he kills his mother whose gender has changed. Can a person be guilty of a mortal transgression by killing a woman who is not his mother, or who is not an Arhat? Yes, if he kills his father whose gender has changed.”

***

When the embryo of a woman falls out and when another woman deposits it in her womb, which of these two women is reputed to be the mother whose murder constitutes a mortal transgression?

103d. The mother is the woman from whose blood one is born.

The second woman takes up the offices of a mother: she is the one who gives the child liquid to drink, who nourishes it, and who raises it.

***

There is no mortal transgression if, wanting to kill one’s mother a person kills someone else; there is no mortal transgression if, wanting to kill another person, a person kills his mother. For example, a man who kills his mother stretched out on a bed where he believes there is a man asleep, and the child of the laundryman who kills his father wanting to kill a mosquito, do not become guilty of mortal transgressions.

If a man kills his mother and another person with the same stroke, there are two avijñāptis, an avijñāpti of simple murder, and an avijñāpti of a mortal transgression; but the vijñāpti is solely of the mortal transgression, by reason of the force of the mortal transgression. Yet,
according to Ghoṣaka (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 617b23-25), there are two vijñaptis, for a vijñapti is made up of atoms.

The person who kills an Arhat without knowing him to be an Arhat, thinking only to definitely kill such a person, does not have any discrimination with respect to the person to be killed.

The person who kills his father, when his father is an Arhat, is guilty of only one mortal transgression, namely the killing of an Arhat: for the father and the Arhat make up only a single person.

Objection: 471 [The Arhat Rudrāyaṇa, assassinated by order of his son Śikhaṇḍin, said to the assassin,] “Go! Tell Śikhaṇḍin that he has committed two mortal transgressions, patricide and the murder of an Arhat.” How do you explain these words?

Rudrāyaṇa means that his son committed a mortal transgression through two causes of mortal transgression; or rather Rudrāyaṇa said “two mortal transgression” in order to doubly condemn the conduct of his son.

Does the person who, with a bad mind, cause the blood of the Tathāgata to flow, necessarily commit a mortal transgression?

He commits a mortal transgression when he has the intention to kill:

104a. No, when he only had the intention of striking the Buddha. 472

Is a person guilty of a mortal transgression when he injures to death a person who becomes an Arhat after being injured?

104b. No, with regard to the person who became an Arhat after the blow.

Add, according to that which precedes, “no mortal transgression.” In fact, the preparation for murder had for its object a person who was not an Arhat.

***

Can a person who made preparation for a mortal transgression, obtain detachment and its result by arresting it? 473
104c-d. Detachment and its results are impossible for one who has made preparation for a mortal transgression.\textsuperscript{474}

Why?
Because there is an absolute contradiction between the intention of a mortal transgression and the acquisition of detachment or a result.
A person who enters the Path after having done the preparation for any other evil deed, will not produce this deed, by reason of the absolute contradiction between his new personality and the deed.\textsuperscript{475}

***

What is the gravest of the mortal transgressions?

105a-b. Lying with a view to schism is considered the gravest transgression.

A person who, knowing what is Dharma and non-Dharma, lies with a view to dividing the Saṅgha and teaching falsely, by this makes himself guilty of the gravest transgression among all misdeeds. In fact, he wounds the Dharma body of the Tathāgatas, he creates an obstacle to temporal well-being and to the deliverance of creatures. As long as concord is not established in the Saṅgha, there is hindrance to entry into the Path (niyānāvakṛanti, vi.26a), to the acquisition of results, to the acquisition of detachment, and to the destruction of the defilements: all actions relative to dhyāna, study and reflection are also arrested; the worlds of gods, Nāgas and humans are troubled and saddened, they are not masters of themselves, and misguided. This is why the retribution for this crime lasts a cosmic age and takes place in Avīci.

Among the other mortal transgressions, the fifth, the third and the first are, in descending order, the heaviest. Patricide is the lightest.\textsuperscript{476}

Objection: The Blessed One said that mental danda is the most culpable of the three dandas;\textsuperscript{477} he said also that false view is the gravest among all the transgressions.

One must understand that, among the mortal transgressions, schism is the gravest transgression; that mental danda is the gravest among the three actions; and that false view is the gravest among the bad views. Or rather schism is the gravest transgression if one considers
the extent of its retribution; manodan
da, if one considers the number of persons destroyed by it;\textsuperscript{478} and false view, if one considers the roots of good which false view alone cuts off.

***

Among the good actions, which bears the greatest result?

105c-d. Among the good worldly \textit{dharma}s, a volition for Bhavägra bears the greatest result.\textsuperscript{479}

"Volition for Bhavägra" means the mental action through which one is reborn in the highest stage of Ārūpyadhātu. This action is the most fruitious of good worldly actions, for its retribution is a perfect tranquility for twenty-four thousand cosmic periods (iii.81).

This is understood from the point of view of its retributive results. From the point of view of its disconnective result (ii.57d) the most fruitious action is volition associated with Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44d; see iv.112b), for this volition has for its result the cutting off of all the bonds. This is why the Kārikā says, "Among the good worldly \textit{dharma}s..."

***

Is it only through a mortal transgression that a person is necessarily reborn in hell?

A person is also necessarily reborn in hell through transgressions similar to mortal transgressions. Others add: but not immediately (\textit{anantaram}) so.\textsuperscript{480}

106-107b. To defile one's mother, to defile an Arhatī; to kill a predestined Bodhisattva; to kill a Saikṣa; and to steal the goods of the Saṅgha are transgressions similar to mortal transgressions; the fifth is the destruction of a Stūpa.\textsuperscript{481}

These five transgressions, in this order, are similar to mortal transgressions: to defile one's mother, to defile an Arhatī (=matricide); to kill a predestined Bodhisattva (=patricide); to kill a Saint who is not an Arhat (=murder of an Arhat); to rob the Saṅgha of its means of
substance (=schism); and to destroy a Stūpa (=to wound the Tathāgata).

***

Other actions embracing retribution are impeded in three circumstances:

107c-d. He absolutely impedes actions by the acquisition of Kṣānti, the quality of Anāgāmin, and the quality of Arhat.⁴⁸²

When, upon leaving the stage of mūrdhānas, he obtains the stage called patience (kṣānti, vi.23), the actions which should be retributed in painful realms of rebirth, being impeded, remain below, because he passes beyond the state of retribution of these actions. In the same way the creditors of the man who is about to emigrate from his country rise up.

When he obtains the quality of Anāgāmin (vi.36d), the actions which should be retributed in Kāmadhātu, being impeded, remain below,—with the exception of those which should be retributed in the present existence.

The same for the actions which should be retributed in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu when he obtains the quality of Arhat.

***

We have seen that the killing of a Bodhisattva is a quasi-mortal transgression.

108a. Since when is one a Bodhisattva?

From what moment on does one receive the name of Bodhisattva?

108b. When he begins to cultivate actions which produce the marks.⁴⁸³

Starting from the moment when he begins to cultivate actions which have for their retribution the thirty-two marks, he is "predestined."

How is this?

From this moment onward, he always
108c-d. Has good realms of rebirth; he is born into noble families; he possesses all the organs (avyakṣaḥ); he is a male; he remembers his past lives; and he does not desist (anivṛt).

One says that he is sugati ("well gone"), because his rebirth realms are excellent, for he is born among gods and humans.

He is born in the wealthy families of Kṣatriyas, Brāhmaṇas, and Gṛhapatis, not in humble families.

The man whose organs are not complete is vikalendriya; if his organs are complete, he is an avyakṣa, a synonym for avikalendriya. He is always male, never female, and, even more so, never non-sexual (sandha, etc.).

In all of his existences, he remembers his past births.

One desists by giving in; as he does not give in, he is avivṛt, a synonym for an avaivartika, one who does not desist or regress: in fact, with an end to being useful to all creatures, he is not cast down by all sorts of sufferings, or by any outrages. He is called the slave not purchased by the world, indeed the Bodhisattva: this great-souled one, who yet possesses the most sublime prefecions (sāmpad, vii.34), acts through pure compassion; he acts without egoism, like a dog, in the presence of all creatures; he bears, on the part of all creatures, outrages and bad treatment; he assumes all fatiguing and painful tasks.

***

He cultivates actions which have the marks for their retribution.

109. In Jambudvīpa, being a male; in the presence of the Buddhas, thinking of the Buddhas; having their origin in reflection; in the course of one hundred supplementary cosmic ages.

The Bodhisattva cultivates actions which ripen in the marks solely in Jambudvīpa, not elsewhere, for the inhabitants of Jambudvīpa are of lively intelligence; he is a male and not a female, for he has already gone beyond the state of female; and he is only in the presence of Masters, for his volition has the Buddhas for its object. These actions have their origin in reflection, not in hearing or in the absorptions. The
Bodhisattva accomplishes these actions in the course of one hundred supplementary cosmic ages, and not during a longer time.

Nevertheless the Blessed Śākyamuni, through the purification of his energy, leaped over nine of these cosmic ages and carried out the actions ripening in marks in the course of ninety-nine cosmic ages so that, in this way, one hundred were completed. This is why, speaking to Asibandhaka, he said, "Oh village chief, remembering ninety-one cosmic ages from now, I do not see any family that has been impoverished or inconvenienced by the giving of cooked foods." The Blessed One expressed himself in this way because his natural memory bore on this number of cosmic periods. (See vii.30, 37, 42)

Former masters say: It is when he finished the first cosmic age that the Bodhisattva abandoned the four defects and obtained the two qualities.

***

Of the marks

110a. Each arises from one hundred merits.

What is the measure of each of these one hundred merits?

According to some, it is equal to the merit which has for its result the pleasure of all beings, with the exception of the Bodhisattva close to Bodhi—that is to say, accomplishing actions which ripen in marks.

According to others, it is equal to the collective action of all beings, which, through its predominating result (ii.56b), produces the creation of the world.

According to others, only the Buddhas know the measure of this merit.

***

How many Buddhas did the Blessed One venerate when he was a Bodhisattva?

In the course of the first asamkhyeya kalpa, he venerated seventy-five thousand Buddhas; seventy-six thousand in the course of the second; and seventy-seven thousand in the course of the third.
Who were the Buddhas at the end of each samkhyeya kalpa? In the reverse order of their enumeration,

110b-c. At the end of the three samkhyeyas, Paśyin, Dīpa, and Ratnasūkhin.

In the period of the perfect and complete Buddha Ratnasūkhin, he completed the first samkhyeya kalpa; in the period of the Blessed Dīpaṁkara he completed the second; and in the period of the Tathāgatha Vipaśyin he completed the third.

***

Of all the Buddhas that he venerated

110d. The first was Śākyamuni.

It was an ancient Śākyamuni (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p.89c), a perfect Buddha, under whom the Blessed One, the then Bodhisattva, formulated for the first time the vow of Bodhi by saying, “May I too become a Buddha in all ways similar to you!” This Śākyamuni, as ours, appeared during a bad age of the world; also his Law lasted only one thousand years.

***

How did the Bodhisattva complete each Pāramitā (p. 694, line 17)?

111a-b. He completed Giving by giving everything to everyone, out of compassion.

When he gave everything to everyone, even to his eyes and the marrow of his bones, out of compassion, without desiring any happiness for himself, he completed the virtue of Giving.

111c-d. Morality and Patience were completed by his not being irritated, even when his limbs were broken, although he was still tied to desire.

When, even though he was not detached, he was not at all irritated when his limbs were broken, he then completed the virtues of Morality
112a. Energy, by praising Puṣya. 501

The Blessed One, when he was a Bodhisattva, saw the Tathāgata Puṣya who had become incandescent 502 in the interior of a cave in a mountain. 503 He praised him for seven days and seven nights, standing, repeating the stanza, "Neither in heaven nor on earth, nor in this world, nor in the abode of Vaiśravana, nor in the palace of the Marus, nor in other celestial abodes, nor in any of the ten directions, would one find, Oh Chief of Men, an ascetic who is your equal, even if one were to traverse, if one wished, the entire world, with all of its people, with its mountains and with its forests." 504 Then, according to this School, he was found to have fulfilled the virtue of Energy and nine cosmic ages were passed over.

112b. Absorption and Intelligence, immediately before. 505

At the moment of Vajropamasamādhi, 506 immediately before Bodhi, he accomplished the virtues of dhyāna and prajñā.

The Pāramitās receive the name of pāramitā 507 because they have arrived (gamanā) at the other shore (pāram) of the other shore of the totality of the perfections proper to each of them.

***

The Sūtra teaches that there are three items of meritorious work (punyakriyāvastu), which consist of Giving, Morality, and Meditation. How are Giving, Morality, and Meditation items of meritorious work?

112c-d. Three are merit, action, occasions of the exercise of action, as in the case of deeds. 508

These three,—Giving, Morality, and Meditation,—each according to its nature, are merit, action, or occasion of exercise, either in combination, or in isolation; the same way that the deeds are either at one and the same time actions and deeds, or only deeds.

To consider first the item of meritorious work which consists of Giving, one must distinguish: 1. bodily and vocal action which is an item of meritorious work on three grounds: merit, because its retribution is
agreeable; action, because it is action by nature; and an occasion for the exercise or an object of the volition of giving which provokes it; 2. the volition of giving, which is merit and action; 3. and the dharmas (sensations, etc.) which accompany bodily and vocal action, and which are solely merit.

The item of meritorious work which consists of Morality is exclusively bodily and vocal action; it is necessarily merit, action and occasion of exercise of action.

For the item of meritorious work which consists of Meditation, let us consider the Meditation of Compassion (maitri, viii.30): 1. this mediation is merit; it is also an occasion for the exercise of a meritorious action, namely that of a volition associated with compassion; 2. the volition in question is merit and action. The same also for the Morality which constitutes dhyānasamvara, the discipline of dhyāna, which a person who practices the Meditation of Compassion possesses; 3. the other dharmas (faith, etc.) concomittant to this Meditation are solely merit.

Or rather the expression punyakriya signifies punyakārana, or punyaprayoga. Giving, Morality and Mediation are vastus of punyakriya, because, with a view to realizing them, one undertakes the preparation of merit.509

According to another opinion, punyakriya is, to speak precisely, good volition; Giving, Morality and Mediation are its vastu, an occasion for the exercise of this volition.

What is Giving, dāna?
Without doubt, dāna in general is what is given (deya), but here

113a. Giving is what gives.510

But one gives through fear, or with the hope of reciprocity, or through attachment, etc.: now this does not refer to this type of giving. Consequently, in order to specify, the author says, "Giving is what gives."

113b. Through the desire to render homage or service.511
What is it that gives?

113c. It is bodily and vocal action and that which produces this action.

A collection of mind-and-mental states gives rise to a bodily or vocal action: this collection and this action give. As the stanza says, "When a person, with a good mind gives what belongs to him, then one says that the good skandhas give."\(^{512}\)

113d. It has for its results great joys.\(^{513}\)

The punyakriyavastu which consists of Giving (dānamaya) has great joys as its result.

The suffix maya, which we translate "which consists of," should be understood as "having as its nature," the same way that one says, "a house made of grass" (trnamaya grha), or "a vase made of leaves."\(^{514}\)

114a-b. Giving is beneficial to oneself, to others, to both or neither.

A gift made to a Caitya is not useful to another; but it is useful to him who gives when he is an Āryan not detached from desire, or a Prthagjana detached or not detached (see iv.121).

The gift that a detached Āryan makes to another—with the exception of the case when this gift ripens in the present existence—is not useful to this Āryan, for the Āryan who is detached has definitively passed beyond the sphere (i.e., Kāmadhātu) where the retribution of the gift could have taken place in a later existence. This gift is only useful to another.

The gift that a non-detached Āryan makes to another, to a detached or non-detached Prthagjana, is useful both to himself and to another.

The gift that a detached Āryan makes to a Caitya—with the exception of the case when this gift will ripen in the present existence—is not useful either to himself, or to another. This gift has for its effect only the expression of homage and recognition.

***

We have said, in a general manner, that giving produces great joys:
114c-d. Giving is excellent by the excellence of the giver, of the object given, and of the field.\textsuperscript{515}

115a. The giver is excellent through his faith, etc.

The giver is excellent when he is endowed with faith, with morality, with learning, with generosity, with wisdom, with few desires, etc. When the giver is excellent, the gift is excellent; when the gift is excellent, its result is excellent.

115b. He gives with respect, etc.\textsuperscript{516}

Such a giver gives with respect, by his hand, at the right time, without doing evil to anyone (\textit{parān anupabatya}; compare \textit{Milinda}, 276).

115c-d. From whence he obtains honors, superior joys, at the right time, sheltered from all loss.

The giver who gives with respect obtains honors; giving by his hand, he will find satisfaction in superior joys; giving at the right time, he will obtain these joys at a suitable time and not when he cannot enjoy them; giving without doing any evil, these joys will be indestructible: they will not be stolen, annihilated through fire, etc.

***

We have explained in what the excellence of the giver consists and how the gift is excellent through the excellence of the giver. How is the object given excellent?

116a. The object perfect in color, etc.\textsuperscript{517}

Add: "is excellent."

The object is excellent when that which one gives is perfect in color, in odor, in taste, in contact.

What will one obtain through the giving of such an object?

116b-d. From whence beauty, glory, joy, great lightness of the body and contacts corresponding to the season.\textsuperscript{518}

He who gives an object perfect in color will be beautiful.
He who gives an object perfect in odor will have his reputation extend to all directions, in the same way that an odor spreads.

He who gives an object perfect in taste will be happy, like a sweet taste.

The body of him who gives an object perfect to the touch, will be very delicate, like the jewel-like wife of a Cakravartin king, and his limbs will have only agreeable contacts, hot or cold according to the season.

***

How is the field excellent?

117a-b. The field is excellent through the realm of rebirth, suffering, benefactors, and qualities.

A field is excellent through the realm of rebirth. The Blessed One said, "If a person gives to an animal, the giver will receive a retribution one hundred times greater than the gift made to the animal, but if this person gives even to a human who has transgressed the precepts, he will receive a retribution one thousand times greater than the gift made to this human." 519

A field is excellent through suffering. The Blessed One, among the seven aupadhiya punyakriyavastus, enumerated giving to a sick person, giving to a hospital attendant, giving during cold seasons, etc., 520 and he continued: "One cannot enumerate the measure of the merits of a son or daughter of good family who is endowed with these seven material meritorious works."

A field is excellent through benefactors. This is giving to one's father, to one's mother (Divya, p. 52), to one's master, or to other benefactors. Example: the Jatakas of the bear, of the antelope, etc. 521

A field is excellent through its qualities. 522 The Blessed One said, "A retribution one hundred thousand times greater than a gift made to a person who upholds the necessities . . . " and so on.

***

Among all the gifts,

117c. The best is the gift from a delivered person to a delivered
The Blessed One said that a gift given by a detached person to another detached person is the best of material gifts.

117d. Or a gift from the Bodhisattva.\(^{524}\)

Or rather, the gift that a Bodhisattva gives for the welfare of all beings; this gift, although given by a non-detached person to other non-detached persons, is the best gift.

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With the exception of the gift from the Bodhisattva,

117d. Or the eighth.

The eighth among the eight gifts that the Blessed One taught.

What are the eight gifts?\(^{525}\) 1. An āsadya gift; 2. a gift through fear; 3. a gift made "because he gave to me"; 4. a gift made "because he gives to me"; 5. a gift made "because my fathers and my grandfathers gave (dattapūrvarvāṁ me pīthbhīṣ ca pītāmahais ceti dānam, compare Jāpaka, 444.52, vol. iv, 34); 6. a gift made in order to obtain heaven; 7. a gift made with an eye to one's reputation; 8. a gift made in order to adorn one's mind (that is to say, in order to obtain ādhibis, vii.48); in order to fill the mind [with the parts of the Path, mārgāṇa, vi.67b]; in order to equip it with a view to yoga; and in order to acquire the supreme goal (that is to say, in order to obtain the quality of Arhat or Nirvāṇa).

What is an āsadya gift?

Some ancient masters explain this as an immediate gift to those who are near, who approach one.\(^{526}\)

A gift through fear is a gift that a person makes who sees that the object is going to perish: "Better it should be given," he thinks.\(^{527}\)

***

The Sūtra (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 722b22) says, "An incalculable retribution proceeds from a gift made to a srotāpānnapānappapannaka; an even more incalculable retribution proceeds from a gift made to a srotāpānna." But there are also five persons who, even
though Prthagjanas, confer an incalculable retribution on the offering that is made to them:

118. Even though they are not Āryans, offerings made to one's father and mother, to a sick person, to a preacher, to the Bodhisattva in his last birth are without measure.\textsuperscript{528}

These offerings are without measure from the point of view of their retribution.

A "Bodhisattva in his last birth" means a "Bodhisattva in his last existence."

To what category does a preacher belong? Among what field should he be placed?

He forms part of the category of benefactors: he gives the eye of wisdom to multitudes blinded by ignorance; he proclaims what is good (\textit{sama = dharma}) and bad (\textit{visama = adharma});\textsuperscript{529} he erects the pure body of the Law;\textsuperscript{530} in a word, he accomplishes all the work of a Buddha: hence he is a great "spiritual friend."

***

In order to appreciate the lightness and the gravity of actions, one should, in short, take into consideration six causes:

119. Accordingly as these causes—consecutive, field, \textit{adhiśṭhāna}, preparation, volition, or intention—are small or large, action also is small or large.

Consecutive: after having done the action, that is, consequential action.

Field: the person to whom one does good or evil.

\textit{Adhiśṭhāna}: the deed itself.

Preparation: bodily or vocal action with a view to the preceding.

Volition: that through which the deed is achieved. Intention: to project the thought, "I shall do this or that to them; then I shall do this or that."\textsuperscript{531}

It happens that an action can be grave only by reason of its consecutive action, for example, when this confers on the retribution the character of necessity.
It happens that an action can be grave by reason that, if the field is the same, a certain adhīṣṭhāna renders an action grave while another adhīṣṭhāna makes it light: for example, to kill one's father and mother is a grave action but to steal from one's father and mother, to lie to them, etc., is not grave by comparison. One can explain in this same way the gravity resulting from the preparation, etc.532

When all these causes are great, the action is very grave; when they are small, the action is very light.

***

Action "done" (krta) is distinguished from "accumulated" (upacita) action.533 What are the characteristics and conditions of accumulated action?

120. Action is termed "accumulated" by reason of its intentional character, by its completion, by the absence of regret and opposition, by its accompaniments, and by its retribution.534

By reason of its intentional character: Action done voluntarily or intentionally is accumulated action;535 action done involuntarily or unconsciously,536 and action not done in haste, even if it is voluntary, is action that is "done."

"By reason of its completion:" Some go to painful realms of rebirth through misdeeds; some by two; some by three (bodily, vocal, and mental misdeeds); some through one deed, through two, through three ... through ten. Since it is a rule that a person goes to a painful realm of rebirth through a certain quantity of actions, if this measure is not completed, the action is done, but not accumulated; but when this measure is completed, it is accumulated.537

"By reason of the absence of regret and opposition:" When remorse (vīpratisāra, anutāpa, ii.28) is absent, or when opposition,—confession, etc.,—is absent, action is then termed "accumulated."538

"By reason of its accompaniments:" When an action is bad and has a bad escort: [or when one rejoices at having committed it,] it is "accumulated."

"By reason of its retribution:" Action is accumulated which necessarily gives forth retribution (vipākadhāne niyātam, iv.50).
The same for good action.

Action which does not present these characteristics is done, but is not accumulated.

***

We have seen (iv.114a) that a gift made to a Caitya by a person not detached from desire is a gift of benefit for him who made it. But no one enjoys the thing given: how can this gift be meritorious?

The merits of the gift are of two types: 1. merit produced by abandoning, that is, the merit which results from the sole fact of abandoning; 2. merit produced by its enjoyment, the merit which results in joy in the object given, by the person who receives.

121a. The merit of a gift to a Caitya is merit produced by abandoning. 540

How can the gift produce merit when no one receives it?

We would answer this objection by asking why would the gift produce merit when someone receives it, and why it would not produce merit when no one receives it?

Because, in the second case, no one is satisfied, or favored by the gift.

If the satisfaction of a person who receives is a condition for merit, you then deny that the Immeasurable Mediations (Mediations of Compassion, etc., viii.29) and the Meditation of Right View are meritorious. The gift to a Caitya thus produces merit,

121b. Even though no one receives it, as is the case with compassion, etc.

In the case of the Meditation on Compassion, no one receives, no one is satisfied, and yet merit arises for the compassionate person, through the very force of his thoughts of compassion. In the same way, even though the Excellent Being has passed away, a gift to a Caitya made with devotion to him is meritorious by reason of the thought of the believer himself.

Should we conclude then that material offerings and worship are superfluous?

No, for the devotion which produces these actions very much
outweighs the devotion of a person who worships and who gives in mind only. When a person who has the intention of killing his enemy, continues his bodily and vocal actions on the dead body of his enemy which this intention provokes, thinking, "This is my enemy," that is to say, he thinks, "This enemy is not yet dead," he obtains demerit very much greater than he would have through merely the intention; in the same way, even though the Master has passed away, the person who does actions of giving and worship inspired through devotion obtains a much greater merit than he would have only through devotion.

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If a seed given to a good field bears an agreeable result, should we think that it bears a disagreeable result if given to a bad field?

121c-d. Even seeded into a bad field, the gift bears agreeable results, for there is never opposition between the result and the seed. From the seed of the vine, there arises solely the sweet fruit of the vine; from the seed of the nimba (Azadirachta Indica) there arises only the sour fruit of the nimba: even seeded into a bad field, the seed bears the result which is appropriate to it. In the same way, this seed which is the gift of a person who has the intention of being useful to another, even if placed into a bad field, can only produce an agreeable result. But, through the evil of the field, the result will be small or almost nil.

We have explained meritorious work which consists of Giving, together with its related questions.

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We must now explain meritorious work which consists of the Precepts.

122a-b. Immorality is bad rūpa. Morality is the renouncing of immorality.

Bad rūpa is called immorality. The renouncing of immorality, which is morality, is
122b. Of two types.

Renouncing is "vijñapti," the action by which one renounces, and "avijñapti," the fact of abstaining (see above, pp. 560, 562, 583). Morality is not solely the renouncing of immorality.

122c. It is, further, the renouncing of that which is prohibited by the Buddha.

To renounce that which is prohibited by the Buddha, the Blessed One,—without being in and of itself immoral, for example renouncing meals at forbidden times,—is also morality. This renouncing is also "vijñapti" and "avijñapti." He who has undertaken to observe the rules and who then violates them, commits immorality.

The morality that we have just described, in short, is

122d. Pure, when it is endowed with the four qualities.

Morality endowed with the four qualities is pure; it is impure in the contrary case.

123a-b. Not troubled by immorality, by the causes of immorality; it takes as its support the opposite of immorality and "peace."

"Not troubled by immorality" we have described; "not troubled by the causes of immorality," that is, by the "kleśas" and "upakleśas" (v.41), "it takes as its support the opposites of immorality," because it relies on the four "smṛtyupasthānas" (vi.14); and it relies on "peace," not on rebirth in celestial realms, because it is directed to Nirvāṇa.

According to another opinion, five causes make morality pure: 1. the purity of the deed itself [the renouncing of bad deeds]; 2. the purity of their attendants [renouncing the preparation or the means of killing, etc.]; 3. the absence of disturbance from the "vitarkas" [kāma, vyāpāda, and vīhimsāvitarka]; 4. its supervision through mindfulness [Buddha, Dharma, Saṅghānusmṛti—which includes the renouncing of undefined actions]; and 5. its application to Nirvāṇa.545

According to another opinion, morality is of four types: 1. the morality of fear, which one observes from the fear of the loss of the resources necessary to life, from fear of a bad reputation, from fear of
chastisement, from fear of bad realms of rebirth;\(^{546}\) 2. mercenary morality, which one observes from attachment to agreeable realms of existence, to pleasures, to honors; 3. a morality suitable to the parts of Bodhi, which persons who possess Right View possess, with a view to their deliverance; and 4. pure morality, which, being free from stains, is free from vices.

We have explained morality.

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123c-d. "Good absorption" or good in absorption, is bhāvanā, meditation, soaking in, or impregnation.\(^{547}\)

What do we understand by samāhita, absorbed? That which is absorption (samādhi, ii.24, viii.1) by its nature, and that which coexists with what is absorption by nature.

Why does "good absorption" receive the name of bhāvanā?

123d. Because it perfumes, impregnates the mind.

Good absorption impregnates the mind to an extreme degree, because it (i.e., the mind) grasps the qualities of this good, in the same way as sesame seeds are impregnated by flowers in their grasping the odor of these flowers.

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We have said (iv.113d) that the result of giving consists of joys. What result does one obtain from the precepts and from meditation?

124a-b. Essentially, the precepts have heaven for their result; meditation has disconnection for its result.\(^{548}\)

Giving also has heaven for its result, but the precepts are the principle, normative cause of it. Disconnection, or Nirvāṇa, (ii. trans. p. 280) has meditation for its cause, which, in the path of abandoning (prahānamārga, vi.60c-d) immediately produces disconnection from the defilements; but the precepts contribute to it, since stilling (samatha) and insight (vipaśyanā) presuppose the precepts.
Chapter Four

The Sūtra says that four persons produce “Brahmin” merit, *brahmāpunya*. What is this merit?

According to the Vaibhāsikas (*Vibhaṣa*, TD 27, p. 425c13), this is the merit which has been defined above in order that we might know the measure of the action which has the marks of the Bodhisattva for its result (iv.110).

The ancient masters said:

124c-d. Four possess Brahmin merit, because they are happy in the heavens for a *kalpa*.

The merit of such a measure that one is happy in heaven for a *kalpa* is the Brahmin merit, for the lifespan of the Brahmapurohitas is a *kalpa* (iii.80d). And in another Canon, one reads, “He engenders Brahmin merit, he is happy in the heavens for a *kalpa*.”

We have studied material giving.

125a-b. The gift of the Dharma is the correct teaching, not defiled, of the Sūtras etc.

The gift of the Dharma is to teach, correctly and with a mind not defiled, the Sūtra and the other parts of Scripture. Consequently, those who teach the Dharma either falsely, or with a defiled mind, through a desire for gain, for respect, and for reputation, destroy the great merit which would otherwise fall to them.

We have explained the three types of good according to the distinction of the three items of meritorious work. Furthermore,

125c-d. Good is threefold, merit, Nirvāṇa and penetration.

Good merit, or good “favorable to merit” is the good which leads to an agreeable retribution.
The good which is deliverance\textsuperscript{558} is the good which, when it arises, becomes a \textit{dharma} of Parinirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{559} It is recognized that whoever, understanding the sermons concerning the defects of Samsāra, the non-self, and the qualities of Nirvāṇa, has his hairs stand on end and who pours forth tears,\textsuperscript{560} possesses the \textit{mokṣabhāgīya} root of good; in this same way, one knows that there was a seed in the \textit{khalabila},\textsuperscript{561} when, in the rain, one sees a plant put forth shoots.

The good of penetration is fourfold, \textit{uṣmagatas}, etc.; it will be explained later (vi.17).\textsuperscript{562}

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What is the nature of what is popularly called writing, carving (\textit{mudrā}), eloquence, poetry (\textit{kāvya}), and calculation?

126. An industrious action, of the body, of the voice or of the mind, with that which gives rise to it, are such things as writing, carving, eloquence, poetry, and calculation.\textsuperscript{563}

"Industrious," that is, due to a certain technique.

"Threefold action" is bodily, vocal, and mental action.

"Writing and carving" are bodily actions, industrious, together with what gives rise to this action, namely the collection of the mind and its mental states.

"Eloquence and poetry" are vocal actions.

Consequently, writing, carving, eloquence, and poetry, are by their nature, the five \textit{skandhas}.

"Calculation" is mental action: this refers to the mental enumeration of the \textit{dharmas}.\textsuperscript{564}

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Now let us explain some synonyms:

127a-b. Defiled \textit{dharmas} are \textit{sāvadya}, \textit{nivṛta}, and \textit{hīna}.

Some synonyms of "defiled" are: \textit{sāvadya}, associated with \textit{avadya}, or bad; \textit{nivṛta}, that is, "covered" by the defilements: and the defilements themselves are covered by other defilements; \textit{hīna}, or ignoble, because
they are low or abandoned by the Āryans.

127b-c. Good and pure dharmas are pranīta.

Pranīta, "excellent," is a synonym for subha, that is, kusala, good, and of amala, immaculate or anāsrava.

The dharmas which are neither ignoble nor excellent, are thus median (madhya).

127c-d. Good conditioned dharmas are sevya.

Sevya, "to be cultivated" is synonymous with "good" and "conditioned."

It then follows that other dharmas, some unconditioned, others conditioned but defiled or non-defiled-neutral, are not to be cultivated. In fact, unconditioned dharmas are not susceptible of being produced, or cultivated, since the unconditioned has no result: now, it is with a view to a result that one cultivates.

All the other dharmas are inferior.

127d. Deliverance is the highest.

These is nothing which outweighs Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa, being eternal and good, outweighs all.

2. Vocal action is "voice," vāg eva karma. However kāyakarma is defined as kāyena kāyasva vā karma.

3. On cetanā, see ii.24. Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Psychology*, p. 8), translates this as "thinking"; Aung (*Compendium*, p. 16) translates it as "volition." "Volition" is only slightly satisfying, for we shall see (below p. 565) that action includes a subsequent cetanā, "I have killed."


5. (a) *Vijñāpti* is "that which informs" (*vijñāpayati*), the manifestation of a mind either by means of the body, or by means of the voice. It is bodily in the first case, vocal in the second: kāyavijñāpti, information through the body, which we call an action, śānvacetā, or viśpanda (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 307), the kāyavipphandana or "bodily suffusion" of Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Dhammaśāhini*, 636, *Atthasālinī*, p. 323); vāgavijñāpti is information through the voice or words (*Kosa*, iv.3d).

The School holds (*Kosa*, iv.2b-3b) that kāyavijñāpti is not an action, a movement of the body, but a disposition, a "shape" of the body. The Sautrāntikas deny that shape exists in and of itself (iv.3c).

But should vijñāpti be considered as being, in its nature, action? This is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas and the heretics of the *Kathāvatthu*, vii.9, x.10 (the Mahābhāshyas, *Sarhmmityas*, and Mahāsārīghikas) who believe that "action" and words constitute "action after having been willed" of which the Blessed One speaks (iv.1b), an action distinct from volition, and rūpa in its nature. But for the Therāvādins (*Atthasālinī*, p. 88, 96, 323, *Anguttara*, ii.157, *Samyutta*, ii.39) and for the Sautrāntikas (below p. 559) action is volition (cetanā); "bodily action" does not mean "information by the body," but a kāyasaraṃcetanā, a volition relative to the body and which leads the body. (The version of Aung, *Points of Controversy*, p. 225, is not totally correct.) (b) *Avijñāpti* (i.11, iv.4) is an action "which does not inform anything to another"; avijñāpti is rūpa, but does not form part of the rūpyatana: it is classed within the dharmaśyatana and is only known by the mental consciousness.

In order to make all this easier to comprehend, the person who commits a murder or takes the vows of a Bhikṣu produces after his volition (cetanā) a bodily or vocal "information"—an action or a word—and, at the same time, an invisible action, nevertheless material and made up of the primary elements, which continues to exist in him and to increase, by reason of which he is either a murderer or a Bhikṣu. This invisible action, created by certain visible or audible actions and which "informs," is called avijñāpti, "non-information"; it is considered to be either bodily or vocal accordingly as it is created by an action or by a word.

When a person gives orders to an assassin, he does not accomplish the action by which the murder is committed; the order that he gives is solely a preparation for murder; he is then not guilty of "the bodily information of murder." But, at the moment when the person assassinated is murdered, a "non-information" of murder arises in him: he is, by this fact, guilty of murder.

When a person enters into a Dhyāna—which supposes detachment from the defilements of Kāmādhatu—he does not pronounce the vows by which one renounces killing, etc. He does not produce "vocal information" by which the monk produces this "non-information" which constitutes his monkhood and which is called discipline (*samvara*, iv.13). But in a Dhyāna, the mind is strong enough to create, by itself and without intervention of "vocal information," the action of "non-information," or discipline.

6. The text has apare, "according to others." The *Vyākhyā* holds that the "others" are the Vātsipputrīyas. The gloss of the Japanese editor, Saeki, mentions the Sarhmmityas.
7. According to the Dharmasaṅgāni, bodily viññāpīti is "to advance, withdraw, to fix the gaze, to look at all sides, to advance the arms, to withdraw them, etc."

8. Hsüan-tsang: "For when the body moves, it moves by reason of action."

9. The Vyākhyā adds: "or rather a kṣāṇa is the minimum length of time" (ii.85d). See ii.46a-b.

10. Hsüan-tsang: "since it perishes later."

11. Extinction does not have a cause, see Kosa ii.46; Madhyamakavatti pp. 29 note 5, and p. 173 note 8, 222, 413. The Sādharanaṃsaṃuccaya (ed. Suali, 46) quotes a Sūtra of the Saṁvāramātraṇa: paścimāni bhikṣusavābh samājñāmātraṇa pratjñāmātraṇa saṁvāramātraṇam / katamāni paśca / asūd'obāvā anagato'obāvā sabhāsakā vīmāsāh akālaṃ padgala iti / Vedāntasūtra ii.2, 23; Nyāya-vārttikatātparyāśikā (Viz. S.S.), 383.


13. Kṣāṇa eva kṣāṇa means kṣāṇe kṣāṇa eva which is further glossed by tasmin eva kṣāṇe. It arises by reason of merit, and immediately perishes by reason of demerit; reborn by reason of merit... Or perhaps it arises by reason of demerit, perishes by reason of merit... Or rather kṣāṇa eva kṣāṇe signifies mukhyē kṣāṇe nāvapacārī kṣāṇe.

14. Vyākhyā: Sakyat caisa kāraṇaparikalpa ēti vistarāḥ / dharmād adharmavamanā ēti kāraṇaparikalpa ēti sarvatra samākṛṣṭe dvayaṇukādāna anityasya rūpādīṣu kāmaṇi ca sākyate kartum ato na vaktavyam etad agniṣṭhyogat kāṣṭhabhājīm vīmāsā ity evamādi.

15. According to Saeki, the Saṁhitāyas.

16. Compare Asaṅga, Sarūtanikāra, xviii.82.

17. Hsüan-tsang, who is translated above, departs from the original: "... this is to simply repeat your affirmation, since the existence of similar atoms is not proved. If it were proved, then these atoms could be joined together; but the self nature of the parts of a shape is not proved, as is the case for the parts of a thing of color (na ca saṁsthanavayavānām varṇāvibhavat svabhāvaḥ siddhah) that is to say, the parts of a "long" thing are not "long," etc.: how can these parts, by their coming together, bring about a determined shape?

18. One sees an army without seeing its soldiers; but this does not prove that an army exists apart from its soldiers. In the same way one sees shape without distinguishing its color.

19. According to Hsüan-tsang. The Tibetan has: First there is produced a certain resolution (saṁkalpa). When one has thus willed a volition is produced whose function or action it is to set into motion (vartayati), and which is "the action after having been willed."

20. For avijñāpīti of the sphere of Kāmadhatu depends on viññāpīti, bodily and vocal action, or rūpa; it does not accompany the mind as does the avijñāpīti of Rūpadhatu. But see iv.75c-d.

21. The Rūpasamgrahasthātra. Compare Dīgha, iii.217; Vibhanga, pp. 13, 64.

22. The Vyākhyā here quotes a part of the discourse of the Buddha to Cunda on the two types of meritorious works (see Minaye, Recherches, p. 185-186, and below iv.117a-b), an extract of the story of Ghosila in the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, see E. Huber, Sources du Divyavadana, BEFEO. 1906, p. 18.

Upadha means the thing (ārāma, vibhāra, etc.) given to a monk or to the Saṁgha; the merit that proceeds (taddhava) from this upadhi is called āvapadhi.

Mahācūndasūtra (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 427c29): saṭṭhomin Cunda āvapadhiyā punyakriyavastūmi mahābālāni jīvan mahāvaśvārikāni jātā samanvāyasayā śrāddhasya kulaupasraya vai kuladubhītāvān vai ca rātā iti śītātāvān svapiyāvān jāgratāvān saratasamātām abhiṣirvabtas eva punyam upajāyata eva punyam / katamāni sapta / iba Cunda śrāddhaba kuluputro vai kuladubhitā vā cātusardiya bhikṣusasanghāyānām pratiśatayati idam Cunda prabhāmaṃ...
The non-material meritorious works do not include offerings: they essentially consist of the joy that the believer experiences from the nearness, from the presence, from drawing near to the Tathāgata or a Śrāvaka. The seventh includes the taking of the Refuges and the undertaking of the prohibitions.

Iha Cunda śraddhāḥ kulaputro va kuladuhitd va śr̥ṇoti tathāgatam ānukām grāmakṣetram upaśīrīya vibharatī frutavā ca pumār adbigacchati prāspāramodyam udāraṁ kuśalam naśākramyopasambhūtam / idam Cunda prathamāṁ nirapadhiṁaṁ punyakriyāvastu.

See Śīksāsamuccaya, p. 137 (Ratnakāśīśūtra). Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 309 and the sources quoted in the notes.

Pali sources: Aṅguttara, ii.50, 54; and the discussion in the Kathvāvatthu, vii.5: pari-bhogamayatam punīhām vaddhāti and x.9: samādānabantakāṁ silam vaddhāti. The Kathvāvatthu touches on some other points relative to the doctrine of avijñāpī, vii.9, x.8, 11-12.

23. The Kathvāvatthu denies that saṁvīra is kamma (xi.1.)

24. Compare Sumanīgalavilāsini, 305, the third type of virati, proper to the Āryans and not susceptible of being cut off, or setūghāvāvīrati; Āttasālini, p. 103, has saṁucchavāvīrati; below v.33a-b.

The Dhammasaṅgani, 299, defines right speech (saṁmāvācā): cātubhi vaśıcıcarītehi ārati virati ... anatiske na setūghāı. According to Buddhaghosa (Āttasālini, p. 219) setūm hanatūi setūghāı: right speech is the destruction (ghāta) of the dike through which the transgressions of the voice pass. The translator (Psychology, 87) adopts this interpretation and refers to Aṅguttara i.220, 261, i.i.145. But, in these passages setūghāa = setubhāna = setu = a dike, obstacle: "The Blessed One has declared that maṁbūma is a setūghāa." "Thus, monks, there is a setūghāa with respect to laughing." "The Nigantha teaches that one destroys former actions through penitence and that one dikes them up (setūghāa) by abstention (akārana)." The Mahāvīryatātī, 255.9, has saṁparāyikāṁ setusamudghādāya; Tibetan version: "with a view to arresting the defilements by means of a dike"; Chinese version: "with a view to arresting the defilements like a torrent." See also Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 525 the definition of Nirvāṇa ja la pravānam ro hataratit setusthānapaḥ.


Saeki has a long note 7b-8a.

It follows from the Vyākhyā that the term Yogācāra does not here designate the follower of a certain philosophic school but simply an ascetic: "The Yogācārin who actualizes the Path (mārgaṁ saṁmuḍhēvyāvāb) takes possession of a mental disposition (āśaya) and a psycho-physical substrate (āśraya), whereas he takes possession of pure morality (anāśrava sāla) as he takes possession of right view: having acquired this pure morality, he abides in a natural morality (prakṛti-silatā)." Or rather (atha va) the Masters maintain that, in this same pure absorption, there is a rūpa of the same nature, that is to say pure (anāśrava'pi saṁmuḍhau tadevaṁ visvādham rūpaṁ ta acārya icchanti).

Śīksāsamuccaya, 138: yadi bhikṣavovo yuktā yogācāro mama śīksāyām pratiṣṭhanno sarvasaṁskāreṣu anityadarśi . . .

On yogācāra in the Mahāvāstūra, i.120.9, see the remarks of the editor, i.469. The passage is obscure.

There follows some relevant references in the Abhidharmakośa:

i.17. Vyākhyā: In the system (dārśana) of the Yogācāras, the manomāṇā is distinct from the six viññānas.

i.41. The Vijnānavādins defend the thesis: viññānam patyati.

ii.24. The Vyākhyā quotes the definition that the yogācāraścittas give rise to adhimuktī (note 117 of our translation).

ii.44e. The doctrine of the former masters of the saṁyaktīs quoted by the Sautrāntikas (p. 231 of our translation).

iii.63a-b. Phases of the moon. Opinion of the former masters; but according to the Vyākhyā, the Yogācārins.

iv.75. Bhāya: "The former masters," but, according to the Vyākhyā: In the system (⁰nayena) of the Yogācārins.

v.8. Vyākhyā: According to the Yogācārins (⁰mati), there are one hundred and twenty-eight klesas.

v.43b-c. Definition of the avarabhāgiyas attributed to aprade. These "other masters" as the Yogācārins (Vyākhyā).

vi.10a-b. The ascetics (yogācārya) who practice asubba are of three types, ādikarmika ... 

26. According to the gloss of Saeki. On this point of the doctrine, see i.31d and Vyākhyā, p. 14.

27. The expression sāsava upādānīya in Sāriyutta iii.47, Aṅguttara iii.248 (definition of the upādānakandhas).

28. Pañcika cetokhila, Dīgha, iii.237, q.v.; Mahāvyupatti, 10.24; vyāpādabhikadveṣa.

29. Hsüan-tsang adds here: If one says "How do the qualities and the actions of a certain person produce a transformation in another person who is thinking of another thing?" This difficulty also presents itself in the theory of avijñapti: how do the qualities and the actions of a certain person cause a certain thing, the avijñapti, to arise in another person?

30. Compare Aṅguttara, ii.54 and the Ratnarāśisūtra, quoted in the Śīḷasamuccaya, p. 138. The phraseology of our Sūtra differs from these two sources; Hsüan-tsang differs here from the Tibetan. He has: "An outflowing of merit moistens his series and a suṣkha without measure flows into his body."

31. According to P’u-kuang, the Bhadanta is Dharmatrata (See i.20a-b). See TD 41, p. 108b6.

32. According to Hsüan-tsang: However whoever has this threefold volition while carrying out himself, without any error of person, the action of murder, is touched by the transgression of murder. If the Bhadanta refers to this case, then he is correct.

33. Vyākhyā: Aśayas caśrayaṃ ceti / aśayaḥ prānātipātadyakaranāśayaḥ śraddhādyāśayo vā / aśraya aśrayaparāvṛttiḥ. "Intention" refers to the intention of not committing murder, or the intention of faith. When one says that an ascetic obtains a certain āśraya, one means that he has undergone a modification (parāvṛtti) of his psycho-physiological substrate. (The āśraya is defined ii.5, 6, 36c-d, 44d).

P’u-kuang explains: Aśraya consists of chanda, or of adhimukti, or of chanda and of adhimukti ... The āśraya is the cetanā which is produced at the same time as the āśraya; it serves as the support (āśraya) of the āśraya ... 

The meaning of parāvṛtti is clearly stated in Vyākhyā iv.14c: "When the gender of the mother or the father is parāvṛtti, that is to say, when the quality of mother or father is destroyed by the parāvṛtti of gender ... ”

The tradition of Asaṅga is heir to the expression aśrayaparāvṛtti, Sūtrālaṁkāra, ix.12. This refers, as S. Lévi says, to a revolution of the very basis of the being, of the appearance of a new personality: a Prthagjana becomes an Āryan, a woman becomes a man, a man becomes an animal, etc.

On parāvṛtti, see vi.41.

34. Numerous and divergent definitions of the eight lokadharmaṇas, Viśāla, TD 27, p. 871b29-cl.

35. Here Hsüan-tsang has two pādas which are absent in Paramārtha "It depends (upādātad) on primary elements which are the support (āśraya) of the viṣṇapti." Viśāla, TD 27, p. 684c12.
36. Certain masters say that *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* arise from the same four primary elements. They ask: "Are there four primary elements which produce two *āyatanas*, or two *rūpas*? Yes, they produce *rupāyatanas* and *dharmāyatanas*, *sabdāyatanas* and *dharmāyatanas." The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka says: "The Abhidharma masters say that this is not correct; it is impossible that the same four primary elements produce both a subtle result and a gross result..." (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 684c23.)

37. The Tibetan version omits this first paragraph.


39. Hsüan-tsang makes two pādas out of this phrase: "The *vijñapti* is solely an outflowing..." The Bhāgya of Hsüan-tsang adds: "For the rest, it is like the *avijñapti* of a non-absorbed state."

40. Auyākṣa, see ii.54, iv.9c at the end.

41. According to the principle *viśākṣyā viścaryavacanī bhāṣate*, ii.33a-b, p..

42. Diṭṭha, i.18, 221; above ii.31; below v.49c, 53c; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 670b24-c25.

43. But the Śāstra says: *sabdābhātāna kāb samanvīgataḥ / āba / kāmarūpa-pāvacaraḥ / ko 'samānvīgataḥ / ārūpyā-vācaraḥ.* If the beings of Rūpdhātu are "endowed" with sound, it cannot be a question of an external sound, one not belonging to a living being (asattvasamābhāyā). Thus one should attribute to the beings of Rūpdhātu the type of sound that one makes with the hands, etc. In order to avoid this criticism, some other masters say, "*Vijñapti...""

44. Two opinions: 1) the *vijñapti* which is produced in the Second Dhyāna and above is of the sphere of the First Dhyāna, being produced by a mind of the sphere of the First Dhyāna, according to the rule given in viii.13. This is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas. 2) This *vijñapti* is of the Second Dhyāna and above. One *vijñapti* of a higher sphere is thus produced by a mind of a higher sphere. When the beings of these Dhyānas talk among themselves, etc. (parasparasambuddhāvikur- vatām), their *vijñapti* is anivṛtyāyākṣa.

45. Hsüan-tsang: "The first opinion is correct." Gloss of Saeki: "Such is the opinion of the author."

46. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 741a10. The Bhadanta says: There are four reasons why one uses the word *kusāla:* because it is good by nature, by association, in origin, and absolutely. Good by nature: some say: *bṛśi* and *anapatrāpya;* some say: the three *kusalamālas...* Absolutely good: Nirvāṇa, called good because it is calm (*kṣema)*.

According to the Vibhajyāvādins, *jñāna* is good by nature; the *vijñāna*, etc. associated with *jñāna*, is good by association; the actions of the body and the voice which proceed from it are good in origin; and Nirvāṇa absolutely good. The definitions of *aksāla* are parallel (i.e., *moha* is bad by nature).

47. The other *kusālas* are not.

48. Diṭṭha, 255.16. On the good, bad, and neutral roots, see v.20.

49. According to the Tibetan. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: "Bodily action, vocal action and the cittaviprayuktasamāskāras." This is also the reading of the Vibhāṣā. Sarghabhadra (TD 29, p. 546b27 and following): Bodily action, vocal action, jāti, etc. (*lakṣāna*, ii.48c) and the *prāptis* of the two absorptions without mind (*nirodha* and *asamjñitamāpticci*).

50. When one again takes possession of the roots of good through doubt (*vicīkṣita*) (iv.80), the *prāptis* of these roots are good: now they are neither good in and of themselves, by association, in origin, nor absolutely so. In the same way, the *prāptis* of innate good (ii.71b) are good and are not included in any of the four categories. Sarghabhadra responds to this objection, TD 29, p. 546b27 and following.
51. The doctrine of the *Kathavatthu* on good, bad, and neutral, is presented xiv.8; Nibbana is *avayaka*, xi.1, xii.9 xiv.8.

52. *Vibhaṣa*, TD 27, p. 610a5.

53. Paramārtha: "If this were the case, then when a person free from mind (acittaka) produces *avijñāpti*, where would his *anuvartaka* mind be?" Hsüan-tsang: "If this were the case, how could a person free from mind produce *śīla*?"

Suppose that a person, while he is receiving ordination (surasampādayamāna) and is thus "binding" his bodily actions (*kāyavijñāptim abadhana*), enters into nirodhasamāpatti and so becomes free from mind. When he produces restraint (samvara) in himself, how can bodily action (*kāyavijñāpti*)—which supposes restraint (*antaragata*)—take place after this ceremony (karma-vāca)?

54. *Rūpa* (the action, *vijñāpti*) is not "contradicted," that is to say "abandoned," by means of *vidyā*, that is by the Path of Seeing, as is the case for the false opinion of personalism, etc. (*sādhyādṛṣṭi*): for the very persons who have seen the Truths are "endowed" (*samunnāgata*) with *rūpa*. It is not contradicted by *avidyā*, as is the case for the Pure (*anāśrava*) Path, for *avidyā* exists while one creates *rūpas* (actions) which are defined or non-defined as having a moral value, and while the *prāptis* (ii.36b) of these *rūpas* continue; and it also exists in the contrary case.

Thus, one cannot say that this *rūpa* is to be abandoned by Seeing, or is no longer not to be abandoned. It is only to be abandoned through Meditation.

55. The *Vyākhyā* explains: "Because it is turned inwards and outwards (*antarbhāvamūrti*)." Hsüan-tsang: "Because it is accompanied by *vikalpa* (savikalpakatva), and because it is turned outwards."

56. Hsüan-tsang: "Because they are turned outwards, they are free from *vikalpa*."

57. Hsüan-tsang places iv.12d here: "(1) The pure mind is neither initiator nor mover, because it is only produced in absorption; nor (2) a mind arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*), because it is produced spontaneously, without effort (anabhisamāskaravādīn)."

58. Hsüan-tsang: "A mover generally of the same type, but sometimes different."

59. "Teaching," *anuvāsan*. Hsüan-tsang: "The mind of the Buddhas, in the teaching of the *dharma*, etc., either increases or at least does not decrease."

60. According to Saeki, the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc. *Vibhaṣa*, TD 27, p. 410b26: The Vibhajyavadins praise the Blessed One, saying that his mind is always absorbed, because his right memory and knowledge are firm; they say that the Buddha is never sluggish (*middha*), because he is free from obstacles (*āvarana*).

61. Anguttara, iii.346, Theragāthā, 696-697: gacchaṁ samābıto nāgo ṭhīto nāgo samābıto / sayam samābıto nāgo nisimno pi samābıto / sabbattı saṁvuto nāgo esa nāgassa sampadā / The Sanskrit has: *cañan samābıto*. The *Vyākhyā* establishes that, in the Sūtra, the Buddha Bhāgavat receives the name of Nāga: Tathāgata Udāyin sadevakhe loke ... āgo na karoti kāyena vāca maṇasā tasmān nāga ity ucyate.

62. A *Śikṣamāna* is a "probationer." According to one opinion which Takakusu (I-tsmg, p. 38; 97) quotes, a *Śikṣamāna* is a woman who undertakes the precepts with a view to becoming a Śrāmaṇerikā; she is included (in the Pāli list) among the Śrāmaṇerikās. But as we shall see, the *Śikṣamāna* discipline is identical to the discipline of the Śrāmaṇerikā. But the *Śikṣamāna* is a candidate for the state of Bhikṣuṇī; see iv.26c-d and *Culavagga*, x.1.4 (*Vinaya Texts*, i. p. 296).

Yogācārins: Why did the Blessed One, with respect to the Bhikṣu precepts, establish two precepts, that of Bhikṣu and that of the Śrāmaṇera, whereas he established three sets of precepts with respect to the Bhikṣuṇī precepts, that of Bhikṣuṇī, *Śikṣamāna*, and Śrāmaṇerikā? Because women have many defilements: thus they progressively take up the Bhikṣuṇī precepts. If a woman
shows joy and faithfulness to a small number of the Śrāmaṇeriṁa precepts, one should give her the Śikṣāmaṇa precepts, one should not precipitously give her the full number of precepts; rather, she should cultivate two years during which...

The Ta-chib-tu luṁ, TD 25, p. 161c4. The Śrāmaṇera, the possessor of the ten precepts, is called to undertake the full number of precepts. Why is there a Śikṣāmaṇa in the Bhikṣuṁaṁhda? In the time of the Buddha, the wife of a merchant, pregnant without her knowing it, left the householder’s life and received all the precepts... It was established that women cultivate the precepts for two years, undertaking six dbarmas, and then they could undertake the full number of precepts.

According to the Vinayamārtkāśūra (8.25) the discipline of the Bhikṣu contains two hundred and fifty dbarmas; that of the Bhikṣuṁa, five hundred dbarmas. According to the Ta-chib-tu luṁ, TD 25, p. 161c4, the Bhikṣuṁa undertakes five hundred precepts; if one were to detail them, then there would be eighty thousand precepts; the Bhikṣu undertakes two hundred and fifty precepts; if one were to detail them, then there would be eighty thousand precepts.

63. The causes that determine the loss of restraint are enumerated iv.38.

64. The Vyākhyā gives an example: the monk who renounces food "at the wrong time" is less exposed to committing killing than a layman.

65. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 646c10: He who undertakes a later discipline does not abandon the earlier discipline. The Upāsaka who undertakes the Śrāmaṇera precepts does not abandon the five precepts of the Upāsaka; he takes up the precepts of the Śrāmaṇera; he thus possesses at one and the same time fifteen rules of discipline... The Bhikṣu will thus possess two hundred and sixty-five precepts. Some other masters say that the Upāsaka takes up Śrāmaṇera precepts, but not by abandoning the five Upāsaka precepts and taking up the five Śrāmaṇera precepts: he thus possesses ten precepts... If a person possesses at one and the same time two sets of precepts, or three sets of precepts (Upāsaka, Śrāmaṇera, Bhikṣu), why is he called according to the latter name,—Bhikṣu, and not Upāsaka?...

66. The Tibetan and Paramārtha say: "If it were otherwise, he who abandons the Bhikṣu precepts would not be an Upāsaka." Hsüan-tsang: "...Upāsaka, etc." Saeki says that a Bhikṣu who renounces the Bhikṣu precepts becomes a Śrāmaṇera; likewise, a Śrāmaṇera becomes an Upāsaka.

67. Divya, 160: Rambhaka āramika Ddibilamāta upāsaka śramapoddesikā Candab śramapoddesa Utpalavarnā bhikṣusu... Anguttara, ii.78: bbikkhusu bbikkhunīsu upāsakasu upārikasu antamaso āramikasamaṇudisesu.

Prātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivādins, v.57 (J.Ar. 1914, p. 515).

The Vyākhyā reproduces below iv.30d the formula pronounced by the śramapoddesa, the liturgical name of the Śrāmaṇera.

68. See Mahāvyutpattī, 268, where the sixth virati is formulated: gandhamālyavilepannavarmaka-dbāravavirati.

69. The Vibhaṣa (TD 27, p. 229c9-230b3) gives ten explanations for the word śīla: cold or cooling; calm sleep, for he who observes śīla obtains calm sleep, and always has good dreams; repeated exercise (abhyāsa), by reason of the incessant practice of the good dbarma; absorption (samādhi); ornament (compare Sumangalavīḷāsinī, p. 55); stage or pond, according to the stanza: "In the pure stage of the Law of the Buddha, morality is the pond, and the Āryans wash themselves of all defilements and arrive to the other shore of the qualities." Śīla defined iv.122.

70. The avijñapti which constitutes the Prātimokṣa samvara results from a vijnapti. The avijñapti arisen from a Dhyāna and pure avijñapti arise from the mind in a state of absorption, from an impure mind of the sphere of the Dhyānas, or from a pure mind.

71. It is a cause of action, because the restraint (samvarastha), with a view to guarding the restraint (parivraṇapārtham), accomplishes actions (kriyā) consisting of bodily and vocal actions. It is an
effect of action, because—in the case of the *avijñāpti* of the *Prātimokṣa*—it is the result of a *vijñāpti*; and because—in the case of the *avijñāpti* arisen from an absorbed mind—it is the result of a volition (*cetana*) arisen from absorption.

72. According to this etymology, we have *prātimokṣa*, but there is a *svārthe svadhidhāna*, as in *vaiśāra = vikṣeram*, and *vaiṣayam = viśayam* (*Vyākhyā*).


Indeed the idea of "obligation" or "restraint" expresses the definition of the *Mahāvagga-Nidānāsa* which also adds an etymological explanation: *ṣilāṁ paṭisē bhā ṣādirāṇam ṣānīyam ṣānīvardo mukharh pamukharh kusalānāṁ dbhāmānāṁ ṣānāpatīyā.

73. But *Visuddhimagga*, p. 16: *pātimokkham eva samvaro pātimokkhasamvaro*.

74. In the *Abhidhamma* (*Atthasālīni*, p. 103), *samādānavirati*, "abstention following upon engagement" (in opposition to *samāpattavirati*) refers to the *virati* obtained through the *Prātimokṣa*.

*Samādānaśīla*, the morality that one obtains by undertaking an engagement, a resolution: "I shall not do either this or that" (the *Prātimokṣa* precepts), is distinguished from *dharma-ṭṭhāṇetaṭṭhikasaṅśīla*, the morality acquired without engagement or vocal action: this is the discipline acquired through the fact of the possession of a Dhyāna (for one only takes possession of a Dhyāna by disengaging himself from the defilements of Kamadhatu, iv.26), or by entry into the Path (pure discipline which includes the certain abstention from certain actions = the *samuccedavirati* of the *Atthasālīni*, p. 103). See above note 24 and iv.33a-b.

75. This is the *samuccedavirati* of *Atthasālīni*, p. 163; it includes *akaraṇaniyama*, the impossibility of committing a transgression.

76. *Anāgāmya* (viii.22c) is the stage of absorption preliminary to the First Dhyāna. In this stage the ascetic obtains detachment from the defilements of Kamadhatu: he does not detach himself from these defilements in the First Dhyāna, for, in order to enter the First Dhyāna, he should be detached from these same defilements.

There are nine categories, strong-strong, strong-medium, strong-weak, medium-strong,... of the defilements of Kamadhatu: these nine categories are destroyed or abandoned by nine paths, the *ānantaryamārgas*.

The practice of each of these mārgas thus includes "abandoning" and, at the same time, "discipline."

The nine *vimuktimārgas* of *anāgāmya* do not include abandoning (vi.28, 65c); the *ānantaryamārgas* and the *vimuktimārgas* of the Dhyāna properly so-called and of dhyānāntara (viii) have no relationship with the defilements of Kamadhatu, since they are detached from the defilements proper to the Dhyānas.

In the *ānantaryamārgas* and *vimuktimārgas*, the ascetic either cultivates the worldly path, and in this case the discipline is called "arisen from Dhyāna"; or he cultivates the superworldly path and in this case the discipline, even though arisen from a Dhyāna, or in the middle of the Dhyāna, is called pure (vi.49).

77. *Samyutta*, i.73; *Dhammapada*, 361; *Udānavarga*, vii.11. *kāyenā samvaro sādhu sādhu vācāya samvaro / manasā samvaro sādhu sādhu sabbatthā saṃvaro*. The Chinese translators translate *sādhu* as an exclamation, "Good!" The text of the final stanzas of the *Prātimokṣa* (L. Finot, *Journal Asiatique*, 1913, ii.543) has *kāyenā saṃvarah sādhuḥ sādhuḥ vācā ca saṃvarah*; but Kumārajīva translates "What happiness!"

78. *Anguttara*, iii.387: *cakkhundriyasamvarasamvarato vibaranati*.

79. The *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 984c21) gives some other definitions: "According to some, *indriyasamvara* is mindfulness and attentive consciousness; according to others, *apramāda*;
according to others, the six perpetual attitudes (sattavibhāra); according to others, the non-
possession of aparībhāna and aparījñāna, and the possession of the Path that opposes them; and
according to others, the undefiled dharmas."

On the different samvaras of the Visuddhimagga (pātimokkha sati, ānāna, khanti, viriya-
samvara), see Warren’s analysis JPTS 1891, p. 77 and following, and the text p. 7-11.

80. In order to prove this thesis, the Vākyāya quotes the Āgama: anyata rayā kīlā devatā bhikṣuṁ
viśayevu indriyāni vicārayantam avocat / bhikṣo bhikṣo vṛṣṭān mā kāṣira iti / bhikṣo aha /
piṇḍāraṇām devata / devataḥa / kumbhamātrani bhikṣo vṛṣṭān kṛtvā kathariṇa piṇḍāraṇī / bhikṣur
aha / smṛtya piṇḍāraṇī saṃprajānyena ca.

In Āṅguttara, v.347, 350, the person who does not watch over his sense organs is one who na
vṛṣṭaṁ paticcādetā.

81. The possessor, the possessor of the prāpti of . . : the presence, in the complex that constitutes
the self, of the viprayukta-dharmas which is the prāpti (ii.36). One can have prāpti of a past, present,
or future dharma (v.25).

82. Hsüan-tsang adds: "It results from this that these persons do not possess future avijñāpti: the
avijñāpti which is not of absorption is not possessed in a future state."

83. "He who is absorbed and he who is placed within the Path": this last expression presents a
difficulty. If one understands āryamārgasthā in the sense of "a person in possession of the Path"
(mārgasamanvita), one arrives at the conclusion that an Āryan, even outside of an absorption, i.e.,
in a normal state (prakṛtisthā), possesses present avijñāpti. Sthā would thus be understood in the
sense of "having mounted upon" (abhīrūḍha), as one says: naustha, "on a boat": thus āryamārgasthā
= mārgam abhīrūḍhabḥ samāpanah = the Āryan who, at the present time, meditates on the Path, a
meditation which only takes place in a state of absorption. It is simpler to follow another opinion
(anayah punar . . .) according to which the Kārikā should be understood: "a person absorbed and one who, being in the Path, is absorbed" (samā-
bitāryamārgasthau = samābhitā saṃābitāryamārgasthau ca).

84. Vijnapti can be (1) samvaralakṣanā, for example, all the actions of a monk which conform to his
discipline. The monk possesses all these actions, of the past, up to the moment when he loses his
restraint (tiṣṭhanityeśaparādibhibh, iv.38); (2) samvaralakṣanā, all the killings which have been
committed by a butcher: the butcher possesses all these actions, of the past, up to the moment when
he renounces this lack of restraint and takes it upon himself to kill no more; or (3) navasamvaranāsamvaralakṣanā, the worship of a Stūpa, etc.: one loses these actions, these
vijnaptis, when the ardour of one's faith ceases . . .

85. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Lack of restraint is a karmapatha only at the moment when it arises."

86. But he produces (samutthāpayati) and possesses avijñāpti when he is agitated with a strong
volition (tiṇvacetana).

87. It may be that the Prthagjana also possesses avijñāpti without possessing vijnāpti (Vākyāya).

88. Tibetan: "The Pātimokṣa discipline, if another is informed of it, is also acquired in informing
another." Paramārtha, in the Kārikā: "through mutual information of another"; Bhāṣya: "If another
informs concerning this, this informs another." Hsüan-tsang: "Information from another. One
who informs another is called another." (Thus we have: "Information from another = information
from another who himself informs.

89. Svāma upasampadā, Mahāvastu, i. p. 2; Mahāvagga, i.6, 28-29; Milinda, p. 76, 265.

90. The Tibetan text has simply "of the Five," the Vākyāya explains: "that is, Aṣṭākaṇṇaṁyā, etc." Paramārtha: "in the case of the five Bhikṣus, Kauṇḍinya, etc., at the moment when they obtained
91. According to the Tibetan: “in the case of Ajñata”; in Mahāvagga, i.6.32, Ajñata kaṇḍaṇīyā is ordained by the formula: “Come, Oh Bhikṣu...” But Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: “in the case of Yaśas, etc.”

The technical name of this ordination is ēhibhikṣukayā upasampadā; the person summoned by ēhibhikṣukā (ēhibhikṣukayā abhāṣita) becomes a monk. These words are addressed to a single person or to many: ēbi bhikṣo cara brahmaṇaṃ...eta bhikṣavāḥ cara bhramaṇaṃ; it is accompanied by the miracle that theVyākhya describes (according to a text close to the stanza, Divya, 48, 281, 342): ēbiḥ coktaḥ tathāgatena tāvīnā/munḍaḥ ca kāṣāyadharo baddhāva...

(Compare Mahavastu, iii.430; Dhammapada Commentary 21-23, Fausboll, 1855, p. 167, Burlingame, i. p. 280, etc.) We have ēhibhikṣukā in Mahāvastu, i.2, Avadānaśataka, i.330, ii.113, Divya, and Kośa: ēhibhikṣukāta in the Hoernle fragment; ēhibbikṣupabbajjā in Dhammapada, 1855, p. 119; ēhibbikṣunivāda, Divya 616. See the formulas of Mahāvagga, i.6.31, Majjhima, iii.2. Par. i.8.1 (Vīṇāyaśākha, iii. p. 24). Compare Śatapatha, i.4.2.

92. All of the images that Kāśyapa saluted broke into pieces; he came close to the Blessed One and did not salute him, fearing that the body of the Blessed One would perish (māṣya rūpaṁvindṣo bhūṭi). Knowing his intention, the Blessed One said: “Salute the Tathāgata!” Kāśyapa saluted, and seeing that the body of the Blessed One was not harmed, he said: ayaṁ me śāśti, “He is my master.” By this, he was ordained. Compare Mahāvastu, iii.51, 446; Sāmalavagga, trans. Huber, p. 161.

93. Praṣṇāraśānena: the Blessed One was satisfied (ārādhāta) by the answers (praśnaviṣarjanena). . . In the Hoernle fragment we should read: [sodajyinaḥ praśnavyākāramena upasampadā.]

94. Gurudharmabhyupagamena, Cullavagga, x, Āṅguttara, iv.76, Bhikṣunikkarmavacana (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 1920).

95. She was locked in the harem and sent a messenger to the Buddha in order to obtain the pravrajya. On Dhammadinna, see Majjhima, i.299 and Therigāthā, 12, where the story is very different.

96. The officiant (vinayadhara) is the jñāptivācaka. A frontier land or a border land: pratyantikeṣu ājanapadesu. Mahāvagga, vi.13.11, ix.41; Divya, 21.18 (pratyantimeṣu); Mahāvastu: pañcavargena gatena upasampadā.

97. See Minayev, Recherches, 272; Takakusu, in Hastings’ ERE, vii.320.

98. Vyākhya: Buddhaṁ śaraṇāṁ gacchāma iti śrīvarocanaṇaṇo upasampat. Paramārtha: “By saying the Three Refuges three time,” translation confirmed by vi.30d.

In Mahāvagga, i.14, the Sixteen are ordained by the formula, “Come!…” See the ordination of Subhadra, Dialogues, i.169.

99. Vyākhya: Samaśavatāṁ iti samāvarasya.

100. Vyākhya: Tetra vissabhāgadṛṣṭevanā tatra samādāne/prayogat / asaranāc cetarāśrayeṇa tat samādānanām na smanati.

101. Hsüan-tsang: “One does not undertake it as one undertakes the good [restraint].”

102. On the upavāsa, see Wieger, Bouddhisme cimbouis, i.149 (Vīṇāya in Ten Recitations); Oldenberg, Bouddha, 2nd edition, p. 372; Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1907, pp. 139-141; Minayeff, Recherches, p. 166. Āṅguttara, i.205; Suttanipata, 400.

On the upavāsa repeated or of long duration, see De Groot, Code du Mahāyāna, 62. The six days of upavāsa, Watters, Yuán-Chuâng, i.304, Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.26, note 2; the four days and their dates, Takakusu, l-tsin, 63, 188.

The half-month of the Blessed One, Mahāvastu, iii.97, is a prolonged abstinence in the manner of the Jains (see the editor’s Introduction).
103. Paramārtha and Hsiian-tsang, in the Kārikā and the Bhāṣya, digress from the order of the Tibetan.

Smras bzlas pa yis = "murmuring after he had spoken" (?). Paramārtha = anu pacat vādin; Bhāṣya: "immediately upon the giving [of the upavāsa], after he speaks . . . "

104. Viśhāṣa (TD 27, p. 647b23): From whom should one undertake the upavāsa discipline? One obtains this discipline by taking it from the seven classes of persons (ch'i-chung 七眾: the seven "pariṣads" of Takakusu, i-tsing, p. 96; monk, novice, nun, probationer, female novice, layman and laywoman). Why? Persons who have not undertaken the precepts (chieh 戒) during their whole life are not worthy of being precept masters (chieh-shib 戒師).

105. Paramārtha: "He rejects ornaments which are not old. Why? The ornaments that one uses constantly do not produce vanity as do new ornaments." "Habitual" should be nityaka; nityaka bhojana, Mahāvastu, i.602, iii.253, is understood as "ordinary."

106. The restraint of the fast arises (for him) at sunrise, and the efficacy of making this restraint arise belongs to the mind which he has formed to oblige himself to undertake the fast. The Vyākhyā says, "Sa bhuktvāpi grhniyat.iti / sūryodaya eva saṁvarā uttiṣṭhate samādānānityamacitta- syottāpaka vā / bhuktvāvagbhaṁtv abhivyaktyartham. Paramārtha translates word for word sa bhuktvāpi grhniyat. Hsiian-tsang: " . . . if some obstacle is encountered, he nevertheless obtains complete abstinence."

107. On the diverse readings and interpretations, uposatha, uposadha (Lalita, Mahāvastu, ii.177, Avadānakalpalata, vi.76), posadha (Mahāvyutpatti, 266), posa ḍa (Jaina), see S. Levi, Observations sur une langue prêcanonique du Bouddhisme, J. As. 1912, ii.501.

gro-styon is explained: "that which nourishes [merits], and which washes away [transgressions]."

Uposadha, such as Māyādevī at the descent of the elephant = nityamavati, iv.74a-b. Posadbika, Mahāvyutpatti 270.13.

108. See the Uposathasutta (Visuddhimagga 227), Āṅguttara, i.211.

109. Paramārtha and Hsiian-tsang quote the stanza: "As it increases the good pure mind of oneself and others, the Blessed One (Buddha Sugata) called it Uposadhika."

110. In Āṅguttara, iv.388, the Uposatha is made up of nine items: one adds the meditation of compassion.

111. Vyākhyā: Śālam pārājikābhavā saṅghāvāsadosybabhavā. On the expression pārājika (*pārācika), saṅghāvāsa, saṅghādisesa (*saṅghātisesa), see S. Levi, Langue prêcanonique du Bouddhisme, J. As. 1912, ii.503-506. The saṅghāvāsas would be the transgressions which "separate the transgressor from the rest of the community" in contrast to the pārājikas which "imply definitive exclusion." Ryōsaburo Sakaki (Vyupatti, 255-256) quotes Burnouf, Kern, and Levi. The Chinese translate seng-ts'an 僧 = That which destroys the Saṅgha.

112. Compare Āṅguttara iv.248, where the order of the items differs.

113. On pīta see Harṣacarita, 45.2, 123.2, 273 (F. W. Thomas).

114. Saṅghabhaddra responds to this objection.

115. On Upāsakas and the place they occupy at the side of the Saṅgha, Burnouf, Introduction, 279-282; Spence Hardy, Eastern Monachism; Oldenberg, Buddha 1914, p. 182, 317, 429; Minayev, Recherches, 296; Foucher, Art greco-bouddhique du Gandhara, ii.86; Przyluski, Légende d'Açoka, p. 207-8.

Cullavagga, v.20, Āṅguttara, iii.366, iv.344, important concerning the relations of the Saṅgha and Upāsakas.

The major text is the Mahānāmasūtra many passages of which are discussed in the Kośa. Other relevant passages in the notes of Buddhaghosa, Sumangalavilāsini, p. 235.
relevant passages in the notes of Buddhaghosa, Sumangalavilāsini, p. 235.

The Upāsaka is considered a "monk" (Anguttara, ii.8), since he has the right to "give" the upavāsa (see the Viśvādī above note 104), since he is called to confess his transgressions (iv.34a-b): he is a "tertiary." But Upāsaka signifies "he who worships [the Three Jewels]" (Sumangalavilāsini, p. 234), and we shall see that, for the Sautrāntikas, one can be an Upāsaka without taking upon himself the rules of training (sīkṣāpada) the observation of which makes him a perfect Upāsaka (note 116.vi).

Whether a layman can obtain the "results of the religious life" (frūdmanyaphala), and especially the quality of Arhat, see Kathāvattthu iv.1, Milinda, 242, 265, 348. According to one group of sources, the layman, even if he is a kāmabhogin, can enter the Path; if, even if living in the world, he upholds chastity (brahmacārī; see for example Ralston, Tibetan Tales, 197), he can obtain the result of Anāgāmin; but in no case does he become an Arhat [It is in this sense that one should understand Dhammapada 142; Udāna, vii.10; Majjhima, i.466, 483, 490; the texts do not clearly say whether a lay kāmabhogin can obtain the result of Anāgāmin]. But Anguttara iii.451 enumerates twenty layman who have obtained the quality of Arhat; see Samyutta v.410. Milinda, like the Kośa, believes that a layman can become an Arhat: but at the moment when he does not exist, he becomes a monk; that very day he enters the Order; if the Order does not exist, he enters an ascetic brotherhood. [Wassilieff, p. 218, followed by Minayev, Recherches, p. 220, is mistaken on the meaning of the Tibetan source, see Kośa, vi.30.] Normally, heaven is the reward for the person who, incapable of abandoning the pleasures whose inanity he understands (Theragāthā 187), and recoiling before the obligation of chastity (Suttanipāta 396, Divya, 303), contents himself with observing the Five Precepts and the upavāsa.

On the teaching given to the laity, sermons on generosity, the precepts, heaven, etc, see Majjhima, i.379: Cullavagga, vi.4, 5, Mahāvagga i.7, 5, etc; Dīgha ii.113. Samyutta iv.314; Divya, 300, 617; Przyluski, Légende d’Açoka, 196, 353. Senart, Piyadasi, ii.208. See iv.112.

The sick or dying layman visited by the āvāsa (resident monk), etc, Anguttara iii.261, Majjhima, iii.261; lacking monks, by layman, Samyutta, vi.408.

The layman reveals the Śūtras to the Bhikkhus, Mahāvagga iii.5.9.

Superstition, the danger of the layman (Kośa, iv.86).

116. The Mahānāmasūtra in Anguttara iv.220 and Samyutta v.395 (Sumangalavilāsini 243) has simply: yato kho mahānām abuddham tasaṇām gato boti dhammaṁ tasaṇām gato boti saṅgham tasaṇām gato boti etāvata kho mabhaññāma upāsakotī botī = One becomes an Upāsaka by taking the Three Refuges.

The Sanskrit Mahānāmasūtra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 236b17) contains in addition a short formula added to the taking of the refuges "Consider me as an Upāsaka." (The same in Divya, 47, where we have: Upāsikāṁ caṁ mabhaṅgavān dhrāryate). This Sūtra is partially quoted in the Vyākhyā: Kyāṭā bhadanta upāsako bhavati / yataḥ khalu mabhaṅgaman gṛhi avadātavasanaḥ puruṣaḥ puruṣendriyasamanyagataḥ ... upāsikāṁ māṁ iyoṭapāsko bhavati. (Vyākhyā: Gṛhīty uddesa-padmam / avadātavasanāṁ iti nirdeśapadam / puruṣa ity uddesa-padam / puruṣendriyasamanyagata iti nirdeśapadam). Hisian-tsang adds to the words of the candidate the words karoṁ māṁ upādaya ... dhārya.

iii. A more complete formula with the same variants, Anguttara i.56, Samyutta iv.113, v.12, Cullavagga, vi.4.5, Dīgha i.85: So abham bhagavantam tasaṇam gacchamī dhammaṁ ca bhikkhu-saṅgham ca / upāsakam māṁ bhagavā dhāretu ajñātagge pāṇupetam tasaṇam gatam. Commentaty of the Sumangalavilāsini: māṁ bhagavā "upāsako ayam" ti evam dhāretu jānātum: "May the Blessed One recognize me as being an Upāsaka." Pāṇupetam iti pānehi upetam: that is, "As long as my life lasts, may the Blessed One consider me as upeta (having come to him), not having any other master, an Upāsaka having taken the Three Refuges, doing what is suitable (kāṣṭhipya). May one cut off my head if I say of the Buddha that he is not Buddha . . . ." See note 126.

iv. The formula that Vasubandhu describes as that of the Drisṭasatyaśūtra (see note 125), and which is quoted, in its first part, by the Vaibhāṣikas (page 598, line 28) with the reading prāṇapeta in place of prāṇopeta (reading interpreted and discussed p. 598, line 31 and p. 600, line 10): Upāsakam māṁ dhāraya adyagreṇa yāvajīvam prāṇapetam [tasaṇam gatam abhiprasannam].
v. The Sarvastivadin formula (given in the Shih-sung chieh-mo pi-ch’iu yao-yung, TD 23, p. 496a14, edited and translated by Wieger, Bouddhisme Chinois, i.146-7): "I, so-and-so, from today to the end of my life, take refuge in the Buddha, the best of two legged beings . . . Know that I am an Upasaka having taken definitive refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, Sarvagha, rejoicing (abhiprasama = 乐) in the Dharma of the Buddha Sakya-muni, having undertaken the Five Silas." This is repeated three times. Then one explains the Five Silas and the candidate answers that he will observe them. The expression "having undertaken the Five Precepts" (shou wu chieh 五戒) replaces the prapatapa of formula iv.

vi. We possess the Sanskrit original of the expression: "having undertaken the Five Silas," in the Abhisamayalakkaratola, commenting on the Apsahasrikaprajnaparamita, p. 137. We learn that the Vinaya has two readings (pātha). According to the first, the candidate begs the master (who receives him as an Upasaka) to consider him as an Upasaka who has taken the Three Refuges; according to the second, to consider him as an Upasaka who has taken the Three Refuges and the Five Precepts.

Triyāranāparigrha (read 0gamanā) pañciṣṭikāpaḍaparigrhaḥ copaśakas tathopāsiketi dvividābhedaḥ / triyāranāparigrhaḥ (read 0gataḥ) upaśakāṁ mām acāryo dhārayatvā / tathā triyāranagataṁ pañciṣṭikāpaḍaparigrhaḥ upaśakāṁ mām acāryo dhārayat viti vininirvidvāpāḥ. (According to a bad copy of the Calcutta MSS, Rajendralal, Buddhist Literature, p. 194).

There are thus two types of Upāsaka: one who has undertaken only the Refuges, and one who has undertaken the Three Refuges and who also undertakes the Five Precepts.

vii. Nepalese formulary which is very confused (the renouncing of the ten transgressions precedes the taking of the Five Precepts) in Ādikarmacarita (p. 189 of my edition in Bouddhisme, 1898), summarized by Minayev, Recherches, p. 296.

117. Paramārtha: "No, for the person in question produces the five renouncings."

118. We have iv.38 dama = sarinvara, but the Tibetan translates dama as 'du-lu-ba.

119. See above note 116.iv.

120. Vyaśkha: Yathāiva hi bhikṣur labdhasāṁvaro/pi jñāpticaturbheha karmanā śikṣāpādānim yathābhālānim grāhyate prajñāpyate / itaś cāmūtaś ca pāraśikādhībhyaś tava sarinvarah/ anyāni ca te sabrahmacārināḥ kathayisyantiūśi.

121. When the Śramaṇera says: Aham evamāṁmā taṁ bhagavantāṁ tathāgatasaṁ arhamtaṁ samyukṣamsambuddhaṁ sakyaṁāṁmā śikṣābhāraṁ bhavati / prajñāpyataṁ amupravisajñāṁ gṛhaśthālaṁ partiṣajñāṁ prajñāśilāṁ samādādamāṁ / śramaṇo deśoṁ mām dbhāyaḥ / yasyāyam dharmo dśāyam / and repeat this formula (evam yayat tati śri praś), he acquired the discipline of the śramaṇera which is then explained to him in detail.

122. The Mahāvyutpattī, 84, adds aparipūrṇakārīn before paripūrṇakārīn; the Chinese and Tibetan versions translate pradesakārin = one who observes (spyod-pa, hsing 行) for a day (ni-tshe = "one day") and also pradesa.

The Vyaśkha quotes the Sūtra (Mahānāmasūtra, Sarīyukta, TD 2, p. 236b): Kīyātā bhagantāṁ upāsaka ekādeśakāri bhavati . . . paripūrṇakāri / iha Mahānāmaṁ upāsaka prāṇātipātāṁ prabhāya prāṇātipātāṁ vinato bhavati / ityā Mahānāmaṁ upāsaka śikṣāyām ekādeśakāri bhavati . . . dvābhīyām pratisārataṁ pratikāri bhavati / tribhūyām pratisārataṁ caturbhīyo vā yabhāyākāri bhavati / pañcābhīyām pratisārataṁ paripūrṇakāri bhavati.

Chavannes, Cinq cent contes, l.244, illustrates this text.

123. Paramārtha: "They are so called because they observe;" Hsüan-tsang: "So termed with reference (yūeb 五) to their observing."

124. Hsüan-tsang continues: "If it were otherwise, the Upāsaka of one precept would be called 'undertaker of one rule' . . . " The question is to know whether there are not some Upāsakas, not endowed with the discipline in all its five parts, but who are engaged in observing one, two, three, or four rules. No, according to the Vaibhāṣikas: the ekādeśakārin is an Upāsaka who violates four of
Chapter Four

the rules that he has undertaken.

In *Anguttara*, iii.215, the Upāsaka Gavesin, *sīlesu aparipūrakārīm*, declares to his comrades: “From this day forward, consider me as *sīlesu aparipūrakārīm*.” Then he undertakes, one by one, the obligations of a Bhikṣu [who is the only person with the complete precepts]. *Anguttara*, iv.380, v.131.

125. According to the *Vyuṭhyā*, the *Dṛṣṭasatyasūtra*: with reason, as this results from the very text of Vasubandhu, page 600, line 10: “Further . . .”

*Dṛṣṭasatyasūtra* signifies “the Sūtra in which a candidate, an Upāsaka, has seen the Truths.” This refers to the text *Divya*, 75, or to a similar text: the Blessed One destroyed the false opinion of personalism of the Brahmin Indra, who obtains the result of Srotaāpanna: . . . *sa dṛṣṭavartyah kathayati/ atikṛnto 'bam bhadantāti kṛntah (The Pāli reads abhikkantam . . . )/ ero 'bam bhagavantam buddhavān tarapāni gacchāmi dharmanā ca bhikṣusasarāgharī ca / upāsakam ca mānū dhāraya adyāgrupanā vasāvijvam prāṇopetanā taraṇām gatam abhiprasannam (Edition: gatam / abhiprasanno ‘bhandro brahmasya . . . ; same text, *Divya*, 462, with the best reading).

Saeki says that the *Dṛṣṭasatyasūtra* is the Sūtra of Śrōṇa the son of Grhapati (*Samyukta*, *TD* 2, p. 6b25): “Sroṣa, having removed all dust, abandoned all defilement, obtained the pure eye of the Law, at the moment when he saw the Law . . . he rose and said to Śāriputra, ‘I, from today onward, take refuge . . .’” Possessors of the eye, candidates for the quality of Upāsaka, are the kings Udena and Soṇa (S, iv.113): but they employ the ordinary formula: *upāsakam mānū bhāravāvau bhāretu ajjatage prāṇopetam taraṇām gatam, omitting the *abhiprasanam* of the Sanskrit (On *abhiprasanam*, see *Samyutta*, v.225, 378).

126. Such is indeed the meaning of the expression *prāṇopeta = srong daṅ bsnyo ba* = “giving up, abandoning one’s life” = “risking one’s life” (Hsiaant-sang). We see in note 112.iii, that this is the interpretation of Buddhaghosa.

127. *Pāṇupetam* can be explained by *prāṇebbyo’petam, prāṇair apetam, prāṇapāṭādibhyo’petam*. This last version “freed from killing, etc.” justifies the Vaibhasika doctrine. To say “Know that I am an Upāsaka free from killing” is to undertake abstaining from killing.

128. The *kuddānakuddakas* do not form part of the precepts, *Anguttara*, i.231.

129. See the translation of Sarṅghabhadra’s commentary, xxiii.4, fol. 84 and following, in the *Introduction*.

*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 177a16. Some say that taking Refuge in the Buddha is taking refuge in a body made up of the head, the neck, the stomach, the back, the hands, and the feet of the Tathāgata. It is explained then that this body, born of a father and mother, is impure (*sārṇava) dharmas, and is thus not a locus of refuge: rather, the Refuge is the Aśaikṣa dharmas of the Buddha which form Bodhi, the *dharma* *kāya*. Some say that taking Refuge in the Dharma is to take refuge in the Three Truths of [Suffering, Arising, and the Path]; or in the good, bad, and neutral dharmas, etc.; or in the rules imposed upon the Bhikṣus: “One should do this, one should not do that.” It is explained then that all these dharmas are conditioned (*samāskṛta) and impure; that they are thus not the refuge; and that the Refuge is solely the Truth of Extinction (*mroḍabhaṇya*), the end of thirst, Nirvāṇa.

Some say that taking Refuge in the Saṅgha is to take refuge in the Saṅgha of Pravrajītas of the four castes (*ssu-bṣing ch’u-ch’ia* 四姓出家). It is then explained that the attitudes (*ṭṝyaṭṭha*), etc. (*wei-i bṣing-bṣiang* 威儀形相) of this Saṅgha are impure: the Refuge is thus the Saṅgha and Aśaikṣa dharmas which make up the Saṅgha.

130. The designation “Buddha” also refers to other dharmas, and other gunas, but not principally so (*apradhānya*).

131. This is the *dharma* *kāya*, vii.34; *Muséon*, 1913, p. 266.


133. Three of the *Vyuṭhyā*: *Laukikamārgasya punyaḥtāmasanāvibhāṇḍalsanasya lokottaranasya ca kṣyeṣaṅkānādikāsanasya-vilakṣana tvat tulyavīt.*
Vibhăsă, TD 27, p. 177c21. If one takes Refuge in a Buddha, the refuge will be partial; and if one takes Refuge in all the Buddhas, why does one say: "I take Refuge in the Buddha," and not "in all the Buddhas?" To take Refuge in the Buddha is to take Refuge in all the Buddhas whose number exceeds that of the sands of the Ganges... The word "Buddha" embraces all of the Buddhas, because they are of the same species. When one takes Refuge in the Saṅgha, is this to take refuge in one disciple of the Buddha or in all of them?...

134. Vibhăsă, TD 27, p. 178a24, quotes the same text: tatra bhagavānīs trapusabhāllikau vapijāv āmantrayate sma / ete yuvām buddhān saraṇam gacchhatam / dharman ca / yo sau bhavvisyaty anāgatē'labvani saṅgho nāma tam api saraṇam gacchhatam. (Excerpt from the Introduction to the Saṃghabhedavastu of which a fragment, discovered in Turkestan [(Miran)], has been published in JRAS. 1913, p. 850). Compare Mahāvagga, i:4; Mahāvastu, iii:304; Lalita, p. 386; Dulva, iv:54b. Numerous variants.

135. Many opinions, Vibhăsă, TD 27, p. 177cl.


137. We have babum ve saraṇam yanti . . .; Divya: babavah saraṇam yanti, which Paramārtha translates. The Tibetan Udānavarga has phal-cher.


139. Vya khya: Akrīyāyam akaraṇe niyama ekāntatā akrīyāniyamah / so'karaṇasamvarah akaraṇalakṣaṇanab samivarah / na samadānākāh samivarati ity arthah / sa ca Sautrāntikānāvasthāvisa eva/ Vaibhāṣikanāyena tu sālāgam aṣṭijaflatir ī. See above note 24, some references to the Pāli sources, setubhaṭavirati = samucchedavirati, sampattavirati, samadānāviri; p. 48, the distinction between samadānāsūla and dharmaḍaprātiśilambhiṣa. The Abhidhamma has many points of similarity with the Abhidharma, but the correspondence is not perfect.

The Vaibhāṣikas attribute pure samīvara, or restraint, to an Āryan (iv:17c); this samīvara is not simply akaraṇa, but a certain rēpa, aṣṭijaflati, a setubhaṭa (see note 24); the Sautrāntikas do not admit the existence of aṣṭijaflati: for them the series of the Āryan has become incapable of certain actions (see note 145), the seeds of these actions having been eliminated: akaraṇasamvarah, an immovable aṣṭijaflati which the Vaibhāṣikas postulate, is not a thing in and of itself but is akarāyam ekāntatā, a certain abstinence resulting from a transformation of the personality.

140. Hsūn-tṣang: "They have not, with respect to the series of all beings, said, 'I renounce incontinence.'" Paramārtha: "They have not, with respect to this series (asmin samānāt), said, 'I renounce . . .'"

141. Hsūn-tṣang translates: "If lying is authorized, he would transgress all the rules. Having transgressed the rules, at the time when he is interrogated,—if lying has been authorized,—he would say, 'I have not done it,' and because of this there would be many transgressions of the rules. Also the Blessed One, desiring that one uphold the rules, places the renouncing of lying in all of the rules, asking, 'How could an Upāsaka, if he violates the rule, declare it himself and prevent new transgressions?" Compare the Sūtra to Rāhula on lying, Majjhima, i:415; the edict of Bhabra.

142. Prahṣeṣeṇapatanaṇādya, pratisedha; prajāḥati, in opposition to what is a transgression by its very nature or praṭīṣeṣvādya. This is transgression of one who does a forbidden action, because he does not respect the law (āsana) of the Blessed One (iv:122c).

143. On jālogi, see Conciles bouddhiques, Muséon, 1905, p. 290; Lévi, J.A.s. 1912, ii. p. 508.

144. The text is quoted in the Vya khya: Māṃ sātāram udātabdābhī kula-grenāpi madyam na pātavyam. In Divya, 191, we have: māṃ bho bhikṣavab sātāram udātabdābhī madyam aperyam.
adeyam antatah kusāgretaṉāpi, which Speyer corrects to addita [bhava]dhibir... Huber, Sources du Divya, BEFEO, 1906, 31, sanctions this correction, and shows the relation of the Divya with the 79th prāyañciśekha.

The Blessed One not only forbids strong liquor in inebriating quantities (madanīya). For the sick Upāsaka who consents to eat dog meat but not to drink wine, and who quotes the “Sūtra of the House,” see Śātralamākara, Huber, 434. Chavannes, Cinq cents contres, iii.14.

Four upakāleṣas: surāmerayapāṇa, mabhuna, jātarūpa, and micchājiva (Aṅguttara, ii.53, Atthāsālimi, 380).

145. See above p. 604. If one puts milk mixed with alcohol into their mouths, the milk would enter their mouths, but not the alcohol, Samuṅgalavilāsimi, p. 305.

146. Mdo (Csoma), xxvi, 425.

147. Four kāyaduścarītas, killing, stealing, forbidden sex, and surāmaireyapramādāstbhāna. Alcohol is missing from the classical lists of the kāyaduścarītas, Mahāvyutpatti, 91, etc.

148. Hsian-tsang translates: “because, by reason of the transgression of this rule, one would commit a transgression which is by its nature a transgression.” The Vyākhyā says: If drunk but once, strong liquor is mortal (vyasambhavet), for the Blessed One said: trīṇi sthānam pratiṣevaṃmanasya nāsti tṛṣṇir vā alantā vā parāparāḥ vā / madam abrahmacaryam stānāmīdābhāya ceti. Same teaching in Aṅguttara, i.261 (roppasam bhikkhave paṭisevanāya nattibhi tinti, surāmerayapāṇassa...; methunaddhammasamāpattiya...).

149. The same quantity of madya is madanīya or non-madanīya depending upon circumstances.

150. The five balas of the Saṅkṣas are śraddhā, vīrya, hrī, aparāpya, and prajñā. The order differs in Aṅguttara, iii.1.

151. Vyākhyā: Yadi kṛimaśvat tadanadhyācarupam ajītaṃ udakādivat kasmān na pibanti.

152. The Nandikasūtra says: surāmaireyamadyapramādāstbhānaśevitena bhāvitena babuṣkṛtena kāyasya bhedān narakesupapadyate. Compare Dīgha, iii.182: surāmerayapramādāṭbhānāmyogā apāyamiko; the same for jītaṇappapādaṭbhāna.}


154. Notes of Palmyr Cordier.

a) Surā = annāsava. Vyākhyā: Annāsava iti tandulakṛtaḥ. Rice beer or alcohol. This is what Hemādri says ad Aṣṭāṅgabṛdaya 1.5.67: saḥpiṣṭakṛtani madyam. This is also confirmed by the Vaidūryakabhāṣya or the autobiography of Vaghbhaṭa, where surā = bru-chan = gro-chan, cereal beer, wheat beer, grain alcohol, in conformity with the Mahāvyutpatti, 230.36 where surā = 'bru'ichi chan (Amarakośa, 2.10.39, surā = chan).

Surā = arrack or raki (rice aquavit, a Persian word Sanskritized under the form of akrā, a word which is missing, in this sense, in non-medical dictionaries).

b) Māreya = dravyāsava (rdzas las shyar ba'iti bhi'bo) = tafia. Vyākhyā: Dravyāsava itikṣasurasādikṛtaḥ.

According to Arunadatta's commentary on the Aṣṭāṅgabṛdaya, 1.7.40, māreya = kbarjūrāsava = alcohol from dates. The Vaidūryakabhāṣya explains bru ram chan = rum or tafia; whereas Candranandana (Padārthacakṣurākha) and Hemādri say dhanyāsava = alcohol from grains. Mahāvyutpatti, 230.38, shyar ba'ichi chan; Amarakośa, 2.10.42, makes māreya the synonym of āsava (me-sog chan), a liqueur from flowers (of Lythrum fruticosum, etc.) and of fābhu (bur chan); rum, tafia.

c) Pūgaphalakodravādayo'pi ... Vyākhyā: Ādiśabdana nispāvādayo'pi grhyante [MSS. nesya'va].

Kodrava, tsi-tsi, Aṣṭāṅganirghanta, 198; Sarat Candra, tsi tse tsi tsi; Mahāvyutpatti, 228.14 ci thse. Nispava, common lablab (a type of bean). Missing in the Mahāvyutpatti and, at least in the botanical sense, in the Amarakośa.

155. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the preparation, the chief action and the consecutive action of undertaking the Prātimokṣa discipline (iv.69c-d) have respectively for their purpose to “bind” the preparation, the chief action and the action consecutive to murder, etc. The preparation of the Prātimokṣa considers the preparation of killing, to which it is opposed, and says to it in some manner: “I bind you (sānyāpons); do not arise!”

156. An important point in the theory of the existence of the past and the future, v.25 (see also i.34d, trans. p. 99).

157. Compare Yogasūtra, ii.31. We see, Divya, p. 10, that the butcher of sheep, taking up the obligation of morality (śīlamādāma) for the night, obtains great benefits: a daytime hell, a nocturnal paradise.

158. The Tibetan has: “relative to former beings who, having become Buddhas, have entered into Nirvāṇa.”

159. “To kill sheep”; to kill is translated by gsod.

“Elephant-driver,” nāgabandhaka hastēpakā (Vyākhyā). Glaṇ po che ’chör ba or ’thser ba, “he who hunts with an elephant, who torments an elephant” (compare the gaddhabādhin of Cullavagga, i.32).

“Slaughterer of fowl,” kukkuṭāṃ ghaṃanti kaukkūṭikāḥ, (Vyākhyā); compare Mahāvyutpatti, 286.93, khyi ’chör ba or ’thser ba: “he who hunts with dogs, who torments dogs” through confusion of kukkura with kukkūṭa (?).

Vāgurika, according to Mahāvyutpatti, 186.92 (ṛgvas ’chör ba = he who hunts with a net) and Amarakośa, 2.10.27 (vāgurā = ri dvagā ’dzin = mṛgabandhinī; vāgurika = bya brūni ba = jālíka = bya rgya pa) which means “poacher, trapper.” But the Vyākhyā makes an animal of vāgurā: paṇiṣā (?), nāma prāṇiṣār vāgurāḥ pāṇiṣā ṭām ghaṃanti vāgurikāḥ and the Tibetan version transcribes (ba gu ri ’chör ba).

Compare the lists of Aṅgustara, i.251, ii.207, iii.303, 383.

160. Chavannes, Cinq cents contes et apologues, iii. p. 117, no. 415 (TD 4, number 203).

161. Paramārtha: “One obtains lack of restraint in two ways: through personal action, and through approval.”

162. See iv.41c-d.

163. According to the Chinese versions. The original has: “I shall constantly give food for a day, a month, a fortnight (ṭīṭhībhakta, ardhamāsabhakta).

Vyākhyā: Ādiśabdēna maṇḍalakāraṇādī gṛhyate (see below note 182).

164. Compare Mahāvagga, ii.36.1, etc.; Pāṇḍika, i.8.2.

165. Mahāvyutpatti, 266.16. Patanty aneti patantyam. These are the four Pāṇḍikas: unchastity, stealing of a certain importance (yathoktapramāṇam adattādānam), killing of a human being (manusyavadha), and lying relative to one’s supernatural powers (uttarimunyadharmanmasyāvāda) (Finot, J.As. 1913, ii.476). See some instructive glosses in Wieger, Bouddhisme chinois, i. p. 215 (1910). On the word Pāṇḍika, see S. Lévi, J.As. 1912, ii.505, and Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhāmi, p. 36.

166. The Vyākhyā mentions an argument taken from Scripture. It says in the Vinaya: “An immoral (duḥṣīla) monk who gives advice (anuśāsti) to a nun commits (āpadyate) a saṃghāvāsa transgression.” Now “immoral” means “guilty of a Pāṇḍika,” for the text opposes a prakṛttibh
śīlavān monk to an immoral monk. Thus the monk guilty of a Pārajika remains a monk, since he can be rendered guilty of a saṅghāvāṣeṣa. Vīnāya uktam /duḥśilās ced bhikṣuṁ bhikṣuṁniṁ anuśāśi saṅghāvāṣeṣam āpādyata iti / apāmaparājīko bi bhikṣuṁ duḥśaloˈbhiṣpeto nānāpamaparājīkaḥ prāktisīṣṭaḥ śīlavān iti viparyayaṁ vacanāt / atoˈvagamyate / aty asya duḥśilāyāpi sato bhikṣuḥvāṣeva yasmat saṅghāvāṣeṣam āpādyata iti uktam iti

167. This text (the Sarvāstivādin Vīnāya In Ten Recitations, TD 23, p. 157a7-b2) has passed into Mābhāvyutpati 278: abbhiṣikṣuḥ aśramaṇaḥ, atāyaputraṣuḥ, dvārayate bhikṣuḥbhavāt, hatam asya bhavāti śrāmaṇyam mathiṣṭaṁ pasitam pariṣitam, apratvyuddhāyam asya bhavāti śrāmaṇyam, tadyataḥ tālo mastaṭkacconmoˈbhavyo haritāvāya / duḥśilā paṭapadbarmoˈnabhiputṛ avasrutaḥ kasambakajālaḥ.

Compare Kṣiṇigarbhasutra in Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 67. On kasambaka, below p. 615.

168. All the editions of the Mābhāvyutpati, 270.37-40.

169. The regularly ordained Bhikṣu (jipticaṭatherthopasampanna), 270.41.

Śāṅghabhadrā (TD 29, p. 557c14) recalls that there are five saṁghaḥ: 1. saṁghaḥ with modesty, 2. saṁghaḥ of speechless sheep, 3. saṁghaḥ of followers (p'eng-tang 朋黨) 4. saṁghaḥ in the popular meaning of the word (lokaśāṃtvitsaṁgha = saṁnuṣaṁsaṁgha), and 5. saṁghaḥ in the proper sense of the word (paraṁśrīsaṁgha = dakkhiṇeyeṣaṁgha).


171. See note 167; Vibhasa) TD 27, p. 356b25; this comparison, 'mAfibima, 1250,54,112%., refers to the defilements.

172. Compare Cullavagga, i.25.1, Vīnāya Texts, iii. p. 120.

173. Kāraṇḍava, Mābhāvyutpati, 228.23, an herb that resembles the yava.

Kālaṁbaka, Mābhāvyutpati, 278.16; also Kālaṁbaka jāta (Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 67, Āstasāhasrikā, p. 181), kālaṁbaka, kālaṁbaka (Wogihara) = pāṭibāṣṭham.

Urplāvi (?) nāma vrīhimaghaˈbhavyantaralaṇḍalavibimhaḥ (Vyākhyā). The orginal has: atoˈpalāvīn, as the Pali shows: Anguttara, iv.169 and Suttanipāta, 281 quoted in Milinda, 414: kāraṇḍavānī naddhamathā kāsaṁbūm apakasaṅcāba tato paḷāpe vāhetha asaṁpate sāmaṇāmaṁīne.

174. The Candasutta in the Uragavagga; Mābhāvyutpati, 223.55-58; mārgajīna (Samyutta, i.187), according to the Vyākhyā, the Āsaiṅka and the Śaiṅka; according to Saeki, the Buddha and the Pratyekabuddhas; mārgadasiṅka, the Buddha or Śāriputra, etc.; mārgajīvin, Nanda, etc., according to Saeki (mārgaˈjīvati śīlavān bhikṣuṁ māraganīmīttham jīvannū). Vībāṣā, TD 27, p. 341c6. Anguttara, iv.169, samapadāsiṁ saṁapapadāpo samanakāraṇḍeva.

175. Mābhāvyutpati, 270.10, Sūtrālāṁkāra, xi.4. Vyākhyā: a monk, through extensive lust, is rendered guilty of unchastity (striyā abrahmacaryam kṛtvā); immediately alarmed (jātasāṁvega) he thinks, "I have committed a frightful (kāṣṭa) action," without a single thought of hiding his crime arising within him, he approaches (upagamyā) the Śaṅgha and confesses: "I have done this transgression." On the instructions of the Śaṅgha (āryasaṁghopadesāt), he carries out his penance (daṇḍakarma kuryāṇā) which consists of abstaining from contact with the Bhikṣus (sarvaˈbhikṣuṇasvakāraṇīkata), etc. He is called a śīkṣādattaḥ. If his immorality destroys his quality of Bhikṣu, he will no longer be a Bhikṣu, or a penitent. Notice too that he is not to receive a new ordination. According to the glosses of Yuan-hsien (quoted by Wieger), the penitent is placed after the monks, but before the novices; he does not take part in ecclesiastical actions; but he will be rehabilitated if he becomes an Arhat.

176. Milinda, p. 257, has some curious theories on the privileges that an immoral Bhikṣu still maintains.

177. The good of the sphere of Dhyāna belongs to the gods of higher spheres and to the ascetics who, here below, cultivate the Dhyānas.
178. The acquisition of the pure discipline is not mentioned as a cause of the abandoning of the lack of restraint; for the discipline of Dhyāna always precedes pure discipline.

179. The masters of Gandhāra; Sarīghabhaddra (TD 29, p. 566c27) accepts this opinion.


181. When one says: ālam samādāna; in other words pratyākhyānavacanena.

182. Avijñāpāti is lost for one who does not act according to his undertaking, yathāsamāttam akurvataḥ.

Vyākhyā: Tadyathā buddhān avandītvā maṇḍalakam akṛtvā vā na bhokṣya iti tadākṛtvā bhuṣājasya . . . In the Bhikṣuṇikarmavācana (Bulletin of the School Oriental Studies, 1920, p. 128) there is mentioned the trimaṇḍala which is constructed before the taking of refuge. De La Vallée Poussin thought that this trimaṇḍala was the triratnamaṇḍala mentioned in the ritual of the Bodhisattvas (Adikarmaśādīpa, in Bouddhisme, Études et Matériaux, 1989, p. 206).

183. Paramārtha transcribes yantra (yen-to-lo延多羅). “Etc” refers to āstrā, viṣa, etc.

184. Vyākhyā: One should say that the viṣṇīapāti, which has given rise to this avijñāpāti, is abandoned at the same time that it is, for its prāpti is cut off by these six causes. But there can be avijñāpāti without a viṣṇīapāti, as we see from iv.67; and [elsewhere], one speaks of the avijñāpāti as if one were speaking of the viṣṇīapāti. According to others, the prāpti of a viṣṇīapāti included in neither-restraint-nor-lack of restraint does not continue (anubandha); thus the author does not here have to occupy himself here with the abandoning of viṣṇīapāti.

185. Further, in certain cases, by detachment from kāma (vairāgya): for example good dissatisfaction (kuḍāla dawrmamasyendriya, ii.1, trans. note 79).

186. All the kleśas are upakleśas, but not all upakleśas are kleśas. See v.46.


188. The Theravadins (Katbāvatthu, iii.10) maintain that there are no precepts among the gods because there is no lack of restraint among them. See below iv.44a-b.

189. By reason of their māndya.

190. Not the Prātimokṣa discipline, because the gods do not have saṁvega, terror-disgust.

191. The Tibetan version of the Bhāṭya skips this Kārikā.

By the practice of dhyānāntara (viii.22-23) one is reborn in the elevated part of heaven of the Brahmaṇopahitas, which is called dhyānāntarika, where the Mahābrahmaś dwell (ii.41d; iii.2d). But birth among the Mahābrahmaṇas is an obstacle (āvarana) (iv.99), for entry into the Path and the pure precepts which make up the Path are impossible for Brahma, who thinks that he is svayambhū, self-created; etc. (vi.38a-b).

192. Paramārtha: The pure precepts among the gods of Kāmādhūtā and Rūpādhūtā, with the exception of the dhyānāntarika and the asamjñāsattvas, and among the gods of Ārūpyadhūtā . . . The gods born in Ārūpyadhūtā virtually possess the restraint of ecstasy and the pure precepts, but not at the present time.


194. Absent in the Tibetan version, but given by Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: “Good action in Kāmādhūtā is called punya because it does good to another and produces an agreeable retribution; bad action is called apunya because by it, one harms another and produces a disagreeable retribution.”

195. The Vyākhyā (iii.101d) admits two readings, āneyya from eṣṭ (kampane) and āniṇyāya from īgī
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(gatyarthe). Variants mentioned by Wogihara in his edition of the Mahāvyutpatti, 21.49, 244.124: aninga, aningya, anihjya, dnifijya. Modern opinions, Lotus, p. 306; Childers (in); Senart, Mahāvastu, i.399 (MSS āṇīṇya); Leumann, Album Kern, 393; Kern, note in Bodhicaryāvatāraṇjikā, p. 80 (Vedic anedya = āṇīṇya); E. Muller, Simplified grammar, p. 8. (See De La Vallée Poussin’s note in Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 365).

ii. Āṇīṇja action. The three abhisamākāras (puṇñha, apaṇñha, āṇīṇja), Dīgha, iii.217, Samīyutta, ii.82, Madhyamakavṛtti, xvi.1 (āṇīṇja). This is the action “leading to immovability” of Warren (p. 180, according to the Visuddhimagga, p. 571); the action “of imperterurbable character” or “for remaining static” of Mrs. Rhys Davids (trans. of Kathāvatthu, p. 358, ad xxii.2). [This is without doubt the action which Vasubandhu describes here, in the action in the domain of the higher spheres.]

iii. Āṇīṇja mind, cittassa āṇīṇjata, “non-agitation of the mind”; mind, absorption, dhāraya, or the saint qualified as āṇīṇjapatta, āṇīṇjapīpta: Uḍāna, iii.3, Netipakaraṇa, 87, Puggalapaṇḍatti, 60, Aṅguttara, i.184, Visuddhimagga, 377, Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi, 19. This is a mind in the Fourth Dhyāna where, according to the heretics of Kathāvatthu xxii.3, the death of an Arhat takes place (compare Kośa, iii.43, Dīgha, ii.156, Avadānasaṅgata, i.199); acala mind, nīrirjana.

The āṇīṇja mind, the foundation of magical powers (iddhi) is, in Visuddhimagga, p. 386, a mind which is not inclined (na mūya) towards rāga, etc. This is not a mind in the Fourth Dhyāna, but a good and absorbed (samaññha) mind. (On āṇīṇa, see Kośa, vii.48). In Samīyutta, iv.202, the āṇīṇjāmaṇa, apbandamaṇa, etc., mind is rid of maññitas, pāññitas, papaññitas, and mānagatas which consist of saying “I am,” etc. The same for the āṇīṇha of Aṅguttara ii.45.

v. In Majjhima, ii.254, 262, the viññha becomes 1. āṇīṇjapaga 2. ākiñcanaññhaññatanañnapaga 3. nevarājanāmaññhaññatanañnapaga. Āṇīṇja is obtained by abandoning the notion of kāma and rūpa; ākiñcanañña by abandoning, in addition, the notion of āṇīṇja; nevarājanāmaññhaññatanañna by abandoning, in addition, the notion of ākiñcanañña. It appears that āṇīṇja corresponds to the first two stages of Arūpyadhatu (see Kośa, viii).

196. yad atra viśarīkatam vicaritam idam atrāryā īṇijītam ity abhuḥ / yad atra prātir avigataḥ idam atrāryā īṇijītam ity abhuḥ / yad atra sukhām sukhām iṣṭa cetasa abhogaḥ idam atrāryā īṇijītam ity abhuḥ. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 743al. Compare Majjhima, i.454... idam kha abham Udāyi īṇijītasmin vadhāmi / kūṁ ca tattha īṇijītasmin / yad eva tattha viśakāvviścāna aniruddhā bonti idam tattha īṇijītasmin.

197. Paramārtha and Hsūan-tsang: In the Āniñjyasantra: pu-tung ching 不動經.

198. Vṛddhi: Āniñjyānusujvalabhāgīnam ākampyāsukalabhāgīnam mārgam arūbhyā. According to Hsūan-tsang: “The Blessed One declares them non-agitated, and considers them (lit. "points out," chā "grasping in the hand") as producing a non-agitated retribution (vipāka)”; according to Paramārtha: "... with reference to (yābha) the Path capable of producing a pratyaya of non-agitated good."

199. Hsūan-tsang: "How can an agitated Dhyāna produce a non-agitated retribution? Even though this Dhyāna includes agitation due to its defilements (apaksāla), nevertheless it is called non-agitated, because, with respect to its retribution..."

200. According to Vībhāṣa, TD 27, p. 596b13. Put more clearly, the retribution of good action is agreeable sensation when it takes place in Kāmādhatu and in the first three Dhyānas.

201. Sukhā vedanā means (1) the sensation of pleasure (kāyika sukha) and the sensation of satisfaction (saumanasa) in Kāmādhatu and the first two Dhyānas; (2) the sensation of satisfaction in the Third Dhyāna (ii.7, viii.9b).

202. See iii.43.

203. See iv.13c-d: "the precepts of beings of this world," aikasālām. Paramārtha: In Kāmādhatu, bad action is termed disagreeable sensation... The Kārikā says "in Kāmādhatu" in order to indicate that this action does not exist elsewhere.

204. Objects, or the psycho-somatic complex (āśraya), ii.57.
Footnotes

205. Quoted in *Vyākhyā*, iii.43.

206. *Dhyānāntara* is an intercalary *dhyāna* between the First and Second Dhyānas, or, as the Tibetans translate it, a *dhyāna* higher (*khyad-par*) than the first through the absence of *vitarka* (see viii.22d); it is a type of annex or precatory absorption of the First Dhyāna. (See above p. 620).

*Samādhi-dhyāna*, the *dhyāna* consisting of absorption, or bliss, is distinguished from *upapattidhyāna*, existence in a certain heaven corresponding to each Dhyāna.

Action in *dhyānāntara* (*dhyānāntarakarman*) is action by which one obtains *dhyānāntara*-bliss and *dhyānāntara*-existence.

i. The Kārikā allows two interpretations as indicated by the Bhāṣya: *dhyānāntarakarmano vipākatas* = since there is retribution of action from *dhyānāntara*; and *dhyānāntare vipākatas* = since there is retribution in *dhyānāntara*.

Paramārtha translates the original literally; Hsüan-tsang: "Because intermediate [action] produces retribution."

207. *Vyākhyā*: *Dhyānāntarakarmano dhyānāntaropapattau vipākena veditena bhavitavyam / tatra sukha dubhka va vedana nāsti / tasmād asyādubhābāsukha vā vedanā vipakā iti...* = "*Dhyānāntara* action should, in *dhyānāntara* existence, have a retribution which is sensation. Now, in *dhyānāntara*, there is neither agreeable, nor disagreeable sensation, so neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation [which is found there] is the retribution of the said action. Thus above the Fourth Dhyāna there exists action which is neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable in feeling."

208. "Or rather" = if we consider the second interpretation of the Kārikā.

209. *Vyākhyā*: "*Dhyānāntare va kasya cit karmaṇo 'nyasya vipāko vedanā na syāt na saṃbhava'ti.*" "Or rather, in *dhyānāntara*, there will no retribution in the form of sensation of any action different from *dhyānāntara* action, for one cannot say that a retribution experienced in *dhyānāntara* is a result of an agreeable action in the First Dhyāna, that it is a result of a disagreeable action in Kāmadhātu, nor that it is a result of an action of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna."

Hsüan-tsang translates: "Or rather there will be no action [which is retributed in *dhyānāntara*] (hüo ying wu yeh 或應無業).

Paramārtha: "If this were the case [=if intermediate action is absent below the Fourth Dhyāna] then *dhyānāntara* action would not have any retribution; or rather, in *dhyānāntara*, there would be an action different in nature [= retributed]." [Now one cannot say that *dhyānāntara* sensation is the retribution of any other action].

210. Hsüan-tsang: "This action produces the sensation of pleasure (*sukhendriya*) of the principal *dhyāna* as its retribution." [Gloss of Saeki: of the First Dhyāna.] Which means: the action which the *dhyānāntara* produces, is retributed in sensation, but in the principle Dhyāna.

211. Do these masters maintain that there is no sensation in *dhyānāntara* existence (*dhyānāntaroapapattau*)? No. But they say that this sensation is not a retributive result, but an outflowing result (ii.57c).

212. Good action free from *vitarka* is the action which produces *dhyānāntara*; its retribution is solely mental sensation. Thus it is false that the retribution of action which produces the *dhyānāntara* is the sensation of pleasure of the *dhyāna* itself (of the First Dhyāna of which the *dhyānāntara* is the higher annex); it is false also that this retribution is not sensation. For action free from *vitarka* exists only in *dhyānāntara* and above.

213. What one feels (anubhūti) is *sukha*, or pleasure, not action . . .

214. According to *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 596a23, where however the order differs ("twofold" becomes "fivefold").

215. Same text *Sāṃyutta*, iv.41.

*Vyākhyā*: *Rūpaṃ pratyanubhavati no ca rūparāgam pratyanubhavatī aryabha / atha va no ca rūpaṃ rāgena pratyanubhavatī alambata iti.*
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216. Mahānīmadharmaparīyāya: yasmin samaye sukhāṁ vedānāṁ vedayate dvē arṣya vedane tasmin samaye niruddhe bhavataḥ; compare Dīgha, ii.66.

217. The problem of the necessity of the retribution of action presents some difficulties. One must take into consideration the multiple given of the problem. See notably (iv.120) the distinction between action which is "done" (krta) and that which is "accumulated" (upacsta): action will not be "counted" or "accumulated" if it is followed by repentance, confession, etc. In fact, action is only completed by its prṛṭha or consecutive action (iv.89); the gravity of an action depends on the gravity of its preparatory action, its principal action, and its consecutive action (iv.119). Accumulated action is not necessarily retributed. The character of the retribution of an action can necessarily change: such an action to be experienced in hell in the next life can be retributed here in this world (Aṅgulimāla is a good example) (iv.55). In fact, with the exception of mortal transgressions (iv.97), crimes do not hinder one—except in the case of "false views"—from entering the Path: from this then the mind, perfumed by the powerful roots of good (purity of conduct, respect for the Three Jewels) becomes refractory to the maturation of former actions—which are non-determinate—which could produce a bad realm of rebirth: "An ignorant person, even if he has committed a small transgression, avoids the bad place. Compact, a small mass of iron sinks; the same iron, in a great mass but fashioned into a vessel, floats" (vi.4a-b, Aṅguttara, i.249).

By planting a little root of good in the field of merit which are the Buddhas, one suppresses the retribution of actions of unnecessary retribution (vii.34 ad finem). The Kośa, iv.60, speaks of "pure" (anāśrava) action which destroys other actions.

Another problem is that of the order in which different actions are retributed: they are heavy, numerous, close (see Kośa, ix., "Refutation of the Pudgala," at the end; Visuddhimagga, p. 601). The Buddha declared that the retribution of action is incomprehensible, and he forbade any attempt to understand it (Aṅguttara, ii.80 Madyamakāvatāra, vi.42, Milinda, 189, Jātakamāla, xxxii.1-3). A very clear point for the Buddhists, but one that is obscure for us, is that there is action and retribution, but that there is no agent. It has been discussed whether all suffering is retribution or whether it has come out of retribution (Visuddhimagga, 602, Kathāvattu, vii.10, Madhyanākaṇtavāra, vi.41, Karmaprajñāpati, at the end). Compare Deussen, Veddnta (1883, 497-8); Vasubandhu devotes one chapter, his "Refutation of the Pudgala," to this problem.

Interesting to Buddhology and to the Lokottaravādins are the following questions: does the Buddha experience the retribution of his former transgressions? (iv.102, at the end), and, how does one explain the animal rebirths of the Bodhisattvas? (vi.23c). Compare Childers, 178b; Warren, 245; Visuddhimagga 601, Compendium, 144. The older sources oppose dīṭṭhadhamma vedānīya to the action which leads to hell (Aṅguttara i.249), and to action experienced later, samparāyavedānīya (ibid., iv.382).

219. Hsüan-tsang: "Or rather one says that there are five actions"; Paramārtha: "Furthermore, there are five actions."

220. The Chinese translators depart from the original: "There are some actions whose result is close and small; there are some actions whose result is distant and great . . . " This is indeed what the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 594a15, teaches: "Action to be experienced in the present life produces a near result: one can thus say that it is strong; how can one say that other actions, of distant result, are very strong? Action to be experienced in the present life produces a near result, but weak: one cannot say that this action is very strong . . . The jaya obtains its fruit after six months, a result more distant but greater than that of flax; the khadira (sψ'li-shu) has its fruit after five, six, twelve years, but this fruit is greater than it; the ṭala has its fruit after one hundred years, but this fruit is the greatest."
221. Paramärtha and Hsiian-tsang: "Some other masters say 'There are four alternatives (chü=word, pāda).''

222. Vyākhyā: Dārśāntikāḥ sauṭrāntikāḥ.

223. Hsiian-tsang adds two words to the Kārikā: "Four, good"; that is to say: "The doctrine of the four actions (50a-c) is good." Bhāṣya: "Actions 'to be experienced in the present life,' etc. are the three determinate actions; indeterminate action is the fourth. We say that this is good, for, by solely indicating here action determinate or indeterminate with respect to the time period of its retribution, the four categories of action taught in the sūtra are explained." Gloss of Saeki: "By saying that this is correct, the Sāstra does not condemn the theory of five or eight actions."


225. See ii.52a, iii.19. Samyutta, i.206; Mahāyuvatpati, 190; Windisch, Buddhās Geburt, 87 and the sources cited. On embryonic life, see the note on प्राणa, Kosa, iv.17a-b.

226. The intermediate being belongs (along with its subsequent life) to a single nīkāya. Intermediate existence and the following existence form only one existence (nīkāyasabbāga). Thus the actions of intermediate beings, maturing completely in the intermediate existence or in the following existence, are all "to be experienced in the present life."

This refers to the retributive result (vipāka); see ii.52a.

227. Literally: "this is projected by upapadidvedaniya action, action to be experienced in the following existence, after having been reborn [once]." Hsiian-tsang: "... by upapadivedaniya action, etc." (Better: for an intermediate existence can be projected by an action to be experienced in a later existence).

228. The text has yathā tatā cati. Vyākhyā: "Either by the mind which holds that killing is meritorious (punyabuddhāya), or by hatred, etc. The Persian (pārasa) who kills his father or mother believing that he is doing a pious act... (see iv.68d). Hsiian-tsang: "Killing... with a light or heavy mind." Paramārtha: (i shuai erh hsin 以率爾心 ) (TD 29, p. 238c2).

229. According to the Vinaya in Ten Recitations, 51.1; Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 593a15.

Those who insult their mothers are punished in this life, Divya, 586.

230. Hsiian-tsang adds: "Such stories are numerous."

231. Majjhima, ii.220, Aṅguttara, iv.382: Can the action "to be experienced in this life" be transformed into action "to be experienced in a future life" (saṃparāyvedaniya) ... ?

The same problem is examined in the Karmaprajñāpti, Mdo, 82, 246b: "There are eight types of actions: to be experienced agreeably, disagreeably, in this world, later, to be experienced in a small manner, to be experienced gradually, ripe, and unripe. Can action to be experienced agreeably, through energy and effort, be changed into action to be experienced disagreeably? No, this is impossible... Can unripe action be changed into ripe action? Yes and no. Some, in order to carry out this transformation, cut off their hair, their beard, their hair and beard, and torture themselves by different paths and bad penitences: but they fail. Others, through energy and effort, obtain the result of Srotāpanna..." "There are three actions: actions to be experienced in this life, in the next life, or later. Does it happen that one who experiences the first one also experiences the other two? Yes, when one obtains the quality of Arhat, the retribution of the other two actions occurs."

232. Hsiian-tsang translates: "The person who departs from the Path of Meditation," that is to say: "who departs from the result of Arhat," for this result marks the end of the Path of Meditation on the Truths.

233. That is to say, one who leaves the absorption in which he has "seen" the Truths (vi.28d).

234. Vyākhyā: In fact, action free from vitarka cannot have a retribution belonging to a lower stage including vitarka and vicāra.
Chapter Four

235. Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 598c7: Daurmanasya arisen from the action of attention (manaskāra), including strong imagination (vikalpa), is abandoned through detachment: but the same does not hold for a retributive result.

236. Cittakkhepa = ummāda (Aṅguttara).

237. Paramārtha adds: “And there are other causes.” Hsüan-tsang: “ Trouble of the mind arises from five causes: 1. retribution, 2. fear, 3. attack of demons...”

238. Upadrava = attack of demons and the evil that results from it; compare Jātakamālā, 41.15. According to Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 658a11.

239. On the amanusyas, see Koša, iv.75c-d, 97b, iii.99c-d; Kāranaprajñāpāti, p. 344 of Cosmologie bouddhique.

240. The Vyūkhya quotes the Sūtra: Bhagavān Mīśilākāyā (? ) vibarati aṣa Mīśilāmravane / tene khalu pumāb samayeva Vasīṣṭhasagostrovāya brāhmaṇyāḥ saḥ putrāḥ kālaṅgataḥ / sā teṣāṁ kālakriyāyā nagnomattā kṛṣṭicātāḥ tene tenānāmabidātā... And the rest up to the conversation of Vasīṣṭha with her husband after the death of their seventh infant: “Formerly you were afflicted by the death of your sons; now you are not afflicted. This is without doubt because you have eaten your sons (nāmaṁ te putrāṁ tvāya bhakṣitāḥ).” To which she answers (compare Therigāthā, 314):

241. The five fears are: ājīvikabhaya, aḍlokabhaya (=aṅkīri), pariṣacchāraudhyabhaya (=sabbhayaṁ sanākucitya), maranabhaya, durgatibbaya (Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 386b21). See Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 46. The readings of the Dharmaśāṅkra, 71, are capricious.

242. Dharmatdbhijñetavā: “Everything that is impure (sāsrava) is suffering, conditioned things are impermanent, and the dharmas are unsubstantial.”

243. According to the Jānāntraprasthāna, TD 26, p. 973c2; Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 609a1. In Vibbanga, 368, rāga, dveja and moha are kāsāvas. But Aṅguttara, i.112, distinguishes veṅkka, dosa and kāsāva.

244. Color (kāsāya) is rājjasamabha, a cause of coloring, like attachment (rāga) which, in fact, “attaches” and “colors” (rājayati).

245. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 600a26; Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 589c16; Aṅguttara, ii.230; Dīgha, iii.230; Atthasarini, p. 89; Nisippakaranā, 158.184. Aṅguttara, iii.385: akampam arukkam nibbānam abbijāyati.

246. Compare Yogasūtra, iv.7.

247. This is the answer of the third masters, Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 591a15.

248. The same action “projects” an existence and the intermediate existence which leads to it (iii.13a-b). There is no intermediate existence proceeding rebirth in Ārūpyadhātu.

249. The Vyūkhya quotes the Sūtra: Asī karma suklamsu klavīpākam tadyathā prathame dhyāyā / evam yāvad bhavāgre.

251. By definition, absorption (samādhi), which is the opposite of evil (akusala), does not exist in Kāmadhatu. It happens, only in Kāmadhatu, that one cuts off the roots of good through false views (mithyādṛśī); but one can never root out false views by Right Views (samyādṛśī).

252. The Theravadins, Kathavatthu, vii.10, maintain that “supramundane” actions have retribution.

253. The text has mahaṭtaṃ sāmyatāyāṃ, that is to say the Mahāsāmyatāṛthasūtra (Vykhyā). Madhyama, TD 1, p. 739b21: ekānāta sūkla āmanta aṣṭikṣadharmaṃ ekānānavadvayāḥ... (Majjhima, iii.115 does not correspond).

254. Prakāraṇa, TD 26, p. 711c3; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 589c26. śuklaḥārmaḥ katu me / kusalaḥ dharmaḥ avyakṛṭāḥ ca dharmaḥ.

255. The pure dharman are not Dhātu, nor integral to the Dhatu (na dātar na dātaspattīḥ). On what engenders (janayati) and arrests (vivasuddhi) the process (pravṛtti), see ii.6.

256. Each moment of the Path is a psychological complex that includes, among other mental states, cetanā or “volition.” According to the definition, iv.1b, this cetana is action.

The four dharmaṇāṣantis, vi.25c; detachment from Kāmadhatu, vi.49.

257. Vykhyā: Na bi tasya (kusalasya) svabhāvoprabājanam īti / prāpticchedaḥ prabājanam / prābīnāśyāpyī kusalasya sarinmukhibhūvāṣī / tadālambanakleśasya prabājanāt tasya kusalasya prabājanam bhavati / tadālambanakleśaprabājanam ca navamasya tadālambanakleśaprabājanas ābhāvite sati bhavatītis navamānantarayamānuragacetaśāvada kṛśṇaśūklaśāya karmāṇaḥ kṣayāya bhavati / tataḥ bi navamasya kleśaprabājanasyā prāpticchedeviṣānayoṣprāptāḥ utpadyate / tasya ca kṛśṇaśūk- lasya karmeṇaḥ kṣayāpyāṃ cānivṛtvāvyākyātāsāya sāsravasya dharmanāḥ viṣānayoṣprāptāḥ utpadyate.

258. Literally: “Action abandoned through Seeing is black; all other is black-white when it arises from kāma.” Objection: One should say kāmaśvacaraṇaṃ dṛṣṭibeyānāṃ kṛṣṇaṃ: “Action of Kāmadhatu which is abandoned through Seeing, is black”; in fact, there are actions abandoned through Seeing which do not have a black retribution, namely certain actions of Rūpadhatu and Ārūpyadhatu. Response: the qualifier kāma, arisen from kāma (that is to say from Kāmadhatu), refers to the first pāda.

259. According to the principle, na dṛṣṭibeyān aklīṣṭam, i.40c-d.

260. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 449c2; Anguttara, i.273; Dīgha, iii.220. Suttanipāta, 700; Mahāvastu, iii.397. Moneya is the quality of Muni or the action of a Muni (muniṭa va munikarma va; Childers (Supplement, p. 617) “conduct worthy of a Muni.” Rgveda, x.136.3. Col. Jacob, Concordance, p. 748, for the value of muni in the Upanisads and the Gītā.

261. Moneya is explained: moneya idam mannaṃ. Bodhicaryavatāra, p. 346, why the Buddha receives the name of muni: threefold silence, defined as here, or silence of samāropas and aparāvāda.

262. This does not refer to all bodily and vocal actions that an Arhat can accomplish, but to actions which are characterized as Arhat or Aṣṭikṣa (vi.45). The actions in question are by their nature avijñapti, non-information: the silence of the body is thus avijñapti-of-the-body characteristic of the Arhat. Actions which are avijñapti (kāyavijñapti, vāgavijñapti) are necessarily impure (sāSRava) and one cannot attribute the quality of aṣṭikṣa to them. (See above).

263. Paramārtha differs: “Action of the body and the voice are abstention by nature. Action of the mind is exclusively cetanā (volition); as it does not include vijñapti, one cannot, by knowing through induction that it is abstention, say that it is silence.”

264. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 454a16; Anguttara, i.272, Dīgha iii.219. tīni soccyānā kāyasoceyyaṃ va sūcsoceyyaṃ manasoceyyaṃ.
265. Vivecana, Hsiian-tsang: to arrest, to cause to cease. To arrest persons who believe that one obtains purity (suddhidarśin) only by virtue of not speaking (tâsminvibhâvamâtra) or through ablutions (kâyamâlapakarśana).

On "false silence" and the "silence of the Āryans," see Theragâthâ, 650, Uttanipâta, 388, Saññiyutta, i.273, Āṅguttara, iv.153, 359, v.266, Mahâvagga, iv.1.13; Vanâparvan, 42.60: maunm na so munîr bhavat.

On ablutions, see Theragâthâ, 236, Udâna i.9 (Udânavarga, xxxiii.14), Majjhima, i.39; Āryadeva, Cittavibuddhiprakârana.

Kośa, iv.86a-c (superstitions of the laity); v.7, 8 (śilavrata).

266. Saññiyutta, TD 2, p. 94b16; Dîgha, iii.214, Āṅguttara, i.49, 52, etc.; Saññiyutta, v.75.

267. Bad volition, or bad action of the mind, is bad cultivation of the mind.

268. Mental action, manâkarmaṇa, is exclusively volition, cetând, iv.1b.

269. Vyâkhyâ: Darśântikâh sautrântaikavîṣyâ ity arthah. See iv.78c-d where this doctrine is attributed to the Sautrântikas.

This discussion is taken from Viśhâśa, TD 27, p. 587a7.

270. Madhyâma, TD 1, p. 437b24 and following; compare Āṅguttara, v.292, Majjhima, iii.207. Our Sûtra has: sañcetanîyam karma kṣetropacitâya narakesāpapadyate / kathâṁ ca bhiśkṣavâb samcetanîyam karma kṛtaṁ bhavat vivâcitaṁ / iba bhiśkṣava ekatayâ sañcetanîyam trividhānâ karma kharoty upacinoit caturvidhānâ vacā trividhānâ manâsā... / kathâṁ bhiśkṣavas trividhmâ manasā bhavati vyāpamudâcito yâvan mithyâdṛṣṭiḥ [kaḥ] khalu bhiśkṣava ibaikatyo bhavati vipari-bedarśin... .

This Sûtra does not mention any mental action apart from abhidharma, etc.; thus it is abhidharma, etc. which is mental action.

271. Compare Majjhima, i.35, 279; Madhyâma, TD 1, p. 790b18.

272. Mithyâdrśin is defined iv.78b-c. It is the prama vajja, Visuddhimagga, 469; it produces all bad dharma, Majjhima, iii.52.

273. Madhyâma, TD 1, p. 437b28, Saññiyutta, TD 2, p. 274a6; Dîgha, iii.269. See also Maha, xii.2-7.

274. Hsian-tsang adds: "light greed, etc."

275. Madyâdivirati, that is to say madyañâdanabanândhânavirati; compare Dîgha iii.176. Dâneyâdhyâ (sbyin, mchod sbyin); adi refers to sañpanodvartanavisama(?)bhasapraddham. Ijya is almost a synonym of dâna; Hsian-tsang has kung-yang供養 = pâja; snâpana and udvartana can be acts of pâja. Mahâvyutpatti (Wogihara ed) 245, 378-379 (snâpana, uśasana).

276. Priyavacanaâdi; adi refers to dharmadesânâmârgakathânâdi.

277. All of the following discussion is according to Viśhâśa, TD 27, p. 635a17.

278. The viññâpi (vocal action) by which I order a killing, panaviññâpi, forms part of the preparation (prayâga) of this killing and is not considered as the deed itself. It is not maulî viññâpi, the principal viññâpi. The action of killing of which I am guilty and now endowed with is thus solely avijñâpi.

279. Paramârtha: "done in person." Hsian-tsang: "Six evil deeds are certainly avijñâpi, these [six], accomplished in person, and adultery, are of two types."

280. Hsian-tsang: "if there is death, etc." The same holds for stealing, etc., as for killing.

281. Abstention from killing is a path of material action. When one undertakes the precepts (samâdânasîla), that is to say, the Prâtimoksa precepts, there is necessarily viññâpi (the declaration: "I renounce killing"), for these precepts are always "undertaken from another" (parasmâd âsya) (iv.28). When one obtains a Dhyâna,—which supposes the abandoning, at least provisionally, of
the defilements of Kama and of bad actions—one acquires the abstention from killing by this very fact, without any avijñapti being necessary; the same holds when one obtains the pure precepts (three parts of the Noble Path). This morality does not depend on being undertaken (samadana); it results from the very nature of things (dharmata): the possessor of a Dhyana possesses the avijñapti which is the abstention from killing.

282. At the moment when the chief or principle action is created, an avijñapti arises which continues and which is consecutive to this action; furthermore one can, after having committed the action—after having killed the animal—commit actions analogous to this action—hitting the dead animal, cutting his flesh, etc. (tasya karmapatbaya anudbarmam anusadhyam karma): each of these actions is consecutive action.

283. The description which follows is according to Vibhosa, TD 27, p. 583b12: "... if, with a mind to kill, he destroys the life of another (pratipatita), the evil action of the body (kayavijñapti) and the avijñapti of this moment, are the killing properly so-called ..."

284. Principle action (the killing) is the achievement of the result of the preparatory action; he who prepares the killing (yo hi prasyate), but does not produce the killing (maulam karmapatham na janayati), receives the "result of the preparation," but not the achievement, or completion, of this result (tasya prayogaphalam asti na tu phalaparipuri).

285. Vyakhyā: lba kaścit parasvam bartukamā maṅcāś uttiṣṭhaisastraṁ gṛṣṇāti paragṛhaṁ gacchati septo na veyā kārṇayati parasvam śṛṣṭi yāvan na sthānāt pratyayaśayatī tāvat pravagah / yasmin tu kṣane sthānāt pratyayaśayatī tatra yā vijñaptis tātakaśācāvijñaptir ayam maulāḥ karmapathah / dvābyām bi karaṇābhyaṁ adattadānāvadyena śṛṣṭyate pravagah phalaparipūrta sa / nataḥ param avijñaptikṣanā śṛṣṭham bhavanti / tāvat tathā parasvam vibhajate viṃśīnte
gopayatī anukīrtayati vā tāvad asya vijñaptikṣanā api śṛṣṭham bhavanti.

286. Maranabhava is defined iii.13c-d.

287. Literally: "and that the killing is not destroyed."

288. Hsüan-tsang: hsi息= aparata, nivṛtta; Paramārtha: wei she wei hsi 未捨未息.

289. Prayogaphala = maulakarman. The pathway of the principal action thus takes place prāṇino mṛtvāvasthāyām.

290. Vyakhyā: Yathā parasvam bartukāmah kāryasiddhaye parakṛtyam hṛtyā tena paśūna balīṁ kṣuryāt ... 

291. Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 576a10) refutes these objections.

292. See Atthasālīmi, p. 102.

293. One of the sources of the following definitions is the Karmaprajñapti (Mdo 72) fol. 210a; see also Vibhosa, TD 27, p. 605c4.

294. This is the classic example. See the interesting story, Chavannes, Cinq cent contes, iii.287, and the references.

295. See above note 228. The Karmaprajñapti attributes the killing to the parents to the Brähmanas of the West called mchu-skyed. Mchu gives oṣṭha, tunda or magha which is a Naksatra: perhaps Maghaja or Maghabhava.

Vibhosa, TD 27, p. 605c16. There is, in the West, some Melchias called Mu-chia who have this opinion, who establish this system: "Those who kill their decrepit and sick fathers and mothers obtain merit and not transgression. Why? A decrepit father has ruined organs and is no longer capable of drinking and eating; if he dies, he will obtain new and strong organs, he will drink anew warm milk; one who has sickness has many painful sensations: dead, he will be freed from them. Thus he who kills them does not commit any transgression." Such killing arises from ignorance.

Mu-chia = Maga, or more properly Magu and Muga under the influence of the initial labial [this
according to S. Lévi]. On the same Mages, see below note 302.

The Mahāyāna admits that one may kill a person who is going to commit a mortal (ānantaryā) transgression, Śīlaśaṃsuccaya, p. 168.

296. Compare Jātaka, Fausboll, vi.208, 210; Nariman in Revue Histoire des Religions, 1912, i.89 and JRAS. 1912, 255; J. Charpentier, in the Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, ii. p. 145 (Leipzig, 1923), which compares the Kambojas, pious killers of kīpas, paṭangas, bhękas, kīmis and makkhikas, to the Zoroastrians of Vendidad 14.5-6 and of Herodotus, i.140.

297. According to Hsüan-tsang, this is the opinion of certain Tīrthikas; according to Paramārtha, the opinion if the Tīrthika P'īm-na-ko(Vinnaka?). Hsüan-tsang: "Serpents . . . harm humans; he who kills them produces great merit; sheep . . . are essential to nourishment: killing them is not a transgression."

On the killing of animals and the use of meat and fish, see 1. the Fifth and Sixth Pillar Edicts of Aśoka; 2. the "pure three," adīṭṭha, asuta, aparisaṅkīra, Majjhima, i.368, Anguttara, iv.187, Dulva, III. fol. 28 (apud Rockhill, Life, p. 38 note); for fish only, Mahāvagga, vi.31, 14 and Cullavagga, vii.3.15 (schism of Devadatta); in Dulva, IV, fol. 453, Devadatta reproaches the Buddha for authorizing "pure" meat; Religieux éminents, p. 48, Takakusu, I-sing, p. 46, 58, etc. The meat of humans, of elephants, etc., is forbidden; 3. E. W. Hopkins, "The buddhistic rule against meat," J. Am. Or. Soc 1906, 455-464.

It is forbidden to cut off the leaves of a tree (above iv.35a-b), to trample down green herbs (tinām), or to destroy "living beings having an organ" (ekindṝya sīva). Mahāvagga, iii.1.

298. Vyākhyā: Anyalābhasyāṁthe parasvam baranti yathāvabārihāb.

299. The original is furnished us by the Śyaṭdvādamānṭṭihā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 1900, p. 32) which shows the lack of authority of Brahmanical texts. These texts say: na bimbasyāṁ sarvabāranti, but they order the killing of five hundred and seven animals in the Āśvamedha; they say: nāṃṣāṁ brāyāv, and then explain the five types of lies that are permitted; the same: adatādānāṁ anekdābā nirvasya tascād uktam / yady api brāhmaṇo bāṭhena pariṇayam ādattē balena u tathāpī tasya nādaṭṭānām yaḥ sarvām idāṁ brāhmaṇe bhūyō āttam / brāhmaṇaṁ nām tu dārbhāyēd ṛṣṭalaḥ parībhūṣṇate / tasmād apabāram brāhmaṇaṁ svam ādattē / svam eva brāhmaṇaḥ bhūnte svam vaste evam vādattē. Compare Manu, i.101 (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 4.22.46). The reading dārbhāyē (Manu: ānṛśāṁcyāt) is certain: dmas pa.

300. Hsüan-tsang: Persians praise abrahmacarya with their mothers, etc.

301. Gosava, transcribed by Paramārtha (cbu-so-p'o)瞿婆婆, translated by ba laṅ` bran, "born of bulls."

The Vyākhyā has: Tatra moha-prādābhiyād upaśīṁ maṭram abrahmacaryśārthē / upaśvasāram upaśīṁ varrāte / upaśvasāram upaśīṁ bhagīṁm iy ārthā / upasagorām upaśīṁ samānagorām iy ārthā / upaśī (?) yajamānāṁ. It is clear that Yaśomitra did not understand this Vedic text very well.

The helpfulness of M. Keith has permitted us to discover Gosava in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, ii.133: tasya vrītām / upa maṭram iyād upa svasāram upa sagoṛāṁ viṣṭhā vīntēs tat tad viṣṭhētaṁaudābo bo lokām jaṅgati. Here we have Vasubandhu’s source. M. W. Caland consented to explain and to complete the translation that he has given to this passage (Jaiminīya in Auswaibli, p. 157). Āpastamba Śrauta xxii.13: tenaśtvā saṅvutsarāṁ paśuvrato bhavet / upavahāyodakām; another Śītra has upamigāḥya pibet; M. Caland corrects upamigāḥya to upavahāya, “to lower.” Viṣṭha would be “natural need,” viṣṭheta would signify "to spread the legs." We would thus have: "In whatever place the need grasps him, he satisfies it.” The end signifies: “He seizes the world of the bulls.”

This translation is with reference to the Tibetan version. Viṣḍhi-mat qualifies the water: one cannot translate "the ritual water." Better to understand this as "he who has undertaken the rite drinks the water..."
Hsiian-tsang: "Women and men undertake the vow of bulls (govrata); they sip water; they cut grass with their teeth; they either stay in one place, or they go about; without distinguishing who is their parent or who is distant from them, as they encounter them, they unite with them."

Paramārtha: "Furthermore, as in the Gosava sacrifice, the other women sip water, chew grass; men go about, taking their parent, or taking their daughter, aunt, elder or younger daughters, women of the same clan, etc."

302. This is the opinion of the Tirthika P'in-na-ko (Paramārtha). Hsiian-tsang adds: "a ladder, a road, or a ship".

According to Vībhāṣa, TD 27, p. 606a16: "In the West, there are some Mlecchas called Mu-chia who have this opinion, who establish this system that there is no transgression in having intercourse . . . Why? Because their women are like dried beef . . . ."

Compare Divyāvadāna, p. 257 (xviii. story of Dharmaruci): pāntāsamo maṭrgrāmaḥ . . . tīrthasamo 'pi ca maṭrgrāmaḥ / yatraiva hi tīrtbe pītā snātī pātra'pi tasmin snātī . . . api ca pratyantēśu janapadeśu dharmatīvaiṣā yām eva pāṭādībagacchati tām eva pāṭāro'py adībagacchati . . .

303. This is the stanza: na narmayuktaṃ vacanam bimasti . . . Syāvādāmatātājī, p. 32; Mbb. i.82.16, etc.; compare Gautama, v.24; Vaiśīṣṭa.avesantī, xvi.30. Max Muller, India, What can it . . . p. 272: venial untruths.

304. Nānāvāsā (translated literally by the Lotsava, gnas sna tsogs and by Paramārtha, pu kung chub) 不共住, translated by Hsiian-tsang as chieh-tan 戒壇 "precept alter," which is elsewhere the equivalent of simā, see iv.39b) is explained in the Vyākhyā: Nānāvāsān pravītāti maṇḍalām pravītāti arthabḥ / nānāvāsa bi tasmin bahāsamāṇaṃ bhavaṃ. For the Sanskrit sources, A Fragment of the Sanskrit Vinaya; Bhikṣuṇīkarmaviṇācana, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Liii (1920). For the Pāli sources, see for example K. Seidenstucker, Pali Buddhismus (German Pali Society); Kern, Manual, p. 78.

One should understand that preparatory action lasts up to the last moment of the third karmaṇivācana.

306. Paramārtha translates: "Until the moment when one says the four niśrayas (i.e., all vijñapti and avijñapti dependent (i.e.) on this principal action,—as long as the series is not cut off,—is consecutive action." Hsiian-tsang is also obscure: cbibh (yāvat) shwo 說(aroc) ssu-su-i four in (cattvāro niśrayāḥ) cbi & (ca) yu 除 (teṣa, anya) i (niśraya) cbi 'en 前 (prāurdhavatvānti) ?.

Vyākhyā: Cattvāro niśrayāḥ civaśaṇapīṇḍapāṭalasayaṇājanānapravītayabhaivajalakṣaṇāḥ.

307. Note of Saeki: A pativyāga thought is a tatksaṇasamuttāṇa cause (iv.10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.

Parivyāga, yoni-su 'dor ba, translated by Hsiian-tsang as wu-so-ka無所顧, "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kill." See below note 313. Compare Atthasāliṁī, p. 91: gabbham . . . pāpakena manasāsukkakako hoti, "to not be indifferent with regard to the embryo" that is, "to desire its destruction."

"Mind of violence," paruṇacitta; Paramārtha: she 膽, rough, harsh, uneven, karkaṭa; Hsiian-tsang: tsu' 營 (audarika) as in pārasya.

308. Adbhūṭhāna = adbhikaraṇa, viṣaya.


309. Vyākhyā: Nāmakāyādbhūṭhāna mṛṣavādādayo vāg nāmāni pravartata iti kṛtvā. See Vyākhyā ad iii.30c-d.

310. See p. 643.

311. This refers to the principal action itself.

312. Paramārtha: "If a person has the intention 'I shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by
reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself.”

Samcintya = samcicca, Mahavuttpatti, 245.68; Pār. iii. Karmaprajñāpti, Mdo 62, chap. xi. Buddhaghosa, Atthasālinī, p. 97 (=Sumanīgalavilasini, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, Manual, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii.195. Five things are necessary for killing: pāṇa, pāṇasaṅhitā, vadhakacāta, upakkama, and marana. The killing itself can be sāhāttika, ānattika, nissaggika, thāvura, vijjāmaya, and iddhimaya. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Expositor, 129: vijjā = art, iddhi = potency).

313. Hsuan-tsang: “There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: ‘Is this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another?’ then he makes the decision: ‘Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him’: by reason of this pariyāga thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action.” Paramārtha: “... by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case, then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): ‘Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not?’ This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: ‘Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him.’ There is thus production of a pariyāga thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing.”

The Tibetan gives us: “There is only a pariyāga thought” or better: “He has indeed a pariyāga thought.”

We do not see how pariyāga differs from māraṇa.

314. The skandhas are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (sva-rasaṇa vinaśvara). How can their destruction be caused by an external cause? (See ii. trans. p. 244, and iv.2b.)

315. Prāṇa depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (ii.42).

Atthasālinī, p. 97: prāṇa = satta, jīvāntariya.

316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no āvasāpasrausvāsa during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an action in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the Wu-fen chieh-pen (a Mahāsākā Prātimokṣa, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the manusya-vigrāha of Pārśīka (See Prātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivādins by Finot-Huber, JAs. 1913, ii.477, and Bhikṣuṇī-karmavacana, p. 138).

317. In fact, there is no living being, prāpīṇa, that can be called dead.

318. Vyākhyā: Pudgalapratistheda-prakaraṇa. This refers to the last chapter of the Koṣa. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, The soul theory of the Buddhists, p. 853; Hsian-tsang’s translation, TD 29, p. 152b.)

319. Quoted ad ii.45a (trans. p. 233) and ciil.3c.

320. Mūlinda pp. 84, 158; Kathāvatthu, xx.1. Sutrākṣāntika, ii.6, 26 (Sacred Books, 45, p. 414), also ii.2 (five types of killing). See above note 3. Nirgrantha = magnātaka.

321. The Tibetan adds: “In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty” (?? nad pa la gnod pa dan si ba na sman pa nam. Reading doubtful). Not in the Chinese translations.


323. Vyākhyā: Nānayatra samajñāvibbaramāt / yadi devadattādāravyam baramāti yeṣādattādāravyam bharati nādattādānam ity abhipratyaḥ. Correct: anyatra samajñāvibbaramāt. Compare p. 76, line 12, anyatraajñānāt; p. 65, line 4, anyatra glānyāt; Para. 4, anyastrābbimāṇāt, etc.
324. See iv.121, a different doctrine.

325. Opinion of the second masters of Vibbāṇa, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stūpa would not steal what belongs to the Stūpa.

326. Vyākhyā: Parivartakarū मतस्या bhikṣoḥ सूरवाद्रवयम् (parivatteti, “to exchange,” Cullavagga, vi.197). According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (śi ba’i nor phrog na); according to Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, to take the goods of a būi-ch’uān 嬉轉, that is, of a pratikāraṇa (Mahāyānatatt, 130.17).


328. Atthasālinī, p. 98. According to the Mahāyāna (i.e., the Yogācāra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. aviṣayā, agamya: males, and women such as one’s mother, etc.; 2. amārga anāṅga: only the yonimārga; 3. asamaya: when the woman is having her period (būi-bāsā 總下), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upāvāsa, or is sick; 4. asthāna; 5. “without measure,” māṇam aśkrāmya gacchati; and 6. ayaṇa: “not conforming to the rules of the world.”

329. Hsüan-tsang adds: “... and the rest to: protected by the king.” See the classic list Mahāyānatatt, 281.251 (prāṭrakṣita, etc.).

330. Mahāyānatatt, 281.26-27: pravīṣṭaḥ sparśavikṛtaḥ / prarśavakarane prarśavakaranasya mukhe varcomārga vā. Compare Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 76: evam svastriṣu api ayonimārgena gacchataḥ; Suttavibhanga, i.9.3: anajātāna vuccamaggam... passāvāmaggam... mukham...

331. Saeki glosses the būi-ch’uān洄處(distant place, etc.) of Hsüan-tsang by a-lien-jo洄轉aranyā; Paramārtha: “place where one cultivates brahmacarya.” “Open place” is doubtless abhyavakāra.

332. Vyākhyā: Garbhimigamane garbbo-parodbhāb / āpyayanti (? see iv.103) stanyopabhogavastha-puṇirikā stīrī / abravmacarye bi tasyāb stanyam kṣiyate / bālakasya vā puṣṭaye tasstanyām bhavati.

333. = posadhikā, iv.28 = sarakkā of Atthasālinī, p. 98. Hsüan-tsang: “When the woman has undertaken the upavāsa.” Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 76: evam upavāsabhasā... See the Sanskrit commentary on the Uvāsagadāsā, ed. Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.

334. Hsüan-tsang adds: “And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc.”

335. Vyākhyā: Anyasmin vastuni prayogo ‘bhi preto’nyac ca vastu prihuktaḥ.

336. The version of Paramārtha: “Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to explain the meaning” (although in the kārikā we have: “indeed lying to another...”).

337. Hsüan-tsang: To which time period does the expression “who understands the sense” (arthābhājñā) refer to? Should we understand “he who understands at the present time [through manovijñāna] what he has heard?” Or should we understand: “he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the rśtriṇa-vijñāna]?” What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal vijñāṇa [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be avijñāṇa [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be “capable of understanding?” The best explanation is that “he who is capable of understanding” is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.

338. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b27; Vibbāṇa, TD 27, p. 861b20; Anguttara, ii.246, iv.307; Majjhima, iii.29; Dīgha, iii.232: castāro anariyavohārā: adīṭhe dīṭhavādītā, assute suvatādītā, amute mutavādītā,
avijnaha vijanatanatita. Apare ti cattaro anariyavobana: adishavadata... (Compare Majjhima, i. 135, quoted verbatim in Vijñanakaya, fol. 12b, which, like the Pali sources, places vijnata after mata.)

Buddhism employs the traditional phraseology (Upamidda) and is at great pains to interpret it.

339. The Vyakhyā (with an unclear reading) gives Māhākāmārta. In Sanāyutta, iv.72, the hearer of this discourse is Mālunyaputta (Mālunyā). Tibetan: mcbo byed kyi ma can. Paramārtha: mo-lo-chib-mu摩羅訶母, which supposes a reading Māhākāmārta; Pu-kuang: man-muquant 母(man: long hair, etc.) which gives Mother Mālā, or Mother Alakī, or even Mallikāmārta (Mabhuyupatti, 240.14: man-buquant= Mallikā; for the different Mallikās, see Kern, Manual, p. 40. Hsiian-tsang: ta-mu大母="he who has for his mother the Great One (Mahallakāmārta?)." For mcbo byed kyi ma can, compare Sarād Chandra Das: mcbo idan ma = mabila (from maba, religious festival = mcbo) [The remarks of S. Lévi and J. Przybiski have been used for this note.]

Majjhima, i.135, iii.261 adds pattam paryesitam anuvicaritam manasa (na upādāyismsi na ca tamissitam viññānam bhavissati) to dātham sutam mutam viññātām.

340. Sanāyutta, iv. 72, only gives three synonyms: atthi te tattha chando va rdgo vapeman ti/ no hetam bhante. The stanzas which follow (iv.72-76), which are Theragāthā, 794, are quoted by Sarṇghabhadra, TD 29, p. 579a18.

Hsiian-tsang gives aleya and nikānti in transcription (ni-yen-ti); compare Dharmapada, 411 and Commentary to 348 (Fausboll, p. 413: aleyam nikāntam ajjhetanam parivatthanām gāham parāmāsam tanham. Hsiian-tsang has ṭṛṇā in place of ṭṛṇa and places ṭṛṇa after preman.

341. Paramārtha and Hsiian-tsang have only: yen manubhayaḥ kībhītām tad viññātām.

342. The Yogācāras (Vyākhyā): Yat pratyakṣiketam caksūṣa...

343. Vyākhyā: Pratyakṣam pratisamveditam suk Aḅdyā asamābhitena cittaṇa / adbigatam samābhitena laukikenaive na lokottarena / laukikavivābhārdviberāt. That which is known in pure, or supramundane absorption is not viññāta, batjñata.

344. The problem discussed in this paragraph is also treated by Buddhaghosa (AtthasaUmi, pp. 90-95). There are many points of contact between the two presentations: a monk can lie through his silence, and a possessor of magical powers can kill an embryo; thus one can commit transgressions of the voice and the body by means of the mind.

345. Vācā parākrameta = vācā param mārayet: when one kills by speech.

346. This is the story of the Dañḍākā Forest, etc., empty of living beings through the anger of the Rṣis (Majjhima, i.378; Upākṣṭāvāna, quoted by Vasubandhu, Vināśīka, 20, Musōon, 1912, i.) which proves the gravity of mental action (see below IV.105a-b), Mālānda, p. 130. For the mention of this episode in the Saddharma-puṇyatapasthāna and the references in the Rāmāyaṇa, see S. Lévi, "Pour l’histoire du Rāmāyaṇa," J. As. 1918, i.97. In the Rāmāyaṇa, the Dañḍākā forest was depopulated through the curse of the Rṣi Uśanas.

Vasubandhu, in Vināśīka, 20c-d, proves that demonic beings would not intervene (see below note 348).

347. In fact, in the Bhikṣuṇīṣṭhāpada, the Vinayadhara asks (amaṭrav): "Are you pure?" (kaccīs-t: sthapatiṣuddhā). If a Bhikṣu does not declare his transgression (saṇīm āpattim) and by this very silence acquiesces (adhibhavati), he lies (mṛṣavaṃ bhaveti). Compare the Prātimokṣa edited by L. Finot, J. As. 1913, p. 476, 488 (with the reading: tāṇāyasmataḥ prabhām kaccīc sthūrṇa pariṣuddhāḥ). Mahāvagga, ii.3.

348. "This is a difficulty to be resolved by the Vaibhāṣikas."

Sarṇghabhadra explains: In fact (arthanas), the Rṣis ordered (ajñāpācaras) the killing. Some demonic beings (amanustha), knowing (avetā) their sinful intention of destroying living beings (sattvapariṇārayogavāṭa pāpaśaya), came to the Rṣis. How did the Rṣis manifest (viññāto) their
intention? By reason of their anger, they modified their bodies and their voices; if they cursed, there
was certainly movement (cesfd) of the body and voice. Some other masters say that all avijñapti
of the sphere of Kāmadhātu does not depend on a vijñapti. For example, the Five (pañcaka)
in obtaining the result at the same time as the Pratimokṣa discipline (above p. 592): in this same way a
bad avijñapti can arise without there being a vijñapti. Would one say that the Five previously
created vijñapti? It would also be the same in other cases. So too in the case of the Rṣis. With respect
to lying at the confession ceremony (pojadbhamśāvāda), the fact that the guilty monk
(aparistuddha) enters the assembly, sits down, and remains there as he should (svam iṃrapātha
kalpayati), and says what he should say, signifies that there was for him a vijñapti previous [to
the moment when he acquiesces by his silence]. (Vyākhyā; Saṃghabhadra, TD 29, p. 580a7).


350. In Atthasālīmi, p. 100, pharusa vācā is a curse or malediction, words "by which one does violence
to oneself or to others" (yāya atḍānam pi param pi pharusan karoti). Buddhaghosa gives some
examples of mental curses: a mother desires that an enraged buffalo crush the child that goes into
the woods in spite of her prohibitions against him doing so, or that the house collapse on her
children; the school master desires the death of his lazy students. In these cases, there is no pharusa
vācā. But on the contrary, there is pharusa vācā when one says “Sleep well” to a person that one
wants to assassinate.

351. Manu, xii.7: anibaddhaprapāṇa.

352. This monk is a mithyāvin (iv.86b). Mithyāvaśa is defined by the Vyākhyā as kubana lapanā
namāttikatā naśpajñikatā. Wogihara (Bodhisattvabhimā, Leipzig, 1908) has a long note on these
four terms and quotes the definition that the Vyākhyā gives here of the term lapanā: lapanām
karoṭāī labhavatakāmātayā sevabhidyoṣikām vācaṃ niścayatayā arthāḥ: it would thus be
appropriate to translate lapanā by “flattery,” as do Paramartha and Hsüan-tsang. But the sources
quoted by Wogihara (namely TD 26, number 1537, the Dharmakandha, etc.) show that they refer
to a monk who flaunts his own merits. See Majjhima, iii.75; Vibhaṅga, 352, commented on in
Visuddhimagga p. 22 and following, JPTS. 1891, 79.

353. Lauhya (Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 69).

354. Mahāvastu, i.355: ye sāṅgapikārāmāb ...; Divya, 464.19; Majjhima, iii.110; Childers, p. 447.
The Atthasālīmi, p. 100, gives the recitation of the battle of the Bhāratas and the kidnapping of Sītā
as examples of samphappālaṃ.

355. Tibetan: “… are endowed with nāśkramya, are not endowed with stegs-snags”; Hsüan-tsang:
“… come from out of nāśkramya, are capable of producing nāśkramya, do not prepare a defiled
mind.” Paramārtha gives the original of stegs-snags as mithyā-rasa. Nekkhamma is opposed to
sāṅgapikā in Majjhima, iii.110. See ii. p.

356. Vyākhyā: āvāba = dāriḵāyā dārakagrbhāgamanam; vivāba = dārakasya dārikagrpbhāgamanam; or
rather, according to others, āvāba = praveśanaka (free union?), vivāba = parinayana. Compare
Childers, avahana, vīvahana, Senart, Piyaḍati, i.203 (marriage of a son or daughter)—
Mahāvyutpatti, 223.246-7 (āvāba = bag ma gton ba = to give a daughter in marriage; āvāba = bag ma
len pa = to take a woman); 281.261-262 (where the meanings are reversed).


358. The translation of Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang.

So bhūdhayāṁ loke prabhāya vigatābbhidhyena cetasā babulaṁ vibaranī / vyāpādam styaṇamid-
dham uddhāvalakṣetram vicīḍitam loke prabhāya śrīnakāṅko bhavati śrīnavicīḍito khaṇamikatī
teṇāsya dharmesu / sa pañca nīvaraṇāṁ prabhāya ... Sanyukta, TD 2, p. 207b12. Diṅgha, iii.49,
Majjhima, iii.3, Anguttara, ii.210; quoted and commented on in Vibhaṅga, p. 252 where abbhidhyā
is explained as rāga sāṅgā, etc. It results from and commented that the term abbhidhyā is synonymous with
kāmacchanda, the first nīvarāṇa. On the nīvarāṇa, see Kośa, v.59.
359. Manu, xii.5: manasāṁ śpācintanam.


361. Atthikavāda is opposed to nāstidṛṣṭi (Majjhima, i.515).

As the Bhāṣya shows, mithyādṛṣṭi is the dīśṭhi vipatti of the Puggalapaññatti, a doctrine condemned in the Sūtra as belonging to Ajita Kesakambali (Dīgha i.55, Majjhima, i.515, TD 2, p. 109a22, Jānānprasabhā, TD 26, p. 1027b17, Viśbāṣa, TD 27, p. 505a6, treatise “Refutation of the Pudgala,” trans. Hsuan-tsang, TD 29, p. 152).

Pāli sources, Kathavatthu, xiv.8-9, whose commentary quotes notably Majjhima, i.388, and Samyutta, iv.307, where silavrataparamārtha is designated a miccādīttī (Kosa, v.7) punished by hell or by an animal existence (The same in Theragāthā, 1091, Commentary, on the realm of rebirth of the person who believes that the doers of karma are reborn in heaven). But Atthasāli, p. 358, distinguishes miccādīttī niyātā (=nāstidṛṣṭis subhāsubhe of the Abhidharma) from the other miccādīttis (see below note 438), and, p. 101, teaches that it is solely through the negation of action, etc, that the kammapatthā of miccādīttī is realized, not by other wrong views (The Expositor translates:... kammapatthabbedo boi na aṭṭhadīttibhi “the distinctive stage of the course of action is reached by the views: there is no result... and not by other views”; kammapatthabbeda, “realization of the deed itself,” should be understood as vacībheda, “words”).

362. Viśbāṣa, TD 27, p. 598a24. Why not consider volition, cetanā, as a deed in and of itself? Cetanā is action. What is called deed, is where the cetanā goes... The same way that where the King goes is called the King’s Road, but the King is not the road... The dharma which coexists with the cetanā can serve as a road for the cetanā and will thus be called a road of action (the deed itself). But in the case where one causes another to kill, much time can pass between the order to kill and the killing itself: thus if the cetanā for the killing has disappeared, how can one say that the dharma (the action of killing) was a road of the cetanā? Let us say, rather, that the dharma which can coexist with a cetanā is a road of action. But two cetanas do not coexist.

363. When preparatory action or consecutive action are themselves deeds (above p. 644), it is by virtue of their characteristics, and not through their connection with another action.

364. The roots of good cannot be cut off in a definitive manner (ii.36c-d, trans. p. 210).

365. Jānānprasabhā, TD 26, p. 925a12; Viśbāṣa, TD 27, p. 182b22.

366. Paramārtha: “the good (subba) of Kāmadhūtā obtained at birth.”

367. Viśvākyā: Anāsraavalambanā visabhāgadabāvatālambanā ca yā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ sā sampraya-gamāraṇa dharmanev anuṣṭete nālabānaṁ tasmād asau durbārā.

368. Viśvākyā: Evarū tu varaṇayaṁ vaibhāṣikāḥ. By using the word evam, the author indicates that he approves of this.

369. Paramārtha: Pi-p'o-she chia-lan-t'a 畏婆沙伽陀他. Jānānprasabhā, TD 26, p. 925a18; Viśbāṣa, TD 27, p. 182a16.

370. The MSS of the Viśvākyā reads anusabatagas which the Lotsava translates literally: phbra mo daṅ ihan tu gyur ba; Hsian-tsang: wei-chü hsin hsing 微行, and Paramārtha: ts'ai hsi heng sui 最細恒隨; but anusabagata is explained by the Viśvākyā as mṛdu-mṛdu “weak-weak.” In his discussion of the pratayayas (ii.61c), Sambhābhadrā (TD 29, p. 440b3) criticizes the Schaviras’ doctrine of anusabagatakulamula (swi-chü-shan-kem 随俱善根); this is the Pāli term, Samyutta, iii.130, Kathāvattu, p. 215. Kosa, ii. trans. p. 255.


372. On the expression vyutthāna, ii.44a-b, p. 227.
373. The person who has undertaken the precepts with a weak-weak mind loses the precepts when he loses (tyāga) or breaks (samuccheda) this weak-weak mind which is associated (samprayukta) with a weak-weak root of good (Vyākhya and Hsüan-tsang).


375. See iv.80d. According to Vibhaṅga, 340, āśaya does not mean intention in general, but an attitude with respect to philosophical problems: to believe that the world is eternal... to believe in the survival of the Tathāgata... to grasp the Middle Way between bhavadiṣṭhi and vibhavadiṣṭhi. 376. The Bhadanta Ghosaka (gloss of Saeki). Vyākhya: Tatra viṣeṣaṇa tārkikatvat.

377. Jñānaprabhāna, TD 26, p. 997a20, Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 767b28. The minimum number of eight organs (five organs of sense, plus kāya, jīvita, and manas) shows that the faculties of faith, etc., can exist in Pūrvavideha.


381. Vyākhya: Pratisaṁbhātāṁ pratisaṁbhākṛtāṁ pratisaṁbhātāṁ / prātipādikadāsūḥ / pratisaṁbhānity āpate paṭhanti.

382. Hsüan-tsang: It happens that, relative to cause and result, there either arises doubt: "Perhaps cause and result exist," or a right view: "Cause and result certainly exists, it is false that they do not exist." At this moment the roots of good arise again. When the possession (prāpti) of good is produced, one says that this person has again taken up the roots of good. Certain masters say that the nine categories successively arise again. But the [Vaibhāṣikas] say that one again takes up at one and the same time all the roots of good: it is however later, and little by little, that they manifest themselves, in the same way that one gets rid of illness at one stroke, but one only gradually regains his powers.

383. The Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 336, explains why: ānantaryakāṁ ānantaryacatenaivavahito bhavati yāvan maraṇāvasthāyāṁ na tāc cātāṁ śaknoti pravīṃdoyāyāṁ ... Kathāvatthu, xiii.3.

384. Madhyama, 37.

385. Hetubalena signifies sabbatābhbubalena (ii.52a). This is the case where one spontaneously (svayam) adheres to false views. Pratyahebalena, that is to say, through the force of the words of another (parato ghoṣa); svabalena = svatarkabalena, through the force of personal reasoning. Parabalena = parataḥ śrutabalena.

386. See above note 375.

387. The Sāriyutta, v.206, distinguishes a micchādīṭṭhika from a micchādīṭṭhabhikāmasamādāna. See iv.96.

388. See Puggalapaṇṇatti, p. 21, the definition of sīlavipanna (sabbā dussilīyam = sīlavipatti) and dīṭṭhīvipanna (sabbā micchādīṭṭhi = dīṭṭhīvipatti). In the Samādhirāja quoted in the Bodhicaryavatāra viii.10, dīṭṭhīvipanna = kumārgāpapāna.

389. The six masters (jātara), examples of bad teachers (ayathārtha) (Vyākhya, i. p. 8.7), are Pūraṇa Kaśyapa, Maskarin Gośiliputra, Saṅjīyain Varatiputra, Ajita Keśakambalaka, Kakuda Kātyāyana and Nirgrantha Jītiṭtiputra.

Mahāvyutpatti, 179 (see the numerous Tibetan and Chinese equivalents in the editions of Wogihara and Sasaki); Divyavadāna, p. 143 (Vairatāputra, Keśakambalaka), Burnouf, Introduction, 162, Lotus, 450.
390. Absent in the two Chinese versions. See iv.99c.

391. One should exclude illicit sexuality always accomplished in person with a defiled mind.

392. One can criticize this redaction. Does it refer to actions committed in person? Then it is useless to specify that the murderer is of mistaken thought, that the robber is in the prey of desire, according to the principle vyabhicāre hi viśeṣam āryate. Does it refer to actions that one has committed by another? Then greed, wickedness, or false views can coexist with killing, stealing, etc. Response: It refers to actions committed in person, and if we specify it, this is not to specify in the true sense of the word, but only to explain what the two paths are. So be it, but there are also two paths in the hypothesis of the person who has a murder committed with a mind of greed. Response: Yes; this case should be mentioned; but the authors only intend to give an example.

393. Vyākhyā: Yatra māraṇenaivāpaḥaraṇam sidhyati / tatra hi vyāpādeprāṇivādaḥdāttādāna-karmapatha yugopad bhavanti.

394. Vyākhyā: Anyacittasya tu māraṇacittasya nāyam niyamaḥ: the restriction is not justified when it refers to a person who steals with a view to killing.

395. We have: lying, which is paśuṇya (maligning words) since the liar has the intention of dividing, and which are inconsiderate words since all defiled words are inconsiderate words (iv.76c-d). The same for injury. For lying, the mental path can be greed or wickedness; for injury, the mental path is wickedness.

It is the same words which are lying, maligning words, and inconsiderate words: the distinction of the three vocal paths is thus purely verbal, and not real. According to another opinion, the distinction is real, for one must distinguish three viññaptis. [The questioners are deluded, divided, etc.]

396. Volition cannot be found with a single path: this single path cannot be a mental path, since a good mind is always accompanied by non-abhidhyā and non-vyāpda; it cannot be a material path included within the precepts, for the precepts include at the very least the renouncing of killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, and lying.

Volition cannot be found with five paths: this would suppose the four paths of the fewest precepts (Upāsaka, etc.), plus a good mental path; now non-abhidhyā and non-vyāpda are inseparable.

Volition cannot be found with eight paths. In fact, the Bhikṣu with a bad mind or with a neutral mind possesses only seven good paths, and, when his mind is good, he possesses at least nine.

397. Kṣayajāna and anuṭṭādajāna are not dṛṣṭi (vii.1); thus the volition of this person is not accompanied by samyakdṛṣṭi. There is no niṣpa in the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, and, as a consequence, so too the precepts with the seven good bodily and vocal paths.

398. Hsüan-tsang clearly distinguishes the three cases: "When one undertakes the Bhikṣu precepts the five consciousnesses are good..." Saeki: right view is lacking because one has the five bad dṛṣṭi.

399. This is by way of example. There are also five paths when—with a defiled or neutral mind—one renounces the five transgressions.

400. "In fact," samukkhibhāvatas (mīon sum du 'gyur ba), svayam (dnyos su); "through possession," samamīgamāt, samamtyāt, prāptātah, lābbatas (ldan pa'i sgo nas, lダン pas, bṣed pas; ch'eng-chiu [xǐ]).

Beings in hell do not have any greed, for greed does not exist in hell; but they have not cut off the prāpti (ii.36b) of greed: they possess, in the past, the greed that they had in a past existence.

401. Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 584b19.

Naraka: nara = man, ka = bad, naraka = a place where the wicked are born; or rather, raka = agreeable (compare Dhātupātha, 10.197), naraka = a place where nothing is agreeable (Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 865b27).
402. Nigraha; Hsüan-tsang, maMah, to curse, injure; Vyunëpatti, 255.4, brgyad gag; Udânavarga, xx.9.

403. Vibhäsā, TD 27, p. 865c13: In Sarnijva hell (iii.99, Lokaprajñāpatti, in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 324, Mahāvastu, i.10) the cold wind that "revives" the damned excires greed (abbidbyā); but there is not, for that, the path of action (=a deed) called greed.

404. There is no marriage in Uttarakuru, Mahābhārata, i.122.7.

405. We should say rather: deva devaṁ na mānyati, "a god does not kill a god," which implies the conclusion: gods cannot be killed (avadbyā). In fact when their major and minor limbs are cut off, they regenerate themselves. But their heads, and their waists do not regenerate themselves when they are cut off: thus gods can be killed.


407. The explanations of Vasubandhu reproduce, with only minute variations, the Vibhäsā, TD 27, p. 588c8.

These three results have been defined ii.56 and following. How action, being past, can bear a result, see the "Refutation of the Pudgala" at the end of the Kosa and the important discussion in Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 316 and following.

Everything that a person experiences does not have former action for its cause (Majjhima, ii.214). According to the Sūtra of Kāśyapa the Nude (same beginning as Sāntyāsa, ii.18) which constitutes a chapter of the Karmaprajñāpatti (Mdo. 62, 241a), suffering is produced by oneself (when one cuts his hair, his hand, etc.), by another (when another cuts his hand), by oneself and by another (when, with another, one cuts his hand), not by oneself or by another, but by causes and conditions: when, for example, wind arises, rain falls, lightning flashes, or houses crash down, or trees are broken to pieces, or the tops of crags cast down: some have their feet cut...: suffering in this case is produced by causes and conditions. Oh Kāśyapa, all pleasure and all suffering are produced by oneself, by another, by self and another, by the seasons (ṛṣa):... in winter great cold, in the season of rains great heat, and in winter cold and heat produce pleasure and suffering." But the problem is not resolved by these definitions: we know in fact that mental trouble (which is a painful sensation) arises from the trouble of the elements and is not from retribution, but that the trouble of the elements is retribution (iv.58). The same holds for sickness, etc. On utuja compare Milinda, p. 271, Visuddhimagga, 451, Compendium, p. 161 (which does not concern itself with the origin of suffering); utuparīñāmaja figures among the eight types of suffering, Milinda, 134-135. Dīgha, iii.139.

408. According to the commentary, the Sūtra indicates, by these three terms, preparatory action (prayoga), the action itself (maula), and the consecutive action (prṇha). This interpretation is not admitted by all the schools as we shall see below p. 670.

409. Rebirth in hell is given as an example of retribution; animal rebirth, rebirth in the state of preta, etc., are also retribution.

410. Karmaprajñāpatti (Mdo. 72, fol. 206a): "... by strong killing, one is reborn among beings in hell; by medium killing, among animals; by weak killing, among the Pretas." Same doctrine in Daśabhūmaka, ii (quoted in Madhyamakavṛtti, ii.7, translated Muséeon, 1907, p. 290). Compare Anāgutara, iv.247: pāṇātipāto bhikkhave āsevito bhavito babhukato nirayasaṁvattaniko tiraccānaṁyasaṁvattaniko pittivisaṁvattaniko / yo sabbalabūsa pāṇātipātassa vipāko manussabuddhatā appayuksasaṁvattaniko boti; Jātaka, i. p. 275: pāṇātipātakamarāṁ nāma nirayā tiraccānanāyoniyaṁ pittivisayeyasurasūrye ca nibbattei, manussesu nibbataṭṭhāne appayuksasaṁvattanikāṁ boti.

Feer, Fragments du Kandjour (Karmaśibbanga); Saddharmasamṛtyupasthāna (Lévi, Pour l'histoire du Rāmāyana, J.As., 1918, i9) quoted in Śīkṣāsāmaccha, 69 and following; Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.198; etc.
On the quasi-impossibility of a human rebirth for a fool (bala) "once he has been reborn in hell," the vexatious characteristics of this rebirth (caste, etc.) and the new transgressions that the former being in hell commits, see Majjhima, i.169 (Balapaññasutta; see J. Przyluski, Légende d'Açoka, p. 120).

411. That transgressions reduce the length of human life and provoke the deterioration of plants, Cakkavattisīhanādasutta (Dīgha, iii.70-71), Lokaprajñāpti, xi (translated in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 309 and following).


413. Compare Yogaśātra, ii.34.

414. Vigor resides in the heart: ojo hṛdayapradetē bhavati.

415. Sāṃyutta, TD 2, p. 201a15; Viśālā, TD 27, p. 604c3. These are three of the mithyāṅgas, Dīgha, iii.254.

Ājīva, according to the opinion refuted iv.86c-d, is solely the means of existence, the manner of procuring a livelihood, clothing, etc.

416. See the ājīnapārisuddhi, Visuddhimagga, p. 22. Dhammapada, 244-245: sujuvam abhīrīkena...

Mithyājīva is described in Asāsasārasikā, p. 334.


The superstitions of the laity are enumerated in the Vyākhyā: Kautukamangalaśīthimbūrta-nākṣatrādīṣṭṛti. Dīct. of St. Petersburg, kautukamangala. On the maṅgas, see Childers; Ninth Rock Edict (Senart, i.203); Suttanāṉa, 258; Jātaka, 87; Huber, Sātrālanāṅkā, 302. Mahāvīryutpatti, 266.19 maṅgalapōsādha. Waddell, Lamaism, 392, Grunwedel, Mythologie, 47; Lalita, 378.9, maṅgalapūrpa kumbba.

418. Jivotpakarana, Mahāvīryutpatti, 239.32.

419.Vyākhyā: Śīlaskandākāyām iti śīlaskandākānām saṁnīpaṭe: we should correct: śīlaśkandānām ... The Śīlaskandākā is a collection of the śīlaskandhas. According to the Tibetan and Hsitan-tsang: the Śīlaskandāsūtra; Paramārtha: chień-chü-ching: śīlasamāntapāṭasūtra.

Saeki refers to the Sāmyutta, TD 2, p. 131c23, which corresponds to Sāmyutta, iii.228 (the person who eats with his mouth down, etc.); but the text referred to here by Vasubandhu is a Sanskrit redaction of the śīlaś of the Brāhmaṇas and the Sāmaṇāṣṭhikā suttas (Dīgha, i.6, 65; Lotus de la Bonne Loi, 465; Rhys Davids, Dialogues, i.17; 0. Franke, Dīgha in Auswahl, p.5).

The text furnished by the Vyākhyā departs from the Pāli as do the Chinese versions of the Dīgha. Here it is at length:

yathā Trīdāṇḍīn<sub>a</sub> eke śrāmanābrahmāṇaḥ śrāddhādeyam parībhūya vividhādarsanamāmāramāṃśaṃyaṃgam anuvyutā vibharanti / tadyathā hasti-yuddheśvayuddhe rathayuddhe patīyuddhe vajyuddhe yaś iyuddhe maṃjukyuddhe sūrapiduddhe viśśabhyuddhe maṃsayuddhe aja-yuddhe meṣā-yuddhe kūkṣitayuddhe vartakayuddhe lābakyuddhe striyuddhe puruṣayuddhe kumāryuddhe kumāri-kāyuddhe uṣāyuddhe udātibhikṣyām<sup>a</sup> abhivāyare balagre senāyuvā āntīkāsamādī caneḥ samāsāmājānāmā pariṇāsmyavanty eke / ity evamupāc chaṃmaṣa vividhādarsanamāmāramāṃśaṃyaṃgam ātalc万亿avatvo bhavati // yathā Trīdāṇḍīn<sub>b</sub> eke śrāmanābrahmāṇaḥ śrāddhādeyam parībhūya vividhādarsadṛṣṭavāmāramāṃśaṃyaṃgam vibharanti / tadyathā rataḥsabde paṭṭisabde saṅkalpīsabde bherīsabde ādāmarasabde niṣṭāsabde gūḍhasabde geśasabde acchāsasabde pāṇīsabre kumbbatāmāre ... caturākāre caturapadāvartanāṃ lokātāpratisaṃyuktenāḥ ākhyāyākā vṛttaṃ cchantaṃ eke / ity evamupāc chaṃmaṣa vividhādarsadṛṣṭavāmāramāṃśaṃyaṃgam ātalc万亿avatvo bhavati //

a. On the Trīdāṇḍīn (tadāṇḍīka, trādāṇḍika) see the list of heterodox comrades and ascetics in Anīguttara, iii.276, Majjhima, 57, Milinda, 191, Mahāniddesa, 89, 310, 416; the notes of Rhys Davids, Dialogues, i.22, Bendall, Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 351; Foucher, Gandhāra, ii.262.
b. MSS. _udgālavāte ut satikāyāṃ_ (reading of the Cambridge MSS according to a communication of E. J. Thomas). Correction according to _Mahāvyutpatti_, 261.51 and 53. Compare Prātimokṣa, _Pac._ 48 - 50 = _Pāṭhayatikā_, Finot, _J.A.ś._ 1913, i.512.


d. Read pratisamāyukta (?)

420. Parallel to action, that is to say, which are neither pure, nor neutral. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, according to the definition of ii.52, translate: "Later dharma, parallel, equal or superior."

421. _Vyākhyā:_ That is to say the dharmas associated with the mind and the dharmas disassociated from the mind (_jati, etc._); see ii.35. According to _Vibhāṣā_ (TD 27, p. 43c25) the _sabhābūs_ are concomitant (_anuvartin_ _rūpas_ and _viprayuktas_).

422. _Prabhāna_ is thus both the result of disconnection and the result of virile activity.

423. There should be a resemblance between the _sabhiṣgāha_ _etu_ and its result, which is _nisyandaphala._ But a bad dharma differs from a neutral dharma (in the class of defiled-neutral, _mauryāyākṛṣṭa, dharmas_), since it includes retribution. But both are defiled (_kliṣṭa_), and this constitutes their resemblance.

424. Or a past action. Past dharmas, arisen after this action, and which are its retribution, are its retributive results; the dharmas which it draws forth (_ākṛṣṭa_), whether these dharmas have arisen at the same time as it or immediately after it, are its result of virile activity; all the dharmas which have risen with it or which, arisen afterwards, are now past, are its results of predominating influence: all the parallel dharmas, arisen after it and now past, are its outflowing results. In this same way past and future dharmas constitute four results of past action.

425. Disconnection is neither _sāikṣa_ nor _asaikṣa_. See vi.45, ii.38a.

426. The result of virile activity to be abandoned by _bhāvanā:_ some good dharmas which are produced upon leaving (_vyūtāne_) the Pure Path.


428. According to the _Vyākhyā_, _ayonisomanaskāra = ayonyā anyāyena klesayogena yah pravṛttito manaskāraḥ._

429. According to _Vibhāṣā_, TD 27, p. 98a11 and following. Same doctrine in _Yogasūtra._

430. Paramārtha. "Through the retribution of a single gift of food in a past time, I attained rebirth seven times among the Thirty-three Gods; seven times I was a Cakravartin king and now I have been born into a rich family of the Śākyans." Hsüan-tsang, whose text is more developed, also has seven heavenly rebirths and seven human rebirths as a Cakravartin.

According to the _Vyākhyā_, Aniruddha's gift was made to the Pratyekabuddha Tagaraśikhīn (one of the Pratyekabuddhas of _Majjhima_, iii.69, _Jātaka_, 390, Dhp. 355); according to _Theragāthā_, 910 (see trans. p. 329), it was made to Upāriṣṭha who receives the epithet of Yasassin: Upāriṣṭha and Yasassin figure elsewhere as distinct Pratyekabuddhas in the list of the _Majjhima._

431. Hsüan-tsang: "Furthermore, certain ones say . . ."

432. Paramārtha: As a painter designs, by means of a _rūpa_, the image of a person and fills it up by means of numerous _rupas._

433. _Vyākhyā:_ If a person possesses all the organs (_sakalendriya_), and if another person does not take into consideration the diversity of actions which "fills" (_paripāraka karman_), for the eye and the other organs are the result of an action "which projects existence" (_ākṣeapakakarmapākha):
"The six organs (saddhayatana) are projected (akṣayate)." But color (varṇa), shape, etc., are the result of the action of re-filling.

434. Hsüan-tsang: "It is not only action which projects and fills an existence, but also all the dharmas which embrace retribution. But, by reason of the capital importance of action, one only speaks of action. However these dharmas, when they do not coexist (saha) with action, are capable of filling but not of projecting, because their force is small. Two categories: Not projecting either of the two absorptions . . . " Sensation and the other mental states associated with cetana, volition, which is action, are projected along with it.

435. Vyākhyā: Tadākṣepakena karmaṇa sababhavantyaḥ 'pi prāptayo na tenaiva saphalāḥ. See Vibhāga, TD 27, p. 97b3, the opinion of Ghoṣaka: the prāptis are not capable of drawing out the sabbhāgata, etc.

Hsüan-tsang adds: "The other dharmas embracing retribution project and fill."

436. Same doctrine in Bodhisattvabhūmi, i. para. 4, 6, etc. In the Pāli sources, as here, āvaraṇa is what hinders entry into the Path, which makes a person be abhavya. The three āvaraṇas are named in Aṅguttara, iii.436, Vibhanga, 341, but associated with three other dharmas (asaddho ca bōti acchandikāḥ ca daśapāñcho ca). [The āvaraṇas of Samyutta, v.77, Dīgha, i.246, are some of the obstacles in the Vinaya, the nivāras (see Kośa, v.99).]

By klesa and pācaya āvaraṇa, the Mahāyāna does not designate the obstacles to bhavyatā, the quality of being able to enter into the Path, but the obstacles to deliverance to the mind. The same in Kośa, vi.77, where the mind is "covered" by anūpī, except the mind of the Arhat; Yogasūtra, iv.30.

The karma āvaraṇa of the Śikṣāsūtramucayya, 280, etc. is the karma āvaraṇa of the Abhidharma; the aksaras, on which the four paths are opposed, partially correspond to vipākāvaraṇa. (Mahāvyutpatti, 120.83; TD 17, number 756 and other sources, Religieux Eminents, 70, Cing cents contes, i.32, 251, etc).

437. Compare the defilements of Visuddhimagga, 177.

438. This is the order of the Vibhanga, p. 378; in Mahāvyutpatti, 122, the killing of an Arhat proceeds patricide; in Dhammasaṅgraha, 60, the wounding of the Tathāgata proceeds schism.

i. Suttanipāta, 231 (Khuddakapāṇi, vi.): six abhiphānas; Aṅguttara, i.27: six things impossible to the Aryan, namely: 1. mātyagbha, 2. pūttagbha, 3. arahantagbha, 4. lobitupphāda, 5. samghabheda, and 6. aññatattvadusasa [which doubtless signifies "to recognize a master other than the Buddha"].

ii. Aṅguttara, iii.436, enumerates six things which make a person abhavya, incapable of entering into the Path . . . Namely 1 - 5 of the preceding list, plus duttapañño bōti jalo elemāgā.

iii. Cullavagga, vii.3.9: idāni devasattvāna paṭhamam ānantarikakammam upacīram yan dūttabacīram vedhabacīram tathāgatass a rudhiram uppaṇdam; vii.17.3, the five ānantaryas of the classic list enumerated together with the rape of a Bhiksuni, the quality of animal, etc.

iv. Dhammasaṅgraha, 1028 (Atthasālimi, p. 358) defines the six dharmas which necessarily cause a bad rebirth (miccbattaniyata, see Kośa, iii.44c-d): pañca kammañi ānantarakāmī yā ca miccbādiṭṭhi niyata "the five ānantary actions and false niyata view." The Puggalapaññatti defines as bound for hell (niyata): pañca puggala ānantarikā ye ca miccbādiṭṭhi ca niyata "the five guilty of ānantary and persons with false views."

What does "false niyata view" mean?

The Atthasālimi explains: miccbādiṭṭhi niyata ti abetuva-akūriyavāda-nabhikavādesu aññatarā: "one or other of the assuredly wrong views of those who do not believe in cause, deny the efficacy of action, are nihilists" (Maung Tin and Rhys Davids). Let us translate rather: "False niyata view is one of the views of the negation of cause, negation of action, negation." (See Majjhima, iii.78). This refers to the false view (above p. 657) which, to the exclusion of other false views, constitutes the action called false view. Atthasālimi, p. 101: nabhikavāduakīriyadiṭṭhibhi eva kammapihabbedo boṭina aññadiṭṭhibhi. [Among the other false views, for example satkāyadṛṣṭi.]
Thus false view properly so-called is *niyata*, which, in the *Kośa*, uproots the roots of good (*nāstidṛṣṭi*, iv.79). "False *niyata* view" signifies "false view which embraces *niyama*, certainty, that is to say *miçchatattaniyama*, certainty of perdition," for him who adopts it: according to the Abhidhamma this disbeliever is bound to fall away, but we have seen (iv.80d) that the doctrine of the Abhidharma differs.

... v. *Vibhanga*, p. 378, enumerates the five kammāni *ānantarikāni*. 439. "Bad realms of rebirth, etc." *Et cetera* refers to the actions which produce the state of non-consciousness (ii.41b-c), a birth as Brahmā (iv.44b-d, vi.38a-b), a birth as a eunuch or an androgyne. All persons who enter the Path obtain deliverance after at most seven more births (vi.34a-b); thus a person who has done an action producing an eighth existence (*ātītama bhava*) cannot enter the Path (See *Suttanipātaka*, 230).

440. We can understand: "... the realm of rebirth where these are produced is the human realm of rebirth ...; the guilty one is a male or a female, not a eunuch, nor an androgyne."

441. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 619a.5. Why the name "*ānantarya*?" For two reasons (*pratyaya*): (1) these five transgressions are so called because they are not retributed either in this life, or in later life, but only in the next existence; and (2) because they are retributed only in hell and not in any other realm of rebirth. There are two reasons by which an action is *ānantarya*: (1) because it does harm to benefactors, and (2) because it harms the field of merit. Two conditions are required in order that there be mortal transgression: (1) preparatory action and (2) consummation of the result; even though one may have done a preparatory action, if the result is not consummated, there is no mortal transgression; and even if the result is consummated, if there was no preparatory action, there is no mortal transgression ... (Compare *Kathāvatthu*, xiii.3).


443. Not in Uttarākuru: *niyatayuṣkatvāt prakteṣṭilavāt tatra śāsanābhbavāc ca.*

444. See above note 441. The body (*ātmabhāva*) of someone blind from birth is incomplete (*vikala*); but what is referred to here is the *vaikalya* which renders a person incapable of salvation. Furthermore, someone blind from birth is loved by his parents.

445. *Vyākhyā*: *Srīyate yatā kaścī eva viśiṣṭāsva ājāneyo mātaram na gacchati vāsasā mukhām pracchādya mātaram gamitab / tena paścaī jñātvā svam āngajātam upaṭṭikam āy evam ājāneyo'śvāb paṭubuddhībhiḥ / *āyānantarāmiḥ* syād āy abhiprāyah / *The Vibhāṣā* recounts this story in different words. It translates *ājāneya* by *ts'ung-hui-lung*聰慧龍 (a nāga). Parmārtha and Hsüan-tsang have only *ts'ung-hui*聰慧. See *Mahāvyutpatti*, 213 (*liang* = good).

446. Hsüan-tsang puts these definitions in the *Kārikā*.

447. *Anupakramadharmaṇa bi tathāgataḥ* (Compare the phraseology of the *Cullavagga*, vii.3.10). *Vyākhyā*: aparopakramamaranadharmaṇa ity arthab.

448. According to *Vibhāṣā*, p. 313bl.

449. *Iśivuttaka*, 18: *āpāyiko nerāyiko kappat saṅghabhedaiko ... saṅgham saṅgamāṃ bhitvāna kappam paccati*. *Āṅguttara*, iii. 402 ... *āpiko Devasatto nerāyiko kappattho atekiccho ... and v.75 (=*Cullavagga*, viii.5.4) ... *saṅgham bhitvā ... kappatthiyam kibbisam pañvanai / kinn pana kappatthiyam kibbisan ti / kappam Ānanda niṛrayambhi paccatthi āpāyiko nerāyiko ... saṅgham saṃgammah bhitvāna kappam niṛrayambhi paccatthi.*

This stanza of the *Iśivuttaka* is discussed in *Kathāvatthu*, xiii.1. The Rājagirikas believe that it refers to one entire [great] *kalpa* (sakalām *kappam*); Buddhaghosa understands it as referring to a twentieth part of a [great] *kalpa* [an antaraka*kalpa*, which is the normal duration of a lifetime, *āyukappa*, in Avici Hell, see *Kośa* iii.83b].
Chapter Four

The *Vibhāṣā* (TD 28, p. 183c16, p. 601c6) mentions numerous opinions. Some believe that, by *kalpa*, the Blessed One means to speak of forty small *kalpas* (*antarakaḷpa*), which make up one *kalpa* of dissolution (*vivarta*) plus an empty *kalpa*, or a *kalpa* of creation (*sahīvarta*) plus a *kalpa* of duration (*kośa*, iii.90b); others understood it as a "great *kalpa*" (eighty small *kalpas*); others as a "small *kalpa*." Furthermore, there is a *Vinaya* text predicting that Devadatta will be reborn among human beings when human life is 40,000 years in length. *Kalpa* can thus be understood as referring to the period of increase or decrease of human life: that is one half of a small *kalpa* (see iii.92a-b). According to the *Milinda*, 111, Devadatta committed the crime of schism at the end of the first of the six parts of the present *kalpa*; he will spend the other five in hell, and after he is delivered from hell, he will become a Pratyekabuddha.

The sources of the Mahāyāna, quoted by Saeki, also merit study.

450. The *Vyākhyā* commenting on the *Bhāṣya* gives the words: *bhikṣur bhimattī... dṛṣṭicaritāḥ...*

Paramārtha reads *bhikṣur dṛṣṭi-su-caritāḥ* (*chien-bao-hsing 見好行*) bhimattī anyasmin deśe bālaṁ, and his version of the *Bhāṣya* opposes a monk of bad practice (*mithyācariita*) to a monk of right (*samyak*) conduct.

451. Only the Bhikṣu, for the Buddha is a Bhikṣu and the schismatic sets himself up as his rival.


453. Hsūian-tsang: "He only divides the Prithagianas, not the Āryans because these directly see the Dharma. According to certain masters, the possessors of *ksānti* can no longer be divided. In order to unite these two opinions, the author says: "the fools."

"Dharma" refers to the *āgammadharma* and the *adbigamadharma* (viii.39a-b), Scripture, and the *bodhipākṣikadharmas*.

*Ksānti* is the second of the *nirvedhabhāgyas*, or preparations for entry into Seeing the Truths, vi.18b. The possessor of *ksānti*, even though a "fool" (*prthagjana*), is considered to be "similar to one who has Seen the Truths" (*dṛṣṭi...*)

454. The subject of the preceding phrase (100a-b) is the schismatic: "It is a Bhikṣu, a heretic, who is moral, who divides, in a place where the Buddha is not to be found, fools." The author continues: "Accepting another master, another path, it is divided; it does not pass the night [in this state of division]." "It" refers to the Saṅgha, a Saṅgha composed of fools.

Paramārtha: "By whom (*kijata*) is the Saṅgha divided? At the time when it admits another master-path, it is already divided (*i-p'ō巴破*)..."


455. *Vyākhyā*: *Na vivasatya asau na tāṁ rāṭrim parivasatīṁ arthaḥ.*

456. This schism receives the name of "breaking the Wheel" because it is the cause of the breaking of the Wheel.


458. See *Mahāvyutpatti*, 276.14-15 (*karmabhedavastu*).
459. See Divya, 150, among the works that the Buddha should accomplish: ...tribbāga āyuṣa utṣṛṣto bhavati / sīmābandhāḥ kṛto bhavati / śrāvakayugam agratāyāṁ nirṛṣṭaṁ bhavati.

460. Joy at the beginning, fear and anguish at the end.

461. Hsüan-tsang translates pʻao 腹, pustule, blister. The Tibetan translates doṣa as skyon. In Saṃyutta, i.43, brigands are the arūḍa of the world. Samantapārādikā, pp. 294, 295, 307: ...sātannaśa abhūtana ca malaṁ ca ... (References of Morris, JPRS. 1886).

462. Vākyāya: Sīmāyām: abaddhāyām iti mandalasāmāyām / ekasyām hi sīmāyāṁ prthakkar-makaraṇat saṁghadvaīdhārī bhavati / naṁ ca prakṛtismāṁ śāntisagaramād / satyam asti / tu satyāṁ sa prakṛtismāṁ vyavasthāpyata iti / tasyā api bandho vyavasthāpyata eveti veditavyam.

463. Śākyamuni, when he was a Bodhisattva, once divided the followers (parṣadbheda) of a Rṣi, who possessed the five abhijñās (Vākyāya; Viśbhasa, TD 27, p. 603b28). This is in direct contradiction to Mūlinda, 161, according to which it was not a past action of the Bodhisattva which provoked the schism of Devadatta. There exists an old formula: tathāgato abheṣjapariso.

The Buddha has not "escaped" the retribution of his former actions, Divya, 416: "Have you not learned these words of the Muni that the Jinas themselves are not freed from their actions?" The Blessed One, on his alms round, was wounded in the foot by a thorn, and declared: ita ekanavate kalpe sākyya me puraṣa hataḥ / tatkarmaṁ viśākṣaṁ pāde viddhōṣi bhikṣavaḥ (Saddarṣana-saṅgraha, ed. Suali, p. 26). On the rock that wounded the Blessed One on the foot, see Chavannes, Religieux Eminents, 155; Fa-hien, Legge, 83. The Blessed One suffered in the back because he has once broken the backbone of a dishonest wrestler, Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādin, in Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, ii.424. Compare Mūlinda, 134, 179.

According to Majjhima, ii.227, the Tathāgata has only pure and agreeable sensations (añāsavā sukhā vedana): "If beings experience pleasure and pain by reason of their former actions, then the Tathāgata has formerly accomplished good actions since he now experiences such pure and agreeable sensations. If beings experience pleasure and pain by reason of the creative action of God (issaranimmaṁabhesu), then the Tathāgata has been created by a benevolent God . . ."

464. According to the Vākyāya, one should understand upakārikasatrasya nirṛkṣeteb.

465. Nirṛkṣetī = parītyāga (see above p. 650). How fathers and mothers are benefactors, Divya, 51, Avasānaśatakata, i.194, 204 (āpyāyikau poṣakau sanivarbdhakau stanyasya dātārau ... ); Itivuttaka, p. 110.

466. They are "fields of meritorious qualities" either because they are the support of meritorious qualities (gūḍānāṁ āśrayatvā), or because, by reason of their qualities (gūḍāḥ), they are a field: all seeds of merit (punyayāṣa) sown in this field bear a great fruit.

467. The Sthavira does not admit this case: "If the embryo is alive, it does not fall; if it falls, it is because it is dead; for a living being cannot pass through all the filth . . ." But it is reported in the Sutra that Kumarakāśyapa (tʻung-tzu chia-yeh 童子迦葉 ) was born in this manner. Since the second woman placed the embryo into the gate-of-birth and breathes (hṣi 吸) it up to the womb, one cannot say that the embryo passes through filth. Or rather she drinks it . . . (Sarīghabhadra).

468. Vākyāya: Sarvamātṛtyogyesu kāryesu drastavyetey abhiprāyo mātrkalpatvāt. Hsüan-tsang: "One verifies that all the offices [proper to a mother] are in the second mother."

An āpyāyikā is a kādaśvādikā, the one who guides the pregnancy to its conclusion; a poṣikā (gso-bar byed-pa) is a stanyadāyikā, the one who gives the milk; a sanivarbdhikā (skyed-par byed-pa) is an audārikābārakalpikā, the one who regulates the assimilable food (trans. of P. Cordier). Or
rather, according to another interpretation, äpyāyikā = stanyadbārikā, nourishment; poṣikā, because she gives solid food; and saṁvardhikā, because she bathes the child and removes harmful foods (visamaparībhāra). (Vyākhya; above note 465).

Divya, 303, has äpyāyitaḥ poṣitaḥ saṁvarditaḥ.

Äpyāyikā = nu zholdud and nu zo ma blud (Mélanges Asiatiques, viii.149); äpyāyana = yons su rgyas bya, Mahāvyutpatti, 197.130.

469. This problem is discussed in the Kathāvatsalā, xx.1, and in the Karmaprajñāpāti. The Uttarāpathakas believe that a person becomes an anantarika (or anantarika) by the non-intentional (asaṁcicca) killing of his mother, etc., given the gravity of the anantarīyavatthu. Compare Sātrikaśāṁga, i.1.2, ii.6.26 (Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras, ii.242.414).

470. See Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, no. 399 (taken from the Sīkṣa stūpa Li, the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya Piṭaka, TD 23, number 1435). Let us translate "laundryman"; Chavannes reads "dyer." The text has dhāvakā which explains as a rajaka.

471. Paramārtha: If this is the case, how does the Avadāna say: "Go away! Say to Śīkhandin . . . ." Hsian-tsang: If this is the case, how does one explain why the Yū (Yū-yū-ching 廣喻經 = the Avadāna) say: The Buddha said to Śīkhandin: "You have committed two mortal transgressions . . . ." The Viṃbāṣa, TD 27, p. 619c26 also attributes this declaration to the Buddha and continues: "How can Śīkhandin, by destroying a single life, commit two mortal transgressions? He commits only one mortal transgression, since the benefactor or father and the field of meritorious qualities or Arhat exist in one person. The text should say: "You have committed a mortal transgression by reason of two causes, patricide, and the murder of an Arhat," and it says "two transgressions," in order to blame Śīkhandin by reason of the two transgressions. According to other masters, even though there is only one mortal transgression, the retribution of suffering is double."

Vyākhya: Rauruke nagare Rudrāyaṇo nāma rāja Śīkhandinā nāma putram abhiṣicya pravrajyāḥ / pravrajyāḥbhāvam abhīgatavān / sa Raurukabhyaśam āgatavān / punā rājam ākāksatāt āmatyapraṇāmātena tena Śīkhandinā rājā śvapitā māritāḥ / tena tu māryamānāvasthāyānā sa mārako manasya ukto gaccha Śīkhandinām brūhi.

In Divya, 567 (compare the Vinaya of the Mālasarvāstivādins, TD 23, p. 874b27 and following, and especially p. 879c1 and following: quoted by Lévi, T'oung Pao, (series 2) viii (1907), p. 109, and Huber, BEFEO, 1906, p. 14), there are many such assassins. In TD 4, number 203, King Udasena (?), an Arhat, was killed by a Cāḍāla on the order of his son Rājasena (Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.131). The Jains have analogous stories (Māhārśtri Erzählungen, p. 33).

472. Paramārtha and Hsian-tsang have ta 打, to strike.

473. Hsian-tsang differs:

Can he who does the preparatory actions of a mortal transgression, a preparatory action not susceptible of being arrested (ch'uan 防, nivart), become "detached" and obtain a result?

104c-d. There is no detachment, no obtaining of a result, for one who does a determinant (ting定) preparatory action of a mortal transgression.

If this should necessarily be accomplished, there is certainly detachment in the course of the preparatory action of a mortal transgression. In the course of the preparatory action of other bad actions . . .

474. This point of doctrine is discussed in Kathāvatthu, xiii.3. The Uttarāpathakas deny that an instigator of patricide can enter the Path.

475. Viṃbāṣa, TD 27, p. 621b15: "In the murder of some living beings is it possible, in the course of the preparatory action (prayogavasthāyām), to enter into the Path? Some say: yes, in the case of the
murder of animals, but not in the murder of humans. Some say: also in the murder of humans, excluding only those who have done the preparatory action for a mortal transgression. Consequently they say: one can do preparatory action for murder and in the meantime obtain Seeing of the Dharma..."

The Vyākyā quotes the Chekāvadāna as an example. Through fear of Virūḍhaka (=Vidudabha, Kern, Manual, 40) a certain Sakyan named Cheka took refuge in the forest and lived off meat along with his children. The Blessed One, who was then living for three months among the Thirty-three Gods, descended in order to convert him and make him obtain the state of Srutaṇḍaṇa. From that time onward Cheka was no longer “touched” by the killing of the animals who continued to die in his traps and nets.

476. A mother is one hundred times more venerable than a father (Roth and Böhtlinck, s. voc. sataguna).

477. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 601a10. Majjībima, i.372 (in the language of the Nirgranthas, dāṇḍa is the equivalent of karman).

478. In the case of the Daṇḍaka Forest, which was made empty through the anger of the Rṣis; see above note 346.

479. Compare Majjībima, ii.265.

480. Vyākyā: Narake'vaśyam uspatyā tāṇi tattādṛṣṭyā tattabhāgany ucyante / na tu tattārantarotpattiyā / anyathā by āṇantarāṇy eva syuriy aparājīm abhiprāyab / anantarabhāvive'pi na tāṇy āṇantarāṇy eva sambhavanty atulyakālāvīpākatvād ātyathāpākṣikānāṁ parihārāb.

481. Compare Mahāvyutpattī, 123. Conjecture of Wogihara: upāṇantarā “an almost mortal transgression,” “a minor mortal transgression” (mthsams med pa dan the ba = bsiao wu-chien tswi 小無間罪). The MSS of the Vyākyā have arhantyā; Minayev-Mironov, arhatyā; Wogihara, arhantyā. In Callavagga, vi.17, bbīkkaṃ sīyāsaka.

Mahāvyutpattī: nīyatābāṁsīśīśaryā bodhisattvasya māraṇam (nīs pa'i sa la gnas pa); Vyākyā: nīyaptītadābodhisattvārārāpa. The nīs gnas of our Kārikā is glossed by nīs par rtoogs pa.

Mahāvyutpattī: saṃghāvābhārata. Bhāṣya: saṃghāvābhārakī “steal the Samgha’s gate of revenue,” explained in Vyākyā: aksayānyatāpābāra “to steal mortemain goods” (aksaya niṣyā is known through inscriptions); one of the Chinese versions of the Mahāvyutpattī: to steal the ch'ang chu 常住 or perpetual property. Takakusu, I tsing, p. 193. Vasumitra explains: mukhyānāvābhārakī-keti yan mukhopādbhogikārī yena saṃgho jīvikāṁ kalpayati tāsāpyābāra iti (Vyākyā).

On stūpabhādaka, see Mahāvastu, i.101, Nettippakaṇṇa, p. 92 and the remarks of Hardy, p. xxv.

482. Quoted in Vyākyā, vi.36a-c. See above p.623.

483. This line is quoted in the Vyākyā ad iii.41a-d (p. 197 of Cosmologie Bouddhique), in order to explain the expression saṃmiṣṣṭabodbodisattva, “the near Bodhisattva,” that is to say “near to Bodhi,” asammiṣṭaḥbodhisattva. “Predestined” = nīs par rtoogs pa (niyaptītā?).

On the Bodhisattva and his career, see Kośa, ii.44a-b; iii.14, 21, 28, 41, 53c-d, 85, 94, 96d, vi.23c-d. 24a-b), vii.34.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 886c22. As long as the first asammiṣṭaḥbodhisattva has not been completed, the Bodhisattva, even though he accomplishes diverse difficult and painful tasks, is not capable of knowing with certainty that he will become a Buddha. When the second asammiṣṭaḥbodhisattva has been completed, the Bodhisattva knows with certainty that he will become a Buddha, but he does not yet
dare to proclaim without fear (vaiśāradya) the words: "I will become a Buddha." When the third asamākhyeya kalpa is completed, when the Bodhisattva has cultivated the actions which produce the marks, he knows with certainty that he will become a Buddha, and he proclaims without fear the roar of the Son of the Master ... When he cultivates the actions which produce the marks, he abandons five bad things and obtains five good things: 1. he abandons the bad realms of rebirth and is always reborn in good realms of rebirth; 2. he abandons humble families and is always reborn in wealthy families; 3. he abandons non-male bodies and always obtains a male body ... The marks are explained in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, viii, in Bodhisattvabhūmi, Camb, Add. 1702, 138b-141b (laksāṇasamvṛtiṣya pāṇḍita). After sūddhādhyāśayabhūmi (see Hastings, ERE, art. "Bodhisattva," and S. Lévi, Sārālāṃkāra, Introduction), all the preparations for Bodhi (bodhisanābāra) produce (nirvartaka) the major and minor marks. This preparation is of two natures: distant, as long as the major and minor marks are not obtained (yo'pratilabdhesi vipākato laksāṇasamvṛtiṣyāṃaste); and near, from the instant when, for the first time, the marks are obtained and as long as they more and more purify and perfect themselves ... The marks are the results of diverse good actions (vicitrakāfobbhisamvṛtaphala), as is explained in the Laksāṇasūtra: because he is solidly installed (established?) (pratisthāta) in morality, patience, and generosity, the Bodhisattva obtains the uṣṇīṣaṃpadāda mark ... (According to Laksāṇasūtra, Dīgha, iii.146, the mark appears only in the Bodhisattva’s last rebirth.)

484. Vyaśkhyā: Mahāsālakulaiva iti mahāprakārakulaiva ity arthāb / ksāriyamahāsālakulaiva yāvad grīhapatiṃmahāsālakulaiva iti mahāgrīhapatikulaiva ity arthāb. Mahāvyutpatti, 187.6. ksāriyama- hāsālakulam . . . 9. uccakulam . . . 11. nīcakulam. See Childers and the Dict. of St. Petersburg. Paramārtha translates simply: "great family"; Hsüan-tsang transcribes the word sāla; the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the Mahāvyutpatti and the Tibetan translation of the Kośa have: "a family similar to the great Sāla Tree."


486. Vyaśkhyā: Kadarthanā mahāparibhavapūrveikā vibhṛtbanā / yayoḥ kāyavācoḥ pravrṣtīyā parasya daḥkabadawmanaye bhavataḥ / tadapekṣayā tannigrabo yantramety ucayate (?).


488. Comparison of the Bodhisattva and a dog, Śīksaśamuccaya, p. 35.

489. Paramārtha, in the second pāda, repeats the word Buddha: tuś-fo fo-ku-i 對佛陀故意 = buddhāpratyakṣarūṃ buddhaśetanāb; and translates the Bhaiṣaja: "In what period does he cultivate these actions? In the period when the great Masters are present (mahātāśravatāmukbhiḥbhāvaśāle), because the volition [in these actions] has the Buddha for its object."

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 887c5. Are the actions which mature in the marks śrutamaṇya, cintāmaṇya, or bhāvanāmaṇya, i.e., do they come from out of the teaching, out of reflection, or out of absorption? They are solely cintāmaṇya. Why? By reason of the special importance (prāddhānya) of this type of action (of action arisen from reflection): the action that issues from out of the teaching exists only in Kāmadhātu ... Some say that the action that matures in the marks issues from out of both the teaching and reflection, but not from absorption. In what place is there produced an action which matures in marks? Only in Kāmadhātu, only in the human realm of rebirth, only in Jambudvīpa, only with a male and not a female body, etc. In what time period? In the period when the Buddhas appear (upāda); and not in a period empty of Buddhas, for the special volition (cetana) and resolution-vow (pravṛddha) [which create this action] do not bear on any other object.

490. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 336: the Bodhisattva is reborn in Jambudvīpa and generally in Madhyadeśa.
491. This refers to the kalpas (great kalpas, mahākalpas, Kośa, iii.84a) which a Bodhisattva should normally endure beyond the three kalpāsamkhyeyas which form the bulk of his career: in the course of these one hundred kalpas, he truly merits the name of Bodhisattva and realizes Bodhi (Mahāvastu, iii.249: te bodhim kalpasatena samudāpenti narottamā). Often these hundred kalpas are neglected and it is said Buddhahood is obtained in three kalpāsamkhyeyas (iii.94b-c), that is to say, in the course of three asamkhyeyas (or asamikhyas) of mahākalpas. Asamikhyeya, "incalculable," is a set number, calculable, but enormous, the value of which varies according to the mode of computation (the fifty-ninth value of a series 1, 10, 100... or of a series: 1, 10, 100, 10,000, 10,000 x 10,000, ... Kośa, iii.94).

It is believed that this theory replaced that of the asamikhyeya kalpas, incalculable kalpas, an expression that remains along with the new computation kalpāsamkhyeya, Religieux Éminents, p. 150, etc. Any kalpa is without measure (aparimita) and yet the kalpas are numerous (Mahāvastu, i.78, compare Sāriyutta, ii.181 and following). In the Abhidharma, asamikhyeya kalpa signifies a one quarter of a "great kalpa," the period of creation, duration, destruction, and chaos.

In the Pāli sources, the career of the Bodhisattva is four asamkhyeyas and one hundred thousand kalpas long (Childers, sub voc. asamikhyeya; Cariyāpiṭaka, i.1; Jātaka, i. p. 2; Aṅguttara, commentary in PTS. 1883, p. 98; Nettippakarana, p. 161; Visuddhimagga, 302). The Sārasanāgāra (first chapter, ed. Neumann, 1891, p. 12) distinguishes Buddhahood in which wisdom, faith, or energy predominate: their careers are of four, and sixteen asamkhyeyas (plus 100,000 kalpas) respectively.

To the classical references given in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 264, we should add that of the Abhisamayālaśīkāloka, viii, where two theories are presented; the second, according to this work, is the theory of Vasubandhu: 1. The career of the Bodhisattva lasts three asamikhyeyas of kalpas (kalpāsamkhyeya, not asamikhyeya kalpa). The first includes the career of the Bodhisattva from the preparatory stage (saṁskārabhumi) up to the first stage properly so-called; the second, from the second stage up to the seventh; the third, from the eighth stage up to entry into the stage of the Buddhas: (buddhabhūmi = samantaprabhā). 2. In fact, we have a kalpāsamkhyeya for the saṁskārabhūmi; two for the abhimuktiyābhūmi, three for the first stage properly so-called (pramudita) and three for each of the ten stages. Having carried out his career for thirty-three kalpāsamkhyeyas, the Bodhisattva arrives at the stage of the Buddhas: ... samantaprabhām buddhabhūmim āsādayatū evam trayastrimśatā kalpāsamikhyeyair buddhatvam prāpyata ity āryavasubandhu-pādaḥ.

492. The future Śākyamuni, by purifying his energy as explained in iv.112a, in other words, by a great effort of energy (virya-rāmbha), obtained the completion of his perfection (pāramitā) of energy and of his other perfections in ninety-one kalpas.

The Mahāvastu (iii.249) is in agreement: viryakāyaṃ samāpanno... nava kalpāni sthāyeyi vyṛyaṇaṃ puruṣottamabhā/ The same for TD 15, number 643 translated by Przyluski, J.A$. 1914, ii. p. 566 (very interesting).

According to certain Mahāyāna authorities (quoted by Saeki and which should be studied), the future Śākyamuni skipped over forty kalpas: eleven by feeding the tigress, eight by extending his hair into filth (Divya, p. 252), nine by praising Puṣya, and twelve by searching out a half stanza in peril of his life.

493. Compare Sāriyutta iv.324. The Vvyākyā summarizes the Sūtra: Aśībandhakena grāmānyā nirgranthahāravākaṇa bhagavān utkathā kim anarthāyāsi bho Gauṣuma kulānāṁ pratipanno yat tvam ādṛśe darbhbikṣa iyātā bhikṣusamāṅgēna sārdham asanivaṇ uvācāya bhikṣām atiṣā/ sa bhagavatābhīśītāḥ iṣo'haṁ grāmāṇi ekāvavatām kalpam upādyāya samanupūrṇam... One should explain: ekāvavatāḥ pāraṇam kalpa ekanavatāḥ.

There are numerous passages where the Blessed One appears to limit his experience in the world to ninety-one kalpas, for example Majjhima i.483; in this period Vipāśyin reigned, Dīgga, ii.2, Divya, 282, whose advent marked the end of the third asamikhyeya in the career of Śākyamuni (above iv.110b-c).
Chapter Four

494. The former Masters, pūrvacaryas. According to Saeki, add: “among the Sautrāntikas.”

The four defects (doğa) are: a bad realm of rebirth (āsravatidōsa), mediocrity of family (abukumatidōsa), incomplete organs (vikalendriyatidōsa), female sex (stribhavudōsa). The two qualities (guna) are: remembrance of past existences (jātismarataguna), and the quality of not regressing or of ceasing (anivartakataguna).

Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang specify that the first cosmic age (kalpa) signifies the first asamkhyeya.

On the animal rebirths of the Bodhisattvas and his transgressions, see vi.23.

495. How should one understand these one hundred merits? The Vyākhyā furnishes three explanations.

a. Fifty volitions (cetana) are produced when the Bodhisattva produces an act of attention having the Buddha for its object (buddhālambana); fifty other volitions when the Bodhisattva thinks: “May I too become a Buddha! (abham apāthaṁ syām).”

b. The Bodhisattva has thoughts of compassion (karuṇācitta) with regard to the forty-eight parts of the world (twenty places in Kāmadhātu, sixteen in Rūpadhātu, four in Ārūpyadhātu, plus the eight cold hells): the same number of volitions are associated with these thoughts: plus a forty-ninth volition which has the Buddha for its object: “In the manner in which he liberates beings”; plus a fiftieth thought: “May I liberate them in the same way!” By repeating these fifty volitions, the Bodhisattva has one hundred merits.

c. The renouncing of killing is undertaken in a fivefold mode (see below iv.123a-b): purification of the principal action; purification of the preparatory and the consecutive actions (sāmantaka, iv.68a); vitarkānupagabhāsa, the renouncing is not troubled by the [three bad] vitarkas; smṛtyanuparigrbhātavā, the renouncing is maintained by the memory of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṅgha; and nirvāṇaparinānātavā, the merit of the renouncing is applied to the obtaining of Nirvāṇa. These make five volitions when the Bodhisattva renounces killing, fifty volitions for all of the ten renouncings, and one hundred volitions by repeating the first fifty volitions (Vyākhyā).

Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 591a6): One hundred merits, that is to say, one hundred volitions (cetana). At the moment when he is going to produce an action producing a mark, the Bodhisattva first produces fifty volitions which purify the receptacle of the body; then he produces the action which brings forth the mark; later, he produces fifty good volitions which strengthen and perfect the action so that it obtains fullness (paripṛtí). The fifty volitions have the ten pathways of action for their object: there are five volitions for each one of them: 1. prāṇātipātavādi-cetana; 2. samādāpanacetanā (Mahavīra, 245, 428); 3. samāttejanacetanā (tsan-mei, compare 245, 429); 4. anumodacetanā; and 5. parimānānacetanā: the volition to renounce killing, to make others undertake this renouncing, to praise them and to preach to them, to rejoice that this is accepted, and to apply the merit acquired to the acquisition of Nirvāṇa. According to other masters, there are, for each pathway of this action, five good volitions, weak, etc, corresponding to the five dhyānas (?). According to other masters, each of the pathways of this action has: 1. prayogaparipūdā, 2. maulakarmaparipūdā, 3. pṛṣṭhaparipūdā, 4. vitarkānupagbhāsa, and 5. smṛtyanuparigrbhāta. According to still other masters, all the actions which mature in marks are from new, extraordinary (wei-ts'eng-hsi 未曾儲) volitions, having the Buddha for their object: when one hundred such volitions are realized together, the Bodhisattva is adorned [with the mark] (upalobhitā).

496. See ii.56b. Paramārtha attributes this second opinion to the Vaibhāṣikas. Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 591a18) presents five opinions; the Vibhāṣā, (TD 27, p. 889c25) presents eleven.

497. These are the numbers in the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 892c5. In the Mahāvastu, “Śākyamuni remembered having honored and served eight thousand Buddhas by the name of Dipathkara . . . three hundred thousand Śākyamunis, and thus following throughout these pages (I.57 and following).” Barth, Journal des Savants, August 1899.
498. Paramārtha: mo-sbib-sbih 末世時 = lokāntakālē; Hsüan-tsang: mo-chiub末劫 = kalpānte, that is, apakātakalpa: in a period when lifespan diminishes in length (iii.92).

At this period, the future Śākyamuni was a kumbhakānakamāra by the name of Prabhāsa (Vyākhyā).

The Mahāvastu knows of a Śākyamuni who lived an infinite number of incalculable (asamkhyeya) kalpas (i.47), also from Kapilavastu, and who received alms from our Śākyamuni, then a merchant (prathamā prānībhi tadā āsi).

499. Example: Śibi.

500. Example: the Bhikṣu Kṣānti who was tortured by King Kali [=Kalābu] (Ta-chih-tu lun, TD 25, p. 89b13); this is the Rṣi Kṣānti [Kṣāntivādin] of the Sāvālamākāra (Huber, p. 325, 383), the hero of Jātaka, 313 (Visuddhimagga, 302), Jātakamāla, 28, Avadānakalpalatā 38, Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.161, Przyłuski, Aṣoka, 358, Watts, i.227.

According to Mahāvastu, i.170, the future Śākyamuni was free from desire (vīśarāga) after the time of Dipānikara.

501. This story is related in Avadānaštaka, 97 (ii.176) and in Romatic Legend, p. 14 (with some variants), where the Buddha was named Puṣya. Paramārtha and Hsūian-tsang give Tīṣya in transcription; our Tibetan version has skar rgyal which Dr. P. Cordier, (according to Aśāṅgaśraddhā 2.1.38) translates as Puṣya. In Mahāvyutpattī we have rgyal = Puṣya (the Nakṣatra) (165.6) = Tīṣya (the Cakravartin), (180.54); 47.17, Tīṣya (the Śrāvaka) = 'od dbam with the gloss pu sa (sus) dan (ma) 'dom na skar rgyal du gtags: "being exhorted by Puṣya (?), he is called skar-rgyal" (?). In the Mahāvastu, iii.240.6, Puṣya received a prophesy from Tīṣya. According to Romantic Legend, Tīṣya came four kalpas before Puṣya, ninety-five kalpas before Śākyamuni.

502. Paramārtha and Hsūian-tsang translate: "Having entered into the absorption of tejodbhātu" (buo-chib-ting)火界定: this is the expression from which Eitel derives agnidhdtusamādhi). The Chinese interpreters most often employ the formula buo kuang ting火光定, "fire light samādhi" (Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i.155, 264), which would correspond to jyotisprabhasamādhi.

This refers to that manifestation of rāddhi by which a saint makes his body incandescent, emitting flames and smoke, Mahāvyutpattī, 15.14: dbumgya prajvalayat api adyabhāpi na ma bān agnishandrab (See Dīgha, iii.27; Kośa, vii.48 and following on rāddhi). The power of the ascetic over the elements, the water element and the fire element, is acquired by a meditation in which he considers this element. This is how the explanation of Childers (sub voc. tejo) explains tejodbhātu samāpajjivā = "having entered into jhāna by tejokasina" (on the kṛṣṇāyatanas, Kośa, viii.36) which Senart (Mahāvastu, i.556) compares to that of Beal: "causing their bodies to ascend into space and emit all sorts of brilliant appearances." This person, having entered into dhyāna through the contemplation of fire (tejokasā), is able, in the course of the dhyāna, to create flames, etc. In Dīnu, p. 186, we have the fight of Svāgata—proclaimed by the Buddha as "the best in the practice of the fire absorption," tejodbhātu samāpadyaṃmaṇāmaṇaṃ agra (Āṅguttara, i.25)—with a Nāga "enflamed" by anger. In a great number of sources the "samādhi of fire" or tejokasina accompanies Nirvāṇa (Udana, viii.9; Przyłuski, Légende d'Aṣoka, p. 26, Mahāvamsa, v.200, Mahāvastu, i. 556, etc.).


504. The MSS of the Avadānaštaka gives: Purusāvṛṣabha stutulo nyo mahāstamanaḥ kutuvāḥ // which Speyer corrects to: purusāvṛṣabhaḥ anyas tulo mahāstamanaḥ tava.

Paramārtha: ho jen teng tsun yu san (erb) teb 何人等尊三(二)德. The Tibetan version finishes with ga la yod, which gives kutub.
finishes with *ga la yod*, which gives *kutub*.

Vyākhyā: Na divi bhüvi cetya vistarāḥ / divi bhūvi cetya uddeśapadanyāyenoktaṃ // nāsmin loka na vaśravanālāye na maruḥvavane ṛṇye sthāna iti tadvyakhyartham nirdeśapadbhām / asmin loka iti manuṣyaloke / vaśravanālāya iti cātumārabhājīkasthāne / maruḥvavane iti maruḥvavane ṛṇyastraśīmāhavane ity arthaḥ / ṛṇye sthāne yāmādhibhāne // lokādibhāvabandhavya api tatsaṭadvayādayābhāvajñāpanārthām āha na duṣyduṣy cetya // atha na śraddhāyate / ca ṛatu kaścid vasuḥvām śrīṁ kriṣṇam śrīṁ bhumāvādhyāśīśāṃ ... svayam pratyakekṣatām ity abhiprayāḥ /

505. It is through *samādhi* and *prajñā (=dhi)* that the results or fruits are acquired. In the Abhidharma, the Bodhisattva remains a *Prthagjana* up to the moment when he sits down under the Tree (iii.41). The various schools are not in agreement with respect to this as one can see in the treatises of Vasumitra and Bhavya. According to the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the Bodhisattva, from the first stage on, abandons erroneous views (*sakāyadṛṣṭি, śilavatā, and vicikitsā*).

506. *Vajropamasamādhi* (vi.44d) is an absorption through which the candidate for the state of Arhat breaks his last bonds and obtains Bodhi, which consists of *ksayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna* (the knowledge that the defilements are destroyed, and the knowledge that they will not arise again). *Vajropamasamādhi* confers the quality of Buddhahood on a Bodhisattva: for a Bodhisattva only acquires the state of Arhat after having fulfilled the *pāramitās* (see vi.24 and ii.44a-b, trans. p. 227).

Hsüan-tsang adds: “taking place on the *vajraśana,*” or *bodhimanda* (Minayev, *Recherches*, 177), as described in *Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, p. 156a3. The *Kośa* speaks of it iii.53b.


Rhys Davids, in *Dialogues*, ii.347-348, examines the place of dāna in Scripture; the *Āṅguttara*, “which contains a good deal more of the milk for babes that the other three of the great *Nikāyas,*” devotes a *Vagga* to charity, which does not figure among the “wings of Bodhi,” and which is ignored in *Dhammapada.* But the teaching of dāna, by definition, is addressed to the Upāsakas; see above p. 598 and p. 697; nevertheless dāna is useful for Nirvāṇa, iv.117d.


509. Hsüan-tsang: Or rather *punyakriyā* signifies "to make *punya," that is, "the preparatory action of *punya*" (*punyaprayoga*). The word *vastu* signifies support (*āśraya, abhiṣṭhāna*); giving, the precepts, and meditation are the *vastu*, the support of the preparatory action of *punya* with a view to the realization of giving, the precepts and meditation.

510. In *Kathāvatthu*, vii.4, the Theravādins maintain that dāna is solely that which is given.

511. By giving one renders homage to the Caityas, and to beings in Nirvāṇa (*parinirvāṇa*).

512. The Chinese translators have: "the good *skandhas* of this moment give . . . " The bodily and vocal action of giving is *rūpa*; the mind and mental states are the four non-material *skandhas*.

513. *Mahābōgga* and elsewhere *udārabhoga*: "great joy from food, from clothing, etc.," or "joy from great objects of joy (kāmaguna)." See *Āṅguttara*, iv.393.

514. The house is only non-modified (*nirvikāra*) grasses; it is not a transformation of the grasses. *Maya* has a different value in *frutamayi prajñā* (vi.5c).
Footnotes

515. Kathāvatthu, xvii.11, the Uttarāparāhakaśas maintain that the giver (dāyaka), not the field, "purifies" the gift.

Karmaprajñāpti (Mdo 62, fol. 246b): "There are four gifts: that which is pure from the fact of the giver, impure from the fact of the recipient, and the rest as in the Saṅgītāprāyāya." This is the text quoted by the author of the Kathāvatthu (Dīgha, iii.231; Anguttara, ii.80; Majjhima, iii.256 [dakkhaṁāvibbāṅgasutta]).

See iv.121c-d.

516. Dīgha, ii.357: sakkaccam dānam, sabatthā, catikatam, anasaṇvidaṁ dānam.

On the "treatises on giving, on the precepts and on heaven," see above p. 598. An example of dānakathā, Anguttara, iv.393; the Viṁśāvatthu belongs to this literature (Minayev, Recherches, 165). Divyāvadāna xxxiv is Mahāyāna (thirty-seven qualities of the gift: kāle . . . satkṛtya . . .).

517. That it is the intention that is important, and not the object given, see for example Huber, Sūtrālāṅkāra, p. 122, Minayev, p. 167 at the bottom: "The poor, who have faith . . ."

518. Anguttara, iii.50: manāpaddāyī labbhati manāpam.

519. This is the Sūtra quoted in Kośa iii.41 at the end. Compare Majjhima, iii.255: tiracchānagāte dānam dattvā satagunā dakkhiṇā pātiṃkētabhā, puthujjanadusṣṭe . . . sabassagunā . . .

520. Here Vasubandhu mentions the sixth and the seventh "material meritorious work" (see above p. 561). We have: 5. āgantukāya gamikāya vā dānam daddī / idam pañcamam . . . 6 . . . glānāya glānopasthāpakāya vā dānam daddī . . . 7 . . . yāt tā bhavanti stūkāda vā watālīka vā varṣalīka vā tadrūpaśu stūkālīsu yāvad varṣalīkāsu bhaktāni vā tarpāṇī (tarpaṇāni) vā yavaṅgāpāṇāni vā tāni saṅghāyabdīnirbhihī anuprayačchata anuprayačchaḥ / idam ārya asmākam anāryayāna anabhiṣṭasca varṣaṁ pahāvī sukarī sanātamsaḥ / idam Cunda saaptanam apanvabhikam punyakṛtyavastu. According to Saeki, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 428al differs slightly.

Hsian-tsang has: "In the seven apanvabhikam punyakṛtyavastu, it says that one should give to the āgantuka, the gamika, the glāna, the glānopasthāpakā, and to the upadhivārika (yuan-lin-ch'ang 圆林常); that he should warm him who is cold." Hsian-tsang thus enumerates the five beneficiaries of the ātīyakṣapindapātas (Divya, 50, Burnouf, 269; Sixth Edic, Buhler, Beitrag 269): the monk who arrives, who departs, who is sick and the infirmary attendant (list of the Mahāvagga, viii.15.7, compare Anguttara, iii.41) and the upadhivārika, the "verger, the guardian of the Vihāra," concerning which we have insufficient information. (Mahāyutpatti, 273,12, ch'ang-t'ang-shih 智者身); Divya, 54, 542; Sarad Chandra Das, dge skyes; S. Lévi, "Quelques titres enigmatiques . . ." J.AS. 1915, ii.193).

Our texts concern themselves very little with the poor. We can mention the Avadāna of the Nirvāṇa of Mahākāśyapa: "... In the streets of the village, the unfortunate were afflicted and enfeebled. He always had compassion on the poor and helped them. Now this multitude of miserable ones have lost their protector . . ." (Przyluski, Légende d'Aṣoka, p. 232).

521. An allusion is made to the bear, Huber, Sūtrālāṅkāra, p. 383. The Vyaṅghyā explains that the bear saved a person guhāṁ praviśya gārōnasūtaṇāpayena; according to the Viṃśāsā (TD 27, p. 592b3): "It is told that a person searching the woods became lost in the snow . . ." Mrga is the animal who had a person who was annoying him cross a river, ubhāyaṁanadīyuttāraṇena . . . upakārin.

522. Majjhima, iii.253, or Gāutamissūtra (Sarīghahadra, xxiii.4, fol. 86), is difficult to interpret. Mahāprajāpatī offers a set of robes to the Buddha who refuses: "Gautami, give to the Saṅgha; by giving to the Saṅgha you will honor me and you will honor the Saṅgha." From this text and the passage where the Saṅgha (the four pairs of eight "persons," Arhat . . . Srotāpanna-
Phalapratipannaka) is defined as the field of merit par excellence (Dīgha, iii.255, Suttanipāta, 569, etc.), certain masters conclude that a gift to the Saṅgha is meritorious, but not a gift to the Buddha. Sarīghabhadrā refutes this theory. [The Buddha is the best field, Majjhima, iii.254; Kośa, vii.34; Divya, 71, Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i. 394. But see in Vasumitra-Bhavya-Vināśadeva (Wassilieff, 251, 283) the opinion of the Mahāsākās (a gift to the Saṅgha is very fruitful, but not a gift to the Buddha; the cult of Śtūpas is only a little fruitful), and the opinion of the Dharmapālakas (a gift to the Buddha is very fruitful, but not a gift to the Saṅgha). A related problem: does the Buddha form part of the Saṅgha?]

When one takes Refuge in the Buddha and the Saṅgha one takes Refuge in the ṣaṅkṣa and ṣaṅkṣa dharmas which form the Buddha and the Saṅgha (see Kośa, iv.32). Now one cannot give to ṣaṅkṣa and ṣaṅkṣa dharmas, but only to "persons" (pudgala): thus a gift to the Buddhas and the Saṅgha do not bear any results. A thesis discussed in Kathāvatthu, xvii.6-10, and Sarīghabhadrā loc. cit. [The Saṅgha in the proper sense of the word, paramārtha-saṅgha, is the dharmas of the Saints and the eight persons which serve as their receptacle: one takes Refuge in the dharmas, but one gives to "persons".]

523. According to Madhyama, TD 1, p. 723a4. See the meager presents that makes novices Arhats in Divya.

Majjhima, iii.257: *yo viñjero viñjagesu dadāti...* [sic]... *ve danam amisa danamadami vipulaṃ ti bruṇamī.*

524. A Bodhisattva's gift has perfect Bodhi and the good of all beings for its purpose.

525. Dīgha, iii.268, eight dānavatthu: 1-4 are formulated as in our text: 5 and 6 differ (sāhu dānam ti dānam deti / abhaṇi pañcami ime na pañcami...); 7. idam me dānam dadato kalyāṇo kātisaddo abbhuggacchati; 8. cittāyām katāciittapariikkhāvattham dānam deti.

The list of the dānavatthu of Anguttara, iv.236, gives us numbers 5 and 6 of our list: dinnapubbaṃ kaṭapubbaṃ pīṣupitāmabebi na arabāṃ porāṇam kūḷavāsīsam hāpetum ti dānam deti /... datvā... saggalokam upapajjissāmī... .


527. Commentary on the Anguttara: *bbhayā ti ayam adāyako akārako ti garabābhaya apāyabhaya vā.*

528. This second list is quoted Vyākyā, ad. iii.41, at the end.

529. According to Saeki: *sama* signifies that which produces a heavenly rebirth; *visama*, that which produces a bad realm of rebirth.

530. Hsüan-tsang translates: "He makes beings produce the pure dharmakāya." Paramārtha: "He produces the dharmakāya." See above p. 601.

531. Hsüan-tsang: All the mental projections: "I should do this and that; I shall do this and that." Note of the editor: "This is distant preparatory action."

532. Compare Milinda, 193, on lying which is serious or light by reason of its object (vatthuvasena); in this same way killing is unimportant when the animal is small, Atthasāliṁi, p. 97.
533. According to Paramārtha and Hsian-tsang: "The Sūtra says that there are two types of actions, kṛta action and upacita action." According to Saeki, this Sūtra is the Karmavāpaksivibhāṅgasūtra (?) (yeh-pao ch'a-pieh ching 載報差別經). See Kofa, v.1.


For the Vedāntic theory, see the sources given in G. A. Jacob, Veddntasdra, Bombay, 1911, p. 160 (saṁcitakarman = upacitaio, kriyāmānāṁ karmāṁ ārabdhopalāṇi karmāni).

534. See above, p. 625.

535. Saṁcintiya = saṁciça, Mahāvyutpatti, 245.68. Manu, xi.90, prescribes penitences for the involuntary murder (akārtas), which greatly resembles asaṁcintya, of a Brahmin. Voluntary murder is inexpiable.

536. Vākyāya: Nābuddhipūrvarā na sahasākṛtam iti / atba vā nābuddhipūrvarā kṛtam idāṁ kuryāṁ ity asaṁcintya kṛtam / taṁ upacitam / ayākṛtam ti tat karmā / na sahasā kṛtam iti nābuddhipūrvarā api na sahasā kṛtam / yad abhāyena bhāṣyakṣepānā mṛṣāvādādasyunustānāṁ kṛtam tad akṣatānāṁ na punar upacitam: "Or rather one should understand: abuddhipūrva action,—the action that one does without deciding 'I shall do that,'—is not accumulated, for this action is morally neutral. Action done in haste, if preceded by a decision, is not accumulated, for example, lies uttered by verbal habit in the enthusiasm of discourse. It is though bhāṣyakṣepa that the author of a treatise repeats, in a stereotyped enumeration, words which are not justified in such a place. (See ii. trans. p. 263).

The Vākyāya, presenting the characteristics of good action which is accumulated, says: evam kusalam apano yojana iti / kathāṁ saṅcetanatāṁ / saṁcintiya kṛtāṁ bhavati / nābuddhipūrvarakṛtāṁ bhavati / tadyathā avyākṛtaccitena pārāṇāṁ ddāmāṁ svavarapāṇāṁ dadyat kṛtam iti taṁ punar upacitam / ayākṛtam ti tat karmā / na sahasā kṛtam / yathā bhāṣyakṣepāṁ satyavacanam / kṛtam iti taṁ kusalam na punar upacitam.

537. Compare Aṅguttara, i.249; above note ad iv.50.

538. There is pāpassa kammassa samatikkamo, "passing beyond transgression," through abstention (virati = the undertaking of the precepts), and through meditation on compassion (maitri), Sāmyutta, iv.317.

Prātimokṣa (Finot, J.As. 1913, ii.16): "He who remembers a fault should disclose it; being disclosed, he will become tranquil . . . . aviseratvā phāsāṁ bhavatī . . . . (see above iv.39, note 174, and on lying through silence, iv. note 347). Prātimokka, in Vinaya Texts, i.2 and Cullavagga, ix.1.4 (Vinaya Texts, ii.305, note 1). Confession in the Mahāyāna, Bodhisattvabhumi, 1.x.

Divya, pāsim: "Recognize your transgression (atyayam atyayato desaya); this action will be reduced, destroyed, annihilated (apy evaitat karma tanutvam pariśayaṁ paryājanaṁ gangeta) [Majjhima, iii.247: yato . . . . accayam accayato dīvā yathādhammaṁ pañjīkarosi taṁ te mayāṁ paṭigantāma; Digha, i.85; Aṅguttara, i.238, Burnouf, Introduction, p. 299; Bodhicaryavatāra, ii.66, etc.]. By recognizing his transgression (having insulted an Arhat whose qualities he ignored) the vajāyantyakāra of Divya, 54-55, avoids hell, but nevertheless is reborn fifty times as the son of a slave.

Sīkṣāsamuccaya, 160 and Bodhicaryavatāra, v.98 quoting the Caturdhammakasūtra, the four dharmas by which the Bodhisatta triumphs over transgressions done and transgressions accumulated: vidāsappāsamasūdārā (repentance), pratipakṣasamudārā (the practice of good), pratypattibala (undertaking the precepts or virati), abhavacala (taking Refuge in the Buddha, etc.). Analogous doctrines, Subhāṣitasamgraha, ed. Bendall (Musción, 1900) at the end.

Theragāthā 872 = Dhammapada 173: pāpam katuṁ kusalena pābhīyatā.
Only tathāgataprasāda can wash away "the bad dharms which Māra has planted in the Buddha" (read with the MSS buddhāvaropitānāṃ akusalanāṃ dharmanām ... prakṣaṇāñām); the faith (śraddhā) and devotion (bhakti) of Māra with respect to the Buddha washes away all of his perfidies (vrjina), Divya, 359, Przyluski, Légende d’Açoka, p. 358.

539. See above pp. 561 and 563.

540. We have seen (iv.73) that the Buddha accepted beforehand all gifts made to Caiyās.

The merit of gifts made to the Buddha and the Saṅgha is contested by many sects, see above note 522.

On the cult of the deceased Buddha, Mūlinda, p. 100-101, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.36.

The place where the Prajñāpāramitā is taught becomes like a Caiyā (caityabhūtaḥ kṛtaḥ), because the worship that one renders to it is a cause of the accumulation of merit (vandanādīna punyopacayahetutvā) (Abhisamayālamkārāloka ad Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 57).

541. Vyākhyā: Satrur ayam na tāvan mriyata ity anayā samyijnayā.

542. The Nirgranthas think that a gift made to thieves, etc., bears bad results. But we do not admit that the quality of the field renders the result agreeable (iṣṭa): it makes the result important, eminent (viśiṣṭa) in its type (Vyākhyā). In Majjhima i.379, the Buddha counsels Upāli to continue his generosities to the Nirgranthas; but he refrains from planting his gifts in a bad field. According to Mūlinda, 258 (which quotes Majjhima, iii.257), even a monk (samaṇa) who has "totally fallen" (swāpamā) and who is of bad morals (dussīla) purifies the gift: for one can wash himself in dirty water.

543. Hsian-tsang: mo-tu-chia chu; 末度迦種 Paramārtha: p’u-t’ao 蒲桃 = grape.

544. Bad rūpa: actions of the body and voice.

545. The text describing the one hundred merits which produce the marks (above p. 692) are given in the Vyākhyā; the interpretation (which we place within parentheses) is according to TD 28, p. 933b16, Dharmatrāta’s treatise, quoted by Saeki. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 889c22: prayogaparipuḍḍhi, maudaripuḍḍhi, pṛṣṭhaparipuḍḍhi, viśṭākānapagbhāta, and smṛtyanupariṇāma.

546. The enumerations of the bhayas are numerous; we obtain our text by combining Āṅguttara, ii.121 and iv.364 (Dharmasamgraha, 71).

547. "Good absorption” signifies the mental (caitta) dharma called absorption and the five skandhas which coexist with this caitta. It is called "absorbed,” because the mind which is good, but not associated with the caitta called absorption, is not bhāvanā, impregnation or meditation: without doubt this mind impregnates the mental series, but not to the same degree as does absorption. It is called "good,” because the absorption of defiled dhyānas, associated with enjoyment (āsvādanā) (viii.6), does not constitute punyakāriyāvastū bhāvanāmaya. Bhāvanā is equivalent to vāsanā.

548. See Samyutta, iv.312, on the inefficacy of funeral rituals; Āṅguttara, v.271, the realm of rebirth of an assassin who gives alms.

549. Ekottara TD 2, p. 656a7; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 825c13. Caturāḥ pudgalā brāhmaṇaṁ punyam prasavanti / apraśīṣṭike pṛśiṣṭeṇaḥ tathāgatasya sārīrāṁ stūpaṁ pratiṣṭhāpayati / ayaṁ prabhamaṁ pudgalo brāhmaṇaṁ punyam prasavati / caturasīṁ bhikṣusamghaś ca rūpam nimayāyati /
aṭṭhaṇa dvitiyāḥ...

abhinnam tathāgata[ya] śrāvakasarīgathāṃ pratisaṅkāḥdibabaṭi/ aṭṭhaṇa triyāḥ...
maitriśabagataṇa cittenāvairṣeṇa atapatena (MSS. samprannena) avyābdhena vipulena mabhad-
gatenāpramāṇāṇa subbhāvitaṇaikāṁ dīsam abhidiccaṣa sphaṇitopasaṇipadaya vibarati... aṭṭhaṇa caturthāḥ.

See Mahāvṃpati, 69, (editions of Wogihara and Sasaki), and the Daśabhūmaka quoted in the Madhyamakavārttaka, 55, 391, trans. Museum, 1907, p. 53; same variants.

Anguttara, v.76: abhinnam pana bhante sarīgathāṃ sāmaggam katvā kīṁ so pasavatīṁ/ brabmnam ānanda puññam pasavatīṁ/ kīṁ pana bhante brabmnam puññani ti/ kappam ānandam saggambhi modatiṁ. There then follows the six pādas of Itivuttaka, 19: sukhaṃ sarīghasa sāmaggi...
sāmaggam kāvāna kappam saggambhi modatiṁ.

550. Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 549c9) attributes this opinion to other masters.

551. According to a gloss of Saeki, the Sautrāntikas or the Mahāsāṅghikas. Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 549c21): “There are other masters who say...”

552. In Suttanipāta, 502, a gift to an Arhat produces rebirth in heaven with Brahmā.

Paramārtha corresponds, in the main, to the Tibetan. He translates 124c-d: “Four action are called Brahmin merits, because, for one kalpa, they produce the happiness of heaven.” He also enumerates the four actions (TD 29, p. 252a8).

Hsiian-tsang reverses the text of Vasubandhu. After having enumerated the four actions of the Sūtra, he continues: What is the measure of this merit? The Kārikā (124c-d) says: “To produce birth in heaven for one kalpa, etc., is the measure of Brahmin merit.” The Bhāṣya says, “The former masters say: The merit that makes one dwell in heaven for a kalpa...”

... In another school, there is a gāthā: “A person of faith, of right views, who cultivates the ten excellent practices (caṅśa), who engenders Brahmin merit dwells happily in the heavens for a kalpa.” The Vaibhāṣikas say that the measure of this merit is that indicated for the action that ripens in marks. The Kārikā has the word “etcetera” in order to indicate the variety of opinions.

553. Vyākhyā: This merit is called brāhmaṇa, Brahmin, because it is the merit of Brahmas (brāhmaṇam): the word Brahma signifies, in this expression, the Brahmapurohitas, since the Brahmapurohitas live a kalpa; since, in another Canon, we read these two pādas: brāhmaṇa punyam prasavati kalpani svargena modate. This merit is thus called Brahmin because [for its duration], it is like (sadbhāma) that of the Purohitas.

In Majjhima, ii.207, metta is brahmānaṁ sabhatatāya maggo.

How should one understand the retribution of Brahmin merit which lasts a kalpa? Sarīghabhadra explains (TD 29, p. 594c14): a person detached from Kāmadhātu (vīkarāga, virakta) who practices the four Immeasurable Meditations is reborn among the gods of a higher sphere and experiences a happiness which lasts one life of a kalpa. A person not detached from Kāmadhātu who builds a stūpa, who constructs an ārāma, who reestablishes concord within the Sarīgha, and who, on many occasions, cultivates the preparatory action of compassion and the other Immeasurable Meditations—we say preparatory action, for in order to practice the Immeasurable Meditations themselves, one must enter into Dhyāna, which supposes detachment from Kāmadhātu,—this person also, as if he were to practice the fundamental (maṣula) Immeasurable Meditations, produces a heavenly (svārgika) happiness lasting for one kalpa (kalpaṃvāma). But is it not said above that, in Kāmadhātu, there is no retribution for a good action which lasts a kalpa? There is no good action which lasts only an instant, which could, as is the case for certain bad actions, produce a life one kalpa in length: this is why we do not express ourselves in this way. But when many volitions are produced which bear on the same object (construction of a stūpa, etc.), they produce in succession a heavenly result which lasts one kalpa: one dies in heaven in order to immediately take up a birth there again. There is thus no contradiction in speaking of a happiness lasting a kalpa.

The Vyākhyā summarizes this doctrine without naming Sarīghabhadra and ends with the words: brhat punyam ity apare.
Chapter Four

554. Aṅguttara, i.91; Itivuttaka, 98 and 100: dvemāni bhikkhave dānāni āmīrssādanāni ca dharmadādanāni ca. Dharmasamgraha, 105, adds maññiddā. Spence Hardy, Eastern Monachism, 196. Dīgha, iii.191, āmisānapādaṇā.

555. Vyākyā: Akliṣṭadeśanā = akliṣṭacittasamutthāpita duṣṭanā.

556. Compare nirāmisadharmedesaka, Mahāvyutpatti, 30.37.

557. In Mahāvaṃsa, i.34, punyabāgiya sattva = a being susceptible of acquiring merit; in the same way pbalabāgiya = a being susceptible of acquiring the results. (Compare Nettippakarana, 48).

Here punyabāgiya kusala = punyabāgiya bītam. Or rather punyam bājita iti punyabhāk / punyabāgi / punyabāgiyam / svārthe kaprāyayabh.

558. Mokṣabhāga is opposed to samsārabhāga; or rather mokṣabhāga = mokṣapratī; thus mokṣabhāga = mokṣapratīyaṃkūla.

On mokṣabhāga, see Kosā, iii.44c-d, vi.24, vii.30; Dīvyā, 50.7, 360.1 (devotion, even though small, has Nirvāṇa for its result), 363.28; mokṣabha, Karṇapūndarikā, 78.14.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 34c28: "In what period are the mokṣabhāga roots planted? In a period when the Buddhas appear: it happens, in fact, that the Buddhadharm exists in order that one be able to plant these roots. According to other masters, even when the Buddhadharm is absent, if one encounters a Pratyekabuddha, one can plant them. What body must one have in order to plant these roots? A male or a female body. On what occasion or by what cause does one plant these roots? By reason of giving, by reason of the precepts, by reason of hearing: but the cause is not required. Why? By reason of the variety of "intentions" (dhyāya). There are some persons who, by giving a mouthful of food or a toothpick, plant these roots, for example, Candra, etc. These persons, after having given, say: "I desire (pranidhi) that by reason of this I may obtain deliverance." There are some persons who even though they have given without reserve (wu-che) to a great Sāṅgha (compare Takakusu, I-tsing, p. 40), do not plant these roots, like Wu-pao (compare Takakusu, I-tsing, p. 40), do not plant these roots, like Wu-pao (Acalandara), etc.; these, after having given, desire riches, etc., in a future life, not deliverance. In the same way there are certain persons who after having undertaken the Upavāsa for a day and a night, after having recited one stanza of four verses, plant these roots; whereas there are others who undertake the Prātimokṣa for the whole of their life, who recite the Tripitaka, but who do not plant them. It all depends on the ardor of their inclination for Nirvāṇa and on their disgust with existence.

559. Hsüan-tsang: Good mokṣabhāga is the good which certainly produces Nirvāṇa as its result. The person in whom it has arisen is said to have within himself a dharma of Nirvāṇa.

560. The same idea in the Mahāyāna, for example Madhyamakāvatāra, vi.4-5: prthajñanatve'pi nisamya sūnyatām...tanūrubosthūllatamī ca jāyate / yat tasya saṁbuddhādaśyo sti bijam.

561. The khalabuśa is a hole hollowed out in order that grain be deposited in it. Khala is the area for thrashing grain: Amarakośa, 3.3.42. Paramārtha: ti-k'um-če 地坎拆 = a hole or a crack in the earth, a fissure.

562. Dīgha, iii.251 (cha nibbedhābhyasāraṇā), 277 (nibbedhābhāgyo samādhi, compare Kosā, viii.17). In the same sense nibbedbika is frequently encountered in the Aṅguttara; in the Visuddhimagga, there are eighty-eight nibbeddabhiṇī paññā, and fifteen nibbedhābhāgyam silaṃ. Nettippakarana, in passim. In the Dīya four nirdmisabdāy (are) distinguished (compare 50.8 and 166.15).
563. In the Śāstra “writings” or “scripture” do not signify writings in the worldly sense of the word (aṃśaracibnam pustakādaṁ), but the action by which writings are written. In the same way, mudrā does not signify the seal having a mark, letter or other sign on it (aṃśarānaṃ aṃśaracibha), but the action by which the seal is carved (khanyate). (Vyākhyā). The Vibhāṣa (TD 27, p. 660b23) gives calculation as an example.

564. Mahāvyutpatti, 218.2-4: lipi mudrā (shou-suan = handrechnen) has asanām, the “handrechnen” of Schiefner) samkhya (shu-nummer) gaganā (shu-nummer and suan) gaganā mudrā uddhāraṇā nyāsa nikṣepa, and then the eight parikṣās. Mahāvastu, ii.423: lekha lipi samkhya gaganā mudrā dhāraṇā... The list of the Brahmajāla: mudrā gaganā samkhāna kāveyya... is explained by Buddhaghosa, Rhys Davids (Dialogues, i.22), O. Franke (Dīgha in Auswahl, 18-19). On kāveyya, also see Mrs. Rhys Davids, Theragāthā, 1253.

565. Compare Vibhaṅga, hīna majjhima pañīta, p. 17 et passim.
